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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss and evaluate how to strike a balance between the 
benefits and the risks of biometric and Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) 
technologies within a data protection regime. This presents a problem because of the 
lack of an applicable theoretical framework and clear guidelines and principles for 
legal regulations to deal with such technologies. The theory chosen here is the 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), which has been justified as the basic 
principle of human rights in any given community. 
This thesis then elaborates on specific applications of the PGC in relation to 
various issues by defining relevant privacy concepts and describing how they are 
analysed to allow the identification, evaluation, and comparison of competing rights 
and interests in a specific conflict. Probing and evaluating current regulation of 
technologies at stake in Europe and Taiwan, it is argued that the right to benefit from 
advances in science and technology and the right to privacy are bound to come into 
conflict.  
However, it is problematic to suggest that the balancing of competing rights is a 
zero-sum trade-off. Instead, in line with the broad concept of privacy, it is contended 
that there is the possibility for the two sets of values to support each other. In this case, 
the thesis suggests a co-operative framework, which relies on a consistent approach to 
maintain valid consent, precautionary and preventive measures to tackle the risks of 
developing such technologies, and an independent institutional framework for 
personal data protection.  
 
 
Lastly, the thesis proposes a PGC-derived regulatory framework and model for 
Taiwan. As the Formosan hydra-headed bureaucracy model generates inconsistent 
data protection consequences, it is suggested that an institutional framework 
comprising an independent regulatory body might be able to assist the success of the 
co-operative model more effectively. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
“And he causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond, 
to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their foreheads: And that no 
man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the 
beast, or the number of his name. Here is wisdom. Let him that hath 
understanding count the number of the beast: for it is the number of a 
man; and his number is Six hundred threescore and six.” 
~13:16-18 Revelation, The Bible. 
 
When I came to the UK to study for my PhD, I was required to show my student visa 
to the (UK) immigration officer. In order to satisfy the border security of the UK, my 
sensitive personal data had to be collected and processed before I was allowed entry. 
Although this was the first time that I had visited the UK, this process was not 
unfamiliar; after all, this is now standard practice in many countries. Ironically, 
however, the reason why I had come to Britain was to write a thesis exploring what I 
took to be an experience of having my rights overridden by other interests that are 
protected by the application of identification and profiling technologies. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
2 
 
                                                
The issues that this thesis is concerned with are biometric and radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) technologies and their routine applications, which enable 
automated authentication/ verification and identification particularly for purposes of 
identity managements, e.g., population management, control of entry to both physical 
and digital areas, and management of health/ research databases. 
Advances in identification, tracking and profiling technologies and their 
expanded applications have never stood still. Indeed, advances in science and 
technology are frequently claimed to be essential to the general welfare and utility of 
all in society. It is therefore unsurprising that governments, private enterprises, and 
individuals claim and apply the right to benefit from those advances. But is there such 
a right?  
This is an important question because it is not surprising that uncontrolled 
utilisation of the technologies can come into conflict with the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.1 It is almost a statement of the 
obvious that, even if there is a right to benefit from advanced science and technology, 
this right can hardly be regarded as an absolute right. When competing rights come 
into conflict it becomes essential to ascertain how these rights and interests relate to 
each other, and how to strike a balance between these different values. 
It is noted in a report from the European Commission that ‘[e]thical frameworks 
for new and emerging fields of science and technology increasingly must address the 
issue of privacy and data protection issues.’2 Awareness of these concerns in the 
 
1 In fact, these concerns may include those other than fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, 
due to regulatory effectiveness, budget or other political or non-political considerations, there remains a 
possibility for immigration checks with respect to biometric system to be abandoned on a regular basis. 
See: BBC, ‘Theresa May: Numbers of Unchecked at UK Borders Unknown’ BBC (London, 7 
November 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15615537> accessed 9 November 2011.  
2  René von Schomberg, ‘Introduction: Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the 
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context of biometrics and RFID has surely compelled advisory authorities as well as 
academics to look into fundamental rights, in particular privacy and data protection. 
For example, the independent EU advisory body focusing on data protection issues – 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29 hereafter)3 – has adopted a 
number of specific documents on these two technologies: Working Document on 
Biometrics,4 Opinion No 7/2004 on the Inclusion of Biometric Elements in Residence 
Permits and Visas Taking Account of the Establishment of the European Information 
System on Visas (VIS),5 Working Document on Data Protection Issues Related to 
RFID Technology,6 Opinion 3/2005 on Implementing the Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on Standards for Security Features and 
Biometrics in Passports and Travel Documents Issued by Member State,7 Opinion N° 
3/2007 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending the Common Consular Instructions on Visas for Diplomatic 
Missions and Consular Posts in Relation to the Introduction of Biometrics, Including 
Provisions on the Organisation of the Reception and Processing of Visa Applications 
(COM(2006)269 final),8 Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy and 
 
Information and Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields’ in René von 
Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2011) 8. 
3 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. Its 
tasks are laid down in Article 30, Directive 95/46/EC and in Article 15, Directive 2002/58/EC. 
4 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics (No 12168/02/EN, WP 
80, 2003). 
5 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion No 7/2004 on the Inclusion of Biometric 
Elements in Residence Permits and Visas Taking Account of the Establishment of the European 
Information System on Visas (VIS) (No 11224/04/EN, WP 96, 2004). The main function of the party is 
to give opinions and advices to the European Commission. 
6 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Data Protection Issues Related to 
RFID Technology (No 10107/05/EN, WP 105, 2005). 
7 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2005 on Implementing the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on Standards for Security Features and Biometrics in 
Passports and Travel Documents Issued by Member States (No 1710/05/EN-rev, WP 112, 2005). 
8 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion N° 3/2007 on the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Amending the Common Consular Instructions on Visas 
for Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts in Relation to the Introduction of Biometrics, Including 
Provisions on the Organisation of the Reception and Processing of Visa Applications (COM(2006)269 
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Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications,9 Opinion 
9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact 
Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 10  Opinion 2/2012 on Facial 
Recognition in Online and Mobile Services,11 and Opinion 3/2012 on Developments 
in Biometric Technologies.12 
However, in my opinion, although these attempts have served to raise awareness 
of the data protection concerns and providing practical guidelines, they have not 
applied any consistent theoretical framework.13 This thesis aims to remedy this gap, 
by developing a framework to assess how to strike a balance between the benefits and 
the risks of emerging biometric and RFID technologies within a data protection 
regime.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
final) (WP134, 2007). 
9 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy 
and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications (No 00066/10/EN, WP175, 
2010). 
10 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal for a 
Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications (No 00327/11/EN, 
WP180, 2011). 
11 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 02/2012 on Facial Recognition in Online and 
Mobile Services (No 00727/12/EN, WP192, 2012). 
12 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies (No 00720/12/EN, WP193, 2012). 
13 For similar attempts in academic field, see, e.g., John D. Woodward and others, Army Biometric 
Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns (RAND Publications 2001), Paul de 
Hert, ‘Biometrics: legal Issues and Implications’ Background paper for the Institute of Prospective 
Technological Studies, DG JRC – Sevilla, European Commission 
<https://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_staatswissenschaften/Frisch/21063courseWebsit
e/LegalImplications_Paul_de_Hert.pdf> accessed 9 November 2011, Yue Liu, ‘Identifying Legal 
Concerns in the Biometric Context’ (2008) 3: 1 Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 45-54. Other academic attempts to theorise the issue may fail to offer justifications with 
regard to the applied theory and clear criterion to deal with the balancing test. E.g., Angela Liberatore, 
‘Balancing Security and Democracy, and the Role of Expertise: Biometrics Politics in the European 
Union’ (2007) 13 Eur J Crim Policy Res 109-137, Yue Liu, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in 
Biometrics: Cases Studies from Norway’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 237-250 and 
Jeremy Wickins, ‘The Ethics of Biometrics: the Risk of Social Exclusion from the Widespread Use of 
Eletronic Identification’ (2007) 13 Sci Eng Ethics 45-54, 52. 
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The central question that the thesis is concerned with and seeks to examine is: 
How do we strike a balance between the benefits and the risks of biometric and 
RFID technologies within a data protection regime, with specific reference to the 
Taiwanese context? 
To answer this question, this thesis will: 
1. Identify and justify an adequate theoretical framework to deal with the 
question; 
2. Probe and evaluate current regulation of biometric and RFID technologies in 
Europe and Taiwan;  
3. Provide clear guidelines and principles for legal regulations to deal with the 
two technologies considered; and 
4. Produce a coherently theorised regulatory framework and rule for 
Formosan14 data protection law regime. 
It should be noted that a handful of core themes will run across most chapters of the 
thesis. These include discussions of the concepts of privacy, consent, trustworthiness, 
the balancing of competing rights, and institutional frameworks.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
The first task of the thesis is to identify an applicable theoretical framework. This 
 
14 The Chinese name of ‘Taiwan’ is also known, especially in the past, as ‘Formosa.’ This is from 
Portuguese Ilha Formosa as "Beautiful Island," given by the European (Portuguese) explorers in the 
16th century. Allan J. Shackleton, Formosa Calling: An Eyewitness Account of the February 28th 
77947 Incident (The Taiwan Publishing Co. 1998) 1. The formal (English) name of the country is the 
Republic of China (Taiwan). 
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thesis employs the moral theory of Alan Gewirth, which requires questions of rights 
and other normative issues to be referred to within the framework of Gewirth’s 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC).15  
I will outline the PGC and its justification and indicate how it can be used to 
adjudicate relevant potential conflicts. I will then apply the PGC to the European legal 
regime, evaluate regulation of biometric data at the European level in relation to the 
PGC, compare the Taiwanese situation to the European one, and suggest a 
PGC-compliant regulatory framework and rules for Taiwan. 
The thesis is conducted primarily through a library-based method, consisting of a 
literature review from richly diverse sources, including books, journals, official 
documents, case comments, and websites of both Western (mainly Transatlantic) and 
Formosan origin.  
It is not my intention to describe the laws of Europe (including the ECHR and EU 
jurisdictions) and then simply compare them to the laws of Taiwan. Instead, the thesis 
focuses on the issues of privacy, data protection, and the right to benefit from 
advances of science and technology in general terms to find an applicable framework, 
and then uses Europe and Taiwan as two substantial case studies to illustrate how the 
same principles apply in different contexts. 
 
1.4 The Road Map for the Thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters including this introductory remark as its Chapter 
1. 
 
15 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978). 
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To arrive at a background understanding of biometric and RFID technologies and 
to achieve essential clarity for later discussions, in Chapter 2, I provide an overview 
of them and data protection concerns associated with the two technologies.  
Although there are a number of social concerns regarding biometrics and RFID, 
the major concern involves data protection issues. In Chapter 2, two questions 
concerning biometric data are addressed: (1) whether biometric data is subject to data 
protection law; and (2) whether biometric data is a type of sensitive personal data. 
The thesis argues that biometric data should be regarded as sensitive personal data on 
the basis of a relatively generous interpretation of personal data. With regard to RFID 
technology, unawareness function creep and concerns of tracking and profiling 
personal data extend the risks of new technologies. Both of them thus demand a 
‘smart’ regulatory approach16  and clear guidelines and principles within a data 
protection regime. To obtain a better understanding of this idea, some real-life 
examples of specific biometric applications are then provided. 
Chapter 3 tackles the fundamental task of answering the research question, 
which is to provide an adequate theoretical framework. This raises the question of the 
particular choice and justification of the theoretical approach taken.17 In this light, I 
offer reasons for the adoption of the PGC. This includes engaging with critiques of 
Gewirth’s argument for the PGC. Two things must be done here: to outline the PGC 
and its justification; and to show how the theory can be used to adjudicate relevant 
 
16 In this regard, Brownsword puts that it is essential for the regulators to be more imaginative and 
avoid the idea of ‘one regulatory size fits all.’ See: Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the 
Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 12. Also, citing from above: Neil Gunningham and Peter 
Grabosky, Smart Regulation (Claredon Press 1998) and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation (OUP 1992). 
17 Bernd Carsten Stahl, ‘IT for a Better Future. How to Integrate Ethics, Politics and Innovation’ in 
René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2011) 25-26. 
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potential conflicts.  
The PGC is a principle governing how agents ought to regard and act towards one 
another, by requiring that agents act in accordance with the generic rights of all agents. 
Needs of agency are generic if they are prerequisites of an ability to act at all or with 
any general chances of success, regardless of the purposes being pursued. Gewirth has 
argued that ‘agents contradict that they are agents if they do not accept that the PGC is 
the supreme principle governing the permissibility of actions.’18 The argument is thus 
an argument produced in the self-reflection of an agent on what is to be an agent. I 
will contend that major criticisms have been unsuccessful, and I will show how the 
PGC can justify human rights. But, because this is contentious, I will also argue that 
anyone who recognises a right to do something must also accept that there is a right to 
the necessary means and conditions to exercise the mentioned right.19 Therefore, one 
cannot sincerely grant human rights without granting rights to the generic conditions 
of agency protected by the PGC.  
Furthermore, I will argue that if the first and least contentious stage of Gewirth’s 
argument for the PGC is valid, then when its conclusion is conjoined with the 
impartiality assumption contained in the idea that all human beings are equal in 
dignity and rights, which is a universal value proclaimed by international human 
rights instruments, then the PGC itself must be accepted.20 Consequently, even if 
Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument is unsound, the PGC should be accepted 
by those who believe that there are human rights as these are currently understood.   
 
18 Gewirth (n 15) 42-47.  
19 Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan 
Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (The University of Chicago Press 1991) 
15-41. Also, Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, Privacy, and Medical 
Research’ in Michael Boylan (ed), International Public Health Policy and Ethics (Springer 
Netherlands 2008) 48. 
20 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human 
Rights’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 1-18. 
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This chapter also introduces Gewirth’s criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action, which states that, in cases of conflict, rights to things that are needed for very 
possibility take precedence over the rights to things are generically needed to be able 
to act successfully, without thereby being needed for the vary possibility of acting. 
The latter rights, in turn, override rights to things that are needed generically to be 
able to improve one’s capacities for successful action. On this basis, the PGC is able 
to reconcile competing interests and rights. 
Building on the Gewirthian framework of a generic condition of agency analysed 
in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 seeks to bring the specific application of the PGC more 
clearly into focus. This is managed in two main steps. 
Since the right to privacy is the main (but not the only) fundamental right with 
which data protection is concerned, the starting point of the chapter is to examine 
whether and in what way the PGC supports the existence rights that are generally 
recognised as falling under the heading of a ‘right to privacy’ in human rights 
instruments.  
The second step switches to the question of how to specifically apply the PGC to 
the research question. The thesis takes Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) as an example. The ECHR does not, however, indicate any 
explicit guidance on how to strike a balance amongst the rights that it grants. Granted, 
the ECHR does not accord the PGC official standing. This does not, however, mean 
that it could not be brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).21 If the 
arguments for the PGC are valid and the ECtHR can be persuaded of their validity 
 
21 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 
76-77. Also, Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 
(2007) 18 King's Law Journal 286. 
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then the PGC could (as it should) be an applicable theory in interpreting the ECHR 
and dealing with such questions. 
The specific application of the PGC will be carried out by identifying the rights 
granted by Article 8 of the ECHR, valuing the rights in the light of the generic 
conditions for action, and deciding which of these take precedence. The tension 
between different conceptions of rights will be vividly brought out by the local cases 
in the two data protection regimes. In this regard, the added value of the PGC 
comparing with the ECHR balancing test is fully presented.  
Before raising subsequent issues in relation to comments on how the European 
and Formosan privacy and data protection laws fare in the light of the PGC, it is 
essential to provide some necessary legal information. Chapter 5 thus offers an 
interpretive description of privacy and data protection legislations regarding biometric 
and RFID technologies in Europe and Taiwan. This starts by reviewing the historical 
track of European data protection law. Although the primary legislative source of 
European data protection law is rather complex, it is clear that Directive 95/46/EC 
(the Data Protection Directive)22 is the main regulatory instrument in Europe. With 
this in mind, the chapter reviews the relationship between the Data Protection 
Directive and other European data protection instruments. This is followed by an 
overview of data protection law at the UK level. The European part of this chapter 
ends by looking at the data protection law in relation to biometric and RFID 
applications.  
As regards the Formosan side, Chapter 5 begins the inquiry by critically 
 
22 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data [1995] OJ L 281. 
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surveying Formosan primary statutory privacy and data protection provisions and 
surrounding constitutional interpretations, followed by a section examining the 
contents of the right to privacy. After doing so, the last section identifies issues that 
need to be commented on under the PGC. 
In Chapter 6, the identified privacy and data protection issues are examined 
through the lens of the PGC. The preliminary question to be examined is whether 
there is a right to benefit from advances in science and technology. If so, should it be 
regarded as a generic right? The thesis argues that there is such a right and, indeed, 
such a right should be taken into account as a generic right. However, since this right 
is unsurprisingly not an absolute right, its relationship with other rights must be 
considered. For the purposes of the thesis, privacy and data protection rights are the 
ones considered. 
I address privacy issues in three main categories, namely spatial privacy, 
decisional privacy, and informational privacy. Questions such as the level of control 
over one’s body, decisional privacy as ‘liberty as licence/ liberty as independence’, the 
‘nothing to hide’ argument about informational privacy, and informational privacy and 
technology, are examined.  
In relation to personal data protection provisions, I differentiate the question of (1) 
conditions under which a right is not engaged from (2) the question of when an 
engaged right is overridden. I argue that if there is no violation of a generic right 
(which will be the case when a problematic activity is validly consented to) then there 
is no need to provide a substantive justification by appeal to an overriding conflicting 
right.23 Correlatively, I argue that, when a generic interest is engaged, in the absence 
 
23 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 238. 
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of consent, wrongs can only be justified by a PGC-sensitive substantive 
justification.24 In light of this, after undertaking the groundwork in relation to consent, 
I move on to identify and comment on the problem of integrity of consent in Article 6 
of the Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL). This is followed by a discussion 
focusing on the substantive justification with respect to a specific justification in 
Article 6 of the PDPL, namely the right to academic research. However, it should be 
borne in mind that different values and interests do not necessarily come into conflict. 
This invites the introduction of ‘the co-operation model.’ 
In Chapter 7, adequate principles and guidelines to safeguard privacy and data 
protection when dealing with technologies are proposed. Instead of ‘a conflict model’ 
which is coupled with a narrow conception of privacy, this chapter adopts ‘the 
co-operative model’ suggested by Beyleveld.25 The ‘co-operative model’ employs a 
broad conception of privacy under which it is possible to view potentially conflicting 
values as supporting each other. By focussing on this possibility, it facilitates a 
positive-sum outlook which is more likely to enable the rights at issue to be given the 
weight they merit.  
It has been argued that the justification of the acceptance of a broad concept of 
privacy can justify the co-operative model.26 Three types of justification are provided 
in this respect, namely the legal, ethical and pragmatic reasons. With this in mind, this 
chapter demonstrates two key privacy and data protection enhancing mechanisms, 
which demonstrate the practicability of the co-operative model, namely Privacy 
Impact Assessment (PIA) and Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). It then moves 
 
24 Ibid 238. 
25 See Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ in Sheila 
AM McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 156-158. 
Also, Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 275-289. 
26 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 158. 
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on to addressing the operationalisation of the co-operative model. In this regard, I 
argue that the creation and maintenance of trust between those with possible 
conflicting interests must be the focus in designing a general regulatory position on 
the basis of the co-operative model. In applying these frameworks, I suggest that a 
well-designed framework can improve trustworthiness between data subjects and data 
controllers. At the end of the chapter, it is contended that legal regimes should be in 
favour of an independent authority regulatory designed to facilitate dealing with 
privacy and data protection issues regarding technologies. 
Building upon the previous discussion, Chapter 8 attempts to tie the threads of 
this work together and to offer a PGC-compliant regulatory framework and rule for 
Taiwan. At the beginning of this chapter, I critically survey the analytic comparison of 
regulatory positions between the European and Taiwanese situations of the two 
technologies. It is observed that the objectives and principles of data protection are 
similar in both areas, as the Formosan data protection law regime borrowed a number 
of experiences from the influential European data protection model. However, as held 
in J. Y. Interpretation No. 603: ‘[d]espite the admissibility of other nations’ similar 
legislations [sic] and domestic popular polls as materials used in interpreting the 
Constitution, they cannot be used as the sole basis of determining the meanings and 
intents thereof.’ In response, three differences between the two regimes are considered; 
differences of handling consent versus public interests; differences in giving effect to 
data protection principles; and differences concerning the existence or absence of 
supervisory authorities. The main issue considers which positions are compatible with 
the requirements of the PGC, taking into account different regulatory methods.  
Based on the understanding of this analysis, this chapter then proposes a 
PGC-derived regulatory framework and rule for Taiwan. Recommendations in 
14 
 
                                                
applying the co-operative model to legislations and the institutional framework are 
made in this regard.  
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 9.  
By relating the PGC to European and Taiwanese privacy and data protection legal 
regimes, it will have been argued that Gewirth’s moral theory is able to assist, in 
theory and in practice, with striking a balance between the benefits and the risks of 
biometric and RFID technologies. To be clear, however, it is also submitted that 
defending the Gewirthian moral theory is by no means the main task of this thesis.27 
Rather, espousing the PGC and the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action, 
enables us to identify which rights are covered and to compare the competing rights 
and interests (and decide which rights can override other rights).  
Moreover, the co-operative model, based on the Gewirthian thinking, suggests 
that competing values may not always belong to two mutually exclusive sets. A 
corollary of this work, in particular Chapters 7 and 8, is meant to provide guidance on 
the way to enhance and operationalise the model to deal with benefits and concerns of 
science and technology as well as their applications. It is noted that, however, this 
thesis does not intend to provide recommendations in effect to guide the European 
and Formosan data protection law regimes and ethical codes with respect to the two 
technologies. Instead, the purpose of this thesis is, again, to make the case for the 
PGC, as a theoretical framework, to be further applied in the future in order to avoid 
the emergence of ‘policing countries.’28 With this in mind, while I have no doubt that 
 
27 For the defending of the PGC, see, e.g., Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Law as a Moral 
Judgement (Sweet and Maxwell 1986), Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis 
and Defence of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency, and Beyleveld, ‘The 
Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 1-18. 
28 It has been argued that ‘there is a further trend towards a reduction in the functional separation 
between public entities, and a change in the boundaries between the public and the private sectors’ by a 
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governance in both data protection regimes is suboptimal and thus can be improved 
upon, I believe that lessons for Taiwan may be learned from the European data 
protection experience and vice versa.  
The structure of the thesis can be briefly expressed in the following map:  
 
report produced by Foundation for Information Policy Research. In this report, it has also been argued 
that this may drive the risk of policing country. See Foundation for Information Policy Research, Paper 
No. 5: Conclusions & Policy Implications (UK Information Commissioner Study Project: Privacy & 
Law Enforcement, 2004). Available at: 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/conclusion_and_pol
icy_options.pdf> accessed 19 October 2009. 
The Map of the Thesis 
 
B 
 
 
16 
 
RFID 
technology 
Ch. 2 
Biometric 
technology 
Ch. 6 
EU level/ Taiwan 
 
 
Evaluate regulation of 
biometric data in conjunction 
with RFID system 
Ch. 3 
Clear guidelines and principles for legal regulations to deal with 
such modern technologies: 
? The co-operative model 
? Operationalising the PGC and the co-operational model Ch. 9 
Conclusion 
Ch. 7 
Applying the PGC 
Provide interpretive description of privacy and data protection legislations 
regarding biometric and RFID technologies in Europe and Taiwan Ch. 8 
Ch. 5 
Ch. 4 
Taiwan/ EU level 
Describe the analytic comparison of 
regulation between European and 
Formosan situation of biometric data in 
conjunction with RFID system 
 
Produce a PGC-compliant 
regulatory framework and rule 
Emphasise differences 
that will require different 
regulatory methods and 
responses 
The PGC 
 
? Concepts and justifications 
? Justify using it to deal with 
the core question 
Problem: lacking of an applicable 
theoretical framework to deal with 
such modern technologies 
Background knowledge on 
technologies at issue 
Introduction 
Core Question 
How to strike a balance between the risks and the benefits of the 
developing technologies within a data protection law regime? 
Ch. 1 
17 
 
                                                
Chapter 2  
Modern Technologies and Data Protection Law:  
Setting the Scene 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It will not be surprising if lawyers are unfamiliar with the technical terms used in the 
field of (bio)technology and the law. To assist with this, this chapter will provide an 
overview on biometric and RFID technologies as a point of departure for later 
exploration. The extensive international literature on data protection issues regarding 
biometrics and RFID, particularly from a European perspective, will be examined 
here. 
The chapter is divided into three sub-sections: (1) biometric technology; (2) 
RFID technology; and (3) data protection concerns associated with these technologies. 
After providing definitions and introducing new technologies, it will then assess both 
benefits and risks of these new technologies. On the one hand, certain technologies 
promise benefits such as introducing a safer and more convenient future. On the other 
hand, they can also pose risks, or at least raise concerns about their safety and 
convenience.1 Consequently, regulating these new technologies requires a persuasive 
and suitable framework that is able to strike a balance between the benefits and the 
risks. Before presenting such a framework, real examples of the regulation of these 
 
1 It should be noted that this thesis concentrates on legal perspective rather than the field of science & 
technology studies (STS). 
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technologies will be provided.  
 
2.2 Biometrics and Its Applications 
2.2.1 Key Terms and Its Process 
Numerous definitions of biometrics exist. In the words of Wei and Li ‘biometrics is 
statistical study of biological data’ and ‘the science of measuring and statistically 
analysing biological data.’2 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) 
states that ‘biometric systems are applications of biometric technologies, which allow 
the automatic identification, and/or authentication/verification of a person.’3 In its 
report: Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural 
Concerns, the RAND institution suggests that biometrics is ‘any measurable, robust, 
distinctive, physical characteristic or personal trait of an individual that can be used 
to identify or verify the claimed identity of, that individual.’4 The recent proposal for 
an EU General Data Protection Regulation, specifies in Article 4(11) that biometric 
data ‘means any data relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural 
characteristics of an individual which allow their unique identification, such as facial 
images, or dactyloscopic data.’5 
 
2 Gang Wei and Dongge Li, ‘Biometrics: Applications, Challenges and the Future’ in Katherine J. 
Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu (eds), Privacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-disciplinary 
Conversation (Springer 2006) 136. 
3 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics (No 12168/02/EN, WP 
80, 2003) 3. 
4 John D. Woodward and others, Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing 
Sociocultural Concerns (RAND Publications 2001) 9. Available at: 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1237/> accessed 4 November, 2009. 
5 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ (2012)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> accessed 30 
Janurary 2012. 
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For the purposes of the thesis, ‘characteristics’, ‘utilities’, ‘presentations’, and 
‘applications of biometrics’ need some further explanation. 
First, as far as the technical terminology of biometrics is concerned, there are 
some essential elements6 regarding the evaluation of whether a specific characteristic 
is suitable for biometric applications, namely: 
• Automaticity: a biometric system is automatically performed and processed by 
computers or digital machine networks instead of manually by a human. In 
other words, it is electronic equipment, not human beings7 that measure and 
statistically analyse biological personal data. 
• Measurability: biological traits or data have to be measurable in order to be 
saved into the system in a digital form and presented to a sensor based on 
accuracy and speed of recognition of measurement regarding the operational 
and environmental factors involved. This includes characteristics of 
universality,8 collectability, performance and acceptability.  
• Distinctiveness (Uniqueness): biological personal data need to be unique in 
order to serve their purpose of identifying/ verifying the claimed identity of a 
 
6 It has been observed that there are seven pillars of biometrics: (1) universality, (2) distinctiveness, (3) 
permanence, (4) collectability, (5) performance, (6) acceptability and (7) resistance to circumvention. 
See: Anil Jain, Ruud Bolle and Sharath Pankanti, ‘Introduction to Biometrics’ in Anil Jain, Ruud Bolle 
and Sharath Pankanti (eds), Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1999) 1-42. Also, European Commission Joint Research Centre, Institute for 
Prospective Technology Studies ‘Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society’ (2005) 
37. Available at: 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/freetravel/doc/biometrics_eur21585_en.pdf> accessed 
20 November, 2009. The Irish Council for Biometrics, Biometrics: Enhancing Security or Invading 
Privacy? Opinion (The Irish Council for Biometrics 2009) 2-3. Available at: 
< http://www.bioethics.ie/uploads/docs/Final_Biometrics_Doc_HighRes.pdf> accessed 20 November, 
2009. 
7 In fact, both physical and behavioural biological characters are regularly used to ‘manually’ verify or 
check identity. For example, imagine you see your colleague’s face, which is a sort of physical 
characteristic, and you recognise him and then greet him; or, you sign your name, which is a behaviour 
biological characteristic, when using a credit card and the cashier compares it with your signature 
which is shown on your card. See also: Samir Nanavati, Michael Thieme and Raj Nanavati, Biometrics: 
Identity Verification in a Networked World – A Wiley Tech Brief (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002) 9. 
8 The WP29 addressed this feature as ‘universal’, which indicates that ‘the biometric element exists in 
all persons’. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, (n 3) 3. 
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given person. The degree of uniqueness determines the application kind of a 
biometric system. For instance, a low degree of uniqueness occurs when 
identical twins are facially-scanned; so, this may not be an ideal application of 
such a biometric system. In order to measure the data accurately, means to 
secure the difficulty are required to defeat or bypass the biometric system. 
This additionally shows the feature of resistance to circumvention. 
• Permanence: if a key can be changed or damaged easily, then it is not ideally 
designed to serve its purpose. As the RAND report explains: ‘[t]he robustness 
of a biometric is a measure of the extent to which the physical characteristic or 
personal trait is subject to significant change over time.’9 The degree of 
stability over time, also, determines the application of biometric system. For 
example, there may be a greater chance for the voice-scan system of 
incorrectly judging a teenager during her/ his period of puberty because of the 
voice change. 
Secondly, as regards the utility of biometric technology, this is either for 
verification or identification. The former involves a so called one-to-one (1:1) 
search.10 It implies checking the identity claim showed by a user to the system for a 
biometric comparison which could be referred as answering the ‘Am I who I claim to 
be?’ question. 11  On the other hand, the identification model, also known as 
recognition,12 involves a one-to-many (1:N) search as one piece of individual data 
being compared against many recorded data. The user needs to provide her biometric 
data in advance, and then the system matches this data with a (normally large) number 
 
9 Woodward and others (n 4) 10. 
10 Ibid 12-13. Also, Ishwar K Sethi, ‘Biometrics: Overview and Applications’ in Katherine J. 
Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu (eds), Privacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-disciplinary 
Conversation (Springer 2006) 118. 
11 Nanavati, Thieme and Nanavati (n 7) 12. 
12 Sethi (n 10) 118. 
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of users to identify the person. It answers the question of ‘Who am I?’13 
Thirdly, in connection to the description of this technology, it is based on unique 
measurements of physiological or behavioural characteristics, or sometimes the 
combination of both.14 The physiological form at least contains data types such as 
fingerprints, face recognition, DNA, hand and palm geometry, iris recognition and 
retina recognition. Examples of the latter, on the other hand, include voice, signatures, 
keystroke dynamics and gait analysis. Applications of different biometric associated 
technologies such as finger-scan, facial-scan, voice-scan, iris-scan, signature-scan, 
hand-scan, retina-scan, keystroke-scan,15 and DNA-scan16 technologies, can either be 
done individually or in combination. It is noted that the above examples cannot be 
seen as an exhaustive list for biometric types as new techniques keep developing 
rapidly. Moreover, due to different specific purposes of the application, it is 
impossible to identify which type of biometrics is the ‘best’ one to apply.17 
The presentation of a system has four stages: 18  sensor or data capture, 
pre-processing, feature extraction, and recognition. The last stage could be carried out 
in one of two possible ways: classification or matching. The former method simply 
uses one or more mathematical functions. The latter is ‘performed by comparing the 
extracted properties of the input pattern against the set of stored properties 
representing different patterns that the system is capable of recognising.’19 Here, ‘the 
 
13 Nanavati, Thieme and Nanavati (n 7) 12-13. 
14 For further knowledge in relation to leading physiological or behavioural biometric modalities, see: 
ibid 43-140. Also, The Irish Council for Biometrics (n 6) 18-58. 
15 For further knowledge in relation to leading physiological or behavioural biometric technologies, 
see: Nanavati, Thieme and Nanavati (n 7) 43-140. 
16 The Irish Council for Biometrics (n 6) 50-54. 
17 James L. Wayman and others, ‘An Introduction to Biometric Authentication Systems’ in James L. 
Wayman and others (eds), Biometric Systems: Technology, Design and Performance Evaluation 
(Springer 2005) 3-4. 
18 Sethi (n 10) 119, citing Richard O. Duda and Peter E. Hart, Classification and Scene Analysis (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1973).  
19 Sethi (n 10) 120. 
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set of stored properties’ is also known as the template.20 
 
2.2.2 The Promised Benefits 
Generally, biometric technologies promise two main benefits: security and 
convenience. This can be observed by comparing the other two traditional 
authentication methods: knowledge based and token based ones. 21  The former 
depends on the knowledge that a genuine system user should have, for example, the 
password or the personal identification number (PIN). The latter relies on presenting 
legitimate tokens given by system controllers. Different from the questions such as 
‘Are you who you claim to be?’ and ‘Who are you?’ asked by biometric technology, 
these two traditional authentication methods inquire ‘What do you know?’ and ‘What 
do you have?’ It is easy to find daily applications combining these two methods. For 
instance, a debit card (which is a token) is only usable after the user inputs her PIN. 
The main shortcoming of traditional authentications is that they may be guessed, 
lost or stolen easily. This is because those tokens/PINs are not tightly coupled with 
their owner’s identity.22 Knowledge-based methods, for example, could fail because 
the user forgets her password, which may be complex or unfamiliar to her. Possible 
solutions to this problem are either to write down the password on an unprotected 
medium such as a single piece of paper stored in her wallet, or to have a simpler 
password to memorise – which is always associated with her (such as her birthday, 
 
20 According to Samir Nanavati et al., a template ‘is a small file derived from the distinctive features of 
a user’s biometric data, used to perform biometric matches.’ For further knowledge about the template, 
see: Nanavati, Thieme and Nanavati (n 7) 18-19. 
21 L. O'Gorman, ‘Comparing Passwords, Tokens, and Biometrics for User Authentication’ (2003) 91 
Proceedings of the IEEE 2021-2040. 
22 Alisher Kholmatov, Privacy Protecting Biometric Authentication Systems – A Novel Framework to 
Protect Privacy (VDM Verlag 2009) 2. 
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address, or telephone numbers). However, it is not difficult to imagine that this 
knowledge may get lost or stolen, and an attacker could get access to all the other 
applications used by the same user – if her passwords are all the same or similar.  
On the other hand, the tokens for token based authentication approaches 
nowadays are usually rather tiny and easy to carry – which, however, means that there 
are increased risks of them getting lost or stolen. Moreover, because the user needs to 
memorise the key or carry the token items, which may be difficult for older or 
disadvantaged people, traditional authentication approaches are not convenient/ safe 
enough for specific groups of individuals. Overall, there are higher chances for these 
traditional ‘token-based keys’ or ‘knowledge-based passwords/pins’ to be used in an 
unauthorised manner.  
Biometrics, however, could solve this problem. The features of biometrics – 
automaticity, measurability, uniqueness and stability over time – provide benefits on 
both safety (biometric traits are harder to imitate or share) and convenience (there is 
no need to carry or remember anything) which are tightly coupled with identity of 
users. Etzioni, therefore, contends that ‘[i]f individuals could be properly identified, 
public safety would be significantly enhanced and economic costs would be reduced 
significantly.’23 
 
2.2.3 The Potential Risks 
Nothing is perfect. Alongside the described benefits, biometric techniques carry some 
potential risks. The two main types of risks are (1) technical problems, and (2) social 
 
23 Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (Basic Books 1999) 104. 
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concerns. 
The first problem arises from the imperfect nature of biometric techniques: ‘false 
rates’ will never (or at least hardly ever) be zero.24 To explain briefly, ‘false rates’ 
may exist as ‘false accept’ errors or ‘false reject’ errors in three ways. Firstly, false 
match rate (FMR) means the probability that a biometric system user’s template ‘will 
be incorrectly judged to be a match for a different user’s template.’25 Secondly, false 
nonmatch rate (FNMR) indicates ‘the probability that a user’s template will be 
wrongly judged to not match her/his enrolment template.’26 Generally speaking, the 
higher the degree of susceptibility to changes in biometric data, user presentation, and 
environment of the live-factors of these application technologies, the lower FNMR 
will be. Thirdly, failure-to-enrol rate (FTE) indicates ‘the probability that a given user 
will be unable to enrol in a biometric system.’27 
High threshold biometric technologies such as iris-scan or retina-scan result in 
higher FNMR or FTE due to susceptible changes. On the other hand, low threshold 
ones such as face-scan or signature-scan have higher FMR based on its level of 
accuracy. It is fair to say that, therefore, there is no perfect biometric technology (at 
least to date) because there is never a conclusive match. 
Though it seems to be safer and more convenient than other traditional 
authentication methods, it is, actually, not as safe and convenient as it is generally 
assumed. The statistics demonstrate that popular forms of fingerprint, face and voice 
biometrics all have their error rates (including FMR and FNMR) exceeding the 0.1 
 
24 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies (No 00720/12/EN, WP193, 2012) 6. 
25 Nanavati, Thieme and Nanavati (n 7) 24-27. 
26 Ibid 27-33. 
27 Ibid 33-38. 
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percent level.28 Furthermore, it is, in fact, not too difficult to deceive most of the 
popular biometric systems/ applications. For instance, an easy-to-make rubber copy of 
a person’s fingerprints can effortlessly trick the system. 29  In addition, a study 
concluded that ‘[a]ll tested fingerprint readers were defeated with artificial 
fingerprints.’ 30  Biometric data theft, in this respect, could even have worse 
consequences in comparison with traditional methods. This is because the biometric 
data of the user cannot be easily changed or re-issued. Therefore, there is a potential 
danger of relying on these technologies as the only and definite authentication 
methods. 
Moreover, the two major advantages of biometrics, namely safety and 
convenience, may conflict – safer (more unique) forms of biometric traits are less 
convenient because the rate of acceptance of the system is lower. Unique forms of 
biometric trait reducing FMR are harder to forge. Yet they cause higher FNMR and 
FTE. Therefore, if the user is not accepted, she may need to provide alternative 
evidence of her identity or she will be rejected by the system. The problem here is that 
the user may not be able to access the needed systems, though she is exactly who she 
claims to be. 
Additionally, although the cost of biometric applications has been considerably 
reduced, financial issues in relation to the applied facilities may still occur. For 
 
28 Anil K. Jain and Sharath Pankanti, Beyond Fingerprinting: Is Biometrics the Best Bet for Fighting 
Identity Theft? (Scientific America Magazine 2008). Available at: 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=beyond-fingerprinting> accessed 18 November 
2009. 
29 Tsutomu Matsumoto, ‘Importance of Open Discussion on Adversarial Analyses for Mobile Security 
Technologies, International Telecommunication Union’ (Telecommunication Standardization Sector, 
International Telecommunication Union Workshop on Security). 
30 Drew Robb, Authentication with a Personal Touch: Fingerprint Scanners Are Accurate Biometric 
Identification Tools - But They're Not Foolproof (Government Computer News, 2005 WLNR 
26140142, 2005), cited from Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy 
and Security (Yale University Press 2011) 202. 
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example, the budget burden of biometric ID cards, with higher costs for using more 
unique forms of biometric systems, or systems that combine two or more kinds of 
biometric data, can be a controversial issue after a cost-benefit analysis is conducted. 
Example could be found in the UK ID cards policy debate regarding its high cost 
budgets.31  
Secondly, a number of social concerns can stem from applying biometric systems. 
For example, the RAND Institute’s report identifies three key ‘sociocultural concerns’:  
physical issues, religious objections, and informational privacy.32 It lists physical 
concerns including stigmatisation, actual harm (for example, those people whose 
careers depend on their eyesight may be worried about iris or retina scans), and 
hygiene issues (one may feel uncomfortable about placing one’s body parts against a 
machine; this problem, however, could be solved by using RFID technology which is 
a wireless one).33 In terms of religious objections, certain Christians, for example, on 
the basis of the language in Revelation (shown in the introductory remark of this 
thesis),34 may regard biometric technologies as the application of ‘Beast Marks’ in the 
modern age.  
Moreover, social concerns also arise from applying biotechnologies to a national/ 
international-wide scope database. This is because such identification and database 
may be a tool for ‘greater government surveillance and can be used to track people’s 
movement.’35  Indeed, fears of the metaphor of Big Brother in relation to data 
 
31 The Department of Information Systems, LSE, The Identity Project: An assessment of the UK 
Identity Cards Bill and its implications (version 1.09, LSE, London 2005) at: 
<http://is2.lse.ac.uk/IDcard/identityreport.pdf> accessed 18 November 2009. 
32 Woodward and others (n 4) 21-31. 
33 Ibid 26-27. 
34 Ibid 28. 
35 Solove (n 30) 201.  
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profiling, e.g., the fear of Orwellian,36 have been called into question.37 It has been 
argued that, relying on the historical precedents of World War II and post-war periods, 
and a general fear about tracking citizens through operated filing systems, past 
experiences have influenced ‘the development of philosophical notions of inalienable 
rights of the individual’ in Europe.38  In this regard, without proper democratic 
processes such as adequate representatives and public hearings, worries in relation to 
transparency and legitimacy may occur.39 With respect to such a large-scale biometric 
database, furthermore, issues concerning discrimination should be noted. It is 
observed that, for example, applying biometric technologies in general is unfair to 
disabled or disadvantaged people, as they could not, practically, provide specific form 
of biometric traits/ samples or simply these technologies do not allow for sufficient 
distinguishing characteristics.  
Last but not least, providing biometric traits/ samples and data may contain other 
kinds of sensitive data.40 For example, McLean’s study showed that palm skin, which 
is needed for a hand-scan, may reveal certain genetic disorders.41  Fingerprints, 
 
36 Orwellian indicates the situation of the totalitarianism that the government constantly monitors the 
individuals to detect betrayal or any unwanted behaviours via "improper" thoughts. This is famously 
from the literary work 1984 of George Orwell. See, e.g., Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation : The 
Death of Privacy in the 21st Century (O'Reilly Media 2001).  
37 However, Solove argues that it is a wrong metaphor regarding informational privacy and considers 
that the problem is better captured by the Kafka metaphor (which stems from Franz Kafka's The Trial). 
This is because, as he argues, the problem lies on the ‘powerlessness, vulnerability, and 
dehumanization created by the assembly of dossiers of personal information where individuals lack any 
meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their information.’ Daniel J. Solove, 
‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy’ (2001) 53 Stanford 
Law Review 1393-1462. 
38 Marek Rejman-Greene, ‘Privacy Issues in the Application of Biometrics: a European Perspective’ in 
James L. Wayman and others (eds), Biometric Systems: Technology, Design and Performance 
Evaluation (Springer 2005) 336. 
39 Helen Busby, Tamara K. Hervey and Alison Mohr, ‘Ethical EU Law? The Influence of the 
European Group on Ethics’ (2008) 33 Science and New Technologies 804-805. 
40 Kholmatov 6. Also, Gerrit Hornung, ‘The European Regulation on Biometric Passports: Legislative 
Procedures, Political Interactions, Legal Framework and Technical Safeguards’ SCRIPT-ed 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/SCRIPT-ed/vol4-3/hornung.asp> accessed 18 November 2009. 
41 W. H. I. Mclean, ‘Genetic Disorder of Palm Skin and Nail’ (1997) 202 Journal of Anatomy 
133-141.  
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according to Chen,42 Schuster,43 and Woodward et al.,44 may disclose some disease 
and health data including leukaemia, breast cancer, Rubella syndromes, Down’s 
syndromes, Turner syndromes, and Klinefelter syndromes. Iris and retina biometrics, 
mentioned by contributions of Woodward et al.45 and Bates46 respectively, could be 
linked with common diseases including diabetes, arteriosclerosis and hypertension. In 
addition to the above health information, biometric data may even reveal the user’s 
sex life – homosexuality,47 which is also under the special categories of personal data 
defined by the Data Protection Directive.48 
 
2.3 Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) Technology 
2.3.1 Key Terms and Its Process 
The following definition49 of RFID is provided by Commission of the European 
 
42 H. Chen, Medical Genetic Handbooks (MO: W.H. Green 1998). 
43 M. M. Schuster, ‘Gastroenterology: Fingerprinting gi disease’ (1996) April Johns Hopkins 
Physician Update 5. 
44 John D. Woodward, Nicholas M. Orlans and Peter T. Higgins, Biometrics: Identity Assurance in the 
Information Age (McGraw-Hill 2003) 202. 
45 Ibid 203. 
46 Barbara Bates, A Guide to Physical Examination and History Taking (5th edn, Lippincott Williams 
and Wilkins 1991) 181-215. 
47 J. A. Y. Hall and D. Kimura, ‘Dermatoglyphic Asymmetry and Sexual Orientation in Men’ (1994) 
108 Behavioral Neuroscience 1203-1206. The term of ‘dermatoglyphics’, according to this report, 
means ‘the characteristics of the ridged skin on the fingertips, palms, toes, and soles of primates and 
some other mammals.’ In this report, the authors remark that ‘[a]lthough this effect was not accounted 
for by differences in hand preference, an association was observed between leftward dermatoglyphic 
asymmetry and an increased incidence of adextrality in homosexual men, but not in heterosexual men.’ 
Available at: 
< http://www.sfu.ca/~dkimura/Publications/Hall%20&%20Kimura%20(1994).%20Dermatoglyphic%2
0asymmetry%20and%20sexual%20orientation%20in%20men.pdf> accessed 18 November 2009. 
48 Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46/EC: ‘Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.’ 
49 Similar definition is suggested by the RFID Journal. According to the RFID Journal, technically 
speaking, RFID is used to indicate a system that: (1) transmits the identity, (2) in the form of a unique 
serial number, (3) of an object or person (who has an RFID tag attached) wirelessly, (4) using radio 
waves. Available at: < http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1339/1/129/> accessed 18 
November 2009. 
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Communities as: 
…the use of electromagnetic radiating waves or reactive field coupling in the radio 
frequency portion of the spectrum to communicate to or from a tag through a variety of 
modulation and encoding schemes to uniquely read the identity of a radio frequency tag 
or other data stored on it. (emphasis added)50 
Under this definition, there are two main components of RFID: a tag that contains an 
identification number or other stored data, and a reader which contains 
‘electromagnetic radiating waves or reactive field coupling in the radio frequency 
portion of the spectrum’ that works as a scanner. A ‘RFID tag’ is specified by the EU 
RFID recommendation as 
…either a RFID device having the ability to produce a radio signal or a RFID device 
which re-couples, back-scatters or reflects (depending on the type of device) and 
modulates a carrier signal received from a reader or writer.51  
RFID tags may have a range of different types. For example, they can be either active 
or passive,  either read-only or read-write,52 and either wearable or implantable.53 
An ‘RFID reader’, on the other hand, is  
…a fixed or mobile data capture and identification device using a radio frequency 
 
50 Section 3(a) of the EU common recommendation of 12.5.2009 on the implementation of privacy and 
data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency identification, SEC(2009) 585 
(here after: ‘EU RFID recommendation’). 
51 Ibid, section 3(b). 
52 Active (battery-powered) tags which contain batteries could broadcast without a RFID reader while 
passive ones cannot do so due to they depend on power supply from a RFID reader. Read-write tags 
could update information they carried. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID)’ (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2004)  
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/POSTpn225.pdf> accessed 18 November 2009. 
53 For example, the wOzNet is kind of wearable tracking device and the VeriChip is an implantable 
one. See: Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Privacy Inalienability and Personal Data Chips’ in Katherine J. 
Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu (eds), Privacy and technologies of identity: a cross-disciplinary 
conversation (Springer 2006) 93-113. 
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electromagnetic wave or reactive field coupling to stimulate and effect a modulated data 
response from a tag or group of tags.54 
Apart from these two infrastructures, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
suggests that when assessing data protection and privacy issues on RFID technology, 
‘the network, the reference database and the database where the data produced by the 
association tag/reader are stored’55 must be considered at the same time. These key 
components make RFID tags not simply ‘electric tags’, but an ‘internet of things’56 
because they extend utility to each part of an overall network. The ‘internet of things’ 
characteristic relates to the possibility of linking databases and certain communication 
networks, such as the internet, Global System for Mobile communications (GSM, 
originally from Groupe Spécial Mobile), Global Positioning System (GPS), and 
Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) networks. Moreover, building upon RFID, the Near 
Field Communication (NFC) standard for smartphone devices allows two-way 
communication between endpoints/ peers, in which traditional RFID devices were 
one-way communicating only.57 
For the purposes of the thesis, two important characteristics of RFID should be 
noted: (1) the wireless nature of RFID could enable the remote processing of data that 
the public is unlikely to be aware of; and (2) a reader could track locations of RFID 
tags on an object or those implanted in human bodies. 
 
54 EU RFID recommandation, section 3(c). 
55 The European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ‘Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework’ (COM (2007) 96, OJ 2008/C 101/01, 2007) para. 
21. 
56 Commission of the European Communities, Communication form the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework (COM 
(2007) 96 final, 2007). 
57 NFC Forum, ‘About NFC’ (NFC Forum, 2012)  <http://www.nfc-forum.org/aboutnfc/> accessed 
10 July 2012. 
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2.3.2 The Promised Benefits 
Again, the benefits of the RFID technology can be understood by comparing them to 
traditional methods. There are three main forms of Automatic Identification and Data 
Capture (AIDC) technologies: (1) an optical type, such as bar codes, (2) a magnetic 
type, such as magnetic stripe cards, and (3) an electronic type, such as RFID tags and 
SIM cards.58 As with biometrics, the widespread use and rapid adoption of the RFID 
technology is due to their convenience and security. 
First, the reader receives information automatically and wirelessly from the tags, 
thus enabling the products/people to save time and avoid the disturbance and 
inconvenience of handing their ID certifications in either optical or magnetic form. 
Information technologies also have the potential to enable sharing, comparisons, and 
analyses (profiling) between databases, so that within a set of systems, several 
services could be run together, which would also reduce costs. Furthermore, tags 
could store more information than the other two types of AIDC technologies. 
Secondly, the ability to trace the location of the tags could improve the safety of 
products or services such as food, medicines and health care services. It is also harder 
to copy RFID tags than the other two traditional types of AIDC technologies, which 
could improve the safety requirements. Consequently, in the context of the modern 
information society, it seems certain that RFID technology reflects whatever 
technology could deliver better results for the entire population. 
 
 
58 Commission of the European Communities (n 56). 
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2.3.3 The Potential Risks 
Yet, there is no denying that risks related to the widespread application of RFID in the 
information era need to be fully recognised. Predicaments regarding RFID technology 
can also be identified in two respects: technical problems and social concerns.59 
Firstly, there are some technique limitations to RFID and its applications. For 
instance, the lack of a universal standard of RFID tags, which may restrict its 
applications at a global-use level, as a result, will increase its cost – both on the 
aspects of installing and of integrating RFID systems into existing setups.60 Similar 
problems with regard to inconsistent global standard stem from the assignment of 
frequencies and power for operation.61 Therefore, the need to monitor demand may 
increase with the use of RFID.62 
Concerns may also arise from an environmental perspective, because of the huge 
amount of waste produced by electrical and electronic equipment and RFID tags.63 
Furthermore, from a health angle, notwithstanding that RFID applications are 
generally low in power (active tags may operate with higher power) under normal 
operating conditions, possible detrimental health effects of exposure to 
Electromagnetic Fields (EMF) are still to be expected.64 
The most significant technical problem is, perhaps, the safety of RFID. According 
 
59 Some other risks ,which lead to privacy and data protection concerns, such as function creep 
problem due to the ‘internet things’ characteristic of RFID, will be discussed in the later part. 
60 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (n 52) 2. 
61 Generally speaking, states have the regulatory power for this kind of ‘spectrum allocation’, as a 
result, it is unavoidable to drive to an international variation in the for RFID systems. See: Ibid. 
62 For example, EU Commission Decision 2006/804/EC of 23 November 2006 on harmonisation of 
the radio spectrum for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices operating in the ultra high 
frequency (UHF) band. See Commission of the European Communities (n 56) 7. 
63 EU regulates those concerns with Directives 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE) and 2002/95/EC on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in 
electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS). See ibid 8. 
64 Ibid 8. 
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to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO, UK), a practical problem is known 
as the ‘skimming’ of RFID, which presents the possibility of unauthorised access for 
the sake of picking up signals from tags through any compatible reader.65 In this 
regard, information stored in the tags may be ‘stolen’, or more accurately, be ‘cloned’ 
or ‘copied.’66 This may not only result in privacy or data protection concerns, but also 
in some other criminal offences.67 Therefore, the ICO recommends that tags with 
sensitive personal data should be at a higher and adequate level of encryption to 
prevent this sort of risk.68 
Secondly, social concerns regarding public databases at a national/ international 
mass scale may also occur with RFID. For example, customers may have a choice not 
to apply RFID in private business sectors (whether on the opt-in or the opt-out model); 
while in the public sphere, citizens may have less choice – such as some ID cards or 
passports with RFID tags on them. In this respect, it is the controller (the government) 
of the RFID system who has more power to decide than the users (citizens).69 
There are, undoubtedly, some unique social concerns raised by RFID. For 
example, the tracking ability offered by RFID, which opens up the possibility of 
physically remote tracking by virtue of profiling through undetected surveillance.70 
Another problem stems from the increasing potential in targeted direct marketing in 
 
65 Information Commissioner Office, ‘Data Protection Technical Guidance: Radio Frequency 
Identification’ 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/radio_fre
quency_indentification_tech_guidance.pdf> accessed 18 November 2009. 
66 Ibid 5-6. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid 5. 
69 For further issues regarding RFID and identity management, see: European Technology Assessment 
Group, European Parliament, ‘RFID and Identity Management in Everyday Life: Striking the balance 
between convenience, choice and control’ (2007) IPOL/A/STOA/2006-22. Available at: 
< http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/publications/studies/stoa182_en.pdf> accessed 18 November 
2009. 
70 For further discussion, See: Ari Juels, ‘RFID Privacy: A Technical Primer for the Non-Technical 
Reader’ in Katherine J. Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu (eds), Privacy and technologies of identity: 
a cross-disciplinary conversation (Springer 2006) 63-64. 
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comparison with bar code AIDC technologies.71 
Additionally, to complete the picture, there is a dramatic move to the use of 
biometrics in ubiquitous ICT developments, e.g., RFID. It is noted that those benefits 
and risks mentioned in both biometric and RFID technologies may extend when using 
biometric technology in conjunction with RFID – not only in those discussed 
technique problems and social concerns, but also in privacy and data protection 
regimes, which will be introduced in next section. 
 
2.4 Biometrics, RFID, and Data Protection: Relationships, Concerns and 
Examples 
Despite there being a number of social concerns regarding biometrics and RFID, it is 
not surprising that the major concern has centred on privacy and data protection 
aspects.72 In light of data protection concerns regarding biometrics and RFID, two 
questions will be addressed: (1) whether biometric data is subject to data protection 
law, particularly under the definition of Directive 95/46/EC and its local implications; 
(2) whether biometric data is a type of sensitive personal data.  
 
2.4.1 Biometric Data and Concepts of (Sensitive) Personal Data 
 
71 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (n 52) 3-4. 
72 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics. Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies 8.It has been 
argued that there are three information regime may be threaded together: the privacy regime, 
processing of personal data regime, and the confidentiality regime. See: Roger Brownsword, ‘Consent 
in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ in Serge Gutwirth and others 
(eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009) 83-110.  
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2.4.1.1 Does Biometric Data fall within the Scope of Personal Data? 
The concept of personal data, which specifies the scope of personal data, has a 
profound impact on the issues with regard to ‘Identity Management in the context of 
e-Government and e-Health, as well as in the RFID context.’73  
According to Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive, personal data is 
defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
('data subject')…’74 (emphasis added). Recital 26 of the Directive, meanwhile, states 
that ‘the principles of protection must apply to any information concerning an 
identified or identifiable person…’ In determining whether a person is identifiable, 
furthermore, the Directive specifies that ‘an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number 
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity’ (emphasis added).75 It is further explained by Recital 26 
that ‘account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by 
the controller or by any other person to identify the said person.’ (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, the 2012 proposal of the EU General Data Protection Regulation, in 
line with opinion WP 136, proposes in Article 4 (1) that ‘'data subject' means an 
identified natural person or a natural person who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, by means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other 
natural or legal person, in particular by reference to an identification number, location 
data, online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
 
73 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data (No 
01248/07/EN, WP136, 2007) 3. 
74 The same definition is also stated both in Article 2 (a) of the 1981 Data Protection Convention and 
Section 1 (b) of the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data (the OECD Guidelines). 
75 Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
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genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person.’76 
With these definitions and explanations in mind, it seems to be much easier to 
answer the first question according to characteristics of biometric data. The WP29, 
therefore, suggests that ‘measures of biometric identification or their digital 
translation in a template form in most cases are personal data’ (emphasis added).77 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the feature of automaticity places biometric systems 
within the scope of the main legal regulations that this thesis is going to focus on, e.g., 
Directive 95/46/EC, 78  Directive 2002/58/EC, 79  the 1981 data protection 
Convention, 80  the Data Protection Act 1998 of the UK (DPA), 81  the 
Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law of Taiwan (CPDPL), 82  and the 
Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL).83  
 
76 However, as regards Recital 24 of the proposed general Regulation, it is argued by the WP29 that 
the Recital ‘might lead to an unduly restrictive interpretation of the notion of personal data in relation 
for instance to IP addresses or cookie IDs.’ Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 
on the Data Protection Reform Proposals (No 00530/12/EN, WP191, 2012) 9. 
77 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics 5. 
78 Article 3.1 of Directive 95/46/EC addresses that ‘This Directive shall apply to the processing of 
personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic 
means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing 
system.’ 
79 Article 1.2 of Directive 2002/58/EC stands that ‘The provisions of this Directive particularise and 
complement Directive 95/46/EC for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1. Moreover, they provide 
for protection of the legitimate interests of subscribers who are legal persons.’  
80 Article 3.1 of 1981 data protection convention gives that ‘The Parties undertake to apply this 
convention to automated personal data files and automatic processing of personal data in the public and 
private sectors.’ 
81 Article 1.1 of the DPA (of the UK): ‘…“data” means information which— (a) is being processed by 
means of equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose; (b) is 
recorded with the intention that it should be processed by means of such equipment; (c)is recorded as 
part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that it should form part of a relevant filing system, 
or (d)does not fall within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) but forms part of an accessible record as defined by 
section 68.’ 
82 Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the CPDPL: ‘the term "personal data" means the name, date of birth, uniform 
number of identification card, special features, finger print, marriage, family, education, profession, 
health condition, medical history, financial condition, and social activities of a natural person as well as 
other data sufficient to identify the said person.’ ‘the term "personal data file" means a collection of 
personal data stored in a electromagnetic recorder or other similar media for specific purposes.’ 
83 Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the PDPL: ‘Personal data: the name, date of birth, I.D. Card number, passport 
number, characteristics, fingerprints, marital status, family, education, occupation, medical record, 
medical treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination, criminal record, contact 
information, financial conditions, social activities and other information which may be used to identify 
a natural person, both directly and indirectly;’ ‘Personal data file: A collection of personal information 
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However, Recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive reads that ‘…the principles 
of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data 
subject is no longer identifiable…’ The description of ‘no longer identifiable’ has been 
given by the WP29 that ‘[i]n cases where biometric data, like a template, are stored in 
a way that no reasonable means can be used by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the data subject, those data should not be qualified as personal data.’84 
(emphasis added) 
Nonetheless, this sort of situation, to use the phrase coined by Rejman-Greene, is 
‘likely to be relatively rare.’85 In his opinion, there are seven requirements to be 
met.86 Only after all these requirements are satisfied, could it possibly be considered 
that non-identifiability is achieved. This is because, per Article 2(a) and Recital 26, if 
there is any possibility that anyone could reasonably relink the datasets, those coded 
data should not be considered as anonymous.87  
It is noted, in this regard, that anonymisation is by no means a privacy-offering 
panacea. Indeed, the ‘easy reidentification result’ has been observed by Ohm in his 
 
built to allow information retrieval and management by automatic or non-automatic measures;’ 
(emphasis added) 
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics 5. 
85 Rejman-Greene (n 38) 344. 
86 Ibid 344-345. These addressed conditions are:  
1. The identity of a previously enrolled individual is only represented by a “one way” template 
without any possibility of reconstruction of the original record; 
2. The template could also be generated by a sufficient number of other subjects in the 
population;  
3. The template is stored on a token held by the end user;  
4. The comparison, at verification, of the output of the sensor with the template, is made on the 
token itself;  
5. All images and records relating to the enrolment are securely disposed of at the time of 
enrolment;  
6. No other data is available that, combined with the biometric data, could link the user uniquely 
to a template; and 
7. The backup alternative, in case of failure of the biometric, does not expose the biometric to a 
process whereby a subsequent verification could reveal the person’s identity. 
87 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 
18 King's Law Journal 280-283. 
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article concerning the failure of anonymisation.88 Such failure, which is made more 
likely by recent technological advances in reidentification, may require modification 
of what is considered to be personal data.89 Accordingly, easily re-identifiable data is 
within the scope of personal data.90 
A similar opinion is reached in the report released by the Consultative Committee 
of the 1981 Data Protection Convention (T-PD) regarding the collection and 
processing of biometric data.91 It is argued in this document that ‘[t]he collection of 
biometric data can only take place under certain circumstances regarding, for example, 
the time and the place of their collection’, and ‘[t]hese circumstances always reveal 
information about the data subject being the source of the biometric data.’92 The T-PD 
therefore concludes that: 
The Committee finds it unnecessary to decide whether biometric data are personal data 
in themselves or whether this is only the case under certain circumstances. It is of the 
opinion that as soon as biometric data are collected with a view to automatic processing 
there is the possibility that these data can be related to an identified or identifiable 
individual. In those cases the Convention applies.93 
Overall, except in rare cases which the data subjects are no longer identified by a 
reasonable measure, biometric data falls within the scope of personal data. Moreover, 
 
88 Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ 
(2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1716. For additional discussion on anonymisation and reidentification 
techniques, see: ibid 1711-1727. 
89 Ibid 1731-1745. 
90 For further discussion on identifiable and identified personal data, see: section 8.3.1. 
91 The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ‘Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of 
Convention 108 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data’ (T-PD, 2005)  
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/data_protection/documents/reports_and_studie
s_of_data_protection_committees/2Biometrics_2005_en.pdf> accessed 13 February 2010.  
92 Ibid para. 51. 
93 Ibid para. 52. 
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in the light of the advanced technologies causing the easy reidentification result, I 
suggest that due to the development of new technologies that may affect data 
protection,94 it is essential to review the current data protection legal framework.95 
 
2.4.1.2 Is Biometric Data a Type of Sensitive Personal Data? 
Article 8(1) of the Data Protection Directive specifies that the processing of five 
special categories of personal data shall be prohibited unless exemptions stated by 
Articles 8(2) and 8(3) apply. These categories are the processing of personal data 
relating to the data subject’s, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, or health or sex life.  
It seems to be obvious that facial images, which are essential to achieve the 
measurability demand of a facial-scan system, will reveal the data subject’s racial or 
ethnic origin, or at least, will provide indications of it. Accordingly, images for such 
type of biometrics should be considered as sensitive data. However, can the 
processing of mere indication of sensitive personal data, which are processed in low 
threshold applications (e.g., facial images, voice and signatures) to be conclusive as to 
its nature for the purpose of the regulation? It has been claimed by certain European 
countries that: 
 
94 Yue Liu, ‘Identifying Legal Concerns in the Biometric Context’ (2008) 3: 1 Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology 47-48. Also, Neil Robinson and others, Review of the European 
Data Protection Directive (Technical Report, 2009). 
95 See section 8.3. In this respect, it is noted that the proposed 2012 EU General Data Protection 
Regulation has introduced a definition of biometric data in Article 4(11). It states that: ‘'biometric data' 
means any data relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual 
which allow their unique identification, such as facial images, or dactyloscopic data.’ However, the 
WP29 finds that, as biometric data are used in both identification and authentication purposes, the 
wording in Article 4(11) should be amended as ‘…are unique for each individual specifically…’ 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform Proposals 
10. 
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‘…Article 8.1 arguably applies to the processing of an image of a person, since that 
image will always "reveal" the ethnic or racial origin of the person, unless he or she is 
masked or otherwise heavily disguised…’ and ‘…such essentially incidental 
"revelations" of the characteristics described in Article 8.1 do not amount to sensitive 
data for the purposes of the Article.’ (emphasis added)96 
Therefore, it may be asserted that those facial images should not be considered as 
sensitive data – at least not at the early stage before being saved into a template97 or a 
RFID tag.  
Nonetheless, this is not the whole story. It is worth noting that the same document 
further suggested that those special categories ‘where they clearly describe intimate 
personal characteristics and their processing is particularly likely to infringe 
fundamental freedoms or privacy…’ should ‘in principle not be processed.’98 Indeed, 
we need to look at the purpose of the processing of personal data. In this regard, it has 
been argued that facial images for processing of biometrics, which describe intimate 
characteristics of those data subjects and aim to process sensitive data (e.g., the 
identity management), constitute sensitive personal data.99 On the basis of the 2012 
EU proposal of General Data Protection Regulation, furthermore, as facial image is 
clearly listed as a type of biometric data (Article 4(11)), and it is referred that 
biometric data presents specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects 
(Article 33(2)(d)), I argue that facial images, in particular for the propose of 
processing of biometrics, should, as the above document addressed, in principle not 
 
96 Department of Constitutional Affairs, ‘Proposals for Amendment made by Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom: Explanatory Note’ <http://www.dca.gov.uk/ccpd/dpdamend.htm> accessed 
18 January 2010. 
97 Rejman-Greene (n 38) 345-346. 
98 Department of Constitutional Affairs, annex: Proposed Amendments to Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC), special categories of data. 
99 Cf. Peter Carey, Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 87. 
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be processed. 
On the other hand, high threshold applications, such as DNA data for DNA-scan 
systems, can surely reveal racial or ethnic origins. DNA data, which contains genetic 
material, reveals not only racial or ethnic origin but also health information, and has 
been rightly argued to be subject to data protection law.100 Furthermore, other types of 
biometrics such as fingerprints, hand and palm geometry, iris recognition and retina 
recognition, as suggested above, may reveal health and sex life information. Therefore, 
those kinds of biometrics, in most contexts, should be considered as sensitive data 
under the Directive and thus should merit a higher degree of protection under the data 
protection law regime. 
However, it seems that to directly treat biometric data as a form of sensitive data 
in general has not received much support. 101  It might be said that biometric 
information per-se does not directly reveal health information – it needs a 
technological shift in order to identify it.102 Nonetheless, I argue that, if there is any 
possibility to reasonably identify or relink/ re-identify biometric data and relevant 
sensitive information such as health, racial or ethnic origin, it should be considered as 
sensitive data. This is because, as we shall see in the latter part of this thesis, the scope 
of right to privacy should be interpreted broadly.103  
 
2.4.2 Concerns over Data Protection 
Since both of the preconditioned questions are given positive answers, this section 
 
100 Beyleveld (n 87) 277-283. 
101 Liu (n 94) 47. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Section 4.3.2. 
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returns to its focus on the data protection concerns over biometrics and RFID. As 
remarked by Koops and Leenes:  
…In the vast majority of technologies developed and used in real life, its influence is to 
the detriment of privacy. That is, technology often has the side-effect of making privacy 
violations easier… 
…Examples in law enforcement and e-government show technology offers increasing 
opportunities for large-scale monitoring – from intercepting all telecommunications…to 
monitoring the movements of people. In the private sector, technology enables more 
control of people, from workplace and transaction monitoring to personalization of 
consumer relationships, with new applications like facial recognition and RFID 
monitoring looming ahead… (emphasis added) 104 
Indeed, biometric and RFID technologies do attract certain growing privacy and data 
protection concerns. In this regard, these concerns reflect different contexts of data 
protection principles for the use of new technologies respectively: (1) processing 
sensitive data; (2) processing in a way compatible with the specified original purposes; 
(3) processing in an adequate, relevant and not excessive way in relation to the 
purposes; and (4) processing in a mass-scale way managed by national or 
supranational databases. 
 
2.4.2.1 Information about Human Bodies 
With the ‘life measuring’ nature of biometrics, it is an essential feature of biometric 
 
104 Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘'Code' and the Slow Erosion of Privacy’ (2005) 12 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 245. 
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technologies to process personal data containing information about human bodies. As 
we have seen, biometric data which involves personal health data or data involving 
sex life, in most contexts, is a sort of sensitive personal data. With this in mind, the 
first question concerns the data subject’s explicit consent. For example, according to 
Article 8(2)(a) of the Data Protection Directive, consent is the very first justification 
regarding the principle of prohibiting the processing of special categories of data. 
Moreover, the ECtHR has held that processing sensitive personal data without explicit 
consent will engage Article 8(1) of the ECHR.105 In this regard, with explicit consent 
made by the data subject, no further justification is required.106  
However, it is possible for some biometric traits or measures to be taken and 
processed without explicit consent, or even the data subject’s knowledge, in a 
biometric system. Examples of possible methods include collecting facial images or 
voice records from CCTV surveillance cameras and microphones, collecting 
fingerprints, hand and palm prints from the surface of something or somebody, and 
collecting DNA samples from body tissues in a crime scene. Also, it is possible for 
researchers to link medical information revealed by biometric data to particular 
biometric patterns. Moreover, biometric data which is stored in a RFID tag could also 
be copied or cloned without explicit consent. 
These examples violate the principle of security processing of personal data as 
required, for example, by Article 17 of the Data Protection Directive. Since consent is 
inclusive of the stage of collecting the biometric data, it is also arguable that consent 
plays a central role on the data protection principle of fair and lawful processing 
relating to data quality.107 In this case, if there is no explicit consent made by the data 
 
105 See: Z. v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. Also, MS v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR 313. 
106 Beyleveld (n 87) 284. 
107 Article 6.1 (a) of the Data Protection Directive: Member States shall provide that personal data 
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subject as the gatekeeper of the relevant rights, then justification must be found to 
prevent breaching the rights.108  
 
2.4.2.2 Function Creep 
‘Function creep,’ i.e., further unintended or unnecessary processing of personal data 
in a way incompatible with the original purpose for which it was collected, has been 
emphasised as one of ‘the most significant informational privacy concerns’ by the 
RAND institution.109 Function creep happens not only with the knowledge or consent 
of data subjects, but also occurs without the active involvement of data subjects. In 
this regard, the lack of transparency of collecting and processing personal data should 
be considered. In fact, the transparency problem of RFID systems has been identified 
by the EDPS as one of the five privacy and data protection issues in RFID 
deployment.110 This is a negative impact on the trust relationship between data 
controllers and data subjects. 
The development of interoperability between biometric/ RFID systems further 
extends the possibility of function creep. It has been observed that the application of 
biometrics presents ‘a greater potential for function creep’ 111  than traditional 
authentication methods could achieve. One of the significant threats comes from the 
consent issue. This is because the most commonly used biometrics of individuals, e.g., 
 
must be: ‘processed fairly and lawfully;’ 
108 Beyleveld (n 87). For further discussion regarding such justifications, see section 6.4. 
109 Woodward and others, Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural 
Concerns 3. 
110 These five basic privacy and security issues distinguished by the EDPS are: identification of the 
data subject, identification of the controller(s), the decreased meaning of the traditional distinction 
between the personal and public sphere, the size and the physical properties of RFID-tags, and the lack 
of transparency of the processing. See: The European Data Protection Supervisor paras. 20-27. 
111 See, Woodward and others, Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural 
Concerns 30. 
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facial images, voice, signatures and other low threshold applications, which are 
thought as ‘hardly’ to be changed or discarded, are regularly exposed and recognised 
in public and.112 This increases the possibility of collecting and processing biometrics 
of individuals without the active involvement of data subjects (through a RFID 
system).  
Function creep, by its nature, raises an obvious problem in that it goes against the 
principle of obtaining personal data for specific, explicit and lawful purpose(s) and 
processing it in a compatible manner.113 It also goes against an important principle of 
the data protection law regime: the principle of proportionality. In this light, the WP29 
clearly points out that: 
‘an evaluation of the respect for proportionality and the respect for legitimacy is 
necessary, taking into account the risks for the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals and notably whether or not the intended purpose could be 
achieved in a less intrusive way. Proportionality has been the main criterion in almost 
all decisions taken until now by the Data Protection Authorities on the processing of 
biometric data.’114 
 
2.4.2.3 Tracking and Profiling 
Due to the ‘internet of things’ characteristic of RFID technology, the interoperability 
 
112 Ibid 30-31. 
113 Article 6.1 (b) of Directive 95/46/EC: Member States shall provide that personal data must be: 
‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific 
purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate 
safeguards.’ 
114 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Documents on Biometrics 6. 
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between biometric/ RFID systems and other different information databases presents a 
particular type of function creep: the abuse of tracking or profiling personal data. The 
definition of tracking is given as ‘the ability to monitor in real time an individual’s 
actions or to search databases that contain information about these actions,’115 or ‘the 
possibility of linking different transactions to build profiles.’116 Tracking refers to 
track/ trace individuals’ movements or locations, which is in close relation to one’s 
spatial privacy. For example, facial-scan biometric system with a RFID, CCTV, GSM, 
or GPS system could identify and locate individuals easily without consent.  
On the other hand, ‘profiling’ means to profile individuals’ behaviour, which 
relates to one’s information privacy by linking individuals to personal data. Profiling 
could be carried out through data mining. For example, biometric database with 
passengers’ record could figure how regular one visits a particular place. Briefly, 
tracking asks the question of ‘where was/is she/he?’ and profiling asks ‘why she/he 
was/is there?’ 
In this case, data protection concerns in relation to function creep including the 
consent issue, purpose principle, principle of proportionality, and the transparency/ 
trust issue must be considered. Moreover, tracking and profiling through biometric 
data could allow data controllers to build a clear image of personality in an all-round 
manner of a data subject. Although the action of collecting and processing personal 
data is, or at least may be, for the original purpose, it must be done in an adequate, 
relevant and not excessive manner. Accordingly, unless such a purpose aims to 
protect an absolute right and is the proportional method of achieving the goal, it can 
hardly be accepted that an overall or any unnecessary extent of the ‘image of an 
 
115 Woodward and others, Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural 
Concerns 24-25. 
116 Sethi (n 10) 133. 
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individual’s personality’ is needed for any purpose.  
 
2.4.2.4 National/ International Scale Databases 
Biometric and RFID technologies have been applied in both public and private 
spheres on a massive scale rapidly. Promoted by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), passports with RFID tags containing biometric data and other 
personal identification data are a good example of this trend. This trend draws social 
concerns such as public trust on legal and political procedures, and of course, data 
protection concerns.  
Since both the right to privacy and the data protection rights are not absolute 
rights, it is commonly argued by governments or international organisations that those 
technologies are deemed to be necessary to uphold some public good such as national 
security, public security, and investigation and prevention of crime. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the tendency of building national/ international biometric databases in 
order to take surveillance on every potential criminal is preferred due to the efficiency 
of protecting above securities and prevention of crime. In this regard, the increasing 
trend of collecting and processing personal data on a wider range of data subject calls 
for a series of considerations. It has been indicated in a report commissioned by the 
UK Information Commissioner’s Office, that the ‘significant extension of the role of 
the police from their traditional tasks’ is now ‘typically intelligence-led’ – which 
involves the trend of collecting and processing personal data on a ‘wider range of data 
subject.’117 Moreover, the specific risks of ‘reuse of such data for incompatible 
 
117 Foundation for Information Policy Research, Paper No. 5: Conclusions & Policy Implications (UK 
Information Commissioner Study Project: Privacy & Law Enforcement, 2004) 1-3. 
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purposes’ are also increased.118 Under such circumstances, restrictions on certain data 
protection principles including principle of obtaining an explicit consent, the principle 
of processing personal data fairly and lawfully, and certain information rights of data 
subject, will be applied. 
Indeed, with respect to the rights-balancing issue between the right to privacy and 
data protection and other collective interests, it is observed by Paul de Hert that  
[p]rivacy and human dignity must preserve the roots of the individual’s autonomy 
against outside steering or against disproportionate power balances in vertical, but also 
in horizontal power relations.119 
Therefore, there is a need to deal with the question stems from the interference on the 
individual’s autonomy and free will of choice, particularly in a unbalanced power 
relations which threatens not only human rights and freedoms, but also ‘the very 
nature of our society.’120 Before dealing with this question, it is helpful at the outset to 
offer some real-life examples of specific technologies to reflect on the current and 
future circumstances.  
 
2.4.3 Examples 
Three main themes are provided here as examples of the ways in which new 
technologies affecting our daily lives: (1) the private sector; (2) health sector; and (3) 
 
118 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies 15. 
119 Paul de Hert, ‘Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society’ 
<http://cybersecurity.jrc.ec.europa.eu/docs/LIBE%20Biometrics%20March%2005/iptsBiometics_Full
Report_eur21585en.pdf> accessed 29 July 2010. 
120 Ibid 91.  
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policing sector.121  
 
2.4.3.1 Private Life 
Within the private business sector, biometric techniques are commonly used in daily 
electric facilities such as laptops, mobile phones, premise gate controllers, and even 
campus libraries.122  
With regard to RFID technology, the EU Commission reports123 that the primary 
cost of RFID tags is decreasing as production rises thus allowing for a wider usage. 
Retailers could, therefore, apply this technology to keep shelves stocked, to better 
account for inventories, and to reduce theft and loss with less labour cost and errors. 
Other current practical applications include electronic payment, supply chain 
management, animal tracking, and data conveying in hostile environments.124 RFID 
technology is also applied in data processing fields such as access control and 
payment facilities. 
Moreover, using biometrics in conjunction with RFID applications to replace 
keys as a method of identification or verification is common. This is applied not only 
 
121 There are other methods to present similar examples such as using the scenario methodology. See: 
Ioannis Maghiros and others, ‘Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society’ 
<http://cybersecurity.jrc.ec.europa.eu/docs/LIBE%20Biometrics%20March%2005/iptsBiometics_Full
Report_eur21585en.pdf> accessed 29 July 2010. For examples and references to specific biometric 
systems and technologies, e.g., vein pattern, fingerprints, facial recognition, voice recognition, 
signature biometrics, DNA and their combined uses, see: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies 16-27. 
122 E.g., Information Commissioner Office, ‘The Use of Biometrics in Schools’ 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/fingerpri
nting_final_view_v1.11.pdf> accessed 18 November 2009. It is also described by Article 29 DP 
working party that ‘the use of biometrics in school libraries can make children less aware of the data 
protection risks that may impact upon them in later life.’ Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
Working Documents on Biometrics 2. 
123 COM (2007) 96 final at 3. 
124 For a detailed description, see: Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (n 52) 2. 
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in tangible spaces but also digital spaces such as the internet. The former type in 
relation to personal data, as previously discussed, is regulated by the Data Protection 
Directive in EU. Specific types of applications of such technologies may be at the 
same time regulated by further EU legislation. Applying biometrics in schools, 
especially for tracking underage children, for instance, is a further concern for the 
public. It is pointed out by the Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), for example, 
that two objections may arise from applying biometric in schools: stigmatisation and 
an attempt to teach children that giving up crucial personal data to those in authority 
is normal and acceptable.125 
The latter type can be exemplified by electronic/ digital biometric signatures126 
which are referred to any electronic data that carries the intent of a signature in order 
to satisfy digital accesses or payments. It is rapidly used in online shopping in the 
digital era. This falls not only within the scope of Directive 1999/93/EC,127 but also 
the Data Protection Directive, Directive 2005/58/EC128 and Directive 2006/24/EC129 
which amended Directive 2002/58/EC; the common purpose of last two directives is 
to harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations of the providers 
of ‘publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
 
125 Information Commissioner Office, ‘The Use of Biometrics in Schools’. 
126 According to Article 2(1) of Directive 1999/93/EC, ‘electronic signatures’ means ‘data in electronic 
form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a 
method of authentication.’ 
127 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures (OJ L 13 of 19/1/2000). 
128 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(OJ L 201, 31/07/2002, 37-47). This Directive replaces Directive 97/66/EC, which was concerning on 
the processing of personal data and the protection of the privacy in the telecommunication sector. 
129 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC (OJ L 105, 13/04/2006, 54-63). 
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communications networks with respect to the retention’ of such personal data.’130 
 
2.4.3.2 Health/ Medical Sector 
With the sensitive nature of medical care, positive and accurate identification is 
essential. It is therefore common for health networks to propose massive applications 
of biometric technologies and RFID tags. Particular disadvantages, however, can be 
identified by applying biometric associated technologies in this sector. For example, 
‘fingerprints will not work in environments where users wear latex gloves, face 
recognition will not work with surgical masks, and voice recognition will not work in 
noisy environments.’131 Another example is the health card with personal biometric 
data and RFID tags, which may involve both private insurance firms and public 
authorities. 
 
2.4.3.3 Policing Sector 
To improve public safety and convenience, biometric technologies are now applied in 
various fields such as military services,132 migration controls,133 and national ID cards 
 
130 Article 1 of Directive 2006/24/EC. 
131 Maghiros and others (n 121) 108.  
132 Army forces have used biometrics as one of the solutions to take care of needs of a security and 
safety way to control access to their systems in times of both war and peace. See: Woodward and 
others, Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing Sociocultural Concerns. 
133 It is exactly due to these mentioned advantages that since 11 September 2001, biometrics has 
become a ‘powerful weapon’ to defend states borders and improve nation security. Some developed 
countries are now using biometrics in their migration management. See: International Organization for 
Migration, Biometrics and International Migration (International Organization for Migration 2005). 
For example, the UK government is now issuing biometric ID cards and visas to foreign students, 
employers, and workers. This card will also show information about the identity of the holder and 
details such as the length of their leave to stay in the UK and whether they are entitled to work. See: 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/managingborders/idcardsforforeignnationals/> accessed 18 
November 2009. 
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policies.134  
Similarly, RFID applications are now also commonly used and their diffusion is 
increasing at a very rapid rate. For example, the ICAO is now promoting a set of 
global passport standard endorsing the deployment of RFID tags in passports.135 In 
this respect, the EU has issued Regulation EC 2252/2004,136 later amended by 
Regulation EC 444/2009,137 to ensure the use of biometric passports meet certain 
security standards. Article 4(3) of Regulation EC 444/2009, which aims to avoid the 
function creep problem, states that biometric features in passports and travel 
documents shall only be used for verifying two specific aspects: ‘the authenticity of 
the passport or travel document’ and ‘the identity of the holder by means of directly 
available comparable features when the passport or travel document is required to be 
produced by law.’ 
 
2.5 Summary  
The chapter has addressed key terms, the promised benefits and the potential risks of 
biometric and RFID applications respectively.  
 
134 Some countries, e.g., China (beginning with Shenzhen City), issued biometric ID cards (with lots of 
other sensitive data such as personal reproductive history) to their citizens. See: 
< http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/business/worldbusiness/12security.html?_r=2&ei=5065&en=2d
7edb61ed1&oref=slogin> accessed 18 November 2009. The UK is now issuing biometric ID cards to 
their citizens. See: 
< http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/Identitycards/DG_174258> accessed 18 
November 2009. 
135 Katherine Albrecht, ‘How RFID Tags Could Be Used to Track Unsuspecting People’ Scientific 
America Magazine (New York, 19 August, 2008) 
< http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-rfid-tags-could-be-used> accessed 18 
November 2009. 
136 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features 
and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States. 
137 Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States. 
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With respect to the benefits of the advanced technologies at hand, convenience 
and safety concerns are commonly shared. For biometric applications, particular 
concerns mainly focus on issues related to sensitive personal data. It has been argued 
that, except in rare cases in which the data subjects are no longer identified by 
reasonable methods, biometric data falls within the scope of personal data. In 
connection with the question of whether biometric data is a sort of sensitive personal 
data, I adopt the idea that if there is any possibility to reasonably identify or 
re-identify biometric data and relevant sensitive information such as health, racial or 
ethnic origin, the answer should be in the affirmative. As regards RFID applications, 
on the other hand, the focus should be on concealed tracking and profiling problems. 
Attention was drawn to four data protection concerns: information about human 
bodies, function creep, profiling and tracking biometric data, and databases in a 
national or international mass-scale were then presented, which share a common 
concern over the potential interferences with individuals’ free will. These data 
protection concerns present four themes worth noting: the concept of privacy, consent, 
trust, and interest-balancing issues between public goods and individual interests. 
These four themes will be examined in detail throughout the thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
Introducing an Applicable Theoretical Framework:  
The Principle of Generic Consistency and Its Justification 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An adequate theoretical framework is essential to approach the research question of 
this thesis. This is because, in order to answer the research question, the relevant 
competing rights and interests must be reconciled on the basis of a criterion to 
determine how one can identify the rights to be protected and understand the values of 
the rights. The proposed theoretical framework is the moral theory of Alan Gewirth – 
the Principle of Generic Consistency, stating that agents must act in accord with the 
generic rights of all agents.1 
This chapter is organised in eight sections. The outline of the PGC will be 
presented in section 3.2. Two main formulations of the arguments elaborating the 
PGC will then be offered in sections 3.3 and 3.4. The first argument is based on 
Gewirth’s own contribution Reason and Morality, arguing that agents contradict 
that they are agents if they do not accept that the PGC is the supreme principle 
governing all of the permitted actions.   
An alternative argument is presented by a Gewirthian scholar Deryck Beyleveld 
 
1 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978) 135. Also, Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 70. 
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in his article Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the 
Principle of Generic Consistency.2 He argues that an agent contradicts its3 acceptance 
that human beings are equal in human rights if it does not grant the PGC a similar 
status, i.e., ‘interpret and give effect to human rights in way consistent with the 
PGC.’4 In this case, anyone (or any legal system) who recognises human rights 
(with the idea that human beings are equal in dignity and rights) must grant the 
PGC a similar status or contradict acceptance of such rights. Therefore, the 
enforcement machinery of any part of a network of international human rights treaties 
of universal or regional application, e.g., the ICCPR, the ECHR and the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted in conformity to the PGC. 
Overall, these two arguments are capable of showing the PGC as the governing 
principle in appeals to human dignity and human rights in all ethics and law, including 
in the data protection regime.5 
Section 3.5 aims to provide the content of agency rights under the PGC. Section 
3.6 will then show a logical consistency rule which is compatible with an order 
whereby some interests/rights are overridden by others.  
Lastly, it must be noted that Gewirthian moral theory ‘runs against the current 
 
2 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of 
Generic Consistency’ (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 15-41. 
3 It has been criticised by Singer that the use of the pronoun ‘it’ referring to an agent is ‘barbaric.’ 
Marcus G. Singer, ‘Gewirth, Beyleveld, and Dialectical Necessity’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris190. However, 
it must be noted that the PGC is directly about agents rather than human beings. Deryck Beyleveld, ‘A 
Reply to Marcus G. Singer on Gewirth, Beyleveld and Dialectical Necessity’ (2002) 15 Ratio Juris 458. 
By reading section 3.2.3 of this thesis, it should be noted that there is no such a requirement to ask 
agents to be human or any gender beings. Accordingly, as Beyleveld puts it, this terminology considers 
nothing about reasons of ‘political correctness’ or mere preference. Indeed, for some applications of 
this theoretical framework, the use of ‘it’ can function as avoiding suggesting that agents are 
necessarily male or female. Shaun D. Pattinson, Influencing Traits Before Birth (Ashgate Publishing 
2002) 3. In this regard, I may sometimes use the pronoun ‘it/ he/she.’ This is because there are (limited) 
chances for agent to be human beings, in particular under the situation of discussing the right to privacy 
and data protection in the later chapters.  
4 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 
(2012) 13 Human Rights Review 1. 
5 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 69. 
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trend of modern philosophy.’6 This chapter, in this regard, must seek to provide 
convincing reasons for the adoption of the PGC. Moreover, we shall attempt to 
respond to the objections raised against the PGC. These two goals shall be achieved in 
section 3.7, following by a summary in section 3.8. 
 
3.2 The Outline of the Principle of Generic Consistency 
It is claimed by Gewirth that the PGC requires agents to act in accordance with 
the generic rights of all agents. This statement combines two major components: 
‘the formal consideration of consistency’ and ‘the material consideration of rights to 
be the generic features or goods of action.’7 To present a brief overview of this 
supreme principle, the following map8 tries to unpack the major terms and notions of 
the PGC. 
 
6 Pattinson (n 3) 3. 
7 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) xi. 
8 This map is based on Beyleveld and Brownsword’s contribution: Beyleveld and Brownsword, 
Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 70-72. 
Classify Classify
The PGC requires agents to act in accordance with the generic rights of all agents 
Agents contradict that they are agents if 
they do not accept that the PGC is the 
supreme principle governing the 
permissibility of actions. 
Anyone who accepts that there are human 
rights must grant the PGC a similar status 
or else contradict acceptance of such rights.
A being that 
does 
something 
voluntarily for 
a purpose that 
it has chosen 
A being with 
the capacities 
required for 
agency with at 
least some 
disposition to 
exercise them 
(PPA) 
Rights to generic needs of agency 
Using the PGC as the governing 
principle in appeals to human 
dignity in all ethics and law 
The needs of agency 
are generic if they are 
prerequisites of an 
ability to act at all or 
with any general 
chances of success, 
regardless of the 
purposes being 
pursued. 
Qualitatively: It 
applies to the idea 
that some things 
impinge on being 
able to act at all, 
where as other 
things, while not 
needed in this 
way, are needed 
for the possibility 
of successful 
action in general. 
Quantitatively: 
The criterion 
applies to the idea 
that deprivation of 
(or interference 
with) another 
generic need. 
Basic needs: Things 
that are needed for 
very possibility, 
including life itself, 
capacities involved 
in an ability to make 
choices, possession 
of mental 
equilibrium 
sufficient to enable 
one to these. 
Needs for the 
possibility of 
successful action 
Non-subtractive needs: 
Things are needed to be 
able to act successfully, 
without thereby being 
needed for the vary 
possibility of acting. To 
interfere with a 
non-subtractive need is 
diminish an agent’s 
chances of achieving her, 
his or its purposes 
regardless of what these 
purposes might be.
Additive needs: Things 
are needed to be able to 
improve one’s capacities 
for successful action, 
regardless of one’s 
purposes. 
The generic rights are strong or claim 
rights, are positive as negative, are 
rights under the will conception of 
rights and are moral rights. 
A morality is a set of categorically 
obligatory requirements for action that 
are addressed at least in part to every 
actual or prospective agent, and that are 
concerned with furthering the interests, 
especially the most important interests, 
of persons or recipients other than or in 
addition to the agent or the speaker. 
The criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action 
discriminates qualitatively 
and quantitatively. 
Arguments Means:Means:
The Map of the Principle of Generic Consistency 
Means:
Classify 
Utility 
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The Agent  
According to Gewirth, an agent is ‘an actual performer of actions or a prospective 
purposive performer of actions who does (perform) something voluntarily for a 
purpose that it has chosen.’9 It refers to a being with capacity to control its ability of 
doing something (X) through its unforced, informed choice,10 so as to try to achieve 
its purpose (E).11 It should be noted that E should be treated by an agent as the reason 
for its action12 since an agent is able to act ‘through consideration of characteristics 
understood to pertain to the possible address of practical precepts that are held to be 
based on reason.’13 
 
The Generic Rights 
As the agent must have ‘capacity’ to do X voluntarily for E, having the ‘capacity’ of 
action is crucial for its action. The rights to generic capacities of action, i.e., the 
‘generic conditions of agency (GCA),’ are termed the ‘generic rights.’ 
Obviously, not every need/ interest/ condition is generic to an agent. The needs of 
agency are generic only if ‘they are prerequisites of an ability to act at all or with any 
general chances of success.’14 To identify whether a need is generic, the first task is to 
 
9 Ibid 72. 
10 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 26, 171. 
11 Gewirth distinguishes an agent from a prospective purposive performer of actions (PPA). A PPA 
refers to a being that at least have the capacities required for agency– at least some disposition to 
exercise them. In this regard, it has capacities or at least some disposition to exercise them to control its 
performance of doing X through its unforced choice so as to try to achieve E, no matter E is in the 
action itself or in something to be achieved by the action. It is noted that the idea of PPA has been 
covered by the scope of ‘agent’ by Beyleveld and Brownsword. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human 
Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 72. 
12 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 39. 
13 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 171. Gewirth uses the term ‘reason’ in a very strict sense as 
comprising only the criteria of deductive and inductive logic. See ibid 22-23. 
14 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 70. 
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be clear on whether agency needs depend on the purpose being pursued. If a need is 
for a specific purpose and is neither essential nor sufficient to some other general 
purposes, then this need is not generic. Consequently, for generic needs of agency, the 
purpose of action is irrespective. This is because it may consist either of the action 
itself or in an outcome of the action.15 Due to the presence of the GCA, i.e., 
voluntariness (or freedom) and purposiveness (intentionality),16 what matters from the 
standpoint of the agent is that the purpose, in this motivational sense, seems to the 
agent to be good.17 
The second stage of identifying the generic needs is to look at whether they are 
prerequisites of an ability to act at all or with any general chance of success. For those 
generic needs of an ability to act at all, they are more necessary than those with any 
general chances of success. The generic needs of agency are, hence, hierarchical.18 
Since the generic needs of agency are ordered hierarchically, it is possible for one 
need to override another when there is a conflict. In this respect, logically, only a 
generic need of agency can outrank another generic need of agency.  
From the standpoint of the rational agent, Gewirth indicates that three kinds of 
generic needs are included, whatever the purpose being purposed. First, Gewirth 
regards the generic needs of an ability to act at all, i.e., ‘the general necessary 
preconditions of action,’ as ‘basic needs (goods).’ 19  The scope of basic needs 
encompasses physical and psychological dispositions such as life itself, capacities 
involved in an ability to make choices, and possession of mental equilibrium 
 
15 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 27.  
16 This is only under a general situation, for some exceptions such as purposiveness in the 
achieve-mental mode. See ibid 62.  
17 Ibid 51-52. 
18 Ibid 63. 
19 Ibid 54. 
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sufficient to enable one to achieve their purpose for very possibility.20 To interfere 
with the basic need, therefore, is to either destroy the prerequisites of the ability to act, 
or to diminish the chances of the agent to act at all.  
The other two categories of needs fall within the scope of the abilities for the 
possibility of successful action. These two kinds of needs, which are constitutive of an 
agent’s purpose, include so-called ‘non-subtractive needs’ and ‘additive needs.’ 
Non-subtractive needs consist of an agent’s ‘retaining and not losing whatever he 
already has that he regards as good.’21 To diminish non-subtractive needs, i.e., the 
goods that an agent already has for successful actions, is to diminish the chance of 
achieving its purposes. On the other hand, additive needs consist of an agent’s 
required needs and conditions in order to improve its capacity for successful action. 
Instead of preventing the loss of something that an agent has already acquired, 
additive goods are something it intends to gain.22  
 
3.3 The Dialectically Necessary Argument to the PGC 
3.3.1 The Dialectically Necessary Argument 
Gewirth terms his argument to23 the PGC a ‘dialectically necessary’ method to justify 
the PGC.24 Firstly his method proceeds from the standpoint of the agent – in a form of 
an internal dialogue, which is claimed by using a first-person perspective. His 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 54-55. 
22 It should be noted that, to be clear, according to Gewirth, additive goods are not basic or 
non-subtractive. Ibid 56. 
23 As Beyleveld puts, this argument is an argument to the PGC rather than an argument from the PGC. 
The latter one means a specific issue that the PGC is applied to. Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and 
Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic Consistency’ 15. 
24 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 44. Also, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Law as a Moral 
Judgement (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 129. 
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argument is thus dialectical; secondly, the formulated argument is dialectically 
necessary because it follows logically from a premise that no agent can coherently 
deny that it is an agent. This argument is presented to support the assertion that the 
PGC is the supreme principle of all ethics and law (including bioethics and biolaw) in 
so far as these are concerned with prescriptions.25  
The dialectically necessary justification can be outlined in three stages. By 
claiming to be an agent, I, by definition, must claim that: 
Stage I 
1. I do something (X) voluntarily for a purpose (E) that I have freely 
chosen. Since this purpose was freely chosen, I attach sufficient value to this 
purpose to motivate me to pursue it; thus, it is dialectically necessary to accept. 
2. My (freely chosen) purpose (E) is good (in this motivational sense). 
Besides, 
3. There are generic needs of agency. The needs of agency are generic 
if they are prerequisites of an ability to act at all or with any general chances of 
success, regardless of the purposes being pursued. On the basis of the principle of 
instrumental reason, whoever (insofar as this agent acts rationally) values/ 
pursues/ defends E, ought to value/ pursue/ defend the necessary means to E, 
whatever E might be. Since I must follow the principle that ‘whoever pursues an 
end must be prepared to pursue the means necessary to achieve the end’ (because 
being an agent, by definition, I do things as perceived means to my chosen ends), 
therefore, I must accept: 
4. My having the generic needs is good for my achieving my purpose 
 
25 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 69. 
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(E), whatever my purpose might be. Also, it is equivalent to saying that my 
having the generic needs is categorically instrumentally good for me. Because 
I value my pursued purposes proactively, I must accept: 
 
Stage II 
5. I categorically instrumentally ought to pursue my having the 
generic needs in order to pursue my purposes. Because the agent must value the 
generic needs only instrumentally, the agent cannot be prohibited categorically 
from waiving the benefits that having the generic needs would confer, therefore, I 
must accept: 
6. Other agents categorically ought not to interfere with my having 
the generic needs against my will, and ought to aid me to secure the generic 
needs when I cannot do so by my own unaided efforts if I so wish, which 
means, I must accept that: 
7. I have both negative and positive claim rights to have the generic 
conditions of agency. In short, I must accept that: I have the generic rights. It 
follows purely logically (Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency, ASA, 
which will be presented below) that I must hold that I am an agent → I have the 
generic rights at the same time. 
 
Stage III 
8. It follows by the logical principle of universalisability (LPU, stated 
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below) that I must accept that an agent has the generic rights, and hence, by the 
conjunction of steps 7 and 8, I must accept: 
9. All agents have the generic rights. Again, on the basis of the LPU, 
therefore,  
10. It is dialectically necessary for every agent to accept that all agents 
have the generic rights. In other words,   
11. Agents must accept that in their actions they must consider and 
take into account all agents’ claims to have both their negative and positive 
rights to have the generic rights, namely, that they are agents. Therefore,  
12. Agents must act in accordance with the generic rights of all agents, 
which is what the PGC requires. 
Two ideas set out above need to be explained: the ASA and the LPU. First, the 
ASA can be described as follows: 
7.1   To deny that ‘I am an agent → I have the generic rights’ is to deny that 
the fact that ‘I am an agent is sufficient for me to have the generic rights’, which is 
logically equivalent to asserting that 
7.2   It is necessary to satisfy condition (or, property)26 D in order for me to 
have the generic rights. This condition D is not necessarily connected with my being 
an agent i.e. some agents might have D, some might lack D. In other words, I affirm 
that ‘I have the generic rights → I have D’. Therefore,  
 
26 The possession of a ‘property’ D has been addressed in early contributions of Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, e.g., ibid 75, Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the 
Principle of Generic Consistency’ 22-23. It has been changed to satisfaction of a ‘condition’ in Deryck 
Beyleveld and Gerhard Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in 
Gerwirth's Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty’ (2009) 
20 King's Law Journal 7-8. The authors of the latest contribution note that it does not influence the 
whole structure and validity of the ASA. 
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7.3   I assert that without satisfying condition D, I do not have the generic 
rights – although I am an agent.  
7.4   However, according to the establishment of 7, I must accept that I have 
the generic rights, which means I am an agent (by definition) and at the same time I 
have the generic rights. In other words, it cannot be the case that I contradict that I am 
an agent if I do not consider that I have the generic rights. 
7.5   Therefore, if I assert by holding 7.3 is for me to contradict that I am an 
agent. Since I am an agent by definition, I must deny 7.3, and hence deny its 
equivalent 7.2. Hence, affirming that I am an agent is sufficient for me to have the 
generic rights. 
7.6   Thus, because I must affirm that I am an agent, this is sufficient for me 
to have the generic rights, as it demonstrates that ‘I am an agent → I have the 
generic rights’. 
Secondly, the LPU may be stated as follows.  
8.1   If S is a system of reasoning in which ‘S1 has the property Q, which is 
sufficient for S1 to have the property P’ is valid, then ‘S2 has the property Q, 
which is sufficient for S2 to have the property P’ is also a valid inference in S.27  
This pure logical principle is applied by Gewirth in order to show that ‘whatever 
is right for one person must be right for any similar person in similar 
circumstances.’28 
 
27 Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic 
Consistency’ 21. See also: Gewirth, Reason and Morality 105-107. 
28 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 105. 
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3.3.2 Objections and Replies 
This subsection aims to present some major criticisms and their replies of Gewirth’s 
argument to the PGC. As we shall see, most of sceptics focus on stages II and III.29 
Objections and Replies to Stage I 
Sherline argues that step 4 of the argument fails.30 This is because, he claims, the 
argument relies on the principle of hypothetical imperatives which is neither logical 
nor analytic. He contends that, on the basis of the fundamental concept of this 
principle, what an agent is required to accept is not something that an agent is 
logically required to accept. This is to say that if an agent refused to accept the 
requirement, he/ she/ it would not contradict that he/ she/ it is an agent. However, it 
has been noted that Sherline fails to realise that an agent, according to the definition, 
who did not accept this principle would not be able to act, and, consequently, would 
not be an agent.31 
Objections and Replies to Stage II 
Williams accepts the statement of the ‘self-referring ought.’32 However, he argues 
that, from my (the agent’s) standpoint of view, the interference from the statement of 
 
29 Beyleveld and Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in Gerwirth's 
Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty’20. Also, Beyleveld, 
‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’6. 
30 Edward D. Sherline, ‘Review of The Dialectical Necessity of Morality, by Deryck Beyleveld’ (1994) 
13 Canadian Philosophical Reviews 75-77. 
31 Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic 
Consistency’ 20. 
32 The statement of ‘self-referring ought’ means that ‘I ought to defend/ pursue my possession of the 
GCA.’ 
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the ‘self-referring ought,’ to the ‘other-referring ought’33 relies on a presumption 
that to deny that ‘I have a claim right to the GCA’ is to grant the other agent a right to 
interfere with my GCA.34 However, this presumption, in his opinion, is false because 
it contradicts the claim of the ‘self-referring ought.’ 
The denial of statement of the ‘other-referring ought,’ i.e., ‘other agents ought not 
to interfere with my having GCA’, nevertheless, may be egoistically considered by 
that ‘it is neither permissible nor impermissible for the other agent to interfere with 
my GCA,’ which does not require me to permit the other agent to interfere with my 
GCA.35 In this respect, he contends that36  
I can also ask why, if I am going to prescribe that much, I should not more 
ambitiously prescribe that no one interfere with whatever particular purposes I may 
happen to have. I want the success of my particular projects, of course, as much as 
anything else, and I want other people not to interfere with them. Indeed, my need 
for basic freedom was itself derived from that kind of want. But the argument is 
certainly not going to allow me to prescribe for all my particular wants. 
This is, indeed, a weak claim against the argument.37 However, this denial is not 
consistent with the acceptance of the statement of the ‘self-referring ought’ (which is 
also accepted by Williams). As the assertion that ‘I ought to defend/ pursue my 
possession of the GCA’ is dialectically necessary, I am required to assent to the claim 
that I must have a negative attitude toward any interference with my GCA. In this 
 
33 The statement of ‘other-referring ought’ means that ‘I have a claim right to the GCA.’ 
34 Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan 
Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (The University of Chicago Press 1991) 
166-171.  
35 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Taylor & Francis 2006) 61. 
36 Indeed, Williams points out that the argument ‘depends on a particular conception of the business of 
making rules, a conception that lies at the heart of the Kantian enterprise.’ Ibid 62.  
37 Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's 
Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 371. 
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regard, the suggested interpretation of the denial of the claim that I have a right to my 
GCA is compatible with my not having a negative attitude towards such interference. 
Accordingly, the above interference from ‘I ought to defend/ pursue my possession of 
the GCA’ to ‘I have a claim right to the GCA’ does not rely on ‘an unjustifiably 
limited interpretation of the denial’ of the later claim.38 
Moreover, Sherline argues that step 5 of the argument raises a question 
concerning the use of principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’39 He claims that it is neither 
logical nor analytical. Moreover, it might not be even, as he states, moral. However, 
the argument uses the principle that ‘it is correlative to the principle of hypothetical 
imperatives,’ and an agent ‘is required to assent to its requirements for the same 
reasons.’40 Hence, this objection is invalid.  
Objections and Replies to Stage III 
Without seriously taking account the presentation of the ASA involved in effecting 
steps 7 and 8, a variety of objections can be put forth with respect to these two steps 
(thus Stages II and III are both involved).41 For example, Bond claims that, as the 
generic rights are prudential rights secured according to my advocacy of my own 
 
38 Ibid 371. 
39 Sherline (n 30) 75-77. 
40 Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic 
Consistency’ 20. 
41 E.g., Adina Schwartz, ‘Review of Reason and Morality, by Alan Gewirth’ (1979) 88 Philosophical 
Review 654-656, EJ Bond, ‘Gewirth on Reason and Morality’ (1980) 11 Metaphilosopy 36-53, RB 
Brandt, ‘The Future of Ethics’ (1981) 15 Nous31-40, Gilbert Harman, ‘Justice and Moral Bargaining’ 
(1983) 1 Social Philosophy and Policy114-131, Richard M. Hare, ‘Do Agents Have to Be Moralists?’ 
in Jr. Edward Regis (ed), Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply by Alan Gewirth 
(University of Chicago Press 1984) 52-58, Christopher McMahon, ‘Gewirth's Justification of Morality’ 
(1986) 50 Philosophical Studies261-281, James P. Sterba, ‘Justifying Morality: The Right and the 
Wrong Ways’ (1987) 72 Synthese 45-69. For a detailed reply to objections in relation to prudential / 
moral rights claim issues about stage III of the dialectically necessary argument, see discussions with 
respect to objection #47 in Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence 
of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 257-281. 
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interests, any universalised rights must be also prudential.42 It is thus contended by 
Bond that the argument of ‘I must consider that an agent has a right to its GCA by 
application of the LPU’ cannot be established ‘without supposing that the rights-claim 
of Stage II is a moral right.’43 Similarly, Brandt claims that because the generic rights 
are secured according to the criterion of my agency interests and rights, 
universalization can only show that other agents must consider that they have generic 
rights as well.44 Moreover, other agents must also consider that any attempt to show 
that it follows that agents must respect each other’s generic rights claims requires a 
supposition that agents necessarily value the interests of others.45 
However, it must be noted that the LPU can be internally applied, which shows 
that the LPU is applied to the inference that is dialectically necessary within my 
internal viewpoint as an agent, making the claim ‘an agent who has a categorical need 
for generic conditions of agency has a claim right to generic conditions of agency’ 
dialectically necessary within my internal viewpoint as an agent.46 In response to 
Bond’s objection, therefore, Beyleveld points out that he fails to consider the internal 
application of the LPU.47  
The ASA makes the application of the LPU straightforward and proves that it is 
dialectically necessary for an agent to recognise that other agents have the generic 
rights.48 This argument, however, has also been criticised. For example,49 considering 
 
42 Bond (n 41) 50-51. 
43 Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's 
Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 259-261. 
44 Brandt (n 41) 31, 39-40. 
45 The reply offered by Beyleveld can be found at: Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: 
An Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 464-465. 
46 On the other hand, the external application of the LPU means that the LPU is applied from a 
dialectically necessary inference within my internal standpoint that all agents must consider the fact 
that they categorically need their generic conditions of agency give them a claim right to their generic 
conditions of agency. Ibid 59. 
47 Ibid 261. 
48 Indeed, with respect to stage III of the dialectically necessary argument, Williams notes that ‘It rests 
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the question of whether any agent can be substituted in my dialectical reasoning, 
suppose there are:  
Claim C1: possession of one specific instance of condition D will only 
belong to the agent from whose viewpoint the argument is 
conducted, i.e., ‘I am a member of the class of beings that 
necessarily values my purpose;’ and 
Claim C2: possession of D defining agents as a class will be possessed 
by all agents, i.e., ‘I am a member of the class of beings that 
necessarily values their own purpose; 
Scheuermann claims that the ASA can only show that the agent must take C1, 
rather than C2, to be the sufficient reason for her/ his/ its claim to have the generic 
rights.50 This implies an assumption that, without any justification, any agent can be 
substituted in my dialectical reasoning.  
However, it is indicated by Beyleveld that this assumption is not necessary.51 
This is because C1 implies C2, and conversely, C2 implies C1: these two claims 
mutually support each other. Accordingly, ‘they are substitutable in the argument at 
 
on the weakest and least contestable version of a “principle of universalizability,” which is brought into 
play simply by because or in virtue of. If a particular consideration is really enough to establish a 
conclusion in my case, then it is enough to establish it in anyone’s case. That must be so if enough is 
indeed enough.’ Williams (n 35) 60. 
49 For one of the other few objections in terms of the validity of the ASA, see: Singer 177-195. In his 
reply, Beyleveld contends that although there is an error in holding the principle of [(P & Q) → R] 
→ [P → (Q → R)] holds in entailment when defending the ASA in his work, ‘it does not 
actually require this principle to hold in entailment.’ See: Beyleveld, ‘A Reply to Marcus G. 
Singer on Gewirth, Beyleveld and Dialectical Necessity’ 458-473. 
50 James Scheuermann, ‘Gewirth's Concept of Prudential Rights’ (1987) 37 Philosophical Quarterly 
291-304. 
51 Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's 
Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 288-300. Also, Pattinson (n 3) 10-11. 
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any point where prediction of agency is the only issue.’52 
Noticing the involvement of the ASA in effecting Steps 7 and 8, furthermore, 
Chitty argues that Stage III remains invalid.53 He accepts that, on the grounds that I 
need the GCA to act for any of my purpose E and the principle of instrumental 
reasoning, I have the rights to the GCA. However, he argues that step 8 does not 
follow step 7. This is because step 8 can only follow step 7 if the former steps can be 
generalised to an argument showing that ‘I had to conclude that any agent had generic 
rights.’ Nevertheless, such a generalised argument cannot be valid. This is because, as 
Chitty argues, in steps 1-7, even if it is accepted that any agent has to accept that 
herself/ himself/ itself has generic rights, the protagonist and the subject would still be 
the same person. Hence, the validity of the argument from step 1 to step 7 depends on 
the fact that its protagonist is the same person as its subject. Accordingly, step 7 
cannot be generalised to step 8, as it only works for the case in which its subject is the 
protagonist of the argument. 
In his reply, Beyleveld contends that although Chitty seems to accept that I have 
the rights to the GCA (in what we have seen in Stage I of the argument), he does not 
take at least two crucial points into consideration: 
Ca: I contradict that I am an agent per se if I do not evaluate actions in terms of 
my prudential criterion; and  
Cb: The principle of instrumental reason: If my doing/ having X is necessary to 
achieve my purpose E, I ought to attach the same proactive value to my 
 
52 Beyleveld and Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in Gerwirth's 
Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty’ 12. 
53 Andrew Chitty, ‘Protagonist and Subject in Gewirth's Argument for Human Rights’ (2008) 19 King's 
Law Journal 1-26. 
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doing/ having X as I attach to E. 
In this regard, on the basis of the acceptance of claim Ca, I am only rationally 
compelled to consider that I have the rights that are formally validated by my 
prudential criterion. Crucially, it should be noted that ‘[t]he epistemological status of 
my rights claim is then neither merely nor essentially prudential, but (for me) also and 
essentially dialectically necessary.’54 In combination of the acceptance of claim Cb, 
because the rational requirement for me to evaluate actions in terms of my prudential 
criterion is a function of Cb, ‘the dialectically necessity for me to accept what is 
validated relative to my prudential criterion, and with it the validity of Gewirth’s 
argument as a whole, rests on it being dialectically necessary for me to employ the 
principle of instrumental reason.’55 
Overall, two main types of sceptics can be identified. First, as Williams contends, 
interference from the ‘self-referring ought’ to ‘other-referring ought’ relied on a ‘false’ 
presumption. Secondly, there are doubts on the ASA and applications of the LPU. 
Although objections to this argument are continuously being made, the identification 
of the flaw is yet to be successfully reached. Indeed, even if there is a flaw in stages II 
and III, the alternative argument set out below is capable of dealing with this. 
 
3.4 An Alternative Argument: The Dialectically Contingent 
Argument form the Acceptance of Human Rights 
An alternative argument to the PGC is presented by Beyleveld in his contribution The 
 
54 Beyleveld and Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in Gerwirth's 
Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty’ 3. 
55 Ibid 3. 
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Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights.56  
As we have seen, stages II and III of the dialectically necessary argument have 
been criticised by most sceptics. In this regard, in combination with the dialectically 
necessary argument and the dialectically contingent argument, it is put forth by 
Beyleveld that:57 
Stage I 
1. Suppose that stage I of the dialectically necessary argument, i.e., the claim 
that ‘my having the GCA is categorically instrumentally good for me,’ is valid; 
and that 
2. I, as a matter of contingent fact, make the impartial assumption that I am 
committed to treat any other agent’s need for the GCA with the same 
concern and respect as I treat my own. I consider that any others’ need for 
the GCA must be treated as though their need were my own, in determining 
what I may do. 
3. Running the risk of contradicting this impartiality, or denying that I am an 
agent, I must hold that unless any other agent is willing to accept generic 
harms, I categorically ought to act in any other agent’s generic needs. This 
entails that I categorically ought to act in any other agent’s generic needs, 
in accordance with her/ his/ its will. This entails that 
4. Any other agent has the generic rights. It follows that on pain of denying: (1) 
 
56 Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’1-18. 
This version of dialectically contingent argument for the PGC has been regarded as a version of ‘the 
argument form categorically binding other-regarding categorically obligatory requirements on action,’ 
or ‘the argument from morality.’ Ibid 16. It is noted that a morality, under the PGC, is a set of 
other-regarding (i.e., addressing at least in part to every agent and concerning with furthering the 
interests) thesis. For the dialectically contingent arguments to the PGC, see: Beyleveld, ‘Legal Theory 
and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic Consistency’ 15-41. Beyleveld 
and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 77-82. 
57 Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 6-8. 
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that all agents categorically ought to be treated completely equally; or (2) that 
as I am an agent, I must accept that all agents, including me and any other 
agent (other than me), have the generic rights. This entails that: 
5. All permissible actions must be consistent with the generic rights of all 
agents, which is what the PGC requires. 
 
Stage II 
6. The idea that ‘everyone should be treated equally’ is a widely accepted 
premise, stated in human rights instruments as an initial and universal value58 
and confirmed by the courts continuously and consistently.59  Taking for 
example the Preamble 60  and Articles 1 61  and 2 62  of the UDHR, since 
international human rights conventions generally claim that all human beings 
are equal in dignity and rights, it entails that all human agents categorically 
ought to be treated as equal in dignity and rights. Accordingly, human rights 
treaties/ provisions commit to complete impartiality of this alternative 
argument on pain of denying that the Declaration can have any coherent 
 
58 It is argued that the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity are followed by very first human rights 
instruments. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 80. Moreover, the 
idea of ‘everyone should be treated equal’ is equivalent to saying that each person is to have equal right 
to a community. The latter idea is in line with the first principle of justice of Rawlsian theory of justice. 
See discussions below. 
59 Most of philosophical arguments for competing moral principles are demonstrated according to 
contingencies of this idea. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 44. For example, as Rawls 
puts, in ‘the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system for 
all.’ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised edn, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1999) 
206-207. 
60 The very first sentence of the Preamble of the UDHR declares that it recognises ‘the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ 
61 Article 1 puts that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ 
62 Article 2 states that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind…’ 
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application to or by human agents.  
7. This does not, however, necessarily follow that the human rights instruments/ 
conventions, e.g., the UDHR, are committed to the PGC. This is because the 
impartiality required by the PGC operates between agents towards the GCA, 
whereas the impartiality stated in the human rights instruments operates 
between humans towards rights enshrined in the conventions. To show that 
human rights instruments are committed to the PGC, it must be declared that 
the existence of any human rights implies declaring that human agents 
have human rights to the generic rights, or justifying that it is 
dialectically necessary for me to have claim rights to the GCA. However, 
as the approach of the alternative argument is to ‘skip’ stages II and III of the 
dialectically necessary argument, thus constituting a rejection of all scepticism 
about these two stages, the latter argument is not considered here (although it 
is valid). 
8. The GCA are needed to be able to exercise any right to act.63 On the basis of 
the principle of instrumental reason (as in stage I of the dialectically necessary 
argument), it is insincere to claim that an agent has a human right to do 
something without granting this agent a right to possess the means necessary 
for it to exercise that right. Accordingly, appreciation of the concept of the 
GCA requires those who accept the human rights conventions to hold that 
human agents have human rights to the GCA. 
9. Again, however, it should be emphasised that only the acceptance of human 
rights that satisfy all features of generic rights result in the recognition 
 
63 This implies that the scope of rights protected by the UDHR or any other human rights instruments 
can be wider than human rights to the GCA. Indeed, the PGC welcomes human rights other than the 
generic rights. The only thing matter is that the GCA are needed to be able to realise the declared 
human rights.  
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that the PGC is a necessary criterion of legal validity. Therefore, any 
human rights instruments under the will-conception must, ‘on pain of 
contradicting that it is a convention on human rights, be interpreted in line 
with the requirements of the PGC.’64 
10. Nevertheless, since the rights to the GCA are assumed to be compatible with 
the conclusion of stage I of the dialectically necessary argument, the rights to 
the GCA implied by the human rights instruments must be assigned as 
rights under the will conception. 
11. Accordingly, the recognition of the impartiality of human rights 
instruments with respect to dignity and inalienable rights entails 
acceptance of the rights granted by the PGC. 
The alternative argument considers the implications of stage I of the dialectically 
necessary argument for the interpretation of human rights.65 Structurally, stage I of it 
presents the methodology of the alternative argument: if the first stage of the 
dialectically necessary argument is sound, and the impartial assumption that human 
beings are equal in dignity and rights is accepted, the claim that ‘all agents should act 
in accordance with the generic rights of all agents’ must follow. The second stage, 
takes the UDHR, which proclaims its acceptance of the impartiality assumption, as an 
example, showing that appreciation of the concept of the GCA requires those who 
accept human rights conventions to hold that human agents have human rights to the 
GCA.  
Since the coupling of categorical necessity of the conclusion of stage I of 
Gewirth’s argument with a commitment to whole impartiality requires me to grant the 
 
64 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 82. 
65 Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 6. 
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generic rights to any other agent, stage II of the dialectically necessary argument is 
valid. Because I have the same attitude towards any other agent’s need for the GCA as 
I must have toward my own need for the GCA (on the basis of the requirement of the 
complete impartiality assumption), I must grant the generic rights of any other 
agent.66 In this respect, the attitude I must have towards my need for the GCA ‘must 
be equivalent in meaning to or entail’ that I have claim rights to the GCA.67 This is 
not to assume that I am actually committed to complete impartiality. Rather, this 
attitudinal equivalence is ‘a direct implication of the fact’ that if I were to have the 
same normative attitude towards any other agent’s need for the GCA as I must have 
towards my own need for it, I would be required to grant any other agent the generic 
rights.68  
According to this alternative argument, it is supposed that stage I of the 
dialectically necessary argument is sound. However, in this regard, this argument 
‘implies that the only possible problem with the dialectical necessary argument lies 
with stage III.’69 Nevertheless, as illustrated in the last section, these objections are 
not convincing.  
However, there are limitations to this alternative argument. The most obvious one 
is that this argument does not fully render the PGC dialectically necessary, as the 
premise that ‘every human being categorically ought to be treated equally’ is a 
dialectically contingent premise. Hence, the argument does not present that this 
contingent premise must be accepted.70 It thus seems that the premise is based on 
external considerations. Nevertheless, it is arguable that this contingent line of 
 
66 Ibid 7-8. 
67 Ibid 8. 
68 Ibid 8. 
69 Ibid 8. 
70 Ibid 16-17. 
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reasoning is commonly accepted by different individuals and cultures71 – at least, this 
is accepted in the European and Formosan legal regime. Moreover, there are, indeed, 
claims that this contingent premise is valid. For example, Gauthier argues that, 
although not necessarily in all cases, it is in our interest to treat everyone equally in 
general (as we are not perfect).72  
If these arguments are sound, then ‘any legal system that recognizes human rights 
(under the requisite conception of these) must regard actions that violate human rights 
as legally invalid.’73 Therefore, the enforcement machinery of any part of a network 
of international human rights treaties of universal or regional application, e.g., the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR, the ECHR74 and the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, must be interpreted to conform to the PGC.75  
 
3.5 The Content of Agency Rights  
A handful of features of the generic rights, which are interpretive and justificatory 
consequences of the dialectically necessary argument as well as the entailment of the 
alternative justification set out in the last section, must be noted. 76  First, the 
dialectically necessary argument for the PGC renders it dialectically necessary for 
 
71 Ibid 17. 
72 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (OUP 1986), citing from Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of 
Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 17. 
73 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 69. 
74 It is arguable that the fundamental rights and freedoms grants by the ECHR can be viewed as rights 
to capacities (or other features) that are necessary to exercise of any rights at all. If this argument is 
valid, the rights claimed by the ECHR correspond to the generic conditions of agency. Deryck 
Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 18 King's 
Law Journal 286. 
75 In fact, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that the human rights instruments ‘do operate with’ the 
features of human rights required above. See: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics 
and Biolaw 82. 
76 Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 8-16. 
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agents to grant inalienable generic rights to all agents. The PGC thus imposes duties 
on other agents to respect the generic needs of an agent, no matter whether those 
generic rights are positive or negative.  
Secondly, the PGC is a moral77 principle and the generic rights are rights under 
the will conception of rights.78 The will-conception of rights means that an agent has 
no perfect duty to itself to defend its possession of these generic conditions. In this 
respect, agents can waive the benefits of the GCA. This is different from the interest 
conception of rights holding that agents accept a perfect duty to themselves, as this 
conception of rights argues that the primary function of human rights is to protect and 
promote certain essential human interests. 79 In this regard, the generic rights are 
claim-rights under the will-conception means that ‘duties imposed on other agents by 
the positive rights are subject to the rights-holder wishing assistance, while duties 
imposed by negative rights are subject to interference being against the rights-holder’s 
will.’80 
With respect to these features, a question immediately and inevitably comes to 
mind: as the dialectically necessary argument grants the generic rights per se to all 
agents, then, can other beings, such as those beings with only part of the capacities to 
control their performance of doing X through their unforced choice so as try to 
achieve E, whatever E is, possess quasi-generic rights?  
Gewirth states his argument of extending the objects of the generic rights from 
 
77 According to Gewirth’s theory, ‘[a] morality is a set of categorically obligatory requirements for 
action that are addressed at least in part to every actual or prospective agent, and that are concerned 
with furthering the interests, especially the most important interests, of persons or recipients other than 
or in addition to the agent or the speaker.’ Gewirth, Reason and Morality 1. 
78 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 71-72. 
79 In their contribution Beyleveld and Brownsword reject Gewirth’s argument that there are ways in 
which agents can have perfect duties to themselves. Ibid 106-108. Gewirth, Reason and Morality 334. 
80 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, Privacy, and Medical Research’ in 
Michael Boylan (ed), International Public Health Policy and Ethics (Springer Netherlands 2008) 2. 
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agents to partial agents as follows:81 
1. Being an agent is only necessary to possess full generic rights. This is because 
the ASA of the dialectically necessary argument demonstrates that being an 
agent is sufficient for it to possess ALL generic rights.82 Being an agent, 
hence, is sufficient, but not necessary for possessing generic rights. The PGC 
thus grants moral status to non-agents. 
2. Gewirth applies the principle of proportionality to extend the possession of 
generic rights to partial agents.83 He argues that by applying the principle of 
proportionality, together with the PGC, partial agents possess limited generic 
rights to a lesser extent. The degree to which partial agents possess generic 
rights depends upon the degree of approach to agency, i.e., the generic 
capacity of agency, on a proportional basis. 
However, this argument meets objections that suggest that this is not necessarily 
true: it is argued that having full generic capacities of agency is not only necessary 
and sufficient to possess generic rights in full, but also ‘necessary to possess any 
generic rights at all.’84 This is because: 
1. The generic rights are rights under the will-conception of rights. Only agents 
can voluntarily waive the benefits by their free choice when not interfering 
with their duties to other agents. 
2. The PGC reciprocally imposes duties on other agents to respect the generic 
needs of any other agent, whether the generic rights are positive or negative. 
 
81 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 120-121. 
82 See Section 3.3.1. Also, Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 118. 
83 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 121. 
84 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Precautionary Reasoning as a Link to Moral Action’ in 
Boylan Michael (ed), Medical Ethics (Prentice-Hall 2000) 39-53. See also: Beyleveld and Brownsword, 
Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 118, and Pattinson (n 3) 20-21. 
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Therefore, only agents can be subjects of duties to any degree. 
3. The principle of proportionality can only be applied to interferences that alter 
the quantity, but not the quality, of holding a property. In this respect, 
Gewirth’s argument commits ‘the fallacy of disparateness.’85 The principle of 
proportionality cannot therefore derive quasi-generic rights, or at least, cannot 
be employed to support his ‘quasi-generic rights’ claim alone. 
4. Moreover, if Gewirth’s claim of quasi-generic rights were valid, then the PGC 
should require an agent to act in accordance with the generic rights and 
quasi-generic rights of all partial agents. This would add an unnecessary 
requirement to the PGC and accordingly affect the ontology of his theory. 
Therefore, only agents possess any generic rights at all and only agents have the 
duty to respect the generic needs of an agent by the PGC. Nevertheless, this does not 
entail that, when applying the PGC to the real world, agents do not owe generic duties 
in relation to other non-agents. Indeed, the agents also owe the indirect duties in 
relation to those non-agents which have particular relationships/ connections with 
other agents. To do generic harms to those non-agents is to interfere with the GCA of 
those agents. For example, if an agent A is a musician who has a piano, since a duty to 
A is a duty owed as a result of properties (such as this piano) possessed by A, other 
agents owe duties not to harm the property (piano) of A (apart from the exemptions 
which can be justified in accordance with the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action).86 
What about other beings/ creatures without particular relationships/ connections 
with agents? Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that agents ‘must accept that they 
 
85 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 119. 
86 Pattinson (n 3) 4. We shall visit an idea very much similar to this when commenting issues with 
respect to consent in the data protection principles in section 6.4.1. 
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have duties towards all living creatures (human or non-human) on a proportional basis’ 
by practically approaching the matter from the application of the PGC to beings in the 
real world and society.87 In this respect, the first step is to identify which beings are 
agents in the empirical world. 
From the standpoint of an agent, she can only ascertain that she is an agent due to 
her imperfect knowledge towards others. However, according to Beyleveld and 
Pattinson, the categorical nature of the PGC requires agents to employ precautionary 
reasoning,88 which obliges the agents to presume that all ‘creatures whose agency is 
uncertain’ are agents. 89  This is because the PGC is a moral principle that is 
categorically binding. Accordingly, it can never be justified that one ignores any 
possibility to avoid running the risk of violating the PGC owing to the categorical 
nature of the PGC. The risk of violating the PGC, therefore, must be minimised in so 
far as it is possible to do so. For this reason, it is unacceptable to presume that an 
ostensible agent90 is not a generic-rights-holder because an agent cannot firmly 
ascertain that this ostensibly agent is not an agent.  
Let me explain this through an example. If A is not an agent, to presume that A is 
an agent can only restrict my act (toward A) to some extent; I am still a holder of 
generic rights – this does not violate the PGC. On the other hand, however, if I 
mistakenly presume that A is not an agent, my denial of A’s agency, which denies that 
A is a holder of generic rights, violates the PGC.91 This mistake can be avoided by 
 
87 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 112. 
88 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Precautionary Reasoning as a Link to Moral Action’ 39-53. 
89 Pattinson 22-26. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 112-113, 
121-134. 
90 An ostensible agent is some other being displaying all the characteristics and behaviour expected of 
an agent. However, as I cannot access this ostensible agent’s mind, it is logically possible to say that 
this ostensible agent is ‘merely a cleverly programmed automation without a mind.’ Pattinson 22-23. 
91 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 121. 
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employing the precautionary principle suggested by Beyleveld and Pattinson:92 
If there is no way of knowing whether or not X has property P, then, is so far as it is 
possibly to do so, X must be assumed to have Property of P is the consequence of 
erring in presuming that X does not have P are worse than those of erring in 
presuming that X has P (and X must be assumed not to have P if the consequences of 
erring in presuming that X has P are worse than those of assuming that X does not 
have P.)93 
Therefore, if A is an ostensible agent, the possibility that A is an agent must be taken 
to in its entirety.94 
In the light of the purpose of thesis, I will only discuss privacy and data 
protection issues in relation to human beings. In this respect, all living human beings 
at least can be considered as partial ostensible agents.95 In sum,  
A. An agent possesses any generic rights at all. Reciprocally, an agent owes 
duties to respect (act in accordance with) the generic rights of all agents. 
B. An agent also owes the indirect generic duties in relation to those non-agents 
which have particular relationships / connections with other agents. 
C. An agent owes direct duties to all living creatures (human or non-human 
 
92 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Precautionary Reasoning as a Link to Moral Action’ 39-53. 
93 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 122. 
94 As regards those apparent partial agents who act with a less extent possibility to be agents than 
ostensible agents, according to ‘the criterion of avoidance of more probable harm,’ when these 
duties to apparent partial agents come into conflict, beings who are more probable agents override less 
probable agents on a proportional basis. See: ibid 122-123. 
95 As regards those who are apparently no more than partial agents, the PGC still obliges the agents to 
presume that ALL creatures whose agency are uncertain are agents. This is because the possibility that 
they are agents cannot be ruled out entirely. With respect to potential agents, it is required by the 
principle of precautionary to grant some moral status to them according to the strength of evidence they 
displayed to be potential ostensible agents. This is because, based on the reasoning of precautionary, 
‘evidence that a being E is a potential ostensible agent is evidence relevant to the possibility that E is an 
agent.’ Ibid 125. 
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beings whose agency is uncertain) on a proportional basis according to the 
degree of the necessary capacities of agency to which they evidentially act. 96   
The other features of the generic rights will also require a brief discussion.  
As the generic rights are granted to agents simply by virtue of being agents, the 
dialectical necessity of the generic rights renders them inalienable.97 Furthermore, the 
generic rights can be positive as well as negative. This is because the fact that the 
dialectically necessary argument is driven by an agent’s categorical instrumental need 
for the GCA (Stage I). However, this is subject to the proviso that positive action to 
protect an agent’s generic conditions of agency cannot be required of another agent if 
the other agent’s assistance conflicts with (at least) equally important generic rights or 
interests of another agent.98 
The understanding that generic rights operate under the will-conception principle 
entails that an agent can waive the benefits of generic rights if they wish to do so. 
Accordingly, he/ she/ it does not have duties to protect, or at least not to harm, their 
own generic agency interests if he/ she/ it does not wish to do so. However, such a 
waiver should not endanger, again, equally or more important generic rights/ interests 
of other agents. Moreover, such a waiver should be on the basis of permitting an 
informed agent to engage freely in activities that are not favourable to the generic 
agency interests of the agent.99 As the PGC is dialectically necessary, the dignity of 
human agents must reside in their capacities for action to achieve the voluntarily 
chosen purposes. It is therefore contrary to the specific dignity of the agent if the 
 
96 Stephen Smith, ‘Precautionary Reasoning in Determining Moral Worth’ in Michael Freeman (ed), 
Law and Bioethics: Current Legal Issues Volume 11 (OUP 2008) 204-212. 
97 Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 15. 
98 Ibid 14. 
99 Ibid 12. 
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waiver of the benefits of generic rights is not in accordance with that agent’s consent 
under the right conditions.100 
I have put forward that whilst considering the waiver of benefits of the generic 
rights and positive actions to assist an agent if she so wishes, the attention in relation 
to the hierarchy of generic rights must be considered. In the next section I will present 
a detailed discussion to illustrate a logical consistency rule which is compatible with a 
hierarchy whereby some interests/ rights are overridden by others. 
 
3.6 How the PGC Approaches the Question of Reconciling 
Competing Rights and Interests: the Criterion of Degrees of 
Needfulness for Action 
Essentially from the will-based conception of Gewirthian moral theory, agents are 
permitted to do anything as long as they are not violating generic rights of other 
agents. In this case, there are possibilities for conflicts to occur between generic rights 
of different agents. According to Gewirth, the duty to respect agents having the more 
necessary goods takes precedence over the duty to respect their having the other 
goods when two duties conflict.101 Based on the restrictions imposed by the PGC, 
considerations resolving conflicts of rights are presented in relation to the direct102 
application of the PGC:103 
 
100 The conditions are unforced and informed choice. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 
7. 
101 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 340. 
102 For discussion with regard to indirect application of the PGC, see section 4.3. 
103 These rules at some level echo the argument of proportionality under precaution in play. The author 
already regarded the principle of proportionality and consent issues when delivering the descriptive 
chapter in relation to the ECHR. 
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1. To deal with conflicts of rights/ interests of the same degree of importance, 
one must follow the criterion of prevention or removal of inconsistency, 
namely, ‘[i]f one person or group violates or is about to violate the generic 
rights of another and thereby incurs transactional inconsistency, action to 
prevent or remove the inconsistency may be justified.’104 
2. The criterion of degrees of needfulness for action is used to deal with ‘goods 
of the different degree of importance, but mainly within the same general 
context of preventing transactional inconsistency.’105 This criterion can be 
expressed as follows: 
(1) The basic needs are the most necessary of all generic needs.  
(2) Within the category of the needs for the possibility of successful action, 
non-subtractive needs are more necessary than additive ones, thus in the case 
of conflict, rights to non-subtractive needs outweigh rights to additive needs. 
This is because, as Gewirth points out, possessing the former needs is usually 
a necessary condition of being able to acquiring the latter needs.106 
It should be noted that, from the standpoint of an agent, within the same category 
of generic needs, there is still an order of generic needs placed ‘in a hierarchy 
according to the degree to which they are needful for action per se and for successful 
action generally.’107 Moreover, Gewirth emphasises that this criterion is concerned 
with ‘preventing violations of rights, not with increasing amounts of goods,’ which 
 
104 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 342-343. 
105 Ibid 343. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 85. For example, among these 
basic needs, there is still a hierarchical ordering. Gewirth points out that among basic needs, life is the 
first priority, followed by various physical and psychological needs such as food, health and shelter. 
See: Gewirth, Reason and Morality 63. A number of examples can be found at: ibid 341-342. 
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distinguishes it from the utilitarian idea.108 
Furthermore, the canon of degrees of needfulness for action can be classified in 
both a qualitative and quantitative way. The former applies from the viewpoint that 
generic needs of an ability to act at all are apparently more necessary than those with 
any general chances of success. On the other hand, the latter applies to the idea 
concerning the interference with other generic needs. No matter which qualitative 
categories (either ability to act at all or ability to act with any general chances of 
success) the generic needs fall under, to interfere with a generic need may have 
quantitative (either greater or lesser) effects.109 
3. There must be rules governing agents’ interactions in a complex society. ‘In 
the case of procedurally justified rules, their requirements override in 
particular cases the duty not to coerce one’s recipients so long as the latter 
continue voluntarily to accept the rules.’110 However, it should be noted that 
only after the fulfilment of the following conditions, these requirements can 
override ‘the duties to refrain from occurrently coercing or harming these 
persons’:111  
A. The requirements are necessary to prevent undeserved coercion and 
serious harm.  
B. The requirements do not go beyond what is needed for such protection.  
C. The taxational coercions and harms imposed are slight by comparison 
with the harm they remove. The requirements are imposed by the 
procedures of the method of consent.  
 
108 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 344. 
109 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 70-71. 
110 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 344. 
111 Ibid 344. 
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Under these conditions, the proportionality principle operating under precaution 
is called into play.112 It should be also noted that the three criteria listed above for 
resolving conflicts are NOT in any respect mutually exclusive.113 Moreover, although 
‘such priorities entail that in certain circumstances the requirements of some moral 
rules justified by the PGC must be overridden by the requirements of other rules that 
are also justified by the PGC,’114 this does not ‘remove the categoricalness either of 
the principle or of its derivate rules.’115  
With reference to practical applications of how the criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action and successful action determines the precedence of a right in 
competing cases, the requirements of the PGC depend on particular circumstances 
when various competing rights come into conflict. In other words, the rights granted 
by the PGC depend upon ‘contingent circumstances attending the interaction of 
individuals.’116 The rights that the PGC grants are not absolute in conflicting cases – 
except the only possible circumstance suggested by Gewirth himself – the right of 
innocent persons not to be killed against his will.117 
 
3.7 Reasons for the Adoption of the PGC and Replies to the 
Objections 
The identification and weight of the rights and interests evoked by the studies 
focusing on balancing tests will surely differ from one moral theory to another. To 
 
112 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 55-56. 
113 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 345. 
114 Ibid 339. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 83. 
117 Ibid.  
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most legal researchers, it saves considerable effort to adopt a theory of ‘current trend’ 
in their writing up of works. The Gewirthian moral theory applied by the thesis, 
however, seems difficult to place within the current trend. In this respect, let us take 
one of the most popular rationalist ethical theories118 – Justice Theory of John 
Rawls –119 as an example to show why the thesis does not choose the popular one. 
The very initial idea of Rawls’ theory to consider justice is to ask, by conducting 
a thought experiment, which principles we would choose in an ‘original position’120 
of equal share of liberties, behind a ‘veil of ignorance’121 that would prevent one from 
knowing anything about who in particular one is. His conception of Justice Theory 
demands:122 
1. Liberty must be maximised, constraints against such a principle is only 
subject to necessity of protection of liberty itself;  
2. The First Principle of justice states that 
‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system for all;’123 and  
 
118 It is observed, for example, that one cannot discuss the issues, at least in the English speaking world, 
in relation to justice without mentioning John Rawls. See: Ruth Anna Putnam, ‘Why Not a Feminist 
Theory of Justice?’ in Martha Craven Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds), Women, Culture and 
Development: A Study of Human Capabilities (OUP 1995) 303. Also, M.D.A Freeman, Lloyd's 
Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 583. Indeed, the Rawlsian theory is 
also popular in the Mandarin speaking world currently. 
119 The Rawlsian theory is then reformulated by himself in Political Liberalism. See: John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (2nd edn, Columbia University Press 2005). 
120 For the idea of ‘original position’ and its justification, see: Rawls, A Theory of Justice 15-17. It is 
noted that in Rawls’ Political Liberalism, the ‘original position’ is addressed as a ‘device of a 
representation.’ See: Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition 15. Briefly, the idea of original 
position is to ‘set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed will be just.’ Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice 118. 
121 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118-119. 
122 Ibid 206-207. Also, Freeman (n 117) 584. 
123 It is noted that in Political Liberalism, ‘the most extensive total system’ is replaced by ‘a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties.’ Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition 291. 
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The Second Principle demands: 124 
‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:  
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and  
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.’ 
In the second principle of justice governing a given society’s social and economic 
institutions, principle of 2(a) has been referred to the difference principle, whilst 2(b) 
is termed the fair opportunity principle. Furthermore, Rawls contends that in being a 
rational person, an individual in the original position should recognise that ‘they 
should consider the priority of these principles’ in order to assign weights for 
adjudicating his or her claims on another.125 The principles of justice, in this regard, 
are ranked in a ‘lexical order’ and ‘therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake 
of liberty.’126 This is named ‘the first priority rule.’127 ‘The second priority rule,’ 
furthermore, states that 
1. ‘The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency 
and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages;’ and  
2. ‘Fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.’128 
 
124 Also, ibid 291. 
125 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 37. 
126 Ibid 207. 
127 Two cases in relation to this principle are provided by Rawls:  
(a) A less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;  
(b) A less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. 
128 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 207. Another two cases are provided by Rawls: 
(a) An inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser 
opportunity;  
(b) An excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this 
hardship. 
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In terms of this lexical order, ‘the order requires us to satisfy the first principle in 
the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before we consider the 
third, and so on.’129 The lexical order in relation to the priority of weighing competing 
liberties against each other, similarly to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action, can be of essence for the purposes of weighing when conflict of rights and 
interests is involved.130 
However, Gewirth observes that the lexical order of priority is not131  
derived from any of his principles, including his first principle of equal freedom; 
instead, the specific ordering he presents is based on considerations external to the 
principles, consisting in presumed reasons or motives persons have for choosing the 
principles … 
He argues,132 moreover, that the arrangements of the lexical order seem to reflect the 
preferences of Western liberalism ‘rather than providing a rational basis or 
justification of such liberalism.’133 Comparatively, the Gewirthian justification to the 
PGC is based on the dialectically necessary argument, which does not require agents 
to understand and agree with the line of reasoning since it is logically necessary 
irrespectively of an agent’s capacity to know the justification.134 This character, which 
does not apply to the Rawlsian justice theory, however, is particularly important for 
the thesis to develop guidelines regarding regulations of the two technologies in 
 
129 Ibid 38. 
130 See: Chapter 4. 
131 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 341. 
132 There is another objection argued by Gewirth in light of the Rawlsian moral theory, namely the 
inability to appeal to ‘independent rational justification’ to justify the theory. See: ibid 19. For a similar 
evaluation of the PGC against the Rawlsian theory, see: Phil Bielby, Competence and Vulnerability in 
Biomedical Research (Springer 2008) 84-87. 
133 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 341. 
134 Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's 
Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 149-150. 
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privacy and data protection law regimes.135 
Returning to the popularity of moral theories, it has been said that the PGC is 
hardly to be suggested as a popular one in academic circles. Indeed, on first reading of 
Gewirth’s argument to the PGC, reviewers (including some leading scholars) might 
think that they have found certain flaws in the argument.136 Academic resistance to 
Gewirth’s theory, therefore, has been solid and continuous.137 This resistance to the 
PGC is nevertheless, unsuccessful. Indeed, later readings and responses from those 
Gewirthian scholars frustratingly reveal most of these flaws to be misunderstandings. 
Most of the critiques against the justification of the PGC rest on stages II and III of 
the dialectically necessary argument. To me, at least until now, no objection generates 
insurmountable difficulties.138 Moreover, the alternative argument that links the first 
stage of the dialectically necessary argument with the dialectically contingent 
justification for the PGC, in this case, is able to answer most of the questions. 
Debates over the PGC do not form a sound basis against the PGC. By contrast, 
these academic discussions in terms of the PGC are even more popular: a series of 
recent discussions regarding the PGC are published in Ratio Juris and King’s Law 
Journal.139 Accordingly, the resistance to the PGC does not affect my willingness to 
 
135 See section 7.1. 
136 See section 3.3. 
137 Discussions, criticisms and responses about the argument to the PGC can be found at Beyleveld 
and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 77-82, 87-110. See also, Beyleveld, ‘Legal 
Theory and Dialectically Contingent Justifications for the Principle of Generic Consistency’ 17-19. 
Pattinson 8-9. Also, Jr. Edward Regis (ed) Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply 
by Alan Gewirth (University of Chicago Press 1984) and Michael Boylan, Gewirth: Critical Essays on 
Action, Rationality, and Community (Rowman & Littlefield 1999). 
138 For a summary of replies to critics, see: Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An 
Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency 360-396. 
139 See: Tony Ward, ‘Two Schools of Legal Idealism: A Positivist Introduction’ (2006) 19 Ratio 
Juris127-140, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Principle, Proceduralism, and Precaution in 
a Community of Rights’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 141-168, Robert Alexy, ‘Effects of Defects—Action or 
Argument? Thoughts about Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment’ 
(2006) 19 Ratio Juris 169-179, Peter Koller, ‘The Concept of Law and Its Conceptions’ (2006) 19 Ratio 
Juris 184-186, Massimo La Torre, ‘On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: 
“Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 197-200, Stuart Toddington, ‘The Moral Truth 
92 
 
                                                                                                                                           
rest arguments by accepting the PGC as an adequate theoretical framework. Crucially, 
it should be noted that, as discussed above, the two justifications provided are 
applicable, adequate and convincing enough to this thesis. 
However, while this thesis contends that the PGC is the most powerful theoretical 
framework for the purposes of this study, it must be proposed that, to be clear, rather 
than defending or providing full analysis of this moral theory, the major task of this 
thesis is only to apply it to produce clear guidelines and principles for legislation in 
Europe and Taiwan. Furthermore, while it is possible for one to challenge that 
choosing a similar type of framework to the Rawlsian justice theory to compare with 
the PGC is too selective and too narrow, it must be emphasised that it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to take an overall evaluation of the PGC against all of the rest of 
rationalist ethical theories.140  
 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the theoretical framework which this thesis chooses to 
apply. The PGC has been briefly illustrated. By showing the justifications of the PGC 
in sections 3.3 and 3.4, I propose the PGC as the supreme moral principle applicable. 
These arguments also provide sufficient motivation of employing the PGC in this 
thesis. Then, I outlined the features of the generic rights. I have shown that the generic 
 
about Discourse Theory’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 217-229. Bev Clucas, ‘The Sheffield School and 
Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti-Positivism’ (2006) 19 Ratio 
Juris 230-244, Robert Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 287, 
Robert Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 176, Søren Holm and John Coggon, ‘A 
Cautionary Note against “Precautionary Reasoning” in Action Guiding Morality ’ (2010) 22 Ratio Juris 
295-309, Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Defending Moral Precaution as a Solution to the 
Problem of Other Minds: A Reply to Holm and Coggon’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 258-273, Chitty (n 53) 
1-26, and Beyleveld and Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason in 
Gerwirth's Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A Response to Andrew Chitty’ 1-20. 
140 Also, Bielby (n 131) 87. 
93 
 
rights are: (1) granted by the PGC to all agents; (2) inalienable; (3) rights under the 
will conception; and (4) rights as positive as negative. Section 3.6 addressed direct 
application of the PGC as the general methodology. By comparing it with one of the 
most popular theories, additionally, reasons for the adoption of the PGC were further 
demonstrated in section 3.7. To answer the research question, specific applications of 
this moral theory to various issues will be explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
The Specific Application of the PGC to the Balancing Test 
Issues 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Building on the Gewirthian framework presented in Chapter 3, this chapter aims to 
elaborate a specific application of the PGC to the balancing test between privacy and 
competing rights. This will be undertaken in two main steps, namely providing a 
philosophical analysis of privacy concepts and specifically applying the PGC. 
To apply the PGC, the need to concentrate on the generic conditions of agency 
(GCA), which are ‘simply whatever is/ might be necessary for action as such or 
successful action in general’,1 must be considered. The focus of this thesis is directly 
related to privacy, since the right to privacy is the main (yet not the only) fundamental 
right regarding data protection. To achieve the goal of the chapter, therefore, the 
starting point will be the philosophical analysis of privacy concepts in order to assist 
further progress. When these concepts are appropriately understood, they can enable 
us to see what is equitable and what is inequitable in the positions.  
The second step will switch to the question of how to specifically apply the PGC 
to the central issue of this thesis, i.e., how to strike a balance between competing 
rights. According to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘[t]he metaphor of balancing refers to 
                                               
1 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 50. 
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theories of constitutional interpretation that are based on the identification, valuation, 
and comparison of competing interests (emphasis added).’2  Applying a theoretical 
framework as a balancing test, therefore, needs to deal with three tasks: to identify, 
evaluate and compare competing interests. Based on the PGC, in weighing competing 
rights and interests, the necessary steps are: (1) specifying what this right covers 
(identification stage); (2) asking which of these are the GCA and at what level 
(evaluation stage); and (3) deciding which rights can override the other rights 
(comparative stage). 
In this respect, this section will firstly address the right to privacy granted by 
Article 8 of the ECHR as an example of specific application of the PGC and thus 
subsequently identify the protected rights. This is because, as we shall see, there is a 
need to interpret the Data Protection Directive in a manner which is compatible with 
the ECHR.
3
 The ECHR, however, does not provide any explicit guidance to assess 
how to strike a balance between the rights granted. Besides, it does not grant the PGC 
official standing. The concern of this stage is thus to examine whether the ECHR is in 
line with the PGC.  
Secondly, the need to evaluate the rights at issue in the light of the GCA can be 
satisfied by examining whether the violation of generic rights is permitted or 
justifiable under the exemptions listed in Article 8(2). Lastly, to decide which generic 
rights take precedence over other generic rights in case of conflict, the PGC offers the 
criterion of degrees of needfulness for action. This criterion will be examined to show 
whether it is capable of providing the added value that the proportionality principle 
                                               
2 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 
945. 
3 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 366-367. 
For discussion in detail, see: section 5.2.1.3.1. 
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under the ECHR regime cannot. Then, we shall present a real-life case closely 
connected with the main issue of the thesis. 
 
4.2 Philosophical Analysis of Privacy Concepts 
4.2.1 Defining Privacy? 
What is ‘privacy’? It is of no surprise that discussions usually start with some 
common adjectives for the concepts of privacy: complex, vague, disarray, equivocal, 
etc. For example, in the Right of Privacy, Richard A. Posner starts his first sentence of 
the article with ‘[t]he concept of “privacy” is elusive and ill defined.’4 Daniel Solove 
opens his contribution Understanding Privacy
5
 by using ‘Privacy: A Concept in 
Disarray’ as the title of the opening chapter, in which he remarks that ‘[n]obody can 
articulate what it means’.  6 Commentators even argue that ‘[p]rivacy is a notoriously 
elastic and equivocal notion’7 because it has a ‘protean capacity to be all things to all 
lawyers.’8 
In philosophical discussions,
 9
 some approaches to privacy are sceptical, mainly 
contending that privacy is merely analysable or reducible to the claims of others. Two 
                                               
4 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 393. The essay pays its 
attention on the law and economics of informational privacy, arguing that the trend of the privacy 
protection of the individual is ‘the opposite of what one would expect if efficiency considerations were 
motivating privacy legislation.’ Ibid 422. 
5 Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2009). The ideas of this 
American privacy advocate will be presented and discussed in the later Chapters of this thesis.  
6 Ibid 1. 
7 Hilary Delany and Eoin Carolan, The Right to Privacy: A Doctrinal and Comparative Analysis 
(Thomson Round Hall 2008) 4. 
8 Tom Gerety, ‘Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 234. 
For other similar comments, see: Daniel J. Solove and Paul M. Schwartz, Informational Privacy Law (3 
edn, Aspen Publishers 2009) 41. 
9 For a rather detailed discussion, see: Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal 
Norms (CUP 2002) 6-8, 28-85. Also, Kenyon Mason and Graeme Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith's 
Law and Medical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2011) 224-226. 
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main arguments of this account have been distinguished:
10
 first, privacy can actually 
be expressed without referring to privacy at all; second, as Schoeman puts it: 
‘theorists who defend privacy fail to give sufficient weight to the socially and 
individually demoralizing aspects of a society in which respect for privacy is 
institutionalized.’11  
Judith Jarvis Thomson is said to be amongst the most famous and influential 
scholars of the reductionist school.
12
 She argues that most privacy claims actually can 
be well characterised in terms of other general liberty interests, in particular property 
rights or rights in respect of the person.
13
 Additionally, some commentators have 
offered alternative versions of this argument. For example, while having much in 
common but being slightly weaker than Thomson’s argument, Russell Brown suggests 
that due to the confusing use of privacy employed by the courts, the right to privacy 
should be better understood as the product of the legal concept of exclusivity.
14
 Apart 
from these views, Posner uniquely presents his economic critique in which he argues 
that privacy is inadequately protected.
15
  
It has been correctly argued that, however, the sceptical approach of privacy 
cannot work properly due to the lack of ‘widespread culture, linguistic or conceptual 
understanding’16 of privacy. Moreover, though a new right to privacy does not have a 
                                               
10 Ferdinand Schoeman, ‘Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions’ (1984) 21 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 209-210. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 6. Also: Judith DeCew, ‘Privacy’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/privacy/> accessed 21 Feburary 2011 The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/> assessed on 01 January, 2011.  
13 Judith J. Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 295-314. 
14 Russell Brown, ‘Rethinking Privacy’ (2006) 43 Alberta Law Review 589. Russell Brown’s approach 
is termed as the ‘substitutive approach’ by Delany and Carolan, see: Delany and Carolan (n 7) 5-6. 
15 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981). 
16 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 6. For example, in his article The Right of Privacy, Posner considers 
merely parts of informational privacy, as the study of information has become a crucial field of 
economics. Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’ 393. 
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clear foundation in most old constitutions such as the US Bill of Rights, the French 
Declaration of Rights 1789, it is argued that there is a conceptually coherent concept 
of privacy.
17
 The later amendments on constitutional documents and the international 
human rights instruments do support this new trend.
18
 This argument is more 
persuasive in the modern technological era in which the debate around privacy 
concerns dramatically is rife in both academic and practical fields. In sum, without 
sufficient justification that privacy derives from other types of protected rights,
19
 the 
reductionist theories suffer from the inability to capture developing dimensions of 
privacy.
20
  
On the other hand, there are theorists defending the fundamental value of privacy 
interests.
21
 It should be noted that any discussion of such an approach must deal with 
the question of how to specifically look at the concept of this claim. To be more 
specific, to define the concept of privacy is to extract an image of privacy describing 
what makes it clearly different from other ideas.
22
 This should include common ideas 
held under the rubric of privacy. In this regard, Solove observes that ‘traditional’23 
method of conceptualising privacy is to locate a category encompassing the essence of 
privacy which is separate from other conceptual categories.
24
 With this in mind, six 
general types of conceptions of privacy are distinguished:
25
 
                                               
17 Judith DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology (Cornell University 
Press 1997). 
18 Eric Barendt, ‘Ptivacy as a Constitutional Right and Value’ in Peter Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty 
(Claredon Press 1997) 8. 
19 Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation (OUP USA 1992) 36. 
20 For more detailed critics and responses to reductionists, see: Amy L. Peikoff, ‘The Right to Privacy: 
Contemporary Reductionists and Their Critics’ (2006) 13 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 
474, cited from citation 127 in Solove, Understanding Privacy 38. 
21 This approach is termed the ‘intuitionist approach,’ see: Delany and Carolan (n 7) 6. 
22 Solove, Understanding Privacy 13-14. 
23 In Solove’s contributions he suggests a ‘new’ method to conceptualise privacy. See: ibid. Also, 
Daniel J. Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087-1155. 
24 Solove, Understanding Privacy 14-15. 
25 Ibid 12-13. Also, Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ 1087. Similar discussion on the conceptions of 
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1. The right to be let alone (the vary famous view addressed by Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis which is often considered as the foundation of American 
privacy law);
26
 
2. Limited access to the self (the ability to remove oneself from unwanted access 
by others);
27
  
3. Secrecy (hiding from others); 
4. Control over personal information (the ability to control over personal 
information); 
5. Personhood (the protection of an individual’s moral and physical integrity); 
and 
6. Intimacy (to control one’s intimate relationships). 
Applying the method of conceptualising, each type of conception should be 
capable of maintaining its coherence by encompassing essential ideas and uses of 
privacy. For example, scholars who suggest that the concept of privacy is equivalent 
to a situation in which one intends to be let alone can encompass essential ideas such 
as limited access to the self (in order to be let alone), secrecy, control personal 
information (which is an essential instrument to satisfy the purpose of being let alone).  
Each of these types, however, as Solove indicates, falls short of providing a full 
account of privacy. The influential inspiration of Warren and Brandies, for instance, 
‘fails to provide much guidance about what privacy entails.’28 This is because the 
conception itself does not offer an approach for dealing with ‘the matter how one 
should be let alone.’29 As regards the inaccessibility point of view, which extends 
                                                                                                                                      
privacy, see: Charles Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 483-493. 
26 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 14 Harvard Law Review 193-220. 
27 This conception is also termed as ‘inaccessibility.’ See: Delany and Carolan (n 7) 8-9. 
28 Solove, Understanding Privacy 17. 
29 Ibid. 
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more broadly than being let alone, embracing freedom from interference from both 
public and private spheres, the problem is on its inapplicability to all situations. Thus, 
as Delany and Carolan argue, the inaccessibility concept of privacy suffers from an 
inability to explain ‘far more complex and multi-faced questions of social existence’30 
encompassed by privacy.  
So, what will the PGC say about privacy? Is privacy a type of the generic 
conditions of agency?  
As indicated in Chapter 3, the needs of agency are generic only if ‘they are 
prerequisites of an ability to act at all or with any general chances of success.’31 Most 
theorists consider privacy as essential to act at all or at least improve the chance of 
success
32
 – regardless of whether it is understood as having an intrinsic or 
instrumental value.
33
  Even if some theorists who are in favour of the sceptical 
accounts of privacy and argue against both ‘the coherence thesis and the 
distinctiveness thesis,’ 34  the other relevant rights such as property rights still fall 
                                               
30 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 9. 
31 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 70. 
32 For example, Charles Fried puts it: ‘The conception of privacy as a necessary context for love, 
friendship and trust depends on a complex account of these concepts, and they in turn depend on the 
more general notions of morality, respect and personality.’ Fried (n 25) 478. He goes on to address that 
‘[t]he principle of morality does not purport to represent the highest value in a person's economy of 
values and interests. It necessarily assumes that persons have a variety of substantive values and 
interests and it is consistent with a large range of ethical systems which rank these values and interests 
in many different ways. It functions rather as a constraint upon systems and orderings of values and 
interests, demanding that whatever their content might be, they may be pursued only if and to the 
extent that they are consistent with an equal right of all persons to a similar liberty to pursue their 
interests, whatever they might be. Thus the principle of morality, far from representing a complete 
system of values, establishes only the equal liberty of each person to define and pursue his values free 
from undesired impingements by others. The principal of morality establishes not a complete value 
system but the basic entitlements of persons vis&-vis each other.’ See: Charles Fried, ‘Natural Law and 
the Concept of Justice’ (1964) 74 Ethics 237-250. 
33 As a matter of fact, intrinsic and instrumental value of privacy need not be mutually exclusive. See: 
Solove, Understanding Privacy 84. 
34 Ferdinand Schoeman terms the question which asks: ‘does an analysis of privacy in terms of a 
variety of interests rather randomly associated do justice to our conception of privacy’ as the 
‘coherence issue.’ He terms the question which asks: ‘does an analysis of privacy in terms of other 
interests point to anything distinctive about privacy, in contrast to other values we find it important to 
protect?’ as the ‘distinctiveness issue.’ Schoeman (n 10) 205. 
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under the scope of generic rights. 
Alan Gewirth who set out the PGC dealt with privacy in his contribution. He 
argues that privacy falls within the concept of generic rights. In his article The Basis 
and Content of Human Rights, he addresses that:
35
 
Besides these three components of the right to well-being, the human rights also 
include the right to freedom. This consists in a person’s controlling his actions and 
his participation in transactions by his own unforced choice or consent and with 
knowledge of relevant circumstances, so that his behaviour is neither compelled nor 
prevented by the actions of other persons. Hence a person’s right to freedom is 
violated if he is subject to violence, coercion, deception, or any other procedures 
which attack or remove his informed control of his behaviour by his own unforced 
choice. This right includes having a sphere of personal autonomy and privacy 
whereby one is let alone by others unless and until he unforcedly consents to 
undergo their action. (emphasis added) 
It seems that, however, the right to be ‘let alone’ is hardly the whole map of the 
concept of privacy, as it is merely a general type of conception of privacy. 
Nevertheless, this right can arguably be read in a broader sense. For example, limited 
access to the self, secrecy, control over one’s personal information, and control over 
one’s intimate relationships, may be interpreted as falling under the heading of ‘the 
right to be let alone’ as Gewirth defined. 
However, such interpretation cannot cover concepts relating to some end or 
purpose constituting an agent’s reason for acting, e.g., the agent’s bodily integrity/ 
personhood (including her/ his/ its physical and moral integrity) and private 
                                               
35 Alan Gewirth, ‘The Basis and Content of Human Rights’ (1979) 13 Georgia Law Review 1159. 
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environmental spaces (shelters). This is because, as Gewirth divides the generic needs 
into two categories, namely voluntariness (or, generic freedom) and purposiveness (or, 
generic well-being),
36
 privacy seems to be placed under the voluntariness category of 
generic needs, which is regarded as instrumental to purposiveness.
37
  
Indeed, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that there is no need to distinguish 
these two categories.
38
 Two reasons are provided. Firstly, this enables the essence of 
the argument for the PGC to be presented simply in the light of the abstract category 
of generic needs. Secondly, this can ‘leave specification of the generic needs (both 
abstract and concrete) to application of the PGC.’39 This is particularly important in 
identifying the problem of privacy at issue.  
Overall, in terms of the method of conceptualising, each conception of privacy is 
either too narrow and thus too restrictive, or too broad and thus too vague.
40
 Even 
though Solove tried to propose a ‘pragmatic privacy’ theory to reconstruct privacy, 
which aims to ‘shift the discussion from elucidating the inherent meaning of the term 
“privacy” to discussing the nature of certain problems’41 by applying the ‘taxonomy’ 
understanding of privacy,
42
 it has been argued that his model is ‘logically circular’ and 
fails to ‘provide a coherent account of privacy.’43 However, it does not follow that, as 
claimed above, one should therefore accept the reductionist theories which tend to 
                                               
36 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978) 27. The former one means 
that its performance is under an agent’s aforementioned control; the latter means that the agent acts for 
some end or purpose that constitutes his reason for acting. 
37 Gewirth argues that ‘[a]lthough voluntariness or freedom, unlike purposiveness, is not conceptually 
tied to ends or purposes, the agent’s control of his own behaviour serves, and is at least sometimes 
perceived by him as serving, as a means to attaining his ends.’ Ibid 52. 
38 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 71, cite 4. 
39 Ibid 71. 
40 Solove, Understanding Privacy 37. For the other observations and comments of conceptions of 
privacy, see: ibid 21-37. 
41 Ibid 106. 
42 Ibid 39-77, 101-170. 
43 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 10. 
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consider the right to privacy as hardly distinguishable from a general right to liberty. 
Instead, to protect the individual against high-handed interference by others, it is 
rather unwise to tag or limit the concept of privacy. 
 
4.2.2 The Value of Privacy 
Analysing and conceptualising the understanding of privacy should involve both the 
entailments and the value of privacy. An assessment of the interests and values 
brought about by privacy is likely to assist in analysing concepts of privacy from a 
theoretical angle. This is because, as Delany and Carolan put, ‘[i]f we can understand 
the reasons why privacy is protected, we may be in a better position to devise a legal 
regime which is capable of achieving this end.’44  
Why is privacy worth protecting? Again, it is unsurprising that since there are 
multiple conceptions of privacy, a variety of theses have been offered by theorists. A 
brief overview regarding the reasons for cherishing privacy provided by scholars and 
practitioners can be found in Solove’s contribution:45  
 Promotes human well-being; 
 Is vital to self-development; 
 Creates and improves intimate relationships; and  
 Is essential for democracy. 
The values in the above list are by no means an exhaustive taxonomy. On the 
                                               
44 Ibid 11. 
45 Solove, Understanding Privacy 79-80. 
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other hand, critiques to privacy can also be listed:
  46
  
 Threats society, community and solidarity; 
 Impedes social control; 
 Makes it difficult to establish trust and judge people’s reputations; 
 Shrouds the abuse and oppression of women at home (by feminist 
scholars); 
 Is a past-time value; and 
 Conflicts with the freedom of information and other values. 
To understand why writers elaborate on the value of privacy in such a way, how 
their theories value privacy must be understood. Philosophers and ethicists defend the 
value of privacy through different motivations.
47
 For example, the consequentialist or 
instrumentalist theories, by holding that ‘the ends justify the means,’ assume that a 
morally right act will produce positive consequences. This shares similar ideas to the 
Utilitarian theories when assessing the value of privacy. This claim, which has been 
applied in the US courts, tends to consider that personal privacy is hardly enough to 
outweigh a social good such as the value of freedom of expression.
48
 Under the 
applications of Utilitarianism, scholars argue that individuals would be more willing 
to seek medical attention and participate in medical research if they could do so 
privately.
49
  
Indeed, Utilitarian theories focus on collective privacy rather than on personal 
                                               
46 Ibid 80-83. Also, Schoeman (n 10) 199. 
47 Similar view on the English common law on confidence, see: Shaun D. Pattinson, Medical Law and 
Ethics (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell Limited 2009) 196-197. 
48 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 12. 
49 Anita Allen, ‘Privacy and Medicine’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/privacy-medicine/> accessed 21 February 2011 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) < 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy-medicine/> assessed on 01 January, 2011. 
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privacy. To seek the best balance of utility over disutility, it values privacy in order to 
achieve the maximum good in general. As individual interests can be put together and 
meaningfully compared, corporate privacy and other ‘greater’ social values should 
therefore override personal privacy.  
On the other hand, deontological (rights-based as well as duty-based) theories, 
holding that the promotion of privacy is beneficial to respecting the value of human 
dignity and autonomy, tend to agree that concepts of privacy should be treated as ‘a 
value which is inherently deserving of protection.’50  Examples51 can be found in 
contributions by philosophers such as Stanley Benn,
52
 Julie Inness,
53
 and Beate 
Rössler.
54
 It should be noted that the Kantian approach is regarded as central to 
deontological moral theories. Charles Fried, for instance, classifies his assessment of 
the value of privacy as Kantian because ‘it requires recognition of persons as ends, 
and forbids the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of 
maximizing the happiness or welfare of all.’55 
Furthermore, most of their work focuses on individual autonomy and autonomy 
as a social value. The ‘autonomous individual’ refers to the ability of an individual to 
control access to their self
56
 by their free will.
57
 ‘Autonomy as a social value’ mainly 
presents the other-regarding characteristic of an autonomous individual, which 
‘depends on a complex network of social mores and expectations.’58 In her broadly 
                                               
50 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 12. 
51 Solove, Understanding Privacy 85. 
52 Stanley I. Benn, ‘Freedom, and Respect for Persons’ in J. Roland Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds), 
Nomos XIII: Privacy (Atherton Press 1971) 2, 26. 
53 Inness (n 19) 95. 
54 Beate Rössler, The value of privacy (Polity Press 2005) 117. 
55 Fried, ‘Privacy’ 478. 
56 James Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 326. 
57 Delany and Carolan (n 7) 14. 
58 Ibid. For example, Charles Fried considers privacy as that ‘aspect of social order by which persons 
control access to information about themselves. How this control is granted to individuals and the 
means for bringing about the social structures which express the notion of privacy have not been of 
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cited essay Coercing Privacy,
59
 Anita Allen, sharing other nonconsequentialists’ views 
on privacy, claims that privacy ‘has value relative to normative conceptions of 
spiritual personality, political freedom, health and welfare, human dignity, and 
autonomy.’60 She continues her argument by remarking that ‘[t]o speak of “coercing” 
privacy is to call attention to privacy as a foundation, a precondition of liberal 
egalitarian society. Privacy is not an optional good, like a second home or an 
investment account.’61 In terms of her view on privacy, it seems that an agent cannot 
give away the exercise/ benefit of that right. Recalling the above theorists who 
consider privacy as an ability to control personal information, her view on the right to 
privacy may be considered as either signing up a duty-based or an interest-conception 
agenda.  
 
4.3 How to Apply the PGC: Article 8 of the ECHR  
4.3.1 Some Remarks on the Application of the PGC 
Gewirth distinguishes two different types of application of the PGC: direct and 
indirect.
62
 In the former type of application, the requirement of the PGC (that agents 
ought to act in accordance with the generic rights of all agents) is ‘imposed upon the 
interpersonal actions of individual persons.’63 In this regard, it involves application of 
the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action to resolve conflicting cases.  
In light of the right to privacy, the direct application of the PGC is regarded as 
                                                                                                                                      
direct concern.’ Fried, ‘Privacy’ 493. See also, Rachels (n 56) 326-331. 
59 Anita Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 723-757. 
60 Ibid 738. 
61 Ibid 740. 
62 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 200. 
63 Ibid 200. 
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deontological consequentialism.
  64
 The PGC is a consequentialism with regard to the 
procedure of judging actions according to their consequences for the generic rights of 
agents.
65
 However, this character must not be confused with Utilitarian 
consequentialism, as the PGC concerns the generic rights. Specifically, a generic harm 
caused by an action against the other agent can be justified under the PGC not 
because its consequences will achieve the maximum good, but as the action will 
correct or prevent such a generic harm (in a precautionary sense), and only if it is 
clear that the harm cannot otherwise be removed.
66
 In this light, it is possible for other 
fundamental rights and freedoms to override the right to privacy. However, it is noted 
that ‘corporate privacy’ or other collective interests should not be able to override 
personal privacy (as required by the utilitarian approach).  
It is noted that there are limits to the direct application  of the criterion of degrees 
of needfulness for action. for example, diffculties arise when comparing the rights of 
an apparent agent with an apparent non-agent (e.g., a new-born baby) when: 
(1) the same generic interest held by the two sides is not in conflict; or 
(2) the apparent agent’s less important generic interest (lower degree of 
needfulness for action) and the apparent non-agent’s higher degree of 
needfulness for action are in conflict. 
                                               
64 Ibid 216. 
65 Ibid, see also, Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 56. 
66 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 216. 
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This is because, as Beyleveld notes, this weighting requires a specific value ‘to be 
assigned to the precautionary probability of the apparent non-agent being an agent for 
which there is no obvious dialectially necessary answer.’67  
In this regard, there must be rules governing agents’ interactions in a complex 
society to deal with difficulties described above. An indirect application of the PGC 
can assist. The PGC’s requirements are indirectly imposed upon the interpersonal 
actions of agents through the ‘mediation of various social rules that govern 
multiperson activities and institutions, and the requirements of these rules in turn are 
imposed upon the actions of individuals who participate in the activities and 
institutions in accordance with their governing rules.’68 These social rules include 
international and domestic human rights instruments. Again, it should be noted that 
these international/domestic human rights instruments must conform to the PGC and 
be structured in line with the GCA.  
A preconditioned question thus must be asked before identifying the rights 
covered by the jurisdiction at issue: is the ECHR in line with the PGC? Adopting 
Beyleveld and Brownsword’s insight, I argue that the ECHR is fully (at least broadly) 
in line with the PGC. This is because, based on the dialectically contingent 
justification, the interpretation of international human rights instruments must 
conform to the PGC.
69
 Moreover, since: (1) Stage I of the dialectically necessary 
argument concludes that ‘my having the generic conditions for agency is categorically 
good for me’; (2) the preamble of the ECHR considers the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which declares that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in 
                                               
67 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 
(2012) 13 Human Rights Review 16. Also, Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics 
and Biolaw 255-258. 
68 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 200. 
69 See: section 3.4. 
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dignity and rights’ (emphasis added); and (3) Article 1 of the ECHR requires that the 
Member States secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in the context of the ECHR; it seems that the ECHR is in line with the PGC.  
However, this argument is not yet convincing enough. This is because the reasons 
illustrated above can only show that any agent who considers that any human being 
has a human right to do anything must consider that all human beings have equal 
rights to the GCA. This is not to say that any agent who considers that any human 
being has a human right to do anything must accept the PGC. It must be noted that 
‘only that acceptance of human rights under the will conception of rights requires 
acceptance of the PGC.’70 This is because the PGC operates on the basis of the will 
conception. This can also be understood by reading stage II of the dialectically 
necessary argument. Nevertheless, as I have presented in Stage II of the alternative 
argument and as we shall see in the following subsection, the interpretations given by 
the ECtHR are in line with the idea that generic rights are under the will-conception 
rather than the interest-conception.  
As regards ostensible agents, however, the ECHR itself does not directly protect 
the rights of the members of some special groups.
71
 Nevertheless, based on the 
precautionary principle previously discussed, it is reasonable for these special groups 
to fall under the protection of the ECHR. It follows that duties to them do not 
correspond to the generic rights, but are justified relatively to them.  
                                               
70 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 82. 
71 Ibid 81. The recent extension of human rights to these members of minority groups is controversial. 
With respect to the ECHR, the protections to human embryos, which can be considered as potential 
partial agent, for example, are indirectly guaranteed by Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997). See: < 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm>. Assessed on 12 November, 2010.  
110 
 
 
4.3.2 The Rights Protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR  
The interests protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR include: (1) private life; (2) 
family life; (3) home; and (4) correspondence. None of these interests, however, is 
self-explanatory in the simple wording of this Article. Nevertheless, the notion of 
Article 8(1) has been given an extended meaning consistent with ‘social and technical 
developments’ by the ECtHR interpretations.72 The widening categories of Article 8(1) 
embrace issues including personal status and identity, moral or physical integrity and 
intellectual freedom, privacy in public and private space, personal and business 
communications, collection and use of personal information, sexual activities, sexual 
identity and gender, ethical identity, rights to one’s image, social life, and the 
enjoyment of personal relationships.
73
  
The following discussion of the breadth of the rights covered by Article 8 of the 
ECHR will be classified in three main categories: (1) spatial privacy; (2) decisional 
privacy; and (3) informational privacy.
74
 This differentiation is based on the remark in 
which Anita Allen proposes in her influential article Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private 
Choice, and Social Contract Theory.
75
 The reasons why I adopt her identification are: 
                                               
72 David Harris and others, Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 361-362. Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 41 para 57. Also, Niemietz v 
Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97 para 29; Pretty v UK 2346/02 (App no 2346/02) 2002-III 35 EHRR 1 
para 61; and P.G. & J.H. v. U.K. (App no 44787/98) ECHR 2001-IX para 56. 
73 See: David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 
527-536. Also, Harris and others (n 72) 364-371; Robin White and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey, 
The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn, OUP 2010) 358-401. S and Marper v UK (App 
nos 30562/04 and 30566/04) ECHR 4 (App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04) ECHR 4 para 66. 
74 There are other ways of categorisation. For example, Mason and Laurie contend that privacy consists 
of two aspects only: informational privacy and spatial privacy. See: Mason and Laurie (n 9) 224-225. 
75 Anita Allen, ‘Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory.’ (1987) 56 
Cincinnate Law Review464-466. Also, Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ 723. In fact, this method of 
distinguishing dimensions of privacy is not a stranger in the international privacy literatures. See for 
example: Rössler. In Rössler’s contribution, she suggests three dimensions of privacy, namely 
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1. There is an absence of a clear articulation in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
regarding categories on which the Strasbourg Court relies. Although there are 
indeed some contributions that try to identify the Court’s observation about 
the concepts and scope of Article 8,
76
 the Court itself has recognised no 
official categorisation; 
2. However, in addressing issues regarding the plethora of different rights 
covered by Article 8, a clear categorisation simplifies the analysis ; moreover, 
3. There is no limit in relation to the classification of concepts of privacy on the 
basis of the PGC; and 
4. Allen’s categorisation is followed by a majority of Formosan scholars, 
practitioners and the constitutional interpretations.
77
  
In this regard, the adoption of her categorisation can be used as a general 
application ensuring the consistency of this thesis. Several points should be noted 
before going on: first, since the interpretation of Article 8(1) given by the Court is 
‘dynamic and continuous,’78 which is not susceptible to exhaustive definition; the 
discussion below only involves present types of issues. Secondly, the variety rights 
covered by Article 8 are closely related to each other, some of which are ‘connected 
with each other and some overlap.’79 Thirdly, after indicating a rich diversity of rights 
that fall under the heading of the right to private life covered by Article 8, only 
selected issues focusing on the specific forms of privacy that are relevant to the thesis 
will be discussed further. 
                                                                                                                                      
decisional privacy, information privacy and local privacy. 
76 E.g., N. A. Moreham, ‘The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human 
Rights: a Re-examination’ (2008) 1 EHRLR 44-79. 
77 Section 5.4. 
78 Feldman (n 72) 527. 
79 Harris and others (n 72) 361. 
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Spatial Privacy (I): Moral and Physical Integrity 
This sub-category of the right to private life has been observed by the Strasbourg 
Court consistently. For example, a person’s body integrity has been considered as ‘the 
most intimate aspect of one’s private life.’80 In this connection the right to be free 
from physical and sexual assault and exposure, therefore, is said to be the first interest 
to fall within this sub-category.
81
 In the Y. F. v Turkey Case the Court concludes that 
any interference with a person's physical integrity must be prescribed by law and 
requires the consent of that person. This attitude reiterates in cases such as Pretty v 
UK,
82
 concerning assisted suicide, in which the Court notes that the concept of 
individual autonomy is of central importance. Similarly, in Glass v UK
83
 the Court 
indicates that medical treatment in the face of parental oppositions interferes with the 
child’s right to private life. 
It must be noted that, although the requirement of harming against body integrity 
in Article 8 is not as strict as Article 3 of the ECHR, not every act affecting bodily 
integrity constitutes a violation of Article 8 rights.
84
  
Spatial Privacy (II): Private Space 
A number of cases regarding private space are frequently considered by the 
Strasbourg Court. These include the right not to be spied upon, watched, or harassed. 
The harm involved is usually caused by the controversy concerning surveillance or 
the interception of communications.
85
 Situations normally take place with regard to 
                                               
80 E.g., Y.F. v Turkey (App no 24209/94) ECHR 2003-IX, para 33. Also, X and Y v the Netherlands 
judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no 91, para 22. 
81 Moreham (n 76) 49. 
82 Pretty v UK paras 73-78. 
83 Glass v UK (App no 61827/00) 2004-II 39 EHRR 341. 
84 Costello-Roberts v UK (App no 13134/87) (1993) 19 EHRR 112 para 36. 
85 The right of not being spy on (surveillance and observation) might also be considered as within the 
113 
 
the collection and retention of personal data from governmental surveillance
86
 with 
the view of securing national security and criminal defence.
87
 Sometimes the harm 
can be also serious with respect to the private sector. A recent example is the UK 
phone-hacking scandal in July 2011, which involves the ‘understandably attracted 
intense interest from politicians and the media whose daily business is power.’88  
One crucial issue in relation to this category is how to understand the concept of 
‘a zone of privacy.’ It is observed by Harris and others that this zone of privacy 
‘relates to the person whose private life is at issue’ rather than the place where the 
interference occurs.
89
 This closely involves and sometimes even overlaps with the 
definition of ‘home’ in Article 8. Similarly, although the Court defines the ‘home’ as 
‘usually be the place, the physically defined area, where private and family life 
develops and that the individual has a right to the quiet enjoyment of that area,’90 the 
notion of it has been extended, for example, to include business premises where 
business is conducted from home.
91
  
The interests protected by such a zone of privacy cover both the physical/ 
concrete enjoyments of residence there and those non-physical ones, such as noise, 
smells, or any forms of unpleasant emissions.
92
 This sub-category of the right to 
private life thus also includes the right to have clean and quiet space to live in. The 
                                                                                                                                      
category of physical and mental integrity. See: Moreham (n 76) 52-62. 
86 E.g., Hewitt and Harman v UK (App no 12175/86) (1992) 14 EHRR 657 concerning personal 
information stored by a secret police register, and Amman v Switzerland (App no 27798/95) (2000) 30 
EHRR 843 concerning the surveillance of telephone calls of a Switzerland businessman by the public 
authorities. 
87 Malone v UK (App no 8691/79) (1985) series A no 82, 7 EHRR 14. 
88 Madeleine Bunting, ‘Phone-hacking scandal is an outrage of human decency’ The Guardian (14 July 
2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/phone-hacking-scandal-ethics> accessed 
14 July 2011. 
89 Harris and others (n 72) 368. 
90 Giacomelli v Italy 2006-XII, 45 EHRR 871 para 76. 
91 Niemietz v Germany para 30. 
92 Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28 para 96. Also, Lopex Ostra v Spain (1994) Series A no 303-C, 20 
EHRR 277, Guerra v Italy 1998-I, 26 EHRR 357, and Giacomelli v Italy. 
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Strasburg Court also found that Member States have positive obligations to 
adequately regulate private industries from polluting the environment in the Hatton 
Case.
93
 In some cases, the right to private space/ home has been interfered with, for 
instance, violations of the right to respect one’s home and correspondence,94 as well 
as the right to be let alone.
95
  
Decisional Privacy: Personal Status, Identity, and Autonomy  
It is observed that ‘the capacity of the individual to determine his identity’ (emphasis 
added) is covered by the right to private life.
96
 In this regard, this sub-category of 
rights covers a right both to develop personality and ‘the relationships with other 
human beings and the outside world.’97 This includes the establishment, development 
and enjoyment of one’s social life and relationships with others, embracing multiple 
aspects of a person's physical and social identity,
98
 such as
99
 
1. Gender identification;  
2. Sexual orientation and sexual life; and 
3. Name and other means of personal identification and of linking to a family. 
Transsexuals’ official recognition 100  and family relationships 101  have been 
                                               
93
 Hatton v UK para 98. It should be noted at the same time, however, the ECtHR does not always try 
to clearly articulate whether Member States have obligations in environmental cases due to the need of 
a wide margin of appreciation. See: Moreham (n 76) 66. 
94 Klass and Others v Germany (App no 5029/71) (1978) series A no 28, 2 EHRR 214 PC and Malone 
v UK. 
95 Harris and others (n 72) 378. 
96 Ibid 366. 
97 S and Marper v UK para 66. See also, Burghartz v. Switzerland 22 February 1994, Series A no 280-B, 
opinion of the Commission, para 47 and Friedl v Austria judgment of 31 January 1995, Series A no 
305-B, opinion of the Commission, para 45. 
98 Mikulić v. Croatia (App no 53176/99) ECHR 2002-I para 53. 
99 Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (App no 44599/98) ECHR 2001-I para 47; Peck v UK para 57, 
Burghartz v. Switzerland para 24 (mutatis mutandis); and Ü nal Tekeli v. Turkey (App no 29865/96) 
ECHR 2004-X para 42. 
100 B v France (1992) 16 EHRR 1 para 62. 
101 For example, the relationship between parents and kids, see: Rasmussen v Denmark (1984) 7 EHRR 
371 para 33; see: Jäggi v Switzerland (App no 58757/00) ECHR 2006-X 13 July 2006 concerning 
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adopted as falling within the scope of the right to private life in some Strasbourg cases. 
This right may be able to override other privacy interests. For example, the Jäggi case 
indicates that in order to exercise the interest of personal identity, proper access to 
relevant personal biometric data (such as a DNA test) is thus needed. Moreover, in 
Odièvre v France, the Court held that a system allowing complete anonymity for the 
mother throughout the birth and adoption process is able to strike a balance between 
the applicant's right to access information about his/her parent and competing 
interests.
102
  
Secondly, the right to develop relationships with others undoubtedly involves the 
free choice to engage in sexual activities. In this regard, the Court considers that 
sexual relations represent the most intimate part of private life in the Dudgeon case.
103
 
Finally, the right to develop relationships with others also involves the right to respect 
one’s ‘family life’ in Article 8. The Court appreciates the development throughout 
time of the notion of the ‘family life.’ It is now understood as extending beyond the 
idea of ‘formal relationship and the family based on marriage’ by the Court.104 This 
includes the considerations with regard to, for example, children born outside the 
marriage (including the previous marriages or relationships), non-biological links 
between children and parents, same-sex partnerships, divorces, and relationships with 
extended family members such as siblings, grandparents-children and uncle-
nephew.
105
 
Informational Privacy: Collection, Retention and Access of Personal Information 
                                                                                                                                      
individual’s interest in discovering his parentage. 
102 Odièvre v France (2003) 38 EHRR 43 para 48. 
103 Dudgeon v UK (App no 7525/76) (1981) 4 EHRR 149, 165 para 52.  
104 Harris and others (n 72) 371-372. Johnson v Ireland Series A no 112 (1986) 9 EHRR 203 and 
Marckx v Belgium Series A no 31 (1979) 2 EHRR 330. 
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Personal information, e.g., information with respect to a person’s health and ethics 
identity,
106
 and image of the individuals
107
 is related to the elements of private life 
under the ECHR. It is established by the Court that collecting personal data (e.g., 
fingerprints and images) by public authorities/ policing powers without the data 
subject’s valid consent (for instance, for facial images) will interfere with one’s right 
to private life protected by Article 8(1).
108
 Similarly, the establishment of national 
DNA databases, which collect and retain personal biometric data, has been declared 
by the ECtHR to be in violation of Article 8 in S and Marper case due to the blanket 
and indiscriminate power of police investigation.
109
  
In general, Member States will need to provide further information in order to 
offer an ‘effective and accessible’ procedure for accessing ‘all relevant and 
appropriate information’. 110  Specifically, for example, the Court concluded that 
Member States have a positive obligation under Article 8(1) with regards to proper 
access to personal data for issues such as threats to public health.
111
  
Specific Forms of Privacy that Are Relevant to This Thesis 
The main object of this thesis focuses on the emerging biometric and RFID 
technologies. Accordingly, after presenting a rich diversity of rights covered by the 
heading of the right to private life, I shall then focus on the specific forms of privacy 
that are relevant to the research question of this thesis.  
                                               
106 Z. v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371 paras 71 and 41. 
107 Sciacca v. Italy (App no 50774/99) (2005) ECHR 2005-I para 29. 
108 Murray v UK (App no 14130/88) (1994) 19 EHRR 191 concerning photographs collected by the 
police and McVeigh, O'Neill and Evans v United Kingdom (1981) 25 DR 15 concerning finger printings 
and photographs collected and stored by the police. 
109 S and Marper v UK para 125, also, Goggins and Others v The United Kingdom ( App nos 30089/04, 
14449/06, 24968/07, 13870/08, 36363/08, 23499/09, 43852/09 and 64027/09) 72. 
110 McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 1 para 101. Also, Roche v United Kingdom 
(2006) 42 EHRR 30 para 162. 
111 Guerra v Italy. 
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Obviously, the rights falling under the scope of informational privacy granting 
protection with respect to the collection, retention and processing of personal 
information are some of the particular forms of privacy at issue. In Chapter 2 we have 
seen that biometric data include various types of sensitive personal data, e.g., image 
data,
112
 fingerprint data,
113
 cellular data, and DNA data.
114
 Moreover, these data may 
contain information with respect to health data
115
 and ethical data. Such biometric 
samples and profiles are crucial elements relevant to private life. Hence, to collect, 
store, and process such data, including the sample and the profiles of them, is 
‘sufficiently intrusive to constitute an interference with the right to respect for private 
life set out in Article 8 of the ECHR.
116
 
Moreover, the potential future use of the personal biometric information 
contained in the profiles, as the ECtHR notes, is ‘relevant to a determination of the 
issue of whether there has been an interference.’117 As regards the biometric samples, 
the subsequent use of the body parts in relation to the technologies at hand is included 
within the concept of the right to body integrity.
118
 
To more specifically focus on the relevant forms of privacy rights and the 
justifications to their interferences, I will provide an example and further analysis in 
the following subsection.  
The Right to Privacy Is as Positive as It Is Negative 
On the basis of the outline and justifications to the PGC in the last chapter, we have 
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seen that generic rights entail both mutually negative and positive duties. Human 
rights upheld by the PGC can be protected in a negative way, in which the possession 
of negative rights entails negative duties of agents not interfering with one another’s 
actions. On the other hand, positive generic rights entail mutual duties to provide 
assistance for agents who cannot attain generic needs by their own unaided efforts if 
they so wish.  
What should be noted is that the imposed negative and positive duties are not 
removed by the complexities in ‘large-scale modern societies.’ 119  Moreover, the 
correlative negative and positive duties ‘bear not only on individuals as recipients but 
also on the economic and political structures of whole societies.’120 Consequently, the 
duties apply to situations not only with respect to individuals, but also where generic 
harm arises from social or institutional contexts of the States. However, it must be 
emphasised that it is crucial to distinguish between (a): negative and positive 
obligations of States; and (b): negative and positive rights of individuals (agents). It is 
noted that positive obligations of the state are obligations of the state to ensure that 
individuals enjoy these rights if they so wish. More specifically, positive obligations 
of the state, in effect, require public authorities to take the necessary but reasonable 
measures to safeguard given rights.
121
 Such measures can be in law as well as in 
practice.
122
 This is because the agents are the ultimate respondents of the rights 
holders of the generic condition of agency.
123
 Yet these might only be negative rights, 
e.g., rights not to have their privacy not interfered with, rather than rights to be 
                                               
119 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 34. 
120 Ibid 36, 41-42. 
121 Hokkanen v Finland Series A no 299-A (1994) 19 EHRR 139, and Lopex Ostra v Spain. 
122 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland Application no 24699/94, Judgement of 28 June 2001 
para. 45. Also, Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on 
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of Europe 2007) 7. 
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assisted by other individuals to secure their privacy. Accordingly, positive obligations 
of the state are not the same thing as positive rights of individuals vis-à-vis 
individuals.  
Arguably, moreover, the wording of the Convention itself provides that the rights 
under Article 8(1) may be subject to restrictions of Article 8(2), whereby states bear 
merely a negative obligation.
124
 However, this is not always consistently upheld by 
the later Strasbourg jurisprudence. In X and Y v the Netherlands,
125
 for example, the 
Court declares that ‘in addition to this primary negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life…’ This 
attitude is then consistently followed.
126
 Accordingly, Member States have both 
negative and positive obligations by virtue of the ECtHR judgements.
127
  
The positive obligation upon the member states rests on the duty to ‘respect’ 
Article 8(1). Member States must thus ensure the rights enshrined in Article 8(1) are 
protected effectively by adopting positive and well-designed measures.
128
 Moreover, 
the Court also holds that the positive obligations under Article 8(1) can extend to 
private activities
129
 and ‘the realm of newer generational rights.’130 In this regard, 
States are still recognised by the Court to enjoy a margin of appreciation to an extent 
that ‘the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case.’131 Therefore, 
                                               
124 Lingens v Austria Series A no 103 (1986) 8 EHRR 407 PC. Harris and others (n 72) 382. 
125 X and Y v the Netherlands para 23. 
126 E.g., Airey v Ireland Series A no 32 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 para 32 and Von Hannover v. Germany 
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the Strasburg Court rarely goes so far as to clearly indicate which appropriate positive 
measures a member party should take.
132
 
The Will-conception of Rights 
To avoid denying the recognition of human rights, it has been argued that any 
convention recognising human rights has to be interpreted in line with the PGC on the 
sufficient condition that the convention accepts human rights under the will-
conception.
133
 On the basis of the alternative argument addressed,
134
 moreover, in 
combination of the acceptance of stage I endorse the dialectically necessary and the 
impartiality assumption, which is supported by the ECHR, that an agent ought to act 
in any other agent’s GCA. This entails that an agent categorically ought to act with 
regards to any other agent’s GCA in accordance with her/his/its will. Since the rights 
in respect to the GCA are accepted as compatible with the conclusion of stage I of the 
dialectically necessary argument, those rights implied by the ECHR (as well as other 
human rights instruments, e.g., the UDHR and the ICCPR) must be assigned under 
the will conception. Accordingly, agents (i.e. human agents with reference to the 
ECHR) possess their generic rights and can freely waive the benefits of such rights, 
unless they renounce claims for insisting on or using of benefits of rights results in 
endangering at least same ranking of generic rights of others.  
In effect, the interpretations given by the ECtHR are indeed in line with the will-
conception reasoning. For example, it is repeatedly recognised by the Strasbourg 
judgements that by collecting and processing any sensitive personal data, the data 
subject’s explicit consent must be present (or justified by the exemptions). 135 
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Furthermore, when dealing with reconciling competing rights to private life in 
conflicting circumstances, the Court considers that the individuals could waive 
confidentiality if they wish to.
136
  
However, it is arguable that the Strasbourg jurisprudence has, on occasion, found 
against the will-conception. In Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK,
 137
 the applicants 
had been engaged in consensual homosexual activities involving violent 
sadomasochistic actions and were convicted for assault resulting in actual bodily harm. 
The ECtHR held that the actions of giving and receiving pain for sexual pleasure 
remained a violation of human rights even if consensual. Moreover, according to Lord 
Templeman in R v Brown and Others,
 138
 
 
 Article 8 of the ECHR was not breached by 
a law prohibiting violence which causes physical and psychological harm.  It thus 
seems that the ECHR aims to protect certain essential interests of agents/humans, e.g., 
personal security. In this regard, agents cannot waive the interests protected by the 
rights. Nevertheless, it has been argued that this judgement ignores the reality with 
regard to the law of consent, ‘both with respect to sexual relations and also in those 
relations of violence which are capable of being consensual.’ 139  Moreover, this 
decision to ‘accept the criminal nature of the acts before the court precluded any 
consideration of the nature of consent’ has also been doubted. 140 In this respect, the 
Court does not conclusively rule against the will-conception.
 141
 
Thus, the exceptions occasionally set out by the Court, based on the coherence of 
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applying the right-based approach, cannot be regarded as cases of application of the 
interest-conception. Rather, these special cases should be treated as based on the 
criterion of degrees of needfulness for action, where rights of other agents under the 
will-conception require the waiver of the rights in question to be overridden. 
A Broad Concept of Article 8(1) 
The very essence of the ECHR is the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. 
However, how the Court judges whether a specific action falls within the scope of the 
guaranteed rights or freedoms ‘might be open to question.’ 142   The nature of 
fundamental rights and freedoms thus results in inconsistent interpretations regarding 
the scope of the enshrined rights: the right to privacy is included therein.   
One should not forget the core purpose of an article when looking at the scope of 
the rights covered by any specific article under the EHCR. Take Article 8 as an 
example, the ECtHR identifies that ‘the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities’ in the Hokkanen 
case.
143
 It is also underlined by the Court that the intention of Article 8(1) is to ensure 
that ‘the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each 
individual in his relations with other human beings.’ (emphasis added)144 
With this in mind, it is unwise to ignore the extension of a right entailing the 
notion of respect. In other words, this narrow concept of privacy, which tries to link 
the rights covered by Article 8 of the ECHR to merely ‘the right to privacy’ with a 
sense of narrow interpreting, may produce inappropriate results. It is therefore 
                                               
142 Jeremy McBride, ‘Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Evelyn Ellis 
(ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999) 23. 
143 Hokkanen v Finland para 55. 
144 Von Hannover v. Germany para 50. See also: Hokkanen v Finland and Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 
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unsurprising that the Court rejects this narrow interpretation. For example, the 
Niemietz Case points out that the Court tends to interpret Article 8 broadly under its 
jurisprudence:
145
  
‘[r]espect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings,’…  
‘it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefore 
entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle.’
146
  
One question, however, remains unresolved: does the Strasbourg Court possess 
absolute power in assessing the applicability of Article 8(1) of the ECHR? Although 
there is indeed a tension between the power of sovereignty owned by nation states and 
individual fundamental rights and freedom protected by the ECHR, Member States 
are not able to claim restrictions freely without any limitation on those protected 
rights after having signed and ratified the Convention.
147
 Therefore, it is at least 
appropriate ‘for the Court to impose procedural requirements on states’ which violate 
interests protected by Article 8(1).
148
  
Overall, the opinion of the ECtHR with respect to identifying whether a right is 
covered by Article 8, which considers that the right to private life is ‘incapable of 
exhaustive definition,’ 149 is in line with the broad conception of privacy. However, 
the Court does provide some guidelines to understand the definition and scope of the 
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primary aim of Article 8(1). Nonetheless, this approach is not clear enough. Two 
reasons can be given: first, the Court does not depend on an applicable theoretical 
framework and clear guidelines to deal with non-exhaustive and ill-defined definition 
of Article 8(1). Secondly, it is observed by David Feldman that:  
[t]he field is becoming considerably more complex because of developments 
information technology and the explosion in the range of legal rules which seek to 
regulate the use of information.
150
 
This presents a problem for the Strasbourg Court and domestic courts: is there a 
rationale to assist the ECtHR to identify those aforementioned rights? This 
question shall be answered (together with another question set out in the next 
subsection) below. 
 
4.3.3 The ECtHR Approach of Balancing Test 
After identifying that the rights at hand fall under the scope of Article 8, the following 
steps are to evaluate and compare the rights at issue. Before doing so, however, one 
must examine how the ECtHR approach operates. 
Article 8(2) and the Principle of Proportionality  
The standard interpretative approach applied by the ECtHR to examine Articles 
8-11 of the ECHR has been termed the ‘constitutional approach’ 151  or the 
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‘interference-violation approach.’ 152  Under this systematic approach, in terms of 
Article 8, the first step is to investigate whether an action amounts to interference with 
the rights protected by this article. This is then followed by assessing whether the 
violation is permitted or justifiable under the scope of the restriction or limitation laid 
down in Article 8(2), if any interference is found at the first stage. In other words, 
Article 8(2) offers limitations permitting the rights enshrined in Article 8(1) to be 
overridden by specified public interests as well as the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of other individuals. Hence, it is essential to explore the exempting 
conditions regulated in Article 8(2) in order to evaluate the level of protection 
afforded to such rights.  
The exempting condition offered by Article 8(2) is broadly framed:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
To understand this paragraph, the standard formula consistently followed by the Court 
can be presented in the sub-stages set out below: 
(1) To assess whether any interference is ‘in accordance with the law’ or 
‘authorised by the law,’153 two sub-principles can be distinguished. First, the 
interference must be ‘governed by law,’ 154  rather than any ordinary 
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administrative orders. Secondly, the law must be foreseeable by a rational 
agent. 
(2) To assess whether any interference serves the purpose of the legitimate 
interests listed in the concerned article. 
(3) To access whether any interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society.’  
The interference here can be either within or outside the scope of Article 8 since 
there are a number of rights covered in it. If any violation in question cannot be 
justified in the earlier sub-stage, then there is a violation incompatible with Article 8. 
If so, there is no need to move on to examine the further stages. With reference to the 
above formula, it seems to be possible to evaluate competing rights and interests: if 
any interference is justified, the right being violated is overridden in specific 
competing case at issue.  
The last stage of the ECtHR balancing test approach requires the evaluation of 
the principle of proportionality.
155
  
This principle, although not stated expressly in the ECHR itself, plays a central 
role in the case law of the Strasbourg Court
156
 in order to strike a ‘fair balance 
between the demands of the general interests of the community and requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.’ 157  Additionally, the 
proportionality test is also applied, in some cases, as a method to determine whether a 
positive obligation has been met.
158
 By using this criterion, the lower level of 
                                               
155 The principle of proportionality embraces three sub-principles, i.e., (1) suitability; (2) necessity; and 
(3) proportionality in the narrow sense. See: Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Influence of the European Principle 
of Proportionality upon UK Law’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe (Hart Publishing 1999) 107. 
156 E.g., Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 para 49. 
157 Soering v UK Series A161 (App no 14038/88) (1989) 11 EHRR 439 para 89. 
158 E.g., Rees v UK para 37, Gaskin v UK A 160 (1989) 12 EHRR 36 para 49. Also, Harris and others (n 
72) 10-11. 
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competing right can be regarded as being overridden by the higher one. In the 
following case we shall see how this principle operates in practice. 
The ECtHR Balancing Test Approach: the Marper Case 
The proportionality test is applied at the ECtHR and most domestic courts in 
considering whether different treatment regarding limitation against a Convention 
right is objectively justifiable. The British courts, after the HRA, also accepted and 
employed the same approach to some extent.
159
 
In the UK case of R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
160
 the applicants argue 
under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR that ‘the authorities had continued to retain their 
fingerprints and cellular samples and DNA profiles after the criminal proceedings 
against them had ended with an acquittal or had been discontinued.’161 
In the House of Lords decision, Lord Steyn suggests a narrow concept of the right 
to private life holding that the mere retention of fingerprints and DNA samples did not 
interfere with Article 8. This is because, as his Lordship explains, there is no decision 
of the ECtHR on the question whether retaining fingerprints or samples might 
interfere with Article 8
162
 and in any event, ‘the trial process ought to weed out’ the 
abuse of processing such data.
163
 
As regards the proportionality test, his Lordship distinguishes five factors to 
                                               
159 E.g., Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, 605; R v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2006] 1 AC 173, 193. For details on the recognition of the principle of proportionality and its 
relationship with the Wednesbury review, see: Paul Craig, ‘Unreasonableness and Proportionality in 
UK Law’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 
1999) 85-106. David Feldman, ‘Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in Evelyn Ellis (ed), 
The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999) 117-144. 
160 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2002] EWHC 478 (Admin), [2003] EWCA Civ 1275, and 
[2004] UKHL 39. 
161 S and Marper v UK paras 3, 12.  
162 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 para 26. 
163 Ibid para 28. 
128 
 
support his view that the interference was proportionate to the purpose of preventing 
crime and protecting the right of others to be free from suffering the effects crime.
164
 
Lord Brown, meanwhile, suggests that ‘[t]he more complete the database, the better 
the chance of detecting criminals, both those guilty of crimes past and those whose 
crimes are yet to be committed,’ and ‘[t]he larger the database, the less call there will 
be to round up the usual suspects.’165 
With respect to the risks of future misuse (i.e., ‘function creep’ meaning that 
further unintended or unnecessary processing of personal data in a way incompatible 
with the original purpose for which it was collected), Lord Steyn holds the opinion 
that ‘[i]f future scientific developments require it (i.e., contemporary use of retained 
samples in connection with the detection and prosecution of crime), judicial decisions 
can be made, when the need arises, to ensure compatibility with the ECHR.’166 
The House of Lords therefore concludes that there is an objective justification 
under Article 8(2). However, the ECtHR disagreed. First, with reference to Article 
8(1), the Court holds a broad concept of privacy and concludes that the retention of 
fingerprints and DNA samples fall within the scope of right to private life.
167
 Secondly, 
as regards to the proportionality test, the Court acknowledged that  
[t]he core principles of data protection require the retention of data to be 
proportionate in relation to the purpose of collection and insist on limited periods of 
                                               
164 Ibid paras 38-40. These ‘factors’ are: ‘(i) the fingerprints and samples are kept only for the limited 
purpose of the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime; (ii) the fingerprints and samples are 
not of any use without a comparator fingerprint or sample from the crime scene; (iii) the fingerprints 
and samples will not be made public; (iv) a person is not identifiable to the untutored eye simply from 
the profile on the database, any interference represented by the retention being minimal; (v) and, on the 
other hand, the resultant expansion of the database by the retention confers enormous advantages in the 
fight against serious crime.’ 
165 Ibid para 88. 
166 Ibid para 28. Lord Brown also agrees this viewpoint, see: ibid para 86. 
167 S and Marper v UK paras 77, 85-86. 
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storage. 
…the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention would be unacceptably 
weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice system 
were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of 
the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests. 
…any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears 
special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard.
168
  
The Court also identified that the margin of appreciation is narrowly applied in this 
case. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the retention of biometric data 
(fingerprints and DNA samples in this case) of suspected but not convicted 
individuals, owing to the ‘blanket and indiscriminate nature of power’ cannot satisfy 
the proportionality test, thus failing to strike a fair balance between the competing 
public and private rights and interests.
169
  
The Problem of the ECtHR Approach 
Here, on the basis of the same factors, the proportionality test can result in different 
consequences. Indeed, even in the same court, by applying the principle of 
proportionality there can be inconsistency in cases.
170
 Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
a commentator contends that ‘[t]he weakness of this process is that it is capable of 
leading to different conclusions on the same facts as was demonstrated by the 
                                               
168 Ibid paras 107, 112. 
169 Ibid para 125. 
170 See Odièvre v France where the ‘majority gave little heed to such considerations.’ Harris and others 
(n 72) 11 citation 93. Cf. R (on the application of GC) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2011] UKSC 21. 
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divergent views of the majority and the minority.’171  
It can be argued that this is partly because of the supranational character of the 
ECtHR
172
 and the demand of balancing the legal differences that reflect the 
complexities of political, economic and social factors. The rejection of a one-size-fits-
all model, together with an ‘increasing burden of proof’ for individual applicants,173   
which may vary on the basis of the nature of the issues considered and related 
interests of individuals,
174
 led to the tendency of the Strasbourg Court to opt for a 
wider margin of appreciation instead of a strict interpretation test when the facts of the 
case are more likely to be subject to local variations.
175
  
When the Strasbourg Court adopts a margin of appreciation in deciding cases, 
which appears to be narrower if fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals are 
called into play, it leaves national courts to identify situations in relation to local 
conditions according to domestic legislations.
176
 Nevertheless, it must be emphasised 
that the margin of appreciation doctrine does not give domestic courts an unlimited 
power of interpretation.
177
 Instead, by applying this doctrine, the courts of the 
contracting states are subject to the European supervision. The limitation and scope of 
the guaranteed rights regulated in Article 8(2) has been further clarified in Article 
                                               
171 Mowbray (n 129) 130. 
172 McBride (n 142) 23. 
173 Ibid 29-30. For a more detailed description, see: George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2007) 79-98.  
174 McBride (n 142) 28-34. 
175 Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 540. 
176 Ibid. Also, Harris and others (n 72) 12-13. 
177 Handyside v UK. Even though shared by majority of domestic population, some local moral 
convictions are still subject to European supervision, particularly within the area of most intimate 
aspects of private life. See e.g., Dudgeon v UK para 60, and Norris v Ireland (1989) 13 EHRR 186 para 
45. Also, Lech Garlicki, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the "Margin of Appreciation" 
Doctrine: How much Discretion is Left to a State in Human Rights Matters?’ in Cheng-Yi Huang (ed), 
Administrative Regulation and Judicial Remedies 2010 (Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica 
2011) 89-91. 
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52(1)
178
 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Although the margin of appreciation is applied, the uncertainty of the 
proportionality applications still presents a problem for domestic courts trying to 
follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence: it is difficult for them to ascertain exactly how 
the ECtHR interprets the ECHR. This generates a series of problems for the European 
citizens: the inefficient legal procedure, the financial cost in order to wait for the ‘final’ 
decision and the uncertainty of developing rights and interests…etc.  
Overall, the Strasburg approach of balancing test is unclear and inconsistent. This 
is because of the combination of: (1) the need of a wider margin of appreciation; (2) 
the limitation set out in Article 8(2) is broadly framed; and (3) the principle of 
proportionality lacks clear guidelines. Accordingly, this character does cause a 
significant problem: it is difficult to ascertain exactly what local courts should be 
‘taking into account’ to determine the hierarchy of protected rights and interests 
when developing domestic human rights law.
179
 Hence, there is a need for the Court 
to have an applicable rationale/ theoretical framework to deal with this problem. Then, 
what rationale can assist the Court to answer both questions asked by this section? 
Squaring the ECHR with the PGC: Challenges and Suggestions 
Neither the ECHR itself nor any judgement of the ECtHR provided a sufficiently 
clear text or rationale on reconciling competing rights and interests by applying the 
principle of proportionality. In this respect, the lack of such a clear criterion does not, 
                                               
178 Article 52(1) states that: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by 
this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject 
to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedom of others.’ 
179 Moreham (n 76) 45-46. 
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at least, contradict the requirement of the PGC.
180
 This is because neither the opinions 
of the ECtHR say anything contradicts the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action. Indeed, as we noted in the Marper case, the Strasburg Court declares that 
having a totally blanket standard is impermissible. In this regard, we must interpret 
the prohibition of blanket checks as the right for which more important needs for 
action must not be outweighed by the less important needs for action. Moreover, in 
terms of conditions of Article 8(2), which are all justifications in terms of human 
rights, it is required by the PGC that protection of rights in Article 8(2) must involve 
generic rights.
181
 Accordingly, listed rights and interests such as the national security 
must be considered as being thus equitable to regard the justification of all restrictions 
as ‘lying in the protection of the conflicting rights of others afforded by the 
satisfaction of such needs.’182  
In light of this, it can be argued that the Strasburg balancing test is in line with the 
PGC. This is because the idea of institutional requirements to override other rights is 
comparable to the principle of proportionality.
183
 Moreover, precautionary reasoning 
requires that the risk of violating the PGC is minimised. This idea is also broadly in 
agreement with the proportionality principle in the narrow sense (one of the three sub-
principles of the proportionality principle). 
 
4.3.4 The Added Value of the PGC 
This subsection aims to present that the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
                                               
180 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 85. 
181 This is because only generic rights (with a higher degree of needfulness for action) can override 
generic rights under the PGC.  
182 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 85. 
183 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 344. 
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action offers a coherent rationale as an assessment to reply to issues previously 
presented: (1) The rationale to assist the ECtHR to identify those aforementioned 
rights? (2) The difficulty in ascertaining exactly what local courts should be ‘taking 
into account’ when developing domestic human rights law.  
The Criterion of Degrees of Needfulness for Action 
It has been indicated that the generic rights/GCA are ordered according to a hierarchy 
arranged by the degree of their essentiality in relation to an agent’s purpose-
fulfilments. In this respect, basic rights are ranked at the highest level and the non-
subtractive rights are more needed than the additive rights. Among and within each 
level of capabilities of action, moreover, there is also a hierarchy determined by the 
degree of their indispensability.
184
 
Compared to the principle of proportionality, the operation of the criterion is able 
to satisfy the requirement of consistency. We can imagine the proportionality principle 
itself as a balance scale that might be used to determine the weight of competing 
rights. This balance scale, however, lacks a clear criterion to rank/ measure the 
weights on each side of the balance scale. To merely apply the proportionality 
principle is similar to use a balance scale in space. The consequence of weighing the 
competing rights is thus inconsistent since the weight of the rights cannot be 
measured/ presented: every judge/ person may weigh the objects based on their own 
variable and contingent perspectives. For example, under the Golden Rule, it depends 
on contingent factors about how people would like to be treated.
185
 Differently 
situated people may have different preferences based on contingencies. Thus by 
                                               
184 Ibid 62-63. See: section 3.6. 
185 Two versions of the Golden Rule should be distinguished. Positively, an agent should treat others as 
one would like others to treat oneself, whereas negatively, an agent should not treat others in ways that 
one would not like to be treated. 
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putting contingent judgements on the proportionality balance scale, this can result in 
divergent consequences. 
On the other hand, the criterion considered here acts as the law of gravity 
(gravitation), which gives weight to objects according to degrees of needfulness for 
action. What matters is not how people feel/ what they prefer under specific 
circumstances. The PGC requires, rather, agents to act in accordance with generic 
rights of all agents, which is a categorical imperative. Thus any agent who exercises 
the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action should reach the same conclusion. 
The criterion is meant to avoid inconsistency. This, however, leaves a question 
unanswered: would other criteria also be able to offer other ‘laws of physics’ to assist 
the proportionality balance scale?  
Unique features of this criterion are yet to be noted and explored in depth. They 
will be closely related to the ideas of collective rights and Utilitarian calculating 
claims. The criterion of degrees of needfulness for action enters into some disputed 
questions (mainly from the Libertarianism) that have implications for the Utilitarian 
calculation. To reply to the objections, some Gewirthian claims thus need to be 
recalled in order to mark out the differences from the Utilitarian arguments. Let us 
presume, in the features addressed below, that A is more needed necessary for action 
than B.  
1. The criterion is able to deal with the collective right or the public good.186 It 
must be noted that a collective right can be also construed as an individual 
right. This is because by applying the PGC indirectly a collective right within 
a given community/ society presents a right which is designed to improve the 
                                               
186 Gewirth, The Community of Rights 48. 
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benefits of all agents in said community/ society.
187
  
This characteristic must, however, be distinguished from the value of 
collective rights under Utilitarianism:
188
 
(1) The distributive aspect of collective rights requires any legal system that 
indirectly applies the PGC to treat the agents affected by it equally. 
(2) Unlike utilitarian that focus on the overall benefit/ happiness, the rights 
under the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action can be divided into 
different parts.  
(3) For the criterion to apply, both A and B must amount to a generic right 
under the PGC thinking. The PGC focuses on the needs for agency. This 
differs from the Utilitarian idea that mainly concentrates on the overall 
happiness and painfulness. 
(4) The collective interest under the PGC must be equally shared by the 
community/ society for its own sake rather than merely as a means of 
maximising overall utility. 
Indeed, a common objection against the Utilitarian argument has been noted: 
since Utilitarianism holds that the higher pleasures should always be pursued 
in order to achieve the maximum sum of happiness, why do sometimes agents 
prefer lower pleasures to higher pleasures?
189
 The application of the PGC is 
capable of responding to this objection by opening up to Utilitarian thinking, 
as the benefits of the rights and interests can be waived under the voluntarily 
condition of the PGC.  
                                               
187 Ibid 48. 
188 Ibid 48-49. 
189 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do (Penguin Books 2010) 54-56. 
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2. The criterion is different from some versions of the Utilitarian theories, which 
hold that enlarging/ increasing the amount of A could be made by taking away 
by sacrificing/ diminishing of B. 
By paying attention to the sum of the satisfaction of happiness,
190
 it is 
arguable that the Utilitarian logic, in particular Bentham’s ideas, fails to 
respect individual rights. On the Utilitarian ground, individuals only matter 
‘in the sense that each person’s preferences should be counted along with 
everyone else’s.’191 To reply to this, it might be argued that considering all 
things together, some extreme harm (such as torture) to individuals may not 
be practically applicable. However, in this regard, it must be noted that this is 
because, by doing so, there will be an overall negative effect, rather than 
because of the need to respect individual dignity.  
John S. Mill later considers that, in the long run, respecting individual liberty 
is the way to achieve the greatest happiness. Nevertheless, the moral basis 
seems not fully convincing. This is because: (i) there can be alternative routes 
to achieving long-term happiness; and (ii) violating individuality may not 
always be the wrong thing to do – if doing so can achieve long-term 
benefits.
192
 
On the other hand, the thinking of the PGC draws its inspiration from the 
Kantian theories.
193
 Here, the Formula of the End in Itself has been argued as 
                                               
190 According to Jeremy Bentham, ‘[b]y the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves 
or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other 
words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.’ Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart eds, 1970) 11-13. 
191 Sandel (n 189) 37. 
192 Ibid 50-51. 
193 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 87-110. 
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in agreement with the Gewirthian manner.
194
 In this regard, the PGC can ‘be 
derived from this formula merely by specifying possession of the generic 
needs as the necessary means of agency.’195 Here, it must be emphasised that 
to possess a right to agency under the PGC is to possess a right to the 
necessary means of agency as such.  
Moreover, the context of agency under the PGC does not have a tendency to 
encourage passive agents who depend on the agency of another. It is pointed 
out by Gewirth that 
[t]he rational autonomy which is the aim of the human rights involves that 
each person is to be a self-controlling, self-developing agent, in contrast to 
being a dependant, passive recipient of the agency of others. Even when the 
rights require positive assistance from other persons, their point is not to 
reinforce or increase dependence but rather to give support that enables 
persons to be agents…
196
  
The criterion here is thus concerned with preventing violations of necessary 
means of agency (including harms consisting in removing or threatening the 
basic, non-subtractive, or additive rights available to all agents), rather than 
increasing the benefits.
197
 For example, under the PGC, a provision allowing 
landlords to permanently seal or darken all the windows in order to increase 
the lodgers’ privacy rights such as the right to be let alone, may not be 
allowed. 
                                               
194 Ibid 98. 
195 Ibid 98. 
196 Gewirth, The Community of Rights 52. 
197 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 344. 
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3. This criterion also differs from the Utilitarian thinking that A might ≤ B*X, 
if the scale of X is large enough (i.e., the weight of B*X can outweigh the 
weight of A) under the Utilitarian measurement.  
This idea seems to be in line with the cost-benefit analysis. By measuring and 
calculating happiness, Utilitarian thinking weighs the preferences of 
happiness and pain instead of judging their moral worth. On this basis, the 
principle of utility translates moral good into a ‘common currency’ of 
value.
198
 The criterion applied by the utilitarian logic to compare competing 
interests is thus to compare happiness (the common currency) under the cost-
benefit analysis. In terms of the common currency – the benefit/happiness – 
applied by the principle of utility, it is noted that Bentham ‘recognizes no 
qualitative distinction among pleasures.’199 It seems therefore that the level of 
happiness has not been distinguished and all preferences should count equally. 
The obvious objection with regard to this ‘single currency’ term is to doubt 
whether it is possible to do so – how to translate, for example, human life, 
dignity, or honour into happiness?
200
 
To justify this objection, Mill accepts that there are higher pleasures, which 
are more desirable and valuable than others. As regards the criterion of 
determining the quality of happiness/ painfulness, he suggests: ‘[o]f two 
pleasures, if there be one to which all or most all who have experience of both 
give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to 
                                               
198 Sandel (n 189) 41. 
199 Ibid 52, cited from John S. Mill, Utilitarianism (George Sher ed, first published 1861, Hackett 
publishing 1979). 
200 Gewirth termed this question ‘the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility or well-
being.’ Gewirth, The Community of Rights 50. 
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prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.’201 
Under the PGC, the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action cannot be 
applied in this way. If A is more needed for action for an agent than B, A will 
not be overridden by B – even B is held by a large number of agents. For 
example, as Gewirth illustrates, the ‘limits’ of the application of the criterion 
of degrees of needfulness for action particularly concern body integrity as an 
essential part of the basic condition of agency.
202
  Since the criterion granted 
by the PGC is distinguished both qualitatively and quantitatively, it is possible 
to avoid the above criticise in terms of the single currency (happiness).  
However, it must be emphasised that to apply the PGC in society, the need of 
A for action may change to being less important than the need of B. Then 
A<B, so B can override A in competing cases.  
An Example of Applying the Criterion of Degrees of Needfulness for Action  
Let us see how the criterion will work by taking the Marper case outlined above as an 
example.
203
 
1. Identify the rights covered by Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
The Court recognises that fighting against organised crime and terrorism depends ‘to 
a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and 
identification.’204 Under the principle of instrumental reason, to defend the public 
                                               
201 Mill (n 199), cited from Sandel (n 189) 54. 
202 This thesis mainly focuses on human beings as the agents. The body integrity thus is a basic need. It 
must be noted that ‘what materially instantiates the generic conditions is, to an extent, an empirical 
matter, being contingent upon the species of the agent.’ See: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in 
the Law 51-52. 
203 For similar case of the ECHR, see Goggins and Others v The United Kingdom. 
204 S and Marper v UK para 105. 
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good of national and social security, the instrument (storing and processing personal 
biometric data in the database) to exercise this interest must be granted readily.  
Since there is a generic need for action, there is a positive duty bestowed upon 
data controllers. This is because the PGC requires agents to assist those agents to 
secure the generic conditions for action when they cannot do so by their own unaided 
efforts and comparable cost if they so wish. Therefore, the positive duty imposed on 
the data controllers implies a duty to provide and participate in a well-designed and 
well-maintained database in order to prevent generic harm to other agents. However, 
the benefits of storing and processing personal biometric data, which is a crucial 
instrument to protect national and societal security (collectively as well as 
individually), might interfere with other related generic rights – such as the right to 
privacy and data protection. 
2. Value the relative rights in terms of the generic conditions for action 
A preliminary question must be asked before comparing the rights covered by Article 
8(1) of the ECHR, regarding whether a broad or narrow conception of privacy should 
be recognised. The English courts, on one hand, in some cases apply a narrow concept 
of privacy.
205
 On the other hand, as previously discussed, the ECtHR and some 
English judgments
206
 do accept a broader conception of privacy. So, how do the 
Gewirthian scholars answer this question? 
A generic right is to be granted to any generic condition of action on the PGC 
ground. In this regard, undoubtedly, ‘there are the generic conditions of action that do 
                                               
205 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 paras 26, 28. See also: Durant v Financial 
Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; R v Department of Health ex p. Source Informatics [2001] 
QB 424.  
206 E.g. Campbell v. MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
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not find expression in the other rights of the ECHR.’207 As the definition of the right 
to privacy remains vague, this is particularly true with respect to Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR. Moreover, since there are generic conditions for action, whether they find 
expression in the other rights of the ECHR or not, there must also be the right to these 
generic needs of agency. It is therefore better for human rights instruments to accept a 
broader conception of privacy. This is in agreement with the opinion of the ECtHR. 
Hence, it is suggested that the dispute in the Marper case poses a threat to the right to 
privacy and Article 8(1) is involved. 
3. Decide which generic rights take precedence over the other generic rights 
On the basis of the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action, the values of storing 
and processing personal biometric data CANNOT override other types of the right to 
privacy in ALL cases of conflict.
208
 The right to benefit from technological advances 
(the retention of personal biometric data values)
209
 is NOT more important than ALL 
other fundamental rights and freedoms protected in the data protection law regime.
210
 
This is simply because that it is not an absolute right under the PGC. 
In the Marper case, several rights are not less important than the retention values: 
the interest of preventing the risk of stigmatisation,
211
 for example, can be viewed at 
least as a non-subtractive need. On the other hand, without proportionate limitations, 
the biometric database cannot be viewed as a basic need since it is not the only or an 
                                               
207 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, Privacy, and Medical Research’ 50. 
208 For similar discussions, see: Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research 
and the Public Good’ (2007) 18 King's Law Journal287, and Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, 
Privacy, and Medical Research’ 54-56. 
209 See section 6.2. 
210 Article 1.1 of the Data Protection Directive states that ‘In accordance with this Directive, Member 
States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right 
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.’ Thus, ALL of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons with respect to the processing of personal data are under the scope of data 
protection. 
211 S and Marper v UK paras 122-123. 
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essential means leading to the very possibility of achieving the purpose which can at 
the same time minimise the risk of violating the PGC. The other GCA under the scope 
of the right to privacy, for example the need to protect minors’ mental equilibrium,212 
which can be viewed as either a basic need or a non-subtractive need, may also 
override the additive need. Moreover, it should be noted that not all biometric 
databases are well-structured and safe. It has been previously argued that there are a 
number of risks regarding safety issues in applying biometric technologies. Unsafely 
built and managed biometric databases can lead to serious violations of both human 
rights and generic needs. 
However, there is a question to be considered: under the PGC, can a majority, 
however big, of the lower degree of needfulness for the GCA override an individual’s 
higher needfulness for the GCA? The answer is No. This is because, as we have seen, 
it is NOT ‘of whether such interference will or will not promote the general welfare 
but rather of the equality of generic rights.’213 (emphasis added)  
With regard to Lord Steyn’s opinion that ‘judicial decisions can be made, when 
the need arises, to ensure compatibility with the ECHR’, it must be emphasised that 
‘[s]ince the PGC is categorically binding, it can never be justifiable to run the risk of 
violating it where this can be avoided.’214 Hence, the risk of violating the PGC must 
be minimised if at all possible. Under the precautionary reasoning, the ‘wait and see’ 
policy held by the House of Lord thus runs the risk of violating the PGC. 
Overall, the blanket permission for such databases or the idea that ‘the more 
complete the database, the better the chance of detecting criminals’ suggested by Lord 
                                               
212 Ibid para 124. 
213 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 326. 
214 Pattinson (n 47) 599. 
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Brown is unable to pass the tests that underlies the PGC. Considering the broad 
concept of privacy, it might be wrong to consider privacy/ data protection values and 
other values as ‘belonging to two mutually exclusive sets.’ 215 The conflict of the 
mentioned competing rights, i.e., applying new technologies as a regulatory 
instrument might be solved by, for example, obtaining explicit consent or new 
technology itself.
216
 A concrete example is offered by Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs).
217
 Indeed, the use of modern scientific techniques of 
investigation and identification to fight against threats to the quality of private life, 
arguably, can be considered as a privacy value. We shall revisit and expand this idea 
in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has offered a brief overview of the concept of privacy. From the analysis 
set out we have seen that the broad concept of privacy should be taken as the way of 
interpreting Article 8 in order to render it consistent with the PGC’s requirements. We 
have also seen that the added value of the PGC is to offer a theoretical framework for 
identifying the generic rights. By justifying the PGC as the basic principle for human 
rights, moreover, this analysis has claimed that the PGC can assist in the 
reconciliation of conflicts of rights and interests. 
So far the chapter has shown how to specifically apply the PGC to the issues 
                                               
215 Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 287.  
216 Argued by Gewitrh, only in some particular extreme occasions, ‘when a necessary-procedure 
justification based consequences of the method of consent conflict with a dynamic-instrumental 
justification based basic harms done by polices,’ the latter rights/interests overrides the former. Gewirth, 
Reason and Morality 319-322. 
217 See: section 7.2. 
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considered in this thesis. In the following chapters, we shall move onto spelling out 
the European and Formosan data protection positions and identifying issues for the 
PGC. 
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Chapter 5 
Data Protection Legislation in Europe and Taiwan 
5.1 Introduction  
In the context of global data protection regulatory frameworks, there are two different 
models, namely the American model (freedom of information model) and the 
European model (personal data protection model).1 As Francesca Bignami states, 
[i]n the European Union, privacy is essential to protecting citizens from oppression by the 
government and market actors and preserving their dignity in the face of opposing social 
and political forces. In the United States, privacy is secondary.2 
This partly explains the choice of studying the European model as part of this research 
on data protection regimes. Moreover, both the first data protection act in the world3 
and the most influential data protection mechanism, i.e., the Data Protection Directive, 
come from Europe. It is, therefore, necessary for any researcher who is interested in 
data protection regulatory frameworks to examine the European context. On the other 
hand, as regards the Taiwanese part, the Computer-Processed Personal Data 
Protection Law (CPDPL)4 owed its genesis to the Guidelines on the Protection of 
 
1 Dorothee Heisenberg, Negotiating Privacy: The European Union, The United States, and Personal 
Data Protection (Lynne Rienner Publisher 2005) 13. Also, Adam D. Moore, ‘Owning Genetic 
Information and Gene Enhancement Techniques: Why Privacy and Property May Undermine Social 
Control of the Human Genome’ (2000) 14 Bioethics 108-109. 
2 Francesca Bignami, ‘Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The case of the European 
Information Privacy Network’ (2005) 26 MICH J INT’L L 807. See also, Joel Reidenberg, ‘Setting 
Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector’ (1995) 80 IOWA L REV 497, 500. 
3 In 1970, the Data Protection Act of the Land of Hessen, German, was the first data protection act in 
the world. See: ePractice.eu, ‘eGovernment Factsheet - Germany - Legal framework’ (2010)  
<http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288243> accessed May 25 2010. 
4 It was promulgated by Presidential Decree Ref. No. ROC-President-(I)-Yi-5960, 11 August, 1995. A 
revision of the CPDPL, which has been renamed as the “Personal Data Protection Law,” passed 
preliminary review in the Legislative Yuan on April 18, 2010. 
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Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (hereinafter, OECD Guidelines)5 and 
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data (hereinafter, Data Protection Convention).6 In order to research 
Taiwanese data protection legislation it is essential to look at the European 
perspective. 
This chapter is structured as follows: sections 5.2 and 5.3 survey data protection 
laws at the European and Formosan level respectively; section 5.4 investigates 
concepts of the right to privacy in Taiwan; section 5.5, building on the essential 
knowledge on the legislation and concepts of data protection law and concepts of 
privacy in the two legal regimes, identifies issues for the later evaluations.  
 
5.2 Data Protection Law and New Technologies: European Context 
5.2.1 Data Protection in European Law: the Data Protection Directive as the 
Main Regulatory Instrument in Europe  
5.2.1.1 The Historical Track of Data Protection Law: a Complex Nature of 
Primary Legislative Sources 
5.2.1.1.1 International Instruments  
• International Human Rights Instruments and Privacy 
 
5 It was adopted on 23 September 1980. Available at: < 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html#part2> 
accessed 28 February, 2010. 
6 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
ETS no. 108, 1981. 
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The EU7 is under an obligation to uphold international law when exercising its 
powers.8 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)9 states 
that:  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
This principle is echoed in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).10 The protection of the right to private life in these two core 
international human rights instruments is also invoked in regional human rights 
instruments. The American Convention on Human Rights,11 for example, provides it 
in Article 11. As regards the European human rights framework, it is provided in 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Differently from other international human rights instruments, 
Article 8(2) introduces relevant elements that need to be satisfied in order to for assess 
interference. 
Despite offering certain considerations on the right to privacy, the above 
materials remain vague with regards to data protection. In relation to the ECHR, for 
example, although case law judgements of the ECtHR could contribute to part of core 
data protection principles, Karanja observes that ‘[w]hen such principles are given 
 
7 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community has entered into force on 1 December, 2009. Consequently, as from that date, 
references to the EC shall be read as the EU. 
8 Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, para 9. 
Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 341. 
9 It was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948. Available 
at: < http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> accessed 28 February, 2010. 
10 It was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 (entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49). 
Available at: < http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 28 February, 2010. 
11 It was adopted on 22nd November, 1969 at San Jose, Costa Rica (entry into force 18 July 1978, in 
accordance with Article 74.2). It mentions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its preamble 
as well. 
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weight, it is only incidental rather than intended’.12 Consequently, he argues that those 
decisions would be unable to assess interferences through ‘a consistent set of 
principles.’13 Indeed, the idea and concepts of privacy were at the initial stage and 
rather undeveloped at the time when these key instruments were introduced. When 
‘Information, Communication and Technology (ICT)’ 14  have been involved, 
unsurprisingly, the aforementioned (vague) privacy protections, cannot meet the new 
demands of the communication society and the information era in 1970’s. 
• International Data Protection Instruments  
The UN subsequently issued the United Nations guidelines concerning Computerized 
Personal Data Files.15 However, this has only had a relatively limited impact on the 
worldwide data protection law regime.16 
Eight core data protection principles of the OECD Guidelines issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aim to harmonise 
data protection legislation for economic reasons and map out the key principles of 
data protection.17 This has had a worldwide impact on the later development of data 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The RAND report of Review of the European Data Protection Directive describes the appearance 
ICT in 1970s resulted as ‘increased the risk of personal data being abused and created concern that 
there would be a need for regulation to ensure that individuals remained adequately protected.’ See: 
Neil Robinson and others, Review of the European Data Protection Directive (Technical Report, 2009) 
6. It is also addressed by Ronald et al. that certain legislation and case law responded to the need for 
regulation on ICTs, such as large-scale processing of personal data in 1980s and internet in 1990s. 
According to their opinion, those legislation and case law were, however, not sufficient. See: Ronald 
Leenes, Bert-Jaap Koops and Paul de Hert, ‘Introduction’ in Ronald Leenes and others (eds), 
Constitutional rights and new technologies: a comparative study (T.M.C.Asser Press 2008) 1. 
15 It was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1990. 
16 Stephen Kabera Karanja, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System 
and Border Control Co-operation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 124. Moreover, it is also 
suggested by Lee Bygrave that in Scandinavia the aforementioned UN guidelines has indeed been 
overlooked. Lee A. Bygrave, Data Proteciton Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits 
(Kluwer Law International 2002) 33. 
17 Paragraph 6 of the Guidelines: These Guidelines should be regarded as minimum standards which 
are capable of being supplemented by additional measures for the protection of privacy and individual 
liberties. 
149 
 
                                                
protection legal regimes, particularly in the OECD areas: Europe, North America, and 
East Asia. Examples can be found at national level in the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Korea. 18  Furthermore, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Ministers endorse the APEC Privacy Framework, 19  which 
agrees that the OECD Guidelines represent the international consensus on the 
protection of informational privacy.20 
According to Article 216(2) TFEU,21 if international agreements are entered into 
by the EU, those agreements are held to be an integral part of the EU legal order.22 
However, it should be noted that the EU is not a party to any of these aforementioned 
international instruments and the Union itself is not directly bound by them (although 
individual member states that have ratified these instruments will be).  
 
5.2.1.1.2 European Data Protection Legal Framework  
The Data Protection Convention is undeniably one of the key reference points in 
Europe for this topic. For instance, the scope of the Schengen Convention relies on 
the Data Protection Convention as a supplementary source along with national 
legislation. 23  After the Data Protection Convention, several relevant normative 
 
18 Daniel J. Solove and Paul M. Schwartz, Informational Privacy Law (3 edn, Aspen Publishers 2009) 
998. 
19 It was endorsed by the APEC Ministers in 16th APEC Ministerial Meeting, Santiago, Chile, 17-18 
November 2004. 
20 The APEC Privacy Framework states that it is ‘consistent with the core values of’ the OECD 
Guidelines’ and ‘reaffirms the value of privacy to individuals and to the information society.’ Citation 1, 
paragraph 5 of the APEC Privacy Framework. Part III of the APEC Privacy Framework therefore 
reaffirms those eight key principles. 
21 I.e., Article 188L, which is the article number used in the text of the Lisbon Treaty.  
22 Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para. 5. Under this circumstance, the member 
states are bound by international agreements as a result of their duties under Community law, not 
international law. See Case C-239/03 Commission v. France (Etang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, para 
26. Also, Craig and Búrca (n 8) 344. 
23 Karanja (n 16) 128. 
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documents have been passed in order to elaborate its content. This includes the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data regarding supervisory authorities and 
transborder data flows24 and related regulations and recommendations.  
The principles stated by both the OECD Guidelines (paragraph 6) and the Data 
Protection Convention (Article 11) are to be considered as minimum standards. It has 
been observed in a RAND report,25 however, that there was little harmonisation 
between these two regulatory texts before the introduction of the Data Protection 
Directive. This might be explained by the nature of these two instruments: while one 
is introduced for economic reasons, the other’s purpose is to protect fundamental 
rights.26 The variation of regulatory instruments at national level led to a barrier to the 
fluent exchange of personal data which is contained in both of the private business 
sector and the public sector. Influencing every pillar of the EU, therefore, the need to 
establish a foundation for a proper harmonisation, particularly in terms of the first 
pillar, was then reflected in the Data Protection Directive.27 
After the introduction of the Data Protection Directive, the EU then issued 
several related instruments concerning different sectors for processing personal data. 
With respect to electronic communications, particularly the internet, for example, 
Directive 2002/58/EC was issued in 2002.28 Moreover, in terms of retention of 
 
24 ETS no. 181. It was adopted in Strasbourg, 2001. This additional protocol mainly deals with issues 
regarding supervisory authorities (Article 1) and transborder flows of personal data to a recipient which 
is not subject to the jurisdiction of a party to the Convention (Article 2). 
25 Robinson and others (n 14). 
26 It is noted that if one reads these two values separately, they are prone to coming into conflict. To 
ensure a more harmonised application of the law, a broad concept of privacy should be accepted. 
27 This is addressed through the Recitals 7-10 of the Data Protection Directive. The main content of the 
Data Protection Directive will be described in the later section of this chapter. 
28 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31/07/2002 P. 0037 – 0047. 
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information concerns in public communication networks or electronic 
communications services, the EU issued Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention 
Directive) 29 which amended Directive 2002/58/EC. The Data Retention Directive 
specifically applies to data protection in law enforcement activities.30 The EU then 
issued Directive 2009/136/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services amending Directive 2002/58/EC.31 
This Directive draws attention by requiring informed consent before information is 
retained or accessed in the users’ terminal device under Article 5.3.32 
There was no pan-European general human rights instrument separating the right 
to private life and data protection in the last century. In 2000, this changed. Article 7 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the right to 
private life as Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Meanwhile, Article 8 of the Charter states 
that: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him 
or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
 
29 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063. 
30 Francesca Bignami, ‘Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention 
Directive’ (2007) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 233-255. 
31 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws, OJ L 337,18/12/2009, P. 0011-0036. 
32 This article has profound impact on the usage of cookies on the internet. For detailed discussion and 
opinions in relation to the consent exemption, see: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 
04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption (No 00879/12/EN, WP194, 2012). 
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3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
Paragraph 2 of the article clearly points out some key data protection principles and 
general rules on the lawfulness of processing of personal data. Moreover, paragraph 3 
introduces the framework of independent authority to control and monitor this new 
type of right. The rights protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter have been 
recognised by Article 1.8) of the Lisbon Treaty. Such a distinction between the right to 
privacy and data protection can also be found in the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of 
Biology and Medicine (hereinafter termed in ‘the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine’).33 
Overall, the Data Protection Directive is a significant milestone. This is because: 
1. Before the Directive, there was no effective and specific international 
instrument which focused on interferences through the processing of 
personal data;  
2. The Directive considers both the human rights approach and the economic 
approach from which it aims to harmonise data protection legislation of 
 
164)’ 
33 ETS no. 164, 1997. See Articles 10 and 26.1. It should be noted that the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine has not been signed and ratified by all EU members, e.g, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom. Moreover, there are also declarations and 
reservations with respect to this Convention. With reference to Article 10 at issue, for example, 
Denmark makes a reservation that ‘[a]ccording to this provision, all persons are entitled to know any 
information collected about his or her health. However, the wishes of individuals not to be so informed 
shall be observed.’ This has been criticised as doing ‘little more than pay lip-service to these measures, 
and continue to implement domestic laws in flagrant breach of their provisions.’ See: Kenyon Mason 
and Graeme Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith's Law and Medical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2011) 42. For 
the latest update of the Convention, see: Council of Europe, ‘List of declarations made with respect to 
treaty No. 164’ (Council of Europe,, 2012)  
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=164&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&
VL=1> accessed 15 May 2012, and Council of Europe, ‘Chart of Signatures and Ratifications 
(Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine CETS No.: 
(Council of Europe,, 2012)  
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=164&CL=ENG> accessed 5 May 
2012. 
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states (Article 1 of the Directive);34 and  
3. The Directive, which is a main regulatory instrument in Europe, extends 
its influence globally (Article 25 of the Directive
 
5.2.1.2 The Content of the Directive: An Interpretive Description 
This section provides an overview on the Data Protection Directive and related 
provisions, which are the main data protection regulatory instruments in Europe.35 It 
should be noted that the intention of this section is to outline the provision of the 
Directive with the processing of personal data for biometric and RFID usages in this 
thesis, rather than to provide a detailed overview of the Directive.  
 
5.2.1.2.1 Purpose and objective 
Article 1 states the objective of the Data Protection Directive and is a key to the 
interpretation of all of the later elements of the Directive. At the pre-Lisbon stage, 
according to Article 1.1, for the purpose of a harmonised manner of the internal 
market, the Data Protection Directive aims to safeguard fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, especially the right to privacy, in order to enable the free 
flow of personal data from one EU Member State to another. In sum, under the Data 
Protection Directive, data protection covers the protection of all fundamental rights 
 
34 However, this does not mean that the Directive considers the balance between these two 
perspectives. Also, Deryck Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in Relation to Medical 
Research’ in Deryck Beyleveld and others (eds), The Data Protection Directive and Medicial Research 
Across Europe (Ashgate Publishing 2004) 6-7. 
35 The member states of the EU were obliged to issue the national legislation that give effects to the 
Directive. In addition, three non-EU members of the European Economic Area (EEA), including 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), have also ratified the Data Protection Directive. 
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and freedoms regarding personal data, and in particular (but not only) the right to 
privacy.36 
Three points need to be noted. Firstly, the Directive does not give a clear 
indication as to whether or not it concerns itself with striking a balance between single 
market objectives and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, 
before the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, The Directive (Article 1.2) shall not be interpreted 
as the purpose of the Directive is to essentially strike a balance between fundamental 
rights and internal market. This is because the central purpose of the Directive is to 
enable the free flow of personal data between the EU members.37 At the post-Lisbon 
stage, nevertheless, as required by Article 6 TEU, human rights provisions in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights have been upgraded as possessing the same binding 
legal effect as the Treaties. Yet, as Craig and De Búrca comment,38 
…the legacy of the EEC’s roots in the common market project remains significant since, 
despite its constantly changing and expanding nature, the EU’s dominant focus remains 
economic, and the debate over the appropriate scope of its human rights role remains even 
after the important changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
In this regard, it has been suggested that this is best viewed as ‘internal’ to the activity 
of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 39  Indeed, ‘the economic 
well-being of a country’ in relation to interests brought by the free flow of personal 
data between the EU members can also be regarded as a type of interest concerning 
private life under the heading of the right to private life in Article 8(1), or the public 
 
36 It is further pointed out by Beyleveld that the Directive is often misunderstood as the ‘Privacy 
Directive’. See: Beyleveld (n 34) 6. 
37 Ibid 6. 
38 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 364. 
39 Beyleveld (n 34) 7. 
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interest laid down by Article 8(2). With the idea of the internal activity of protecting 
the right to private life, it is not necessary to have a conflict between the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms as such and any other factors (e.g., the free 
movement of personal data between the EU members). To view this matter internally, 
therefore, can avoid the unnecessarily and inconsistency with the notion of integrity 
of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. 40 This is consistent with the broad 
concept of privacy and remains valid after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Moreover, this idea is even more crucial with reference to rapid technological 
developments and globalisation which require ‘further facilitat[ion of] the free flow of 
data within the Union and the transfer to third countries and international 
organisations, while ensuring a high level of the protection of personal data.’41 
Secondly, to interpret the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in Article 1, 
the rights recognised in the ECHR, which have been treated by the ECJ as a ‘special 
source of inspiration’ for EU human rights principles42 and required by Article 6(2) 
TEU to accede to the ECHR, must be taken into account. Lastly, as regards to the 
principles of fundamental rights and freedoms, which have been clarified by the ECJ 
to view the Charter as the principle basis,43 Recital 11 gives substance to and 
amplifies those contained in the Data Protection Convention.  
 
 
40 Ibid. This is in line with the co-operative model in Chapter 7. 
41 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ (2012)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> accessed 30 
Janurary 2012, Recital 5. In the 2012 EU General Data Protection Regulation, it is stated in Article 1(3) 
that ‘The free movement of personal data within the Union shall neither be restricted nor prohibited for 
reasons connected with the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.’ 
42 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 362. 
43 Ibid 362. It should be noted, however, the UK, Poland, and the Czech Republic negotiated a protocol 
to the Lisbon Treaty with respect to the impact of the Charter.  
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5.2.1.2.2 Definition and Scope 
Article 2(a) sets out that if an identifiable person can be identified ‘directly or 
indirectly’, then this linkable data is personal data. In this respect, personal data is not 
within the definition of anonymisation if there is any possibility that anyone could 
link the datasets through reasonable methods.44 It is suggested that these reasonable 
methods are those that do not consume disproportionate time, energy or financial 
means.45 
The definition and scope of the ‘relevant filing system’ under Recital 27, Articles 
2(c) and 3(1) are also debateable. Core characteristics of relevant filing systems 
include: (1) the structuring by reference to individuals; and (2) the ready accessibility 
of certain specific information. The UK courts have interpreted this by adopting a 
narrow interpretation in the Durant case. 46  In this case it was ruled that two 
conditions must be satisfied in order to determine whether information ‘relates to’ an 
individual: (1) ‘whether the information is biographical in a significant sense’; and (2) 
the information ‘should have the putative data subject as its focus rather than some 
other person with whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event in 
which he may have figured or have had an interest’.47 Auld LJ stated that ‘either on 
the issue as to whether a document contains "personal data" or as to whether it is part 
 
44 Graeme Laurie and Nayha Sethi, ‘Information Governance of Use of Patient Data in Medical 
Research in Scotland: Current and Future Scenarios’ (Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP))  
<http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Scoping_Report_Final_August_2010.pdf> 
accessed 6 August 2011 at 27. See also, Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical 
Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 18 King's Law Journal 280-283. 
45 For discussion in relation to applications of anonymisation, see section 7.2.2. 
46 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746. For the UK Information 
Commissioner Office’s viewpoint toward the Durant Case, see: Information Commissioner Office, 
‘The ‘Durant’ Case and Its Impact on the Interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998’ 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/the_dura
nt_case_and_its_impact_on_the_interpretation_of_the_data_protection_act.pdf> accessed 9 June 2011, 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/the_dura
nt_case_and_its_impact_on_the_interpretation_of_the_data_protection_act.pdf> accessed 24 April, 
2010. 
47 Durant para 28. 
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of a "relevant filing system", the mere fact that a document is retrievable by reference 
to his (Mr Durant’s) name does not entitle him to a copy of it under the Act’48 – even 
though his name was shown on the file. 
However, it should be noted that later cases in other domestic courts ruled in the 
opposite direction.49 Therefore, the Durant case must be treated carefully since it 
‘would be unwise to assume that the Durant interpretation would be followed by 
other EU Member States or by the ECJ.’50 
 
5.2.1.2.3 Data Protection Principles 
The principle-based framework provides Member States certain margin of 
appreciation in implementing essential measures whilst taking into account local 
differences and specific needs.51  
 
Data Protection Directive Data Protection Convention The OECD Guidelines 
Principles relating data quality 
(Art. 6): 5 principles of data 
protection (see below) 
Quality of data (Art. 5) Data Quality Principle 
Purpose Specification Principle 
Use Limitation Principle 
Criteria for legitimacy (Art. 7) Collection Limitation Principle 
                                                 
48 Ibid para 30. 
49 R v Rooney [2006] EWCA Crim 1841. Also, Dexia Bank Nederland Case, Hoge Raad, 29 juni 2007, 
LJN AZ 4664. The Dexia Case points out that the right of access should be interpreted in a broader way, 
which includes a right to copy documents for a customer from a bank. See: Sjaak Nouwt, ‘Towards a 
Common European Approach to Data Protection: A Critical Analysis of Data Protection Perspectives of 
the Council of Europe and the European Union’ in Serge Gutwith and others (eds), Reinventing Data 
Protection? (Springer 2009) 283-284. 
50 Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 280. 
51 Robinson and others (n 14) 24. 
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Confidentiality and security of 
processing (Arts. 16-17) 
Data Security (Art. 7) Security Safeguards Principle 
Right to information (Arts. 
10-11) 
Right to establish the existence 
of personal data (Art. 8(a)) 
Openness Principle 
Right to access (Art. 12) Right to access (Arts. 8(b)-(c)) Individual Participation 
Principle 
Remedies and liability (Art. 
22-23), Sanctions (Art. 24) 
Right to have a remedy (Art. 
8(d)) 
Accountability Principle 
Table 5.1: General rules on the lawfulness of the processing of personal data in Europe 
Article 6 includes five basic principles relating to data quality: personal data must be: 
1. processed fairly and lawfully; 
2. collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of 
data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards; 
3. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed; 
4. accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to 
the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified; 
5. kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than 
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which 
they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate 
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safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical 
or scientific use. 
The 1st principle of processing personal data fairly and lawfully can be read in 
either a broad or a narrow way.52 The former indicates that, in order to obey this 
principle, ‘all the requirements of the Directive imposed on processing must be 
complied with.’ 53 This covers the whole set of rules on the lawfulness of processing 
personal data (Articles 7-21), including the other four principles of data protection. To 
read it narrowly, on the other hand, according to Recitals 30-36, only Articles 7-8 are 
covered. As regards the fair processing, the right to information (Articles 10-11) is 
related to the 1st principle by Recital 38.54 
• Consent in the Data Protection Principles when Processing Sensitive 
Personal Data 
Due to its vague provision on the legitimacy principle provided in Article 7, it has 
been argued that ‘satisfaction of the conditions laid down by Articles 7 and 8(2) in 
way that do not involve the consent of the data subject at least implicitly requires the 
obtaining of consent to be impracticable, etc.’ 55  To explain this briefly, when 
processing sensitive personal data,56 
(1) Article 7 applies to all personal data; therefore, at least one condition from 
Article 7 as well as one condition form Article 8 will be met. Meanwhile, 
(2) meeting any of the conditions of the Article 8 will automatically meet at least 
one condition of Article 7. For instance, meeting the condition of necessity for 
 
52 Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in Relation to Medical Research’ 9. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid 12. 
56 Ibid 11-12. 
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the purpose of carrying out the obligations as it is authorised by national law 
providing for adequate safeguards will also meet the condition of Article 7(c). 
However,  
(3) the ECtHR’s opinion points out that processing sensitive data without consent 
is an interference to the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.57 
(4) Before the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ took the decisions of the ECtHR seriously 
although it was not legally bound by them. At post-Lisbon stage, although the 
ECJ kept the attitude to maintain its autonomy after the accession by the EU 
to the ECHR, the relationship between the Strasburg and Luxembourg Courts 
remains mutually constructive.58 Therefore,  
(5) In the light of the exemptions in Article 8(2) of the ECHR, conditions in 
Article 8(2) and Article 7 are not entirely open alternatives. Satisfaction of the 
conditions laid down by Articles 7 and 8(2) of the Directive in way that do 
not involve the consent of the data subject requires the obtaining of consent to 
be impracticable. 
Therefore, it is arguable that without explicit provision in the Data Protection 
Directive, consent should still play a key role when processing sensitive personal data 
such as biometric data. Furthermore, when assessing the exemptions from consent and 
its components, both the proportionality principle and the legitimacy principle should 
be genuinely considered.59 
• Proportionality in the Data Protection Principles 
The principle of proportionality is provided mostly to evaluate the balance struck 
 
57 MS v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR 313, paras. 34-35. 
58 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 406. 
59 See: Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 285. 
161 
 
                                                
by EU/national authorities between competing interests. It should be noted that, 
however, since the Data Protection Directive applications in Member States do not 
limit the data controller as merely for national authorities, there are chances to apply 
the principle horizontally as well.  
When applying the principle of proportionality to data protection, it should be 
noted that according to Article 7, either consent (Article 7(a)) or the proportionality 
principle (Articles 7(b)-(f)) should be considered as permitting to process personal 
data. It has been argued that despite the fact that DPAs in Member States seem to 
‘regard consent as weaker than the principle of proportionality’ in biometric field in 
order to ‘ensure a stronger level of protection biometric data,’ it would be ‘quiet 
dangerous to assume this.’60  
• Data Controller’s Duties: Transparency Demands/ Data Subject’s Rights: 
Information Rights 
Transparency demands in Articles 10-11 should play a core role in the Data 
Protection Directive (in fact, in all data protection instruments). The Directive refers 
Articles 10-11 as duties of the controller, not as rights of the data subject.61 From a 
logical point of view, it can be considered loosely as the data subject’s right. However, 
it must be emphasised that to regulate in this way should be considered as putting 
more stress on information transparency than describing it as a sort of right bestowed 
upon the data subjects. To exercise consent, which is of central importance when 
processing sensitive data and has been emphasised by the ECtHR, relevant 
information must be informed first.62 Meanwhile, the transparent demands of the data 
 
60 Yue Liu, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in Biometrics: Cases Studies from Norway’ (2009) 25 
Computer Law & Security Review 237-250. 
61 Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in Relation to Medical Research’ 12. 
62 See: Beyleveld, ‘The Duty to Provide Informaiton to the Data Subject: Articles 10 and 11 of 
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controllers are also essential to exercise information rights provided in Article 12 and 
Recitals 41-42 (right to access). 
Moreover, Articles 10-11 and Recitals 38-39 request the data controller to provide 
involving personal data to the data subject and meet the principle of fair and lawful 
processing under Article 6. The principle of proportionality, particularly when 
assessing the exemptions addressed in Articles 11(2) and 13, must therefore be 
considered. 
 
5.2.1.2.4 Institutional Frameworks 
• Supervisory Authorities at National Level 
Article 28 requires Member States to provide at least one63 independent (Recital 
62) public authority which is responsible for the application within its territory of the 
adopted provisions. The missions of these public supervisory authorities can be 
understood in three different roles: 
1. As the promoter of the Data Protection Directive, a supervisory authority 
needs to take the promotion of the public awareness of data protection into 
consideration. In pursuit of the goal, Article 28(5) requires that it must draw 
up a public report on its activities at regular intervals. 
2. As the guardian of the Data Protection Directive, a supervisory authority is 
responsible for consulting (Article 28(2)) and monitoring (Article 28(1)) the 
application of domestic legislation. To comply with this purpose, it should not 
 
Directive 95/46/EC’ 69-87. 
63 In the UK, there is an Information Commissioner Office and a Scottish Information Commissioner. 
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only cooperate in a vertical axis to monitor the applications within one 
state/area, but also co-operate with the supervisory authorities in other 
Member States horizontally (Article 28(6)). 
3. As the defender of the Data Protection Directive, it should be able to defend 
individuals against the excessive power exercised by their governments. This 
is especially important in a trend of authoritarian states which increasingly 
extends beyond the traditional police tasks.64 In this regard, the authority in 
charge must be given investigative powers, effective powers of intervention, 
and the power to engage in legal proceedings (Article 28(3)). Moreover, it 
must be able to hear claims lodged by any data subject (including associations 
representing the data subject) and for checks on the lawfulness of data 
processing lodged by any person when the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to Article 13 of this Directive apply (Article 28(4)). Moreover, the 
outcome of the claims should be made public or accessible to the individuals 
affected.  
Considering the importance of all these missions, consequently, the supervisory 
authorities must not only be independent, but also organised professionally and in 
light of the aims of such a position. 
• The Article 29 Working Party 
The Article 29 Working Party (WP29), which plays its independent role at EU 
level, was set up to provide advisory suggestions and reviews. The main target of the 
WP29 is to harmonise data protection principles by contributing to the uniform 
application of the national measures adopted under the Directive (Article 30(1)(a)) 
 
64 Foundation for Information Policy Research, Paper No. 5: Conclusions & Policy Implications (UK 
Information Commissioner Study Project: Privacy & Law Enforcement, 2004). 
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and to enable an internal market for personal data. Whenever the WP29 notices 
divergences likely to affect individuals regarding the processing of personal data in 
the EU, according to Article 30.2 of the Directive, it shall inform its professional 
opinions and recommendations to the Commission which is to be assisted by a 
Committee referred to in Article 31. 
 
5.2.1.3 The Relationships between the Data Protection Directive, the ECHR and 
the Data Protection Convention  
Perhaps the description given in a report for the UK information commissioner study 
project of its observation can convincingly present the complex nature of data 
protection legal framework at the European level: ‘…the Data Protection Directive 
builds on the Data Protection Convention in order to secure to individuals the 
protection of Art. 8 of the ECHR…’65 The first dimension of the relationship between 
the ECHR and the Data Protection Convention has already been addressed in 5.2.1.1.2. 
The other two dimensions will be discussed in this subsection.  
 
5.2.1.3.1 The Data Protection Directive and the ECHR 
Although the two systems of law in the EU and the CoE are institutionally and legally 
separate, the Data Protection Directive, which is applied in the EU Member States as 
a main regulatory instrument in Europe, gives effect to fundamental rights and 
freedoms protected in the ECHR.  
 
65 Foundation for Information Policy Research, Paper No. 4: The Legal Framework: an Analysis of the 
"Constitutional" European Approach to Issues of Data Protection and Law Enforcement (UK 
Information Commissioner Study Project: Privacy & Law Enforcement, 2004). 
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Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU was not party of any of these aforementioned 
international treaties66 – including the ECHR. Yet with the fact that all EU Member 
States are parties of the CoE,67 the relationship between the ECHR and the EU in 
matter relating to human rights, consequently, has become more complex. The 
foundations of the rights protection within the EU legal system are inspired by the 
integration of human rights norms developed by its Member States and of the norms 
of the ECHR, including their common national constitutional traditions and 
international/ European human rights instruments. According to the ECJ’s consistent 
attitude after the Staunder case,68 general principles of EU law including protection 
for fundamental rights and freedoms are granted.  
Additionally, prior to the enactment of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,69 
the ECJ treated the ECHR as one of the key sources of the general principles 
supporting EU law.70 However, it should be noted that the ECJ held the opinion that 
the EU in unable to accede to the ECHR because that would exceed the scope of 
Article 235 of the Treaty without any amendment of it.71 Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
for the ECJ to make decisions that run contrary to ECtHR judgements. This is because 
the supremacy principle of EU law and certain EU Member States’ constitutions are 
 
66 The EU itself is not bound by the UN Charter directly but is bound by it indirectly due to the EC 
Treaty. As regards the ICCPR, it is indeed a source of the general principles of the EU law (for counter 
opinion, see Case C-249/96 Grant v. South West Train Ltd. [1998] ECR I-621, paras. 44-47.) See Craig 
and Búrca (n 8) 366-369. 
67 Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 281-282.  
68 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. This attitude was later confirmed by the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case (Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratstlle für Getreide und Futtermittle [1970] ECR 1125), the Second Nold Case (Case 4/73 J. Nold v. 
Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 507) and Amministrazione delle Finanze delle 
Stato v Simmenthal (Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze delle Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 
629) See also: Craig and Búrca (n 8) 364-366, Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in 
Relation to Medical Research’ 6, and Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 138. 
69 Article 6(1) TEU. 
70 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 366-367. 
71 ECJ, Opinion 2/94, 28 March 1996. See also: Fenwick (n 68) 138 and Craig and Búrca (n 8) 367. 
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bound by ECtHR decisions.72 
Precisely because of the complex nature which generates potential conflicts, one 
of the reasons73 for the EU’s accession, according to the CoE, is to reconcile the 
conflict between two different human rights protection legal frameworks and achieve 
‘a coherent system of fundamental rights’ protection across Europe.’ 74  This is 
addressed in Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the Treaty of the European Union.75 On the 
other hand, the legal basis for the accession of the EU is provided in Article 59(2) of 
the ECHR, amended in Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. However, before the 
successful/ completely accession to the ECHR,76 the ECJ, in the data protection 
regime,77 retains the freedom to ‘go beyond’ the ECHR ‘in recognizing rights as part 
of EU law.’78 It is observed by Craig and De Búrca that79 
It remains to be seen how strictly the ECJ will treat the stipulation that Charter rights 
corresponding to ECHR rights shall have the ‘same’ meaning as the ECHR rights, 
 
72 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ in Sheila AM 
McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 158-160. 
73 Craig and Búrca also points out to further reasons, namely to deal with the accusations in relations to 
the human rights roole of the EU and the sincerety of the attempt to promote the protection of human 
rights. Craig and Búrca (n 8) 399-400. 
74 The other provided reasons by the Council of Europe include: strengthen the protection of human 
rights, ‘close gaps in legal protection by giving European citizens the same protection vis-à-vis acts of 
the Union as they presently enjoy vis-à-vis all member States of the Union,’ make sure that ‘all 
European legal systems being subject to the same supervision in relation to the protection of human 
rights,’ ‘reassure citizens that the EU, just like its member States, is not “above the law” as far as 
human rights are concerned.’ See: Council of Europe, ‘Accession by the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Answers to frequently asked questions’ (Council of Europe, , 
2011)  
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-UE_documents/EU_accession-
QA_2011_en.pdf> accessed 14 May 2012 2-3. 
75 Article 6(2) TEU: ‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined 
in the Treaties.’ Article 6(3) TEU: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.’ 
76 The accession by the EU to the ECHR will be successful once the accession agreement has entered 
into force, which requires the ratification by all member parties to the ECHR as well as the EU itself. 
77 Case C-28/08 Commission v Bavarian Lager 29 June 2010. 
78 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 367. 
79 Ibid 367. 
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but it seems clear that the ECJ is willing to look closely at the relevant ECtHR case 
law for guidance. 
Data protection and the right to privacy are included in the general principles of EU 
law.80 In light of this, the interpretation of the Data Protection Directive (and the Data 
Protection Acts of Member States at national level, which are intended to implement 
the Data Protection Directive) must take the ECHR into account. This can be 
confirmed by reading Recital 1081 and Article 1.1 in conjunction with Recital 1 of the 
Data Protection Directive. It has been frequently observed that the influence of 
European human rights law is increasing perceptibly after the Amsterdam Treaty 
came into force.82 This has been affirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon. Consequently, the 
implementation of EU instruments into domestic law is subject to respect for the 
ECHR.  
 
5.2.1.3.2 The Data Protection Directive and the Data Protection 
Convention  
As the Data Protection Directive builds on the Data Protection Convention (Recital 
11), unsurprisingly, the main structures of these two data protection instruments are 
alike. For example, elements of core data protections principles and other provisions 
such as mechanisms for mutual assistance and consultation can be found in both of 
the documents. Several differences, however, can be distinguished. Firstly, as Nouwt 
 
80 Cases C-465/100, 138 and 139/01 Rechnungshof v. Österreichisher Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-12489. 
81 Recital 10 of the Data Protection Directive: ‘Whereas the object of the national laws on the 
processing of personal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, 
which is recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law…’ 
82 Fenwick (n 68) 138. 
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observes, the Data Protection Directive provides a more detailed content and attracts 
more attention than the Data Protection Convention, which in turn focuses on 
administrative obligations.83  
Secondly, before the Lisbon Treaty, the Data Protection Directive concentrated 
mainly on the first pillar of the EU, while the Data Protection Convention provides a 
more common framework, in particular for the police sector (the third pillar).84 
However, it should be emphasised that the EU and the Data Protection Directive 
‘protect fundamental freedoms and rights only arises for the reason that this protection 
is deemed necessary for achieving the purposes of the single market.’85 Nevertheless, 
it has been suggested that there is a trend indicating that ‘the EU is shifting towards 
the DP regime of the CoE’86 and a common approach for data protection for both the 
CoE and the EU.87  
Thirdly, the respective scopes of personal data within these two documents are 
defined differently. The Data Protection Convention defines its scope on automatic 
processing of personal data88 while the Directive extends its scope on applying to the 
processing of personal data ‘wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the 
processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a 
filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.’89 The Directive is 
subsequent to the Convention and it is much more common to process personal data 
through an automatic method due to the advanced technologies and the need to 
 
83 Nouwt (n 49) 289-290. 
84 Ibid 290. 
85 Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in Relation to Medical Research’ 6. 
86 Nouwt (n 49) 286. He reasons this by giving two reasons: first, the EU is now extending the data 
protection law framework to the third pillar; secondly, the human rights approach is also becoming 
important to the EU. The latter reason is later confirmed by the content of the Lisbon Treaty. 
87 Ibid 290. 
88 Article 1 of the Convention. 
89 Article 3 of the Directive. 
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process more complex personal data. The Directive thus demands the protection of 
individuals that ‘must apply as much to automatic processing of data as to manual 
processing’ and ‘the scope of this protection must not in effect depend on the 
techniques used, otherwise this would create a serious risk of circumvention.’90 Hence, 
processing personal data by using any kind of technique, either in advanced or simple 
ways, is not the key point here. However, this does not mean that the scope of the 
Directive is unlimited. According to Recital 27, ‘files or sets of files as well as their 
cover pages, which are not structured according to specific criteria, shall under no 
circumstances fall within the scope of this Directive.’ This is because in processing 
such data it is barely possible to interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals, especially the right to privacy, since one cannot be identified, or at least 
cost disproportionate efforts to do so.  
 
5.2.1.4 The United Kingdom: Data Protection Law at National Level 
The UK has followed the dualist approach91 which is also accepted in Taiwan. Having 
ratified the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) in 2009,92 Taiwan is now discussing how to implement the rights 
protected by these international human rights instruments. There is a chance for 
Taiwan to learn from other experiences to some degree by understanding the practice 
of how to deal with the horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in 
relation to the jurisprudence of the ECHR. For example, the biometric issue in 
 
90 Recital 27 of the Directive. 
91 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 214-215. 
92 Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, promulgated on 22 April, 2009. For both Chinese 
and English edition, see: 
<http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=26507&CtUnit=8379&BaseDSD=7&mp=200> 
accessed 24 April 2010. 
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relation to the ID cards policy in the UK, which refers to the question of how to strike 
a balance explored in this thesis, has been discussed broadly. Consequently, the 
Taiwanese legislative context and policy could embrace certain features of 
biotechnology law in respect of data protection and privacy considerations as set out 
in the UK legislation, in particular the HRA and the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). 
These will be analysed below as an example to understand the Data Protection Law at 
the domestic level. 
 
5.2.1.4.1 Domestic Influence of EU law 
The EC/ EU Treaties are international agreements. Since the UK has followed the 
dualist approach, international conventions and treaties can enter into effect provided 
they have been approved by Parliament. Required by UK membership, the 
implementation of the European Communities Act 1972 fulfilled the need to 
incorporate existing Community law and to be able to take necessary steps for future 
Community legislation to take effect. 
According to Article 288 TEU, Member States must ensure the compliance of 
their domestic legislation with the directive before the end of the implementation 
period expires. The Data Protection Directive requires implementation in Member 
States by 24th October, 1998. Data protection legislation has been implemented by 
most EU Member States at various stages (although only Sweden met the deadline).93 
EU legislation often calls for implementing action by the national authorities. 
However, some important matters are dealt with through an Act of Parliament – in this 
 
93 The Status of implementation of data protection Directive 95/46/EC could be found at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm#ukingdom> accessed 24 
April 2010. 
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case, the DPA, which implements the Data Protection Directive.94 
It is observed by Craig and De Búrca that one of the most problematic issues is 
the doctrine of direct effect of EC law.95 For example, due to the weak nature of 
Article 258 TEU, direct effect could only be applied in public enforcement law.96 For 
private enforcement law aspects (which individuals can use to challenge local courts 
and national action that are against the Community legal order), the ECJ offers direct 
effects with certain conditions, which were gradually loosened by the ECJ.97  
This also occurs with regards to the effect of directives. The ECJ held the opinion 
that directives could have direct effect in principle in the Van Duyn98 and the Ratti 
case.99 However, the ECJ gives the consistent opinion that directives are capable of 
direct effect merely in a vertical way, meaning that they could be brought before the 
courts against the States (or state entities), but do not have horizontal direct effect 
which imposes obligations on a private party.  
As regards the indirect effects of directives, the ECJ holds that, in many aspects, 
the Member States have some freedom of action in implementing the directives. 
However, this is not unlimited.100 In the Marleasing case101 and in later cases such as 
Johnson v MDU,102 the ECJ held that the national court's obligation is to interpret 
 
94 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (6th edn, CUP 2007) 321. 
For a detailed description and analysis of the DPA, see: Peter Carey, Data Protection: A Practical 
Guide to UK and EU Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009). 
95 Craig and Búrca (n 8) 180. 
96 Paul Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in the West: Directive Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’ 
(1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453. Also, Craig and Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (n 8) 181. 
97 Craig and Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 8) 181, 186-188. 
98 Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, para 12.  
99 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, para 23. 
100 Case C-553/07 The College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v Rijkeboer [2009], 
paragraph 56. 
101 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA [1990] ECR 
I-4135. 
102 Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2007] EWCA Civ, para 90. 
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domestic legislation, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purposes of a 
directive and thereby comply with EU obligations. This includes the obligation arising 
from a directive, which applies even in a horizontal situation. Furthermore, in the Von 
Colson case103  the ECJ established the principle of consistent interpretation,104  
according to which national courts are under an obligation to interpret national law at 
all possible to avoid a conflict with the Community law.105 Also, the supremacy of EC 
law is declared since the Van Gend en Loos case106 and the UK courts has accepted 
this since the Factortame case.107 
On the other hand, it is well established in the UK that where domestic legislation 
implements a directive of the European Community, the domestic legislation must so 
far as possible be interpreted in conformity with the directive. As Sir John Laws 
posited in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, the UK court is under the duty when 
delivering a final judgment to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict 
with any directly enforceable rule of Community law.108 
Nevertheless, due to the ‘negotiated’ character of EU legislation, 109  some 
domestic implementations may not interpret and apply the purposes of the EU law 
effectively and consistently. This surfaced when applying directives, which are one of 
 
103 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kilmann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891. 
104 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca named this as ‘the principle of harmonious interpretation’. See 
Craig and Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 8) 200-207. 
105 It is worth noting that in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA, it goes 
further to require the national courts to interpret domestic law so as to ensure achievement of the 
objectives of the Directive. However, Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Guarantia Salaria 
[1993] ECR I-6911, subsequently, with slightly conservative attitude, holds the opinion which allow 
national courts to go against pre-existing domestic law, but still requires national courts to interpret 
national law at all possible to avoid a conflict with the Community law. See also, Beyleveld, ‘Data 
Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 277. 
106 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
107 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Faetortame (No 2) [1991]1 AC 603 (HL). 
108 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151. 
109 Jean-Claude Piris, ‘The legal orders of the European Community and of the Member States: 
peculiarities and influences in drafting’ (2005) 58 Amicus Curiae24-25. 
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the main ‘instruments of harmonization’110 used widely by EU institutions. This can 
be found in the DPA, for example, that the definition and scope of ‘relevant filing 
system’ given in s.1(1)(c) was explained by the House of Lord in a rather narrow way 
as mentioned above in the Durant Case. However, considering the opinions given by 
the ECJ to interpret provisions of national law so as to comply with the terms of a 
directive, this decision is open to criticism and in fact controversial. 
In the UK, it is the DPA that implements the Data Protection Directive. 
Considering the Marleasing case, the obligation to interpret the DPA to comply with 
the Data Protection Directive if at all possible is suggested. However, the Directive is 
not the only source of legislation that the DPA should take into account when 
interpreting its provisions. Since the Data Protection Directive gives effect to 
fundamental rights and freedoms protected in the ECHR, the DPA interpretations 
must therefore take into account the Convention rights. This interpretive obligation in 
the UK, at the same time, is declared by s.3 of the HRA. Hence, it is essential to 
address the domestic influence of the ECHR in the UK, particularly the HRA. 
 
5.2.1.4.2 Domestic Influence of the ECHR: Human Rights Act 1998 
The UK was the very first country to ratify the ECHR in 1951, and the Convention 
came into force in 1953. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR was granted by the UK in 
1966, which is much earlier than the introduction of the HRA. The nature of the 
relationship between the ECHR and the HRA, in particular the Convention rights 
under the HRA as a species of constitutional rights, is rather complex. It can be 
divided into two axes.  
 
110 Craig and Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 8) 187-188. 
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The vertical axis refers to the accomplishment of individuals’ constitutional rights 
against the state. Before the entry into force of the HRA, British citizens could only 
access the ECHR rights and freedoms through the exhaustion of domestic judicial 
remedies. This is because the ECHR provisions did not have the direct internal legal 
effect or valid enforcement in the UK111 before 2nd October, 2000.112  
Since the HRA entered into force, the domestic impact of the ECHR can be 
observed in three aspects: legislation, Parliament and case law.113 This is partly 
reflected in the s.2(1) of the HRA in relation to the flexible obligation for the courts to 
‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Although the local courts showed 
their increasing willingness to ‘take into account’ the ECHR provisions before the 
appearance of the HRA,114 this was not always the case.115 After the HRA, the House 
of Lords, more or less, showed the willingness of their lordships to treat the 
Strasbourg decisions as an expression of fundamental principles.116 However, the UK 
courts can still treat the Strasbourg case-law less as binding authority (with the risk of 
being challenged at the ECtHR and may result in a hefty fine that the UK must pay 
the applicant.) 
Such a ‘hesitant’ attitude can be explained in various ways. Considering the 
separation of powers, for instance, the democratic legitimacy question on transferring 
power from the elected arms of government on human rights grounds to the courts – 
 
111 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. 
112 This is the date which the HRA came into force in England and Wales, other areas in the UK has 
already done the procedure before this date. See: Ian Leigh and Roger Masterman, Making Rights Real: 
The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (Hart Publishing 2008) 5-6, citation 16. 
113 Turpin and Tomkins (n 94) 273-278. 
114 E.g., Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1994] QB 670, 691 and Derbyshire County Council v 
Times Newspapers [1992] QB 770. 
115 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534. For a more detailed description of 
domestic influence of the ECHR before the HRA, see: Turpin and Tomkins (n 94) 270-271, Leigh and 
Masterman (n 112) 5-13. 
116 R. v. DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2002] 2 AC 326, 380-1, per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
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the ECtHR and the domestic courts – will need some further considerations. This 
consequently draws certain research attention.117 From the view of constitutional 
interpretation, both intentionalism and textualism supporters would argue that due to 
the lack of legal certainty and publicity, the ECHR, which is produced by non-elected 
arms, is not able to guide individuals’ conduct.118  
Another question raised here is the authority of a ‘higher court’ in relation to the 
sovereignty issue. This controversy mainly concentrates on the margin of 
interpretative autonomy: domestic courts are not bound by the Strasbourg decisions, 
but merely need to take them into account. The court’s autonomy and ability to 
interpret the law freely is constrained by s.3(1) and s.6 of the HRA. For example, one 
of the architects of the HRA, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who was also the then Lord 
Chancellor when the HRA was adopted, suggested that the UK courts should not be 
bound to follow the ECtHR jurisprudence.119 On the other hand, in a controversial 
decision regarding personal data protection, the House of Lords pointed out that it 
should not extend a protection of the ‘Convention Right’ through broadening the 
scope of the right in question unless the Strasbourg Court ever authorised to do so 
before.120 Overall, as Masterman describes, ‘the HRA leaves open the question of 
whether it would be legitimate for a domestic court to develop its own reading of the 
 
117 E.g., Roger Masterman, ‘Aspiration or Foundation? Tha Status of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence and 
the 'Convention Rights' in Domestic Law’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman 
(eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human RIghts Act (Cambridge University Press 2007) 60-63. 
118 For further discussion on the arguments and critics on the view of intentionalism and textualism on 
interpreting the ECHR, see: George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (OUP 2007) 58-79. 
119 HL Debs., 18 November 1997, vol. 583, col. 514. 
120 R. v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39, Lord Steyn, para 27; Lord Rodger, para 
66; Lady Hale para 78. The same case was later in the ECtHR: S and Marper v UK (App nos 30562/04 
and 30566/04) ECHR 4 (App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04) ECHR 4. See also: Regina v. Special 
Adjudicator ex parte Ullah; Doe v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 26, Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill described at paragraph 20 that ‘…the ECHR is an international instrument, the 
correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court…’  
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compatibility of a provision with the Convention right.’121  
Criticisms have been made in light of Strasbourg case-law. First, the appellants 
may, due to the need to appeal their case to the Strasbourg Court in order to 
accomplish certain Convention rights, bear the burden of delay and cost and suffer 
from long court activities.122 Secondly, it is arguable that the aforementioned attitude 
does not fit in with the spirit of ‘bringing rights home’ which is aimed by the HRA. To 
hold an opinion which is not compliant with the main purpose of the law discussed 
here is, therefore, unwise. 
As regards to the ‘horizontal rights,’ 123  under traditional international law, 
individuals can have merely vertical rights as addressed above. In other words, private 
parties cannot raise legal proceedings against another private individual which is not 
‘the High Contracting Parties’ (i.e. the State).124 This is also applied in the ECHR 
machinery, though there is an exception of the right to petition under Article 35. The 
major controversy in the UK regarding whether Convention rights have horizontal 
effect, as Ian Leigh and Roger Masterman observe, is about the protection of the right 
to privacy.125 This is because the text of Article 8 of the ECHR refers to only public 
authorities and does not give a clear indication about whether the right to privacy in 
the ECHR is capable of both vertical and horizontal effect. 
In terms of this argument, some English judgements do not fully adopt the 
 
121 Masterman ( n 117) 63.  
122 See also, ibid 76-86, Ian Leigh, ‘Concluding Remarks’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and 
Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human RIghts Act (CUP 2007) 435-440. 
123 It refers to the application of human rights when the infringer is an individual or a private legal 
person. 
124 Article 34 of the ECHR: ‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto…’ 
125 Leigh and Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (n 112) 239. 
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concept of the direct horizontal effect.126 However, this has been surpassed by the Von 
Hannover case127 which points out that Article 8 requires Member States to assume a 
positive duty to offer domestic remedy for violations of the right to private life by 
private individuals. Moreover, since the DPA reaches fully between the private parties 
in the UK, it is suggested that at least part of the rights protected by Article 8 of the 
ECHR may bind private bodies in the UK.128 The key question of this issue, as 
addressed by scholars, is ‘whether further adjustments will be required to give full 
effect to Von Hannover case since it is clear that English courts must now look in 
determining what counts as private information.’129 
 
5.2.2 Data Protection Law Regarding Applications of Biometric and RFID  
The so called ‘new technologies’ share a common characteristic: they always develop 
much faster than regulation. It has been remarked by Brownsword that, as indicated 
by our experience, these attractive technologies tend to ‘create difficulties to 
regulators.’130 As biometric and RFID technologies are rapid-developing technologies, 
it is unsurprising that there are relatively few regulations focusing specifically on 
these new technologies in Europe. It is noted that most of the biometric and RFID 
legal frameworks concentrate on data protection perspective due to their implication 
 
Technologies’ 
126 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, [2003] UKHL 53. Also, Campbell v. MGN [2004] 
UKHL 22. See: Leigh and Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade 
(n 112) 248-252. Also, Gavin Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ in 
Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK 
Human RIghts Act (Canbridge University Press 2007) 143-173. 
127 Von Hannover v. Germany (2005) EHRR 41. 
128 Cf. Fenwick (n 68) 936. 
129 Leigh and Masterman, Making Rights Real: The Human Rights Act in its First Decade (n 112) 252. 
130 Roger Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on Regulating 
in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory 
Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing 2008) 26. Also, Roger Brownsword, Rights, 
Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 160-184. 
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on collecting and processing of personal data.  
At EU level, the European Council issued Regulation EC 444/2009 which 
amends Regulation EC 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States. Two specific groups are 
excluded from providing fingerprints: (1) children under the age of 12, (2) persons 
physically unable to provide fingerprints.131 This exemption responds to the concerns 
we mentioned in section 2.2.3. 
The WP29 also continually pays attention to this. WP 80 regarding the 
application of data protection principles of the Data Protection Directive,132 for 
example, particularly focuses on the principle of purpose specification and principle 
of proportionality.133 Further opinions such as WP 96,134 WP 112,135 and WP 134136 
on the biometric passport and travel documents have since been adopted. 
With regard to the CoE, on the other hand, according to the progress report on the 
application of the principles of Convention 108 to the collection and processing of 
biometric data,137 the T-PD concludes that the fundamental data protection principles 
 
131 Article 1(1). 
132 Working document on biometrics, adopted on 1 August, 2003, 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf> accessed 24 April 
2010. 
133 Ibid., section 3.2 at 6-8. 
134 Opinion No 7/2004 on the inclusion of biometric elements in residence permits and visas taking 
account of the establishment of the European information system on visas (VIS), adopted on 11 August 
2004, < http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp96_en.pdf> accessed 24 
April 2010. 
135 Proposal for a Council Regulation on standards for security features and biometrics in EU citizens’ 
passports, adopted on 30 September 2005, 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2004-11-30-eupassports_en.pdf> 
accessed 24 April 2010. 
136 Opinion N° 3/2007 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending the Common Consular Instructions on visas for diplomatic missions and consular posts in 
relation to the introduction of biometrics, including provisions on the organisation of the reception and 
processing of visa applications (COM(2006)269 final), adopted on 1 March 2007, 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp134_en.pdf> accessed 24 April 
2010. 
137 The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
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are relevant to biometric technology in its recent report and reflects these principles to 
this developing technology.138 These principles include, for instance, the principle of 
purpose,139 the principle of proportionality,140 and the principle of precaution.141 It 
also points out the close relation between human rights, human dignity, and 
biometrics at both international and national level.142 It further recommends to take 
‘precautions to avoid possibly irreversible developments that are not aimed at but 
contain considerable and unnecessary drawbacks for the protection of personal 
data’143 (emphasis added). It has been observed, however, that while this report 
emphasises on the importance of the data protection principles, it remains silent on the 
question as to whether there is a real free choice for individuals could be taken part in 
daily life with respect to biometric applications144 – both in the public and private 
 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ‘Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of 
Convention 108 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data’ (T-PD, 2005)  
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/data_protection/documents/reports_and_studie
s_of_data_protection_committees/2Biometrics_2005_en.pdf> accessed 13 February 2010. There are 
several recommendations and surrounding reports could be considered as being relevant to biometric 
technology and data protection. For example: Recommendation No.R(87) 15 regulating the use of 
personal data in the police sector (17 September 1987) and its three Evaluation Reports, 
Recommendation No.R(89) 2 on the protection of personal data used for employment purposes (18 
January 1989) and Explanatory Memorandum, Recommendation No.R(91) 10 on the communication to 
third parties of personal data held by public bodies (9 September 1991) and Explanatory Memorandum, 
Recommendation No.R(97) 5 on the protection of medical data (13 February 1997) and Explanatory 
Memorandum, Report containing guiding principles for the protection of individuals with regard to the 
collection and processing of data by means of video surveillance (2003), Guiding principles for the 
protection of personal data with regard to smart cards (2004), and Study on the introduction and use of 
personal identification numbers: the data protection issues (1991). 
However, these materials are merely of some relevant to biometrics issues. The only official document 
approved by the CoE that concentrates on biometrics usage, indeed, is the progress report itself. 
138 Ibid, paras 106-107. 
139 This report expressed the attitude of following the principle of purpose when deciding the criteria to 
choose the system architecture. See: ibid, paragraph 43. 
140 It is stressed by the T-PD that any exceptional circumstances of the principle of purpose in deciding 
the criteria to choose the system architecture should consider particularly the requirement of the 
principle of proportionality in accordance with Article 8 paragraph 2 of the ECHR. See: ibid, paragraph 
49. 
141 It is addressed in this report when considering the sensitive nature of biometric data, it must bear in 
mind that ‘[t]he precautionary principle demands that where new techniques may uncover unexpected 
new information one should be reticent to start with systems where there can be reasonable doubt that 
in the long run unwanted and possibly irreversible side effects may appear.’ Ibid, paragraph 74. 
142 Ibid, paras 106-107. 
143 Ibid, paragraph 15. 
144 Yue Liu, ‘Identifying Legal Concerns in the Biometric Context’ (2008) 3: 1 Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Technology49-50. Also, The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, paragraph 58. 
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sectors. 
As regards RFID, the Commission of the European Communities issued the 
recommendation on the implementation of data protection principles in supplications 
supported by the RFID in 2009 (2009 Recommendation).145 This document aims to 
provide the requested clarification and guidance on the data protection and privacy 
aspects of RFID applications through one or more Commission Recommendations. 146 
In addition to defining certain key terms of RFID, it assesses the impact of the uses of 
RFID regarding privacy and data protection, in particular the Data Protection 
Directive. It stresses the importance of information and transparency on RFID 
applications. Moreover, the WP 29 adopted relevant documents such as WP 105147 
and WP 111.148 
The 2009 Recommendation furthermore asks States to request the relevant RFID 
industry and its shareholders to develop a framework to assess the impact of privacy 
and data protection. This framework has been submitted to the WP29 for endorsement. 
The WP29 was not satisfied by the first submission and released its opinion, holding 
that three action points should be fulfilled in the revised version.149 These three 
 
145 Commission Recommendation of 12.5.2009 on the implementation of privacy and data protection 
principles in applications supported by radio-frequency identification, 
< http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/documents/recommendationonrfid2009.pdf> 
accessed 24 April 2010. 
146 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework {SEC(2007) 312}, 
< http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0096:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 24 
April 2010. 
147 Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, adopted on 19 January 
2005, < http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf> accessed 24 
April 2010. 
148 Results of the Public Consultation on Article 29 Working Document 105 on Data Protection Issues 
Related to RFID Technology, adopted on 28 September 2005, 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp111_en.pdf> accessed 24 April 
2010. 
149 Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment 
Framework for RFID Applications, WP 175, 13 July, 2010, < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp175_en.pdf >, accessed 26 July, 2011. 
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requirements include: (1) to produce a well-defined risk assessment approach for 
privacy and data protection impact (PIA);150 (2) to consider RFID tags carried by 
persons without noticing or valid consent; and (3) to consider the tag deactivation 
principles in the retail sector. What is worth noting here is that the opinion, with 
respect to the second requirement, contends that when a RFID tag is associated to an 
identifiable data subject, no matter whether she is identified or not, the definition set 
forth in the Data Protection Directive is called into play. This is crucial since the 
nature of the RFID applications raises the possibility of a data subject to be tracked by 
RFID application operators without her being aware of it. This is in agreement with 
what was discussed in section 5.2.1.2.2 with respect to Recital 26 of the Directive. A 
subsequently revised framework has been submitted to the WP29 in this regard. It has 
been endorsed in Opinion 9/2011.151 
 
5.3 The Right to Privacy in Taiwan: the Status Quo 
A different legal system which profoundly transplants Western jurisprudence and 
applies European data protection principles makes its regulatory position worth 
researching. During this process, I will begin this inquiry by surveying Formosan 
primary statutory privacy and data protection provisions and surrounding 
constitutional interpretations, followed by a section critically examining the contents 
of the right to privacy. The issues that need to be analysed further through the lens of 
the PGC will also be identified. 
 
150 For a detailed discussion, see section 7.2.2. 
151 Opinion 9/2011 on the revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact 
Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, WP 180, 11 February, 2011, < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp180_en.pdf >, accessed 26 July, 2011. 
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5.3.1 The Statement of the Right to Privacy  
Traditionally, under the profound cultural influences of the Chinese immigrants and 
the Nationalists Party (KMT) which fled in 1949, there was no legal foundation 
regarding the right to privacy in Taiwan.152 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the relatively 
‘modern/ young’ concept of the right to privacy is not one of the constitutionally 
enumerated fundamental rights in Taiwan.153  Some inter-related reasons can be 
offered. Firstly, the demand to take the right to privacy as a constitutional right was 
weak. As it is universally observed, the first right to privacy article was published by 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their famous contribution The Right to 
Privacy in 1890. However, to consider it as a type of fundamental right and freedoms 
is a rather long process. For example, in the international law domain, the right to 
privacy was later stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 
1948 and enshrined in the ECHR in 1950. It is thus difficult for Taiwan’s legal system 
to transplant and borrow Western jurisprudence and legal experience to include the 
right to privacy that developed so late. 
Secondly, in Taiwan, the change of the Constitution evolves more slowly than 
expected because of the complex post-Second World War history and the relationship 
between Taiwan and its mainland neighbour – China (People’s Republic of China, 
 
152 In fact, the right to privacy is discouraged by some Eastern-Asia ancient wisdoms. Confucius, for 
example, addresses that ‘the Gentleman is free and has nothing to hide.’ Some commentators argue that 
the family-oriented system may, at some degree, have the idea of ‘private space’ from the public 
perspective. See: Shin-Yi Peng, ‘Privacy and the Construction of Legal Meaning in Taiwan’ (2003) 37 
The International Lawyer 1038-1040. However, the reason why the ancient houses were built in such 
styles can also be argued as for the defending purpose and the demand of politeness.  
153 Taiwan’s (the Republic of China, ROC) Constitution was adopted on 25th December, 1946, by the 
National Assembly convened in Nanking (China).  
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PRC). Because of the impasse between the cross-strait governments154  and the 
international society (mainly, the USA)155 in relation to the legal and political status 
of Taiwan, amending the Constitution is never an easy job. Seven revisions have been 
made mainly due to the need to meet the demands of constitutional rule before the 
‘national unification’ of ‘the Republic of China.’156 Consequently, it is unsurprising 
that most constitutional changes have focused on the governmental institutions such 
as the Legislative Yuan (the parliament), the National Assembly, the elections of the 
Honourable Justices of the Judicial Yuan (the court), and the president, rather than 
deploying the values of fundamental rights and freedoms. Consequently, the attempts 
of listing any new type of fundamental rights in Taiwan’s constitution are much more 
complex than other ‘ordinary nations.’157  
However, this does not mean that there is no demand of judicial effort with 
regards to emerging rights or interests. Actually, such a demand is undoubtedly 
enormous, particularly when facing profound transformations, starting from a 
 
154 Banyan, ‘Taiwan's Commonsense Consensus: Economic Integration with China Is not Doing What 
China Hoped and the Opposition Feared’ The Economist (London, 24 February 2011) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/18229208> accessed 5th March, 2011. 
155 For example, in a report written by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, the 
project director addresses that ‘… we need to make clear to Taiwan that although America supports 
Taiwan’s democracy and will stand by its obligations under the Taiwan Relation Act, those obligations 
do not involve handing Taiwan a blank check. Taiwan’s leaders must consult with us on any actions or 
policies that could threaten cross-strait stability, including the revision of the Taiwan Constitution. The 
process of changing the Taiwan Constitution must be a transparent one, and the views and the 
cautionary notes bring expressed by the United States need to be taken into account…’ (emphasis 
added). See: Donald S. Zagoria, The Taiwan Challenge (the National Committee on American Foreign 
Policy presneted to the Asia Society, 2004) 6. Also, Banyan, ‘America’s Security Commitment to 
Taiwan: From Keystone to Millstone?’ The Economist (London, 3 March 2011) 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/03/america%E2%80%99s_security_commitment_taiw
an> accessed 5 March 2011. 
156 For the official English translation of Taiwan’s Constitution and the reversions, see: 
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=434> accessed 3 March 2011.  
157 The seventh revision of the constitution states that ‘Amendment of the Constitution shall be 
initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at 
least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total 
members of the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors in the free area of the Republic of China 
at a referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of public announcement of the proposal, 
wherein the number of valid votes in favour exceeds one-half of the total number of electors, ’ which 
leads a relatively high threshold to amend the constitution. 
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totalitarian regime and moving towards a new constitutional democracy158 and the 
extending gap between the rapid technology developments and the delay in legal 
change.159 To meet the aforementioned demands, the constitutional interpretations 
(issued by the Honourable Justices of the Judicial Yuan, hereinafter ‘J. Y. 
Interpretation’) help to ‘push forward the changing of the Constitution over time.’160 
The right to privacy, for example, has attracted both scholarly research and 
civil-society/ civil rights movements for more than one decade in Taiwan.  
Overall, the Formosan modern legal framework regarding the right to privacy is 
noticeably ambiguous by virtue of the lack of historical foundation of the idea of 
privacy. The constitutional privacy framework is therefore left to constitutional 
interpretations. An overview of Taiwan’s constitutional privacy framework and 
personal data protection framework is needed in order to help understand the 
circumstance of this demand and the current responses – and of course, some of the 
challenges it poses.  
  
5.3.2 The Constitution and Its Privacy Framework 
Although the right to privacy is not a clearly listed fundamental human right under 
Taiwan’s Constitution, the term ‘privacy’ can be found in the main text of the 
Constitution. It is stated in Article 12:  
 
158 Cheryl Saunders and others, ‘Asian Constitutions in Comparative Perspectives’ (2009) 4 National 
Taiwan University Law Review 204. 
159 The second revision of the constitution has acknowledged the challenge and therefore states that 
‘the focus of fundamental national policies is expanded to include promotion of culture, science and 
technology, environmental protection, and economic development, and to safeguard the interests of 
women, aborigines, the handicapped, and the people of offshore islands.’ 
160 Wen-Chen Chang, ‘The Role of Judicial Review in Consolidating Democracy: the Case of Taiwan’ 
(2005) 2 Asia Law Review 73. 
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[t]he people shall have freedom of privacy of correspondence. 
However, this article actually regards the freedom of correspondence rather than the 
right to privacy. Arguably, privacy of correspondence can be considered under the 
concept of the right to privacy.161 Similarly, it is also arguable that the rights protected 
under Articles 13162 and 14,163 namely, freedom of religious belief and freedom of 
assembly and association may include certain concepts of privacy.164 However, even 
from a view of intentionalism, it remains unlikely that this reflects the intentions of 
the constitutional drafters. Moreover, the above arguments are unable, at least barely 
so, to explain the whole concept of the right to privacy itself.165 It is, therefore, 
unlikely to make a reliable statement saying that Article 12 introduces a general idea 
of the right to privacy.  
The term ‘privacy’ can also be found in the words of the Honourable Justices. It 
is quite interesting to see how the Formosan Constitutional Court repeatedly refers to 
the fundamental rights and freedoms, the right of personality, and the 
self-development principles to justify the recognition of this ‘modern right’. The first 
privacy concern can be read from J. Y. Interpretation No. 293 in 1992.166  However, 
whether the status of privacy was a right under the protection of the Constitution 
remained unclear. 167  It was until J. Y. Interpretation No. 535 in 2001 the 
 
161 In J. Y. Interpretation No. 631 the Honourable Justices point out that ‘The freedom of privacy of 
correspondence is one of concrete modes of right to privacy that the Constitution guarantees.’ 
162 Article 13: The people shall have freedom of religious belief. 
163 Article 14: The people shall have freedom of assembly and association. 
164 Privacy International, ‘PHR2006 - Republic of China (Taiwan) ’ (Privacy International, , 2007)  
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/category/countries/taiwan> accessed 5 March 2012. 
165 Comparing with Article 8 of the ECHR which consists protection of private and family life, home 
and correspondence, Article 12 of Taiwan’s Constitution only refers the correspondence interest. 
166 It is noted that in J. Y. Interpretation No. 293, three Honourable Justices consider the right to 
privacy should be interpreted as a constitutional right. 
167 Tzu-Yi Lin, ‘Genetic Information and Genetic Privacy: the Processing and Legislative Framework 
of Genetic Information from the Perspective of Protecting the Right to Privacy’ in The Editing 
Committee on Celebrating the Seventieth Birthday of Professor Yueh-Sheng Weng (ed), Contemporary 
Public Law Issues, vol 2 (Angel Publisher 2002) 700. Also, Fu-Te Liao and Yi-Hung Weng, ‘Dilemma 
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Constitutional Court regards the right to privacy as a type of fundamental rights and 
freedoms: 
… However, the ways in which police checks are conducted including searches, 
street checks, and interrogations may have a great effect upon personal freedom, 
right to travel, property right and right to privacy and therefore such checks must be 
in accordance with the rule of law as well as legal principles guiding police 
functions and legal enforcement. Thus, to fully ensure the constitutional protection 
of people’s fundamental rights and freedoms, the requirements and procedures of 
police checks as well as legal remedies for unlawful checks must be prescribed 
clearly in the law… (emphasis added) 
This opinion was then reaffirmed by J. Y. Interpretation No. 585 in 2004: 
The right of privacy, though not clearly enumerated under the Constitution, is an 
indispensable fundamental right protected under Article 22 of the Constitution 
because it is necessary to preserve human dignity, individuality, and the wholeness 
of personality development, as well as to safeguard the freedom of private living 
space from interference and the freedom of self-control of personal information (See 
J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 509 and 535). (emphasis added) 
Under this interpretation, an abstract article168 for safeguarding all the other unlisted 
types of fundamental rights and freedoms is applied. This interpretative method is 
 
or Co-existence: Collecting Individual Information and Protection of Information Privacy’ in The 
Editing Committee on Celebrating the Seventieth Birthday of Professor Chung-Mo Cheng (ed), Issues 
on Public Law in the 21st Century (New Sharing Publishing 2008) 309. 
168 Article 22 states that ‘[a]ll other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social 
order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution.’ Article 23 further declares that 
‘[a]ll the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Article shall not be restricted by law except 
by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an 
imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.’ 
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then followed by J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 603 and 613.169 As the majority of170 the 
Formosan Honourable Justices obtained their law degrees from Germany, it is 
unsurprising to find out that this approach, which refers to human dignity and the 
right to personality in order to justify the right to privacy, borrows from the German 
Constitutional Court’s opinions.171 
 
5.3.3 General Provisions on the Right to Privacy and Personal Data 
Protection 
5.3.3.1 Legal Framework of the Right to Privacy 
As previously noted, the right to privacy does not find its ‘Eastern tradition’ in Taiwan. 
Formosan modern privacy framework transplants and migrates from Western 
jurisprudence. For example, constitutional interpretations repeatedly contend that the 
core value of the right to privacy, which can be viewed as a value borrowed from the 
German jurisprudence, is to protect human dignity.172 This is reflected in several 
contexts of Taiwan’s legal fields. 
The Civil Code 
 
169 For the German Constitutional Courts’ opinions in relation to the justification of the right to privacy, 
see: Yves Poullet, ‘About the E-Privacy Directive: Towards a Third Generation of Data Protection 
Legislation?’ in Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet and Paul De Hert (eds), Data Protection in a Profiled 
World (Springer 2010) 4-5. 
170 Until September 2011, 9 out of 15, and after October 2011, 6 out of 15 obtained their law degrees 
from Germany.  
171 In an empirical study analysing the patterns of foreign law citations by the Formosan Constitutional 
Court, it has been observed that ‘justices with learning experiences in Germany are more likely to cite 
German constitutional laws whereas those with learning experiences in the United Stated more 
frequently cote American constitutional laws.’ Wen-Chen Chang, ‘Transnational Constitutional 
Dialogues: An Empirical Study on Foreign Law Citations by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan’ in 
Shu-Perng Hwang (ed), Constitutional Interpretation: Theory and Practice Vol 7 Part Il (Institutum 
Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica 2010) 483-518. 
172 J. Y. Interpretation No. 603.  
188 
 
                                                
The concept of the right to ‘personality’, which is cherished by the Constitution, 
is reflected in Article 18 of the Civil Code. It is considered that, under the Civil Code, 
the right to privacy is merely indirectly protected in a very vague sense by applying 
Article 18.173 It is noted that tort damages could only be recovered by satisfying the 
burden of proof of damages specifically provided by law (e.g., Article 19 of the Civil 
Code with respect to the right of the usage of one’s name).174  
It was not until 1999 the term ‘privacy’ clearly appeared in Taiwan’s Civil Code 
Amendment. In Article 195(I) of the amendment, the value of human dignity and 
personal integrity was expressly connected to the protection of privacy as an 
individual interest: 
If a person has wrongfully damaged to the body, health, reputation, liberty, credit, 
privacy or chastity of another, or to another's personality in a severe way, the injured 
person may claim a reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a 
purely pecuniary loss. If it was reputation that has been damaged, the injured person 
may also claim the taking of proper measures for the rehabilitation of his reputation. 
(emphasis added) 
This article implies that the interference of an agent’s privacy could be considered 
as a type of severe damage of his/ her personality. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
drafters may refer to the privacy value as a crucial concept of ‘personality’, which is a 
reflection of human dignity. 
 
173 Article 18 of the Civil Code states that ‘(I) When one's personality is infringed, one may apply to 
the court for removing. When one's personality is in danger of being infringed, one may apply for 
prevention. (II) In the preceding paragraph, an action for damages for emotional distress may be 
brought only it is otherwise provided by the act.’ For the indirect application to deal with the invasion 
of privacy prior to the 1999 amendment, see: Peng (n 152) 1046-1047. 
174 Article 19: ‘If one's right to use his name is infringed, one may apply to the court for removing of 
infringement and for damages for emotional distress.’ 
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The Criminal Code 
The Formosan Criminal Code concentrates on the breach of confidence in 
Chapter 28.175 It begins with Article 315, which states that a person, who, without a 
reasonable cause, opens or conceals a sealed letter or other sealed document or 
picture belonging to another, may be punished under the law. However, the purpose of 
this article is simply to correspond to Article 12 of the Constitution rather than a direct 
protection of the right to privacy. 
To deal with the need to reduce the gap between the normative framework and 
technology, the Criminal Code affirmed Articles 315-1 and 315-2 in its 1999 
amendment. Article 315-1 states that an individual shall be punished if he uses 
devices or equipment to peek at, wiretap or eavesdrop, or if he records, photos 
videotapes or uses any electrical devices to record on other’s private activities, 
conversations, or speeches without any reasonable causes. If one violates the above 
rules in pursuit of his own interests or to disseminate, broadcast or sell the content of 
the above records, Article 315-2 is involved. It should also be noted that the purpose 
of these articles is to protect the interests of both social welfare and individual 
privacy. 
Two points require further discussion. First, the requirements of Article 315 
which protect the confidentiality are very similar to the earlier (which is the 
conventionally understood one) English common law idea of the duty of 
 
175 Some commentators translate the title (妨害秘密罪) of this Chapter as ‘Offences against Privacy.’ 
See for example: Peng (n 152) 1045. However, this might not be right. First, throughout this chapter, 
there is no such an idea of ‘privacy.’ It must be noted that, until now, the term ‘privacy’ has not been 
addressed within the text of the Criminal Code. It was not until the appearance of Articles 315-1 and 
315-2, the concepts of the right to privacy was clearly mentioned in the purpose of the amendment. 
Secondly, at the time drafting the Criminal Code, there is no such an idea of ‘privacy’ in Taiwan. 
Thirdly, as the author argues below, the aim of Article 315 in the Criminal Code is to protect the 
interest of confidentiality or the privacy of correspondent under the demand of Article 12 of the 
Constitution, which is merely one concept of privacy, rather than the right to privacy. 
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confidentiality. There are three key elements in the English traditional formulation for 
the action of breaching of confidence:176  
1. ‘The information itself… must have necessary quality of confidence about it;’ 
2. ‘Information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confidence;’ and 
3. ‘There must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the 
party communicating it.’ 
Under this formulation, the common law duty on breach of confidence ‘was of 
limited value in protecting privacy, since it only covered those specific instances in 
which information was communicated in confidence.’177 This is similar to Article 315 
of Taiwan’s Criminal Code, which states that one of the elements of violating this 
legal duty is to open or conceal ‘a sealed letter or other sealed document or picture.’ 
Secondly, can the subsequent 1999 amendment widen the scope of the duty of 
confidence protected by Article 315? The answer should be affirmative. This is 
because the concept of protected interests under Articles 315-1 and 315-2 includes 
uncovering private facts and activities. Hence, it can be argued that, at least under the 
Criminal Code, the protection of the right to privacy may now be encompassed (at 
least to some extent) by the law of confidence. This is also similar to the modern 
common law trend. 178   Moreover, the new amendment does not mention any 
exemption in relation to other (constitutional) fundamental rights and freedoms such 
as the freedom of press. This is again similar to the reshaping of the action for breach 
 
176 Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers) Limited [1969] R P C 41, 47. This judgement was then confirmed 
by A-G v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 A C 109. 
177 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-examination’ (1996) 55 
Cambridge Law Journal 453. 
178 Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 W L R 804, 807. Fenwick and Phillipson, 
‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-examination’ (n 177) 453-454. 
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of confidence in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers in English common law, 
which protects the right to privacy as well.179 
Nevertheless, this new doctrine is not in every case final and definitive, as stated 
in Article 23 of the Constitution. Therefore, similar to the argument raised by Fenwick 
and Phillipson on the English common law regarding confidence and privacy,180 the 
1999 amendment cannot always offer a remedy in certain situations, e.g., the conflict 
between the freedom of press and the right to privacy.  
The Administrative Provisions 
There are a number of administrative regulations governing communication and 
correspondence in response to Article 12 of the Constitution. Such provisions, for 
example, can be found in Articles 23181 and 24182 of the 1996 Radio and Television 
Act, Articles 61183 and 62184 of the Cable Radio and Television Law, and Articles 
30185 and 31186 of the Satellite Broadcasting Law. However, privacy is not a directly 
 
179 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Confidentiality and Data Protection’ in Andrew Grubb, 
Judith Laing and Jean McHale (eds), Principles of Medical Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 655-656. 
180 Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-examination’ (n 177) 454-455. 
181 Article 23 states: ‘If an involved party considers a station’s report to be erroneous, the said party 
may request a correction within 15 days of its broadcast. The station shall make the correction in the 
same program or in another program in the same time slot within seven days of receiving the request. If 
the station considers that there is no error in the report, it shall make a written response to the said 
party.  
If the erroneous report of the preceding paragraph causes actual impairment to the rights and interests 
of the involved party, the station, its responsible person, and related personnel shall be liable to civil or 
criminal charges.’ 
182 Article 24 states: ‘If radio/television commentaries involve other people or agencies or 
organizations to the extent of impairing their rights and interests, the stations concerned shall not reject 
requests by the involved parties for an equal opportunity for defence.’ 
183 Article 61 states: ‘If an involved party considers a cable radio or television program or 
advertisement to be erroneous, the said party may request a correction within 15 days of its 
transmission. The system operator shall make the correction in the same program or advertisement in 
the same time slot within 15 days of receiving the request. If the system operator considers that there 
has been no error in the program or advertisement, it shall state its reasons in a written response to the 
said party.’ 
184 Article 62 states: ‘When a commentary in a cable radio or television program involves other 
individuals, institutions, or organizations to the extent that the rights and interests of the involved party 
are impaired, the request by the said party for a commensurate opportunity to respond shall not be 
rejected.’ 
185 Article 30 states: ‘If an involved party considers a satellite broadcasting program or advertisement 
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protected form of right under these laws: none of these even mention the right to 
privacy. To look at the right to privacy in the communication aspect, one has to turn to 
Article 6 of the Telecommunications Act.187  
The competing interests under Article 6 of the Telecommunications Act have 
frequently been regarded as public interests defined by the governmental 
authorisation. So, how to reconcile the possible conflicts under this article? The 
Communications Protection and Surveillance Law may offer us a hint by further 
regulating that ‘[n]o interception of communication may be executed, except as 
necessary to ensure national security or the maintenance of social order.’188 The aim 
of this law, contained in Article 1,189  is supposed to prevent illegal spying or 
surveillance. However, it is rightly observed by Peng that this regulation may have a 
practical problem: the government, and particularly the police, tends to ‘expend its 
power’ to tap into other unregulated new-developing communicating methods.190 
How to deal with this problem? 
Although there is no clear criterion to deal with competing rights and interests 
within the administrative regulatory tools regarding the communication in Taiwan, the 
 
to be erroneous, the said party may request a correction within 20 days of its broadcast. The satellite 
broadcasting business shall make the correction in the same program or advertisement in the same time 
slot, within 20 days of receiving the request. If the satellite broadcasting business considers that there 
has been no error in the program or advertisement, it shall state its reasons in a written response to the 
said party.’ 
186 Article 31 states: ‘When a commentary in a satellite broadcasting program involves individuals, 
institutions, or organizations to the extent that the rights and interests of the involved party are impaired, 
the request by the said party for a commensurate opportunity to respond shall not be rejected.’ 
187 It states that ‘Communications processed through telecommunications enterprises or dedicated 
telecommunications shall not be accessed or taped without authorization, nor shall the privacy thereof 
be violated through other illegal means,’ and ‘ a telecommunications enterprise shall implement 
appropriate and necessary measures to safeguard the confidentiality of its processed communications.’ 
Article 56.1 further provides that ‘Violators of Paragraph 1 of Article 6 regarding infringement on 
others' secrecy of communications shall be penalized with imprisonment of not more than five years, 
with a possible fine of not more than NT$1,500,000…’ 
188 Article 2 of the Communications Protection and Surveillance Law. 
189 Article 1 states: ‘The purpose of this Act is the protection of the people's right of private 
communication from illegal infringement, ensuring national security and maintaining social order.’ 
190 Peng (n 152). 
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constitutional demand of protecting human dignity should always be taken as the 
central value. In this regard, it is crucial to bear in mind that, as Article 5 of the 
Fundamental Communications Act states, that ‘[c]ommunications shall safeguard 
human dignity, respect minorities' rights and interests, and promote the balanced 
development of cultural diversity’ (emphasis added). 
There are other specific administrative rules regulating the media and press in 
order to protect the right to privacy.191 However, to understand the general Formosan 
legal framework of personal data protection, in particular the right to privacy, it is 
necessary to focus on the Personal Data Protection Law. 
 
5.3.3.2 Personal Data Protection Law 
The Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law (CPDPL) was promulgated in 
1995. Although it seemed to follow a number of data protection principles applied by 
the primary international/ European legal frameworks, e.g., the OECD Guidelines, the 
Data Protection Convention and the Data Protection Directive,192 it has been argued 
that the 1995 version was unable to protect the rights and interests in relation to 
 
191 For example, paragraph 4, Article 36 of the Public Television Act states: ‘Program production and 
broadcasting shall respect personal reputations and protect the right of privacy, ’ paragraph 1, Article 46 
of the Children and Youth Welfare Act states: ‘No publicity materials, publications, broadcasting and 
television, website information or other media shall report or write the name or any information that 
may be identify the children or youth concerned suffering the behaviours as stated in article 30 or 
paragraph 1 of article 36…’ and paragraph 1, Article 13 of the Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act 
states: ‘Advertisements, publications, broadcasts, television, electronic messages, computer, internet or 
other kinds of media should report or record neither the victim's name nor other information which can 
lead discovery of his or her identity...’ 
192 According to the regulations governing the personal data held by the Ministry of Justice, the 
regulations are in accordance with the CPDPL, its revision and considering with the data protection 
principles enshrined by the OECD Guidelines, the Data Protection Directive as well as the APEC 
Privacy Framework. Available at: < http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/01217148162.pdf>, 
accessed 19th March, 2011. 
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personal data in effect, particularly the right to privacy,.193 In response to these 
criticisms as well as the demand of bridging the gap between technology 
developments and the lag of data protection laws, the Legislative Yuan issued a 
revision in 2010: the Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL).194  
Purpose and objective 
The PDPL aims to govern the collection, processing and use of ‘personal 
information’195 so as to prevent infringement upon the right to personality. The right 
to privacy has not been specifically mentioned here. In fact, the legal status of the 
right to privacy in Taiwan, in particular the relationships between human dignity, the 
right to personality and the right to privacy remain quite confusing.  
‘The right of personality is indispensable in guarding the individuality and free 
development of character, closely related to the safeguarding of human dignity, and is 
therefore protected by Article 22 of the Constitution’196 (emphasis added). 
‘The detention of a criminal defendant not only will create a serious 
psychological impact upon her, but will largely affect her rights of personality such as 
reputation, credit, and so forth as well’197 (emphasis added). 
 
193 Wen-Tsong Chiou, ‘Comments on the Framework Problems of the Draft of Computer-Processed 
Personal Data Protection Law from the Perspective of the Conceptual Distinction between Information 
Self-determination and Information Privacy’ (2009) 168 The Taiwan Law Review 172-174. Ching-Yi 
Liu, ‘Not So Improved: Initial Commentry on the Personal Data Protection Law’ (2010) 183 The 
Taiwan Law Review 147. 
194 According to Article 55 of the PDPL, the law will only become effective when the Executive Yuan 
(the central government administrative authority) issues an official order that specifies its effective 
date. 
195 The official translation of the PDPL (in English) does not distinguish different ideas between 
personal data and personal information. The title of the PDPL, for example, is translated as the 
‘Personal Information Protection Act’. This error has repeatedly been made through the whole official 
English translation of the PDPL. See: < 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0050021 > accessed 24th April, 2011. 
196 J. Y. Interpretation No. 664. 
197 J. Y. Interpretation No. 665. 
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Here, according to the former Honourable Justice Tze-Chien Wang, the right to 
privacy is included in the concept of the right to personality.198 In other words, the 
right to privacy is merely one of the rights/ interests protected by the PDPL: the 
purpose of the PDPL is to protect the right of personality in relation to the collection, 
processing and utilisation of personal data. 
It is essential to note that the interests protected by the PDPL must not be 
confused with the protection of personal data. This is because ‘the concept of the right 
to privacy is much broader than the individual’s right to protection of personal data,’ 
and ‘protection of personal data’ could be considered as a particular type of the right 
to privacy.199 This is also true in Taiwan, as Ding-Wang Lu, the Vice Director of the 
Department of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, in an academic article 
commenting the PDPL, argues that ‘protection of personal data is exactly subject to 
the right to personality’200 This is also implied by the J. Y. Interpretation No. 603.201  
In sum, the PDPL protects the right to personality as well as human dignity, 
which covers the right to privacy and the right of data protection. 
However, it can be misleading to refer the PDPL as the legislation to merely 
regulate the right to privacy. In fact, the term ‘data protection’ is often confused with 
‘privacy protection.’ For example, in their popular contribution, Solove and Schwartz 
put that ‘[i]t is worth noting that the phrase “data protection” is frequently used to 
 
198 Tze-Chien Wang, ‘The Issue and the Development of Protecting the Right to Personality (III): the 
Materialization of the Right to Personality and Its Scope’ (2007) 97 Taiwan Law Journal 36. 
199 Mette Hartlev, ‘The Concept of Privacy: An Analysis of the EU Directive on the Protection of 
Personal Data’ in Deryck Beyleveld and others (eds), The Data Protection Directive and Medicial 
Research Across Europe (Ashgete Publishing 2004) 25.  
200 Ding-Wang Lu, ‘Brief Commentary on the Amendment of Personal Data Protection Law’ (2010) 
183 The Taiwan Law Review 131. 
201 Ibid 131. 
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describe privacy protection in the European context.’202 Nevertheless, as the PDPL 
(as well as the Data Protection Directive) considers the right to personality, which 
includes the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution, to the 
extent that they may be interfered with in the use of personal data rather than only to 
protect privacy,’ it is important to be clear about this.203  
Definition and Scope 
By reading the change of the title of the law in the amendment, it is easy to 
realise that the scope of the PDPL has been expanded: the definition of personal data 
is no longer limited to those ‘computer-processed’ data but any data format covering 
the information based on the possibility to identify someone whose identity is 
unknown when collecting his data.204 
Moreover, unlike the CPDPL which limited its applications to the public sector 
and eight specified private sector areas, 205  the PDPL covers all industries and 
individuals as well as the public sector. This is now in line with the European context 
because, as the Ministry of Justice stated, it takes the European and international data 
protection legal regime into consideration.206 
Data Protection Principles 
 
202 Solove and Schwartz 996. 
203 In terms of the Data Protection Directive, see: Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in 
Relation to Medical Research’ 6. 
204 According to paragraph 1, Article 2 of the PDPL, personal data refers to ‘ a nature person’s name, 
date of birth, national unified ID card number, passport number, characteristics, fingerprint, marital 
status, family, education, occupation, medical history, medical treatment, genetic information, sex life, 
health examination, prior criminal records, contact information, financial status, and social activities as 
well as other data which can be used directly or indirectly to identify the person.’ 
205 These eight industries are: credit search businesses and groups or individuals whose major line of 
business is to collect or process personal data by computers, hospitals, schools, telecommunication, 
financial, securities, insurance, and mass communications industries. 
206 See: http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/01217148162.pdf, accessed 1st June 2011. 
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The PDPL lays down some basic personal data protection principles which 
correspond to the Data Protection Directive. The personal data must be, namely: 
1. processed fairly and lawfully (principle of bona fide, Article 5);  
2. collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (Article 5); 
3. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed (Articles 5, 11, 15, 16, 19 and 20); 
4. accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to 
the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified (Article 11); 
5. kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than 
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which 
they are further processed (Article 11). 
Data Controller’s Duties: Transparency Demands/ Data Subject’s Rights  
During the legislating process of the amendment, there were public concerns on 
the balance between the right of personal data protection and the freedom of 
expression with respect to the media, political commentators and elected 
representatives. These worries stemmed from the legal obligation of the data 
controllers (including both government and non-government agencies) to inform data 
subjects (required by Article 9207) and obtain their prior explicit consent208 before 
 
207 Article 9 states: ‘A government agency or non-government agency should notify the data subject of 
the source of information and Item 1 to 5 of Paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, before processing or 
using personal information collected in accordance with Article 15 or 19 which was not provided by 
the data subject...’ 
208 The PDPL requires a written consent under Articles 19 and 20. 
198 
 
                                                
collecting or publicising any information about them under Articles 19 and 20 of the 
PDPL.  
With respect to the duty to inform of the data controller, such a rule seems to put 
considerable emphasis on the transparency demands and can be loosely thought as the 
data subject’s right. However, in order to respond to the great public fear and the local 
legal ideology towards freedom of expression, which is rooted in the profound 
shadow of the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Party during the 
White Terror209 period, the reports of media are exempt from the rule due to the 
‘public interests’ under Article 9.210 
Nevertheless, this exemption could give rise to further concerns regarding 
obtaining valid consent.211 This is because, apart from free will, a data subject’s right 
to information which assures relevant knowledge and understanding is the 
fundamental precondition to give valid consent.212 In this respect, the whole map of 
consent rules of the PDPL needs to be further examined. 
Consent in the Data Protection Principles: the Procedure Justification  
Rules provided by Articles 6, 16 and 19 of the PDPL raise some consent concerns. 
To understand and deal with the issue, it is better to start from the legislation 
 
209 The ‘White Terror’ describes a period of political suppression enacted by the Nationalist party 
under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. It was first enacted in 1947 as a result of the 228 Incident in 
Taiwan. During the period, the right of freedom of expression and press was strictly limited / banned by 
the longest martial law in the world (from May 19, 1949 to July 15, 1987). 
210 It states: ‘…The notification mentioned in the preceding Paragraph may not be given for the 
followings:…5: Personal data collected by the mass media for the purpose of news reporting on the 
basis of public interests…’ 
211 The Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR), for example, argues that the amendment allows 
too many exceptions from obtaining consent. See: Iok-sin Loa, ‘Groups Decry Revision of Data Act’ 
Taipei Times (Taipei, 29th April 2010) 3 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/04/29/2003471758> accessed 22 March, 
2011. 
212 For further discussions, see: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart 
Publishing 2007) 145-153.  
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governing the prohibition of collecting and processing personal sensitive data.  
Unlike the former CPDPL’s lack of rules governing specific kinds of personal 
data, sensitive personal data, in principle, is not allowed to be collected, processed, as 
well as used under Article 6 of the PDPL. This is in line with Article 8 of the Data 
Protection Directive regarding the special categories of processing personal data. 
Under the PDPL, the sensitive personal data is defined as medical treatment, genetic 
information, sex life, health examination and criminal record. There are four 
exemptions, namely: 
1. in accordance with law; 
2. it is necessary for the government agency to perform its duties or for the non- 
government agency to fulfil the legal obligation, and when there are proper 
security measures; 
3. the data subject has disclosed such information by himself, or when the data 
concerned has been publicized legally; and  
4. the personal data is collected, processed or used under certain methods by a 
government agency or an academic research institution based on the purpose 
of medical treatment, personal hygiene or crime prevention statistics and/or 
study. 
These four items thus can be viewed as the substantive justifications when 
balancing competing interests. In this regard, prohibited actions may be permitted 
with conditions. Surprisingly, unlike Article 8(1) of the Data Protection Directive, 
readers cannot find a procedural justification of the explicit consent under Article 6 of 
the PDPL. Therefore, in reading its text literally, it might invite the interpretation that 
if any individual, group or the government meet any of the above exemptions, the 
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sensitive personal data discussed can be collected and processed without consent.  
What is the role of consent then? Is consent not a sufficient, or necessary 
(procedural) justification in such circumstances? This generates a problem of the lack 
of clear guidance, or misinterpretation that consent may not even have any place in 
sensitive data collection and processing behaviours. This has been criticised by 
Taiwanese academics by looking at the framework of Formosan personal data 
protection law.213 We shall review this problem in the next chapter.  
Proportionality in the Data Protection Principles: the Substantive Justifications  
The fairly vague and flexible language of the definition and scope of public 
interests and proper reasons/ reasonable expectations exemptions under Articles 6, 9, 
19, and 20 of the PDPL are further criticised as leaving loopholes for data controllers 
to substantively justify the collection and processing of personal data.214 The open-list 
nature of public interests, for example, makes it ‘potentially compatible with any 
moral theory, though the identification of relevant public interests and the method of 
weighing competing interests will differ from one theory to another.’215 To deal with 
the ‘public interests’ justification, on the basis of the PGC grounds, three classes of 
reasons can be legitimately applied as guidelines:216 
1. Instruments in order to secure respect for the rights of fellow agents in the 
community;217  
 
213 Chiou (n 193) 181-186. Liu, ‘Not So Improved: Initial Commentry on the Personal Data Protection 
Law’ (n 193) 151. 
214 Liu, ‘Not So Improved: Initial Commentry on the Personal Data Protection Law’ (n 193) 156-162. 
Chiou (n 193) 181-186. 
215 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Confidentiality and Data Protection’ (n 179) 666. 
216 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law (n 212) 271-272. 
217 This covers three sub-categories: ‘(1) interventions that are designed to discourage violations of 
rights; (2) interventions that aim to co-ordinate the community’s activities to that responsibilities to 
right-holders are discharged more effectively; and (3) interventions that are designed to assist with the 
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2. Instruments in order to preserve the context in which autonomous agents will 
enjoy the opportunity to flourish as members of a community committed to human 
rights and responsibilities;218 and  
3. Instruments in order to give effect to prohibitions that have been expressly 
authorised by members of the community. 
As regards the third category, it should be noted that, since Taiwan is simply not a 
considerably small community like an ancient Greek city-state, it is not practical to 
apply such guidelines.219 Overall, as the national critics hold, given the open textured 
nature of the language, the abuse of such exemptions in the name of ‘public interest’ 
should not be viewed as a blank cheque. Also, the applied instruments should take the 
criterion of degrees of needfulness for action into account. This shall be further 
discussed in section 6.4.2. 
Institutional Frameworks 
It has been argued that, under the European data protection tradition, an 
independent and specialised supervisory agency dealing with the data protection 
framework has been assumed to be best suited (or, essential) to ensure the full 
implementation of such rules in practice.220  
Although the PDPL seems to draw from European experiences, particularly the 
 
enforcement of rights.’ Ibid 271. 
218 This category also covers three sub-categories: ‘(1) interventions that are designed to make 
essential community choices between morally optional conduct or forms of life; (2) interventions that 
provisionally settle the community’s position on a morally contested matter (whether relating to the 
interpretation of rights principles or their application); and (3) interventions that aim to preserve those 
features of the context from which agents take their identity as members of a community committed to 
respect for rights, and concomitantly, their responsibilities.’ Ibid 271-272. 
219 Ibid 357. 
220 Peter Blume, ‘Transbroder Data Flow: Is There a Solution in Sight?’ (2000) 8 International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology67. Also, Lingjie Kong, ‘Enacting China's Data Protection Act’ 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 225. 
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Data Protection Directive, there is, surprisingly, no single/ independent supervisory 
authority in charge. Instead of having an independent oversight body, the enforcement 
of the PDPL is left to the Ministries responsible for each industry sector. By reading 
Articles 53221 and 55,222 however, it is arguable that the Ministry of Justice acts as the 
supervisory body, or at least the chief authority in charge of the PDPL and the data 
protection institutional framework. Nevertheless, unless it is clearly appointed by the 
law, the Ministry cannot always play multiple roles as the de facto promoter, guardian, 
and defender of the PDPL regime. For example, the Ministry may not be able to 
defend individuals against the public authorities’ wrongdoings in relation to the right 
to privacy since the Ministry itself is the executive department under the Executive 
Yuan rather than an independent authority. This is thus quite reasonable for the local 
commentators to share a general opinion that, although evidence of the enforcement 
or effectiveness of the data protection law is lacking, the PDPL (as well as the CPDPL) 
is ineffective. 
 
5.4 The Concepts of the Right to Privacy in Taiwan 
Building upon the knowledge of the status quo of the Formosan privacy framework, 
the categorisation offered by Allen, i.e., spatial privacy, decisional privacy, and 
information privacy, will be used for later discussion. 223  This categorisation is 
followed by a majority of Formosan commentators, including the former Honourable 
 
221 Article 53 of the PDPL states: ‘The specific purpose and the classification of personal information 
stipulated in this Law should be prescribed by the Ministry of Justice in conjunction with the 
government authority in charge of subject industry at the central government level.’ 
222 Article 55 of the PDPL states: ‘The Enforcement Rule of this Act shall be prescribed by the 
Ministry of Justice.’ 
223 The reasons of the general application of Allen’s categorisation have been provided in section 4.3.2. 
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Justice Tzu-Yi Lin,224 who is one of leading scholars in the Formosan privacy law 
field. Moreover, by reading J. Y. Interpretation No. 603: 
Although the right of privacy is not among those rights specifically enumerated in 
the Constitution, it should nonetheless be considered as an indispensable 
fundamental right and thus protected under Article 22 of the Constitution for 
purposes of preserving human dignity, individuality and moral integrity, as well as 
preventing invasions of intimacy of private life and maintaining self-control of 
personal information (See J. Y. Interpretation No. 585)… (emphasis added) 
three dimensions of privacy can as well be distinguished: (1) individuality and moral 
integrity can be argued as referring to spatial privacy; (2) preventing invasions of 
intimacy of private life implies the concepts of decisional privacy; and (3) 
maintaining self-control of personal information indicates informational privacy. To 
understand Taiwan’s current privacy discussions, it is an appropriate and effective 
way to apply the general categorisation given by Allen.225 
However, there is a need to make a distinct between Professor Allen’s proposal 
and this thesis. As previously addressed in section 4.2.2, Allen’s view on privacy is 
based on a duty-based consideration. This thesis, on the other hand, applies the 
Gewirthian theory subject to a right-based thinking. An agent must be granted generic 
rights for any purpose it has voluntarily chosen. Only by this premise the generic 
rights of others will not be threatened under a right-based line of reasoning. Undesired 
access by any other agent over the agent’s personhood thus causes a generic harm 
(although it may be justified under the PGC). To violate this generic need (privacy) 
through an actual physical admission to spaces or body integrity is termed the spatial 
 
224 Lin (n 167) 700-701. 
225 See: section 4.3.2. 
204 
 
                                                
privacy harm. Metaphorical access to the agent’s personhood in the sense of 
possibilities for intruding and intervening in a voluntarily act is termed decisional 
privacy, while in the sense of access to information is termed as informational 
privacy.226 
 
5.4.1 Spatial Privacy 
The right to spatial privacy refers to the right to respect and protect the interest of an 
individual’s body integrity and the space where the individual lives or stays. It 
embraces the prevention against interferences with: (1) physical and mental integrity; 
(2) limited access on private space and communication; and (3) the living space and 
environment.  
First, an individual’s body concerns not only the most intimate aspect of one’s 
private life,227 but also the ability to keep oneself from unwanted access by others. 
Both interests are core concepts of the right to privacy. Under Article 8 of the 
Constitution, which states that ‘personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people,’ 
the right to be free from interference with physical and psychological integrity is 
protected.  
With respect to physical integrity, the avoidance of non-consensual physical 
assault of the body, for example, can be identified as falling within this form of 
privacy: individuals are protected against assaults by public bodies, in particular by 
the police, prosecution, and judicial powers.228 J. Y. Interpretation No. 535, for 
 
226 See also: Beate Rössler, The value of privacy (Polity Press 2005) 43-44. 
227 This opinion is also stated by the ECtHR. See for example: Y.F. v Turkey (App no 24209/94) ECHR 
2003-IX, para. 33. 
228 Article 8 of the Formosan Constitution states that: ‘Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the 
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instance, states that 
According to Article 11, Clause 3, of said Act (The Police Service Act), a police 
check is authorized as a way for police to facilitate law enforcement. However, the 
ways in which police checks are conducted including searches, street checks, and 
interrogations may have a great effect upon personal freedom, right to travel, 
property right and the right to privacy and therefore such checks must be in 
accordance with the rule of law as well as legal principles guiding police functions 
and legal enforcement. (emphasis added) 
The Honourable Judges agree that the (stop and) search cases by the police can lead to 
potential violations of privacy. Physical assault could as well affect mental integrity 
since it may provoke emotions experienced in anticipation of such harm. Similarly, 
the non-consensual exposure of the body not only violates physical integrity, but also 
leads to a breach of one’s mental equilibrium. Clear examples can be found in the use 
of X-ray, ultra red-ray or electromagnetic waves to assess persons for security (or any 
other) reasons that can interfere with body integrity since unnecessary exposure in 
front of others (when the individual is aware of such scan), or having one’s body 
scrutinised without knowing (i.e. when the individual is unaware of such scan) that 
 
people. Except in case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained 
otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No 
person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed by law may be resisted. 
When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, the organ making the 
arrest or detention shall in writing inform the said person, and his designated relative or friend, of the 
grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for 
trial. The said person, or any other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served 
within 24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial. 
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall it order the organ 
concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute, or 
delay in executing, the writ of the court for the surrender of the said person for trial. 
When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ, he or any other person may petition the 
court for an investigation. The court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, 
investigate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law.’ 
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lead to stigma which may damage mental well-being.  
To maintain bodily integrity, the right to be let alone and the right not to be spied 
on in the restricted access space regarding the human body should also be taken into 
account. This is particularly crucial with respect to mental integrity. Unwanted 
watching, listening, taking of photographs, recording or any observations of an 
individual’s body and behaviour, will interfere with the individual’s interests in bodily 
integrity. Article 23 of the 1996 Radio and Television Act and Articles 315-1 and 
315-2 of the Criminal code, for example, specifically focus on these interests. To 
complete, it must be added that those two forms of body integrity– physical and 
psychological integrity are not separated, but that there is a certain degree of overlap. 
Secondly, private spaces such as living, working, studying or entertaining spaces 
of an individual are as well within the category of protecting spatial privacy. The 
limited access of visible, tangible, or touchable spaces as well as the realms of life and 
the way of life of an individual is protected.229 This is enshrined by Article 10 of the 
Constitution which declares that individuals shall have freedom of residence and of 
change of residence. Moreover, Article 12 of the Constitution which stands for the 
freedom of privacy of correspondence can be argued as contributing to the protection 
of intangible private space.  
The right to be not spied on in private spaces and communications is of central 
importance under this sub-category. Regulations on surveillance can reflect the 
balance between this interest and other rights and freedoms. It is held, for example, in 
J. Y. Interpretation No. 631:  
The Communication Protection and Monitoring Law is a statute enacted by the State 
 
229 Rössler (n 226) 142. 
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for the purpose of balancing the conflict of interests between “protection of the 
people’s freedom of privacy of correspondence from illegal invasion” and 
“guarantee of national security and maintenance of social order.” (see Article 1 of 
the Communication Protection and Monitoring Law) According to its provisions, 
only where it is necessary to safeguard national security and maintain social order 
the State may issue the writs of communication monitoring to examine the people’s 
private correspondence, provided that both substantive and procedural legal 
requirements are met. (see Articles 2, 5 and 7 of the Communication Protection and 
Monitoring Law) 
As regards the limited access related to physical separation or isolation from others, in 
J. Y. Interpretation No. 535 concerning the police check, it is provided that it must be 
protected to the same extent as residence under Article 10 of the Constitution if the 
police check is exercised in the private spaces.  
Thirdly, the protection of the private space itself should also be taken into 
account. This is because without such a private ‘space,’ individuals are not able to act 
privately. The protection of this interest is closely related to the property right under 
Article 15 of the constitution which states that ‘the right of property shall be 
guaranteed to the people.’ Therefore, the property right to home as a shelter is crucial 
to achieve and maintain the right to privacy. Moreover, the maintenance of such a 
space, e.g., the protection of one’s living and life-supporting environment is also a 
necessary interest/ requirement to guarantee the spatial privacy. Lastly, as regards the 
environmental right, the Constitution does not mention it in the main text. However, it 
is stated by Article 10(II) of the Additional Articles of the Taiwan’s Constitution that 
‘[e]nvironmental and ecological protection shall be given equal consideration with 
economic and technological development.’ 
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5.4.2 Decisional Privacy 
Professor Allen proposes a second category of privacy – decisional privacy, 
concerning with ‘freedom from governmental or other outside interference with 
decision-making and conduct, especially respecting appropriately private affairs.’230 
Following her reasoning, this dimension expresses the concept of privacy in a liberty 
sense.231 Briefly, this dimension refers to action that is simply classified as a private 
matter because it is no one else’s business other than the agent at issue.232  
Decisional privacy cannot be clearly identified in Taiwan’s Constitution. 
However, according to Article 13 of the Constitution stating that individuals shall 
have the freedom of religious belief, an individual’s ‘own business’ concerning her 
intimate aspect of personhood to voluntarily choose her religious belief is guaranteed. 
In this regard, merely choosing one’s religious belief normally will not violate others’ 
generic conditions of agency, as it could be done alone without having any form of 
relationships with others. This article thus can be viewed as a reflection of decisional 
privacy.  
However, it should be noted that not all social behaviour and actions can be done 
alone without establishing and affecting relationships with others – as there is no 
ultimate private/ isolate space for an agent to do things without encountering others. 
The right to decide whether or not and how to develop relationships with other human 
beings concerns an individual’s personhood, particularly if it comes to the decision to 
 
230 Anita Allen, ‘Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory.’ (1987) 56 
Cincinnate Law Review 465-466. 
231 Ibid 465-466. In the essay she remarks, Allen does not clearly distinguished between liberal, 
freedom, and decisional privacy. For a discussion in a greater detail, see, e.g., Rössler (n 226) 79-110. 
232 Rössler (n 226) 79. 
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maintain or to end familial and other intimate relationships. In J. Y. Interpretation No. 
554, in applying Article 239 of the Criminal Code relating to a person who commits 
adultery and to the other party in the adultery that are punishable, the constitutional 
court holds that  
Marriage and family serve as the foundation on which our society takes its shape 
and develops and are thus institutionally protected by the Constitution (See 
Interpretations Nos. 362 and 552). The root of our marriage system lies in the 
freedom of personality, with such social functions as the maintenance of the order of 
human relationships and gender equality, and the raising of children. (emphasis 
added) 
In this case the Court considered that ‘the cornerstone supporting matrimonial 
cohabitation is unquestionably the relationship between the husband and wife 
established upon the affection and faithfulness toward each other,’ and it is the 
‘affection between the husband and the wife and their privacy’ that should be centrally 
taken into account when dealing with the relationship of the marriage.233 (emphasis 
added) It thus arguable that the Court recognises that decisional privacy has to be 
considered since the marriage involves intimacy between husband and wife (or any 
intimate partners). 
Additionally, the same case contemplates the freedom of sexual activity. It is held 
that ‘the freedom of sexual behaviour is inseparably related with the personality of 
individuals, and every person is free to decide whether or not and with whom to have 
sexual affairs.’ (emphasis added) On this basis, the Honourable Justices confirmed 
that the right to establish and develop sexual relationships with other human beings is 
 
233 Paragraph 3 of the reasoning of J. Y. Interpretation No. 554. 
210 
 
                                                
closely related to decisional privacy and thus should not be violated by others. 
As a type of decisional privacy, furthermore, the right to retain and choose one’s 
name is also protected. It is held by J. Y. Interpretation No. 399 that 
The right of an individual to select his/her own name is a type of personal right. The 
name of an individual signifies an aspect of his/her personality. Therefore, the right 
to choose one’s own name is a physical freedom safeguarded under Article 22 of the 
Constitution… (emphasis added) 
…Whether or not the characters chosen in giving names are decent hinges upon the 
subjective value judgment of the person who enjoys the right to a name, such 
naming process deserves deference from the agency-in-charge in making its own 
decisions thereof. 
 
5.4.3 Informational Privacy  
The notion under the broad rubric of informational privacy can be roughly understood 
as closely related to ‘control over what other people can know about oneself.’234 The 
value of this dimension of privacy is quite similar to decisional privacy in the sense of 
personal integrity and autonomy and overlaps with spatial privacy, particularly bodily 
integrity and limited access to private spaces and communication, 235  yet it is 
particularly manifest in informational aspects concerning one’s own private life.236  
 
234 Rössler (n 226) 111. 
235 N. A. Moreham, ‘The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human 
Rights: a Re-examination’ (2008) 1 EHRLR 62-63. 
236 Roger Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ 
in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009) 93. 
A first reading of the definition of informational privacy might be associated with 
the idea of the right to protect personal data, in particular the requirement of fair 
processing under such a right. However, there is a need to untangle the right to 
informational privacy from the right to protect personal data.237  
 
  D Informational 
Privacy 
Figure 5.1: The PDPL: the right to informational privacy and the right to protect personal data. 
First, not every type of information relating to an agent is covered under the 
scope of informational privacy. Public knowledge, for example, is excluded from 
private information. This is because the right to informational privacy protects private 
information and if the information has been publicised, such information is simply no 
longer private information.238 This type of personal data has been placed in Article 
19.3 of the PDPL as an exemption to collecting and processing personal data.239 
Secondly, with respect to the right to protect personal data (D shown in figure 
5.1), as previously argued, the PDPL aims to protect fundamental rights and freedoms 
to the extent that they may be violated in the collection, process and use of personal 
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237 See: ibid 93-96. 
238 Neil C. Manson and Onora O'Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (CUP 2007) 103. 
239 Article 19.3 of the PDPL: “Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the 
non-government agency should not collect or process personal information unless there is a specific 
purpose and should comply with one of the following conditions: …3. Where the Party has disclosed 
such information by himself or when the information has been publicized legally; …” 
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data. Moreover, it is arguable that the scope of data is broader than information since 
information is simply processed data that has a specific meaning for the person who 
receives it.240 By recognising this, the thesis shares the Brownsword’s view to ‘treat 
personal data as a broad class of information’241 that relates to the data subject. 
However, it must be noted that informational privacy is merely a type of privacy. 
The idea of informational privacy has not been widely discussed before the 
information technology reached an advanced and mature level. In Taiwan, 
informational privacy was first mentioned by the constitutional court in J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 293 that: 
This provision242 was enacted to protect bank customers’ confidential information 
on their individual properties and to prevent banks from freely and unilaterally 
disclosing such information, with a view to protect the people’s right of privacy.  
Yet this constitutional interpretation in relation to the right to personal financial/ 
property informational privacy did not clearly explore the concept of informational 
privacy. Neither did the later constitutional interpretation (J.Y. Interpretation No. 586) 
concerning the same type of right offer any indication of the concept of informational 
privacy. 243  A general concept of information privacy was dealt with by J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 603: 
 
240 Patricia Margaret Alexander, ‘Towards reconstructing meaning when text is communicated 
electronically’ (PhD thesis, University of Pretoria 2002) 66, available at: 
<http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-08192002-155431/unrestricted/03chapter3.pdf> accessed 14 
January 2012. 
241 Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ 95. 
242 Article 48, Paragraph 2, of the Banking Act stipulates: “Unless other laws or regulations 
promulgated by the central governing authority indicate otherwise, banks shall keep their customers’ 
information regarding deposits, loans and remittances in strictest confidence.” 
243 J.Y. Interpretation No. 586 merely mentioned that ‘Because the creation of filing obligations places 
a restriction on the people’s constitutionally guaranteed autonomous right to information and property 
right, it shall be imposed by law instead of by administrative regulations.’  
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As far as the right of information privacy is concerned, which regards the 
self-control of personal information, it is intended to guarantee that the people have 
the right to decide whether or not to disclose their personal information, and, if so, 
to what extent, at what time, in what manner and to what people such information 
will be disclosed. It is also designed to guarantee that the people have the right to 
know and control how their personal information will be used, as well as the right to 
correct any inaccurate entries contained in their information. (emphasis added) 
Hence three sub-categories of rights under this dimension can be distinguished, 
namely: 
1. The right to decide/ consent whether or not to disclose information;  
2. The right to know and control how their personal information will be used; 
and 
3. The right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in their information. 
All of the above rights are closely related to the autonomy-oriented aspects as 
well as to the perspective of bodily integrity which emphasises the protection of 
personality.244 The first type of right emphasises an individual’s consent to disclose 
her personal information, which considerably influences on the collection, retention, 
and processing of such information. Furthermore, it encompasses fundamental data 
protection principles in relation to the disclosure of personal information. This right 
also covers the right to objection. 
The second right is the right to access and to be informed, which is, as Hartlev 
points out, a prerequisite for the individual to ‘be able to take part in the control of the 
 
244 The understandings of the concepts of information privacy here under J. Y. Interpretation No. 603 
are mainly based on Mette Hartlev’s contribution. See: Hartlev (n 199) 29. 
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flow of information, and to know for what purpose information about him/her will be 
processed.’245 The last right is the right of correction, which supports individuals to 
control their information.  
 
5.5 Data Protection Issues Raised by the Biometric and RFID 
Technologies 
Having introduced some essential information on biometric and RFID systems and 
their omnipresence in people's everyday lives, outlined both the European and 
Formosan data protection legal regimes, and examined the concepts of privacy, I am 
now able to identify a number of issues for later discussions on the basis of the legal 
issues highlighted so far,.  
The leading question requiring consideration is whether there is a right to benefit 
from the technologies discussed here, and if so, to what extent it should be taken into 
account. Another inevitably following issue focuses on data protection concerns, in 
particular the right to privacy, brought by the aforementioned technologies. This 
invites a number of discussions concentrating on the concept of the right to privacy. 
The first issue rests on the assessment of the rights that are covered (by the right to 
privacy in both legal regimes). It then needs to be asked which of these are generic 
conditions and at what level. This is the precondition to answer the subsequent 
questions about the priority of the rights. Secondly, the question closely related to the 
application of technologies at stake is the claim that ‘if you have got nothing to hide, 
you have nothing to fear/ lose’ (the ‘nothing to hide’ argument). How to assess the 
validity of this argument? Thirdly, how can the development of technology affect the 
 
245 Ibid 30. 
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right to privacy, in particular the right to information privacy? Furthermore, how to 
deal with the changing concept of information privacy, which is profoundly affected 
by the development of technology, and its applications?  
Moreover, since there are only a few absolute rights (and apparently, the right to 
privacy, the right to protection of personal data,246 and the right to benefits from 
technology are not considered to be absolute rights), most of the fundamental rights 
and freedom may be overridden in specific conflicting cases. This has already been 
shown by examining the exceptions to the right to privacy in both legal regimes. This 
gives rise to the central question of this thesis – how to deal with the competing rights 
(the right to benefit from technology and the right to privacy for example) when they 
are in a conflict?  
Two justifications are involved when considering this question. The first one is 
the procedure justification – consent. We have seen that consent indeed plays a crucial 
role in the data protection principles in both legal regimes; however, we should 
neither undervalue nor overvalue it. On the other hand, there is a second possibility of 
the justification – the substantive justifications to reconcile the competing interests 
and rights. The principle of proportionality has been taken into account in both legal 
systems considered here. Is such a principle able to play a distinct role? If not, is there 
a criterion approaching the question of reconciling competing rights and interests? 
How to apply such a criterion?   
One crucial question that remains unanswered is whether conflicts between the 
right to privacy and the right to benefit from advances in science and technology can 
be avoided. It seems that although there can be applicable criteria to deal with the 
 
246 Court of Justice of the EU, judgment of 9112010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und 
Markus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I-0000. 
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conflicts, it is much better to avoid such conflicts. In other words, it is mistaken to 
always regard the competing rights respecting the developing technologies within a 
data protection law regime as belonging to two mutually exclusive sets. 
I will discuss these questions on the basis of the PGC architecture. 
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Chapter 6 
Privacy and Data Protection Issues related to Biometric and 
RFID Technologies  
6.1 Introduction  
This Chapter offers a commentary on the privacy and data protection issues regarding 
the technologies discussed here through the lens of the PGC. As addressed in the last 
chapter, the first issue to examine will rest upon the question of whether there is a 
right to benefit from the advances in science and technology in light of the PGC. If so, 
how should we treat it? I will then turn to the fears provoked by biometric and RFID 
technologies. Previously, I have recognised that the primary consideration with 
respect to these new technologies and their implications is the worries about their 
impact on privacy and data protection. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 will address these privacy 
and data protection questions.  
Before evaluating these issues, however, a preliminary question has to be 
answered: as we have seen in section 4.3.1, the ECHR is in line with the PGC; but 
how about the Taiwanese legal regime? More specifically, do the human rights values 
employed by the Formosan Constitution satisfy all the features of generic rights by 
which the PGC can be viewed as a necessary criterion of legal validity?  
By applying the dialectically necessary method to the concept of agency, the PGC 
has been justified as the basic principle of human rights in any community, requiring 
agents to act in accordance with the generic rights of all agents. There are some 
observations to be made on the Formosan situation. First, the immediate acceptance of 
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the PGC follows that all agents should be treated equally for a purpose, whatever that 
purpose is. On the basis of the alternative justification addressed in section 3.4, the 
acceptance of the impartiality assumption is of central importance. In this regard, the 
Formosan Constitution addresses equality in Articles 7 and 5.1 Moreover, although, 
Taiwan is not currently a member of the UN, the Act to Implement the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has been promulgated on 22nd April, 2009.2 Accordingly, 
the contingency upon which the dialectically contingent approach relies, namely, the 
requirement of the acceptance of human rights to be equally held by all recipients/ 
agents has been recognised.  
Secondly, it has been repeatedly confirmed by the Constitutional Court that the 
government should grant both negative and positive rights. With reference to the right 
to privacy, the Constitutional Court identified it as a fundamental right covered by the 
scope of Article 22 of the Constitution, which requires the government to stay out of 
citizen’s business. As regards the obligations of the government, the Constitutional 
Court also requires the government authorities to provide both organisational and 
procedural privacy-enhanced entitlements.3  
Thirdly, the Constitutional Court considers that the core value of Taiwan’s 
Constitution is to protect human dignity and to respect the ‘free development of 
personality.’4 The idea of ‘human dignity’ is a basic requirement of the agency since 
 
1 Article 7 states that ‘All citizens of the Republic of China (Taiwan), irrespective of sex, religion, race, 
class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law.’ Article 5 declares that ‘There shall be equality 
among the various racial groups in the Republic of China (Taiwan).’ 
2 Article 2 states that ‘[h]uman rights protection provisions in the two Covenants have domestic legal 
status.’ 
3 See J. Y. Interpretation No. 603. 
4 See J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 603 and 613.  
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‘dignity as the basis of rights is constituted by the property of being an agent’.5  
Violating an agent’s dignity is the ultimate prohibition of the PGC since it is to act 
contrary to the agent’s agency granted by the PGC. However, it must be noted that the 
concepts of ‘human dignity’ held by the Constitutional Court are still quite vague.6 
This is partly because the concepts of human dignity are profoundly affected by 
traditional Confucianism and the Han culture, which pre-date modern 
constitutionalism. 7  Nevertheless, there is no doubt that human dignity is 
acknowledged as the core value of the Constitution.  
However, this is not the whole story: it is, ‘actually by virtue of vulnerable 
agency that the generic rights are to be granted.’8 The second core value, i.e., the free 
development of personality enshrined by the Constitution, is arguably in line with this. 
This is because, by protecting the free development of personality, the agents are 
capable of reflecting their own physical and mental integrities and frailties which 
‘constitute the dignity that ground the generic rights.’9 
It is noted that an application and a competent decision-making body applying the 
PGC are essential when evaluating regulatory attempts. 10  The above examination 
seems to lead to an observation, at least pro tanto, that the constitutional approach 
followed by the Judicial Yuan can meet the requirement. It is thus now possible to 
proceed with the discussion.  
 
 
5 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 112. 
6 See: Cheryl Saunders and others, ‘Asian Constitutions in Comparative Perspectives’ (2009) 4 
National Taiwan University Law Review 203. 
7 Ibid 210-211. 
8 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 5) 112. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Shaun D. Pattinson, Influencing Traits Before Birth (Ashgate Publishing 2002) 71. 
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6.2 The Right to Benefit from Advances in Science and Technology? 
This section aims to examine whether there is a right to benefit from progress in 
science and technology. If so, is it a generic right on the basis of the PGC ground? As 
only a generic right may override another generic right (e.g., the right to privacy and 
data protection rights), this is a preliminary question for subsequent assessments of 
privacy and data protection issues related to the technologies at hand.  
Indeed, the right to benefit from advances in science and technology is not in 
itself a new phenomenon. It has been recognised by relevant international human 
rights instruments, such as:11  
1. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);12 
2. Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 13 
3. Article 13 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 14 
4. Article 42 of the Arab Charter of 2004;15 and 
5. Article 14 of the Protocol of San Salvador to the American Convention on 
Human Rights of 1988.16 
 
11 See: Stephen Marks, ‘Out of Obsecurity: the Right to Benefit from Advances in Science and 
Technology and Its Implications for Global Health’ (The 3rd conference on Law, Science, and 
Technology: Health, Science, and Human Rights, Taipei, 18 December 2010) 13-14 < 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/stephen-marks/files/spm_taipei_18_dec_2010_keynote_address-
_ver_feb_16_2011.pdf> accessed 3 August 2011. For the official statements of conferences held by 
international organs (such as the UNESCO), see: UNESCO, ‘The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of 
Scientific Progress and its Applications’ 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001855/185558e.pdf> accessed 3 August 2011, 17-18. 
12 It states that ‘Everyone has the right freely … to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.’ 
13 It reads the right: ‘to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.’ 
14 It states as the right of every person ‘to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual 
progress, especially scientific discoveries.’ 
15 It expresses that ‘Every person has the right … and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
application.’ 
16 It declares that “the right of everyone … To enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological 
progress as well as …the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of 
international cooperation and relations in the fields of science, arts and culture…” 
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Moreover, according to the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of 
Scientific Progress and its Applications issued by UNESCO in 2009, it is suggested 
that the obligations of the State in relation to this right involve not only the negative 
ones, but also the positive ones.17  
In light of the PGC, this right, which includes vast technological fields, can be 
considered as a generic right. Several complex technologies, indeed, involve 
improvements with respect to an agent’s capacities for successful action in general. 
They include, for example: (1) biotechnologies in medicine scope that affect the 
beginning of life, the quality and enjoyment of life, and the end of life; (2) the 
scientific advances in the area of food production, such as genetically modified 
agricultural products that may affect the human diet; and (3) the information, 
communication and identification technologies which increase opportunities for the 
improvement of capacities for action at all or general chances of successful action, 
such as life, education, access to accurate information and so forth.18 Moreover, for 
those technologies and their applications which have been broadly and consistently 
used in the modern era, to interfere with their use is to diminish an agent’s chance of 
achieving the agent’s purpose, whatever the purposes being pursued. Hence, the 
technologies involved are/ might be things that are needed for making successful 
actions possible.   
This is particularly important in considering that the implementation of generic 
rights requires other agents to effectively prevent generic harms and secure such 
rights. This duty for the agents can be more efficiently met by governments and is 
 
17 UNESCO (n 11) 17-18. Also, Marks (n 11) 17-19. However, it has to be noted that the obligations 
mentioned are not only focusing on the protection of the right to benefit from the progress of science 
and technology, but also the other competing fundamental rights and freedom. 
18 UNESCO (n 11) 13-14. 
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largely left to governments.19 Hence, for example, the technologies focused on in this 
thesis – biometric and RFID technologies – are widely applied by the states and 
public authorities to improve collective rights. 
From a Gewirthian perspective, this right involving the ongoing process of 
science and technology requires attention. Two issues are of particular relevance: first, 
the accessibility of benefits, and second, the relationship to other rights.20  
1. The Accessibility of Benefits 
Since the right to enjoy the benefits from the progress of science and technology is a 
generic right, all agents should, therefore, equally possess this generic condition of 
agency. To enjoy the right to benefit from the progress of science and technology, we 
must consider that such a right is as negative as it is positive. It is recalled that, as 
regards the positive rights under the PGC, other agents categorically ought to help an 
agent to secure the generic needs when she cannot do so by her own unassisted efforts 
if she so wishes. However, such positive rights to generic conditions of agency are in 
potential conflict with the other agents’ generic rights. This is because they impose 
obligations to the other agents that limit the other agents’ generic rights. 21  With 
respect to the right at hand, for example, the proposition of sharing in such benefits as 
a generic right of all agents greatly challenges the financial interests of researchers, 
researchers/inventors of science and technology, and even governments.22 The patent 
and the surrounding intellectual property rights regarding the science and technology, 
thus, may be interfered with.  
 
19 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 56. 
20 These two issues are identified and responded by the Venice Statement and the related conference 
held by UNESCO. See: UNESCO (n 11) 5. 
21 Gewirth (n 19) 44. 
22 Marks (n 11) 35. 
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There must be, therefore, an adequate framework, and an adequate moral or 
ethical justification, to deal with the market in order to reconcile competing rights: the 
right to enjoy the benefits of advances in science and technology and the right to 
(intellectual) property.23 This issue, particularly in the field of the enjoyment of the 
benefits of biotechnology discussed in this thesis, inevitably raises a question in 
relation to the debate of market regulation. A brief overview of this debate may offer a 
glimpse of what is at stake.  
On the one hand, it has been claimed that free markets are better suggested. This 
is because, based on a Utilitarian argument, this model may promote the overall utility 
as long as the deals between the agents are not harming anyone and the deals possess 
the potential of bringing mutual profits. 24  In a preference Utilitarian version, for 
example, it is the maximisation of the subjective preferences of agents in a calculus in 
which all preferences count equally.25 Moreover, based on the Libertarian rights ethics, 
voluntary exchanges uphold the respect of individual liberty. Free markets are 
therefore advocated by such theories.26 
On the other hand, there are objections to the above free-market model.27  A 
general objection against the free-market model, for example, considers that 
technologies associated with human bodies are incompatible with human dignity. It 
can be, rather, argued that certain benefits and social practices cannot be the object of 
trade or patents. It has been argued, for instance, that it is inappropriate to patent 
processes or products involving tissues from human beings, are for it may be contrary 
 
23 It is noted that even in a free-market model, the market should still be attached by some instruments 
at a minimum level e.g., the contract obligations and tax.  
24 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do (Penguin Books 2010) 75. 
25 Richard M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods and Point (OUP 1982). It is noted that 
preference utilitarianism pre-supposes that the strength of agent’s preferences can be measured and 
compared on a scale. See: ibid Chapter 7. 
26 Sandel (n 24) 75. 
27 Ibid 81-91. 
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to human dignity.28 Some regulations, according to such a consideration, incorporate 
a morality exclusion.29 Moreover, a free-market model cannot avoid the possibility of 
an initial situation of inequality. It is debateable that not every deal is fair in a free 
market. This is because there are chances that the deal is made under a non-free or 
out-of-necessity situation. In such cases, even though there may be consent in 
attendance, it may still be made in an invalid way.30 Overall, this objection is similar 
to the ‘dignity as constraint’ argument on a dignity-based perspective.31 
A specific objection, furthermore, contends that the objects, i.e., the donors of 
human body tissues, were used as a mean rather than an end. This fails to recognise 
the holders of generic rights as agents. Therefore, this objection fits with the ‘dignity 
as empowerment’ argument.32  
However, both objections are well founded in the PGC. First, to violate the PGC, 
there must be a harm interfering with the status of agency. It might be suggested that 
in certain cases, whether directly or indirectly, there might be a violation. However, 
since this is not true in every case, the answer should be left open. In other words, as 
Beyleveld and Brownsword remark, ‘[u]nless it is argued that patents on human genes 
impinge upon the status of agents as rights-bearers, there is no case to answer.’33  
Secondly, unlike the duty-based reasoning, the PGC allows an agent to waive the 
benefits of generic rights under the condition that this does not threaten the other 
 
28 For example, the Relaxin Opposition in Europe. See: Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 5) 196-202. 
29 For example, the European Patent Convention and the Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions. See: ibid 199. 
30 This is closely related to the Justice theory of John Rawls. 
31 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 5) 198-202. The ‘dignity as constraint’ argument suggests that it is 
‘implicated in much recent thinking about the limits to be placed on biomedicine, reflecting the belief 
that biomedical practice in the twenty-first century should be driven, not by the vagaries of individual 
choice, but by a shared vision of human dignity that reaches beyond individuals.’ See: ibid 29. 
32 Ibid 202-205. The ‘dignity as empowerment’ argument claims that ‘it is the intrinsic dignity of 
humans that acts as the foundation for human rights.’ See: ibid 27. 
33 Ibid 202. 
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agent’s generic rights. As the PGC is a right-based theory, there are no direct duties on 
the agent himself. Hence, it is considered that an agent should have property of their 
own bodies, including the tissue. 34  Here, the holder of generic rights is being 
considered as an agent.  
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the PGC would agree that the benefits of 
science and technology should be best left governed by minimal regulation.35 It has 
been argued by Beyleveld and Pattinson that, ceteris paribus, some potential benefits 
‘must be available to all or available to none.’36 This is because, for the PGC, any 
criteria allocating benefits/ resources must recognise the equal status of all agents as 
right-holders since an agent must act in accordance with the generic rights of all 
agents. In this sense, moreover, it is noted that priority should be placed on the level 
of generic condition of agency according to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action, rather than the number of agents. In the cases which equal status cannot be 
secured, the PGC cannot permit discrimination between agents, considering that all 
agents are fundamentally equal. Now, the key question is how to maintain an equal 
status? 
According to Beyleveld and Pattinson, an equal status can only be achieved by:37 
1. Universal access;  
2. Universal denial; or  
3. Completely random allocation. 
 
34 Ibid 204. For further discussions, see section 6.3.1. 
35 Cf. the Nozick-style libertarians, see: Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell 1974). 
Also, Adam D. Moore, ‘Owning Genetic Information and Gene Enhancement Techniques: Why 
Privacy and Property May Undermine Social Control of the Human Genome’ (2000) 14 Bioethics 97-
119. 
36 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Individual Rights, Social Justice, and the Allocation Of 
Advances in Biotechnology’ in Michael Boylan (ed), Public Health Policy and Ethics (Kluwer 2004) 
59-72. 
37 Ibid 66. 
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In the third situation, what constitutes the equality is the opportunity to be accessed 
and to be denied. In this regard, for example, since some researches (e.g., those 
aiming at maximising bodily existence) cannot be available for all, it must be led to 
cautious reconsideration. Hence, there must be some smart regulatory methods for the 
government to adopt.38 In this sense, the free model cannot be totally accepted by the 
PGC in a certain amount of cases.  
Overall, to deal with the sharing of the right to enjoy the benefits from the 
progress of science and technology, as long as there is a justification, whether a 
procedural or substantive one, based on the PGC, the generic conditions of agency are 
not necessarily harmed. Therefore, what we should care about is not which market 
model can better fulfil the positive as well as the negative rights – particularly not in 
the case with an over-enthusiastic focus on the benefits of scientific and technological 
advances. Rather, the PGC focuses on (1) whether the agents are treated as capable of 
giving a valid informed consent, which leads us to consider the procedural/ prior 
justification; and (2) how to reconcile competing rights. They are also related to our 
next question on the relationships with other rights. 
2. The relationships with other rights 
The second issue deals with the fact that the right to enjoy the benefits from the 
progress of science and technology often conflicts with other fundamental rights and 
freedoms. This concern, indeed, has been regularly addressed by several international 
norms. It has been pointed out, for example, by the UNESCO that:39 
1. Technological Progress in the Interest of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind 
 
38 Cf.: Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008). 
39 UNESCO (n 11) 5. 
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(GA Res. 3384 (XXX)), adopted in 1975, noted that “while scientific and 
technological developments provide ever increasing opportunities to better the 
conditions of life of peoples and nations, in a number of instances they can give 
rise to social problems, as well as threaten the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of the individual.”  
2. The World Conference on Human Rights (1993) reaffirmed the right to benefit 
from scientific progress (Paragraph 11 of the Vienna Declaration). The World 
Conference noted that certain advances, notably in biomedical and life sciences 
as well as in information technology, may have potentially adverse consequences 
for the integrity, dignity and human rights of the individual, and called for 
international cooperation to ensure that human rights and dignity are fully 
respected in this area of universal concern.  
3. Serious challenges in relation to REBSP (the right to enjoy the benefits from the 
progress of science and technology and its applications) arise in connection with 
bioethics and biotechnology. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (1997), the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
(2003) and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), 
adopted by UNESCO, were adopted in response to these challenges.  
(Re-paragraphed and emphasis added) 
As regards the legal regimes discussed in this thesis, in Europe, the Preamble to the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights states that ‘…it is necessary to strengthen 
the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress 
and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visible in 
a Charter.’ On the other hand, Article 10(2) of the Additional Articles of the 
(Formosan) Constitution states that ‘[e]nvironmental and ecological protection shall 
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be given equal consideration with economic and technological development.’  
It should be borne in mind, however, that it is not the aim of this thesis to discuss 
all (potentially) competing rights with respect to such a right in general, but to the 
biometric and RFID technologies and the privacy and data protection concerns over 
them. Accordingly, it must be recalled that in the field of ICT, new technologies 
should not put the right to privacy and data protection interests at risk (Chapter 2). As 
we have seen in Chapter 4, moreover, the PGC provides the criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action to deal with the question of reconciling the competing rights in 
conflict. To concentrate on the core issue addressed in this thesis, i.e. privacy and data 
protection concerns over biometric and RFID technologies, our next step is to 
evaluate the concepts of privacy and data protection on the PGC ground. 
 
6.3 The Concepts of Privacy 
6.3.1 Spatial Privacy 
Under an empirical assessment through the legal regimes considered here, bodily 
integrity 40  including both physical and psychological integrity, arguably, can be 
considered as a basic need of agency to be a prerequisite of an ability to act at all, 
whatever the purpose being pursued.41 This is because an agent (A) acts through A’s 
body: as A’s body is attached to A, then to violate the integrity of A’s body can 
 
40 This thesis regards the body integrity as including both physical and psychological integrity. It seems 
that Beyleveld and Brownsword term the physical integrity as the bodily integrity and the 
psychological integrity as personal integrity. See: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in 
Bioethics and Biolaw (n 5) 177. It shall be noted that to consider body integrity as a basic need under 
the PGC is to presuppose that agents are necessarily physical embodied beings. However, this might 
not be true when applying the PGC to all species. Nevertheless, by empirically looking at the Formosan 
legal regime, the agent here concentrates only on individuals i.e. human beings. See: Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 51-52.  
41 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978) 54. 
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generically affect A’s capacity to act at all or act successfully.42  
The PGC, thus, grants generic rights to bodily integrity. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that A must be granted the control over A’s body and its integrity. It 
is still arguable that other agents (B) might need to use A’s body when B needs to act 
through A’s body. Nevertheless, to grant A’s rights to body integrity without granting 
A to control A’s body is not a sincere grantee. This is particularly true when: (1) there 
is harm to her physical integrity to a severe extent which results in A being unable to 
act at all or act successfully through A’s own body; and (2) A’s psychological integrity 
is harmed to an extent which leads A to have serious objections or hesitations against 
A’s holding of generic rights, so as to act for any purpose.  
However, this does not follow the recognition of control over subsequent uses of 
A’s body. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the right to physical integrity is not the 
only right covered in order to ‘give the source person control over the use of his or her 
body parts after their removal.’43 Psychological integrity as well as other concepts of 
privacy should also be considered. In this regard, the functional aspect of the claim 
should be taken into account for the analysis of the right to bodily integrity in relation 
to the concept of the right to privacy, particularly when the research/ application is 
focusing on the subsequent uses of the body parts. The relevant subsequent uses of the 
body parts with respect to the technologies considered include: (1) the use of these 
body parts (e.g., biometric samples) after they are separated from the agents; (2) the 
use after the death of the agents; and (3) the use without, or sometimes even against 
A’s consent (e.g., via RFID technology in a function creep way). A further question, 
therefore, must be asked: to what extent can this be controlled? Is this control over a 
 
42 See: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 186. 
43 Ibid 177. 
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subsequent use also recognised?  
To be consistent with the above discussion which indicates that an agent acts 
through its body, I shall firstly outline Beyleveld and Brownsword’s justification for 
property rights, i.e., the ‘rule-preclusionary’ conception of property.44 They remark 
that45 
A right to exclusive use of an object is necessary and sufficient to characterize 
property rights substantively, and that the essential function of a justification on the 
basis of a property right is to justify a right to exclusive use in a characteristic way. 
Why should A be given such a level of control over its body then? This is because:46 
(1) A’s reliance on A’s body is so strong that the challenge of the control over A’s 
body itself places A’s agency under threat; and 
(2) Lacking control over A’s body may cause specific generic harm to A, 
particularly in the cases that A’s ‘legitimate beliefs’ over A’s right to privacy 
have been interfered with, leading A to hold strong objections against uses 
impinging on A’s right to body integrity. The ‘legitimate beliefs’ here ‘makes 
persons particularly prone to attach religious and other deep, sometimes 
idiosyncratic, emotional significance to their bodies and body parts.’ 
It is pointed out, furthermore, that the second reason is especially crucial when A 
is unable to act through A’s body, in particular when A cannot practically show A’s 
 
44 Ibid 171-194. Also, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘My Body, My Body Parts, My 
Property?’ (2000) 8 Health Care Analysis 87. For the applications of the ‘rule-preclusionary’ 
conception of property, see, for example: Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Directed Donation and Ownership of 
Human Organs’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 392-410. 
45 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 177. 
46 Ibid 187-188. For general arguments to justify why agents own their bodies in the rule-preclusionary 
sense, the two scholars offer three arguments. See: ibid 179-186. 
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consent, e.g., the control over A’s removed body parts and A’s body and body parts 
after death or when A is unconscious.47  
On the basis of this conception, A owns A’s body according to A’s prima facie 
right, and such a right enables A to: (1) use A’s body in any legitimate way (based on 
the PGC grounds); and (2) exclude B from using A’s body. This is because A stands in 
a particular relation48 to A’s body that precludes A from depending on a case-by-case 
basis for A’s right to use A’s body and to exclude B from using A’s body. In this regard, 
the biometric samples would imply exclusive use, subject to the waiver (with valid 
consent) or the overriding rights of others, whether individually or collectively, 
without articulating the specific right in every particular use. Such a claim does not 
mean, however, that the right to bodily integrity is an absolute right. Rather, it only 
holds a prima facie right to do what A wishes to do with A’s body (as a positive right) 
or a prima facie right to prevent B doing what B wishes to do with A’s body (as a 
negative right).49 Furthermore, under the PGC, this claim only permits B to use A’s 
body where B has A’s consent or a right that outweighs A’s right based on the criterion 
of degrees of needfulness for action. 
It might be argued that, however, as it is not necessary for A to act through any of 
A’s body parts (such as A’s hairs, nails and so on), the argument of granting control 
over those ‘attached parts that are not only renewable but can be removed without 
significant lasting harm on bodily integrity’ may be not necessarily apply. 50  
Nevertheless, the second reason provided above is able to reply to this objection: 
 
47 Ibid 188. 
48 Whilst A’s body belongs to and metaphysically related to A, it functionally means that it is so related 
to A that A does not have to say why A should be able to use it or why A may exclude others from using 
A’s body. See: ibid 188. 
49 See also: Pattinson, ‘Directed Donation and Ownership of Human Organs’ 396. 
50 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 188. 
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since they are closely related to A’s ‘legitimate beliefs’ to the extent that A stands in a 
particular relation to them, to cause generic harm over those body parts is to be 
avoided under the PGC. This is of central importance to explain why the biometric 
samples and files are considered to be sensitive under the data protection regime. 
Specifically, to interfere with the control over such body parts may cause particular 
generic harm in relation to A’s bodily integrity.51  
A further issue, moreover, rests on the question of why personal (biometric) data 
and subsequent information can be ‘owned’ and related to an idea/ concept of property 
right applying the ‘rule-preclusionary’ conception of property. Indeed, this is not a 
new question. In Moore’s article, on the basis of a Lockean model of intangible 
property,52 he argues that53  
Intangible property of this sort can be owned – that the proper subjects of intangible 
property claims include medical records, genetic profiles, and gene enhancement 
techniques. Coupled with a right to privacy these intangible property rights allow 
individuals a zone of control that will, in most cases, justifiably exclude 
governmental or societal invasions into private domains. 
Two sub-arguments have been justified in this article. First, personal data 
(information), as a type of intangible property, can be owned according to the ‘no 
harm, no foul’ principle.54 Secondly, the author contends a ‘fairly strong presumption 
in favour of individual privacy.’55 
We shall have a little more to say in relation to consent issues. There are also 
 
51 Such harm to privacy usually overlaps other concepts of privacy, e.g., informational privacy. 
52 Moore (n 35) 98-103. 
53 Ibid 98. 
54 Ibid 101. 
55 Ibid 109. 
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further considerations in relation to the applications and guidelines on biometric 
samples and data, e.g., the legitimacy of transferring such samples and their 
subsequent uses. This will also be discussed in the next chapter. 
With regards to the right of not being spied on or the right to be let alone 
regarding the restricted access of A and A’s private space, regardless of whether the 
agent is aware of it or not, if an agent is being seriously spied on or disturbed to the 
extent that A’s psychological wellbeing has been affected, there is a basic harm to A. 
This is particularly the case when the powerful prying eye comes from State 
authorities or private entities with special powers. This can also happen in the 
situations of function creep of RFID applications and the abuses of data filing, 
particularly for biometric data. The violation of such a right, in specific cases, can 
affect one’s bodily integrity to the extent of fearing, worrying, and feeling ashamed to 
one’s private beliefs to act successfully. This causes harm to a non-subtractive need. 
With respect to the protection of the living space and environment,56 it is argued 
by Gewirth that the need for shelter can be considered as a basic need. In addition, it 
has been addressed by Mills that ‘even in societies that have no private property 
ownership rights, control of physical space is protected.’ 57  To interfere with the 
control of the residential or any shelter space could therefore amount to a violation of 
generic needs.  
It has been argued by the (German) government in Von Hannover v. Germany58 
that there is a criterion of spatial isolation in relation to the private space when 
deciding on a violation to the right to private life. Such a criterion appreciates the 
 
56 See also, section 4.3.2. 
57 Jon L. Mills, Privacy: the Lost Right (OUP 2008) 20. In his book the author exemplifies the North 
Korea as the discussing legal regime. 
58 Von Hannover v. Germany (App no 59320/00) (2004) ECHR 294, para 54. 
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place where the interference occurs when deciding whether there is a violation of the 
right to private life. It is limited to the situation in which an agent is in a secluded 
place out of the public eye where ‘persons retire “with the objectively recognisable 
aim of being alone and where, confident of being alone, they behave in a manner in 
which they would not behave in public”.’59 However, this criterion to judge whether a 
place is under the ‘public eye’ has been considered as ‘too vague and difficult for the 
person concerned to determine in advance’ by the ECtHR.60  
Two points shall be made in relation to the German criterion of spatial isolation. 
First, it is observed by Harris et al. that the objection against such a criterion rests on 
the reason that an agent ‘must be able to a substantial degree to keep to himself what 
he is and what he does, if he wishes to do so.’61 This observation is in line with the 
PGC reasoning, which requires that each agent must be equally treated as a holder of 
generic rights and must also reciprocally respect these rights in all other agents. Such 
rights shall be substantively respected wherever the agent is, for whatever purposes 
the agent acts, if the agent so wishes. The criterion thus fails to take into account the 
genuine means to keep the agent’s generic rights. 
Secondly, an agent can always waive benefits that the exercise of these rights 
affords her through valid consent as long as it is not causing any harm to others, or the 
harm can be justified. However, it does not necessarily follow that an agent always 
means to waive her benefits of the right to privacy whenever she is in a public place. 
This is closely related to the issues of reasonable expectations. Indeed, practice can 
frequently and inevitably reduce the scope of the right by affecting the expectations.62 
 
59 Ibid, para 54. 
60 Ibid, para 75. 
61 David Harris and others, Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 368. 
62 Roger Brownsword, ‘Informed Consent in the Information Society’ (Durham CELLS Lecture, 
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In the case at hand, however, her clear appearance of her free will should be able to 
present her unwillingness of waiving the benefits of her right to privacy.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that in special cases, the rights of other agents may 
require the agents in question to be overridden according to the criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action. Considering the case in J. Y. Interpretation No. 535, for 
instance, an on-the-spot police check involves police powers performing checks or 
street checks to enforce the law, interrogating persons, and executing other duties in 
public or private spaces can interfere with A’s body integrity. In such a situation, 
because Article 2 of the Police Act sets out that the duties of the police are to maintain 
public order according to the law, to protect social security, to prevent any harm, and 
to promote people’s welfare, A will not be permitted to reject the police power. This 
does not follow that, however, A’s body integrity as well as A’s privacy are no longer 
generic rights. It only means that A’s integrity and privacy are overridden by the other 
generic rights according to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action. 63  
Furthermore, this overriding right (public interests) is far from absolute: it has to be 
further justified under the PGC reasoning. With this in mind, it is aptly required by the 
Honourable Justices that ‘the requirements and procedures of police checks as well as 
legal remedies for unlawful checks must be prescribed clearly by the law.’64 
 
6.3.2 Decisional Privacy 
It has been noted that the right to develop personality, identity, or any deep emotional 
significance linked to an agent’s bodily integrity is within the scope of the right to 
 
Durham, 8 May 2012). 
63 See also: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 172. 
64 Paragraph 2 of the reasoning of J. Y. Interpretation No. 535. 
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privacy. Moreover, this group of rights also includes the establishment, development 
and termination of relationships with other agents and the outside world. 65  The 
autonomous character of decisional privacy thus will be emphasised when evaluating 
rights subject to this dimension and surrounding cases.  
It is important to point out that, under the Gewirthian reasoning, individuals must 
‘be permitted to do anything they like, provided only that this does not directly or 
indirectly threaten the generic rights of others.’66 Therefore, to deny A’s decisional 
privacy by acting against A’s free and voluntarily choice, either in those decisions 
concerning only A’s own business, or establishing or changing relationships with 
others, is not to offer adequate protection to A’s generic rights.  
However, as previously mentioned, it does not follow that decisional privacy, 
along with other (non-absolute) generic rights, must always be permitted – it should 
not be permitted if it is conflicted with and prevailed over. In this respect, the 
Formosan landmark case of J. Y. Interpretation No. 554 provides an interesting 
example.67 Two interests of decisional privacy are considered, namely the right to 
maintain relationships with other human beings and the right to freedom of sexual 
activity. As regards the former right, the marital relationship is at stake. According to 
the constitutional interpretation,68  
[m]arriage means a living agreement where a husband and a wife mutually engage 
with each other to live their lives together so that both may realize and develop their 
respective personalities. (emphasis added)  
 
65 See: Section 4.3.2. 
66 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 194. 
67 See: Section 5.4.2. 
68 J. Y. Interpretation No. 554. 
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The Court, here, implies that although a new relationship is established, decisional 
privacy of two agents should still be taken into account independently. Moreover, the 
Court accepts that ‘every person is free to decide whether or not and with whom to 
have sexual affairs.’ This covers the right to freedom of sexual activity. In the current 
case, these two rights conflict: to have sex with others might affect, usually in a 
negative way, the relationship between the two partners.69 
In Dworkin’s contribution he criticises that Himmelfarb70 misunderstands John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty as she confuses ‘liberty as license’, which means ‘the degree to 
which a person is free from social or legal constraint to do what he might wish to do,’ 
with ‘liberty as independence’, i.e., ‘the status of a person as independent and equal 
rather than subservient.’71 In this regard, according to the definition given by Anita 
Allen, decisional privacy, as freedom from any external influences on an individual’s 
decision-making in relation to private affairs, might be misunderstood as what 
Dworkin terms ‘liberty as licence.’72  
Under the PGC, the concept of decisional privacy does not fit with the idea of 
‘liberty as license’, which suggests that the value/ function of decisional privacy is a 
 
69 Different communities may have different rule-sets to operate in relation to such a particular type of 
consent. Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 340. Also, the Constitutional Court holds in 
paragraph 3 of the reasoning of J. Y. Interpretation No. 554 that ‘as regards the type of restriction, if 
any, that must be imposed on sexual affairs between a married person and a third party during the 
subsistence of a marriage and whether or not an act in violation of such restriction should be made 
punishable as a crime, the problems must be dealt with by the norms of conduct to be determined by 
the legislature by taking into consideration how marriages and the family system should be protected in 
light of the customs of the country, which vary from nation to nation.’ (emphasis added) In Taiwan, it 
seems that the value of marriage can override the interest of freedom of sexual activity when conflicts 
happen. However, under some circumstances, these two values may not necessarily be in conflict with 
each other. See: Paragraph 3 of the reasoning of J. Y. Interpretation No. 554. 
70 Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill (Alfred A. Knopf 
1974). 
71 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriosly (New impression with a reply to critics, Duckworth 2005) 
262. 
72 Ibid 262-264. For a Taiwanese local discussion, see: Wen-Tsong Chiou, ‘Comments on the 
Framework Problems of the Draft of Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law from the 
Perspective of the Conceptual Distinction between Information Self-determination and Information 
Privacy’ (2009) 168 The Taiwan Law Review 176. 
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license that allows the external (such as social or governmental) constraint off. To 
view decisional privacy as ‘liberty as license’ is simply wrong because it is by virtue 
of vulnerable (in the sense of a vulnerable decision-making/ autonomy) agency that 
the generic rights are to be granted, and it imposes duties on other agent to respect the 
generic rights of the right-holder, rather than a protection from the external constraint.  
It should be recalled that, on the basis of the dialectally necessity argument, ‘I am 
required to claim that I am an agent is sufficient for me to claim that I have the generic 
rights.’ However, this claim can only be applied to vulnerable agents instead of ‘non-
vulnerable agents.’73 Whatever purposes chosen by the agent, these should always be 
able to motivate them to pursue the ends valued. Hence, as Beyleveld and 
Brownsword put:74  
[t]he most fundamental of these generic needs are the vary capacity to reason and 
make choices, life itself, and mental equilibrium sufficient to translate a wish for 
something into activity designed to obtain what it is wished for. (emphasis added) 
With this in mind, the concept of decisional privacy under the PGC is closer to 
Dworkin’s idea of ‘liberty as independence’. More specifically, decisional privacy e.g., 
the capacity of an agent to decide her own identity, offers an intrinsically flexible 
capacity to an agent. This makes an agent able to voluntarily act for whatever 
purposes the agent has chosen. 
Moreover, Dworkin defines ‘liberty as independence’ as a discriminate concept 
which distinguishes between forms of behaviour. Dworkin further suggests that when 
an agent places a high value on liberty as independence, he ‘is not necessarily 
 
73 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 115. 
74 Ibid 115. 
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denigrating values or amenity, or even in a relative way.’75 For example, if an agent 
exercises her right to decisional privacy, she does not automatically exercise this in 
favour of ‘greater licence’ when other values are not in a conflict. Dworkin’s account 
of justice in ‘liberty as independence’ runs parallel to the Gewirthian account: the 
PGC requires empirical knowledge ‘what concrete things instantiate generic rights, 
and also about the quantitative needfulness of various generic needs.’76 Therefore, the 
PGC would not require attempts to suggest a clear list of the abstract categories (i.e., 
basic needs, non-subtractive needs, and additive needs) regarding which the PGC is 
couched.  
Accordingly, to avoid a generic harm to agency, the collection and processing of 
biometric data and the employment of RFID technology should be taken into account 
in a ‘liberty as independence’ perspective. The use of such technologies should not be 
seen as freeing an agent from social or legal constraints. Rather, we should regard an 
agent as an end who independently and voluntarily acts for whatever purposes. In this 
regard, we should pay more attention to regulations in relation to the profiling of 
collection and processing of personal data. This is because such profiling results in 
affecting, or even re-shaping, an agent’s bodily integrity according to the data 
controller’s will, rather than the ‘independent’ will of the agent itself.77  
We have seen that the interference with an agent’s decisional privacy commits a 
violation of the PGC. However, there is no violation of the PGC if the agent has 
waived the benefit of the right to decisional privacy (as well as other generic rights) 
and it does not threaten the generic right of others.78  
 
75 Dworkin (n 71) 263. 
76 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 71. 
77 Chiou (n 72)177-180. 
78 Cf. the harm principle remarked by John Stuart Mill that ‘the liberty of the individual must be thus 
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6.3.3 Informational Privacy  
1. The ‘nothing to hide’ argument 
The right to decide whether or not to disclose information emphasises what others (B) 
should know about the agent (A). A rather common objection against such a right can 
be termed the ‘nothing to hide’ argument, i.e., ‘if A has got nothing to hide, A has 
nothing to fear/ lose’. 79  This argument is not unfamiliar, particularly for many 
governments with respect to their sweeping surveillance policies. For example, it was 
stated that ‘if you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to fear’ in the British 
government’s campaign slogan for the citywide CCTV surveillance programme.80 In 
Taiwan, the Confucian thinking of ‘the Gentleman is magnanimous and has nothing to 
hide’ and ‘the petty man is always full of worries’ has also been taken as a powerful 
reasoning of counterarguments. Indeed this argument is exactly the one that generally 
minimalises the privacy interest.81 
In the light of this argument, it has been observed by Solove that, with the 
exception of some extreme yet unsuccessful forms, a general manner of such an 
argument can be recast as ‘positing that all law-binding citizens should have nothing 
to hide’; thus only those engaged illegal conduct should carry an interest in 
concealing their unlawful activities.82  Hence, the concept of the ‘nothing to hide’ 
 
far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.’ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (first 
published 1859, Batoche Books 2001) 52. 
79 Daniel J. Solove, ‘"I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ (2007) 44 
San Diego Law Review745-772. 
80 Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (Random 
House 2004) 36, quoted from Solove  (n 79)748. 
81 Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale University 
Press 2011) 21. 
82 Solove, ‘"I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ 751. 
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argument can be briefly summarised as when it comes to accessing and retaining 
individuals’ information, ‘there is no privacy violation if a person has nothing 
sensitive, embarrassing or illegal to conceal.’83  A related argument asserted by 
Richard Posner argues that ‘the economist sees a parallel to efforts of sellers to 
conceal defects in their products.’84 Therefore, in his view, the law should not protect 
‘the right to conceal discreditable disadvantage’85 under the concept of privacy.  
The counter-arguments against these points are also common. The most popular 
one – I merely don’t want to disclose all of my personal information to others, 
however, is not quite convincing. Indeed, the data controllers need not necessarily 
collect and process all kinds of personal data, 86  particularly irrelevant ones. 
Nevertheless, the ‘nothing to hide’ argument implies further criticisms to the 
protection of privacy. For example, during the ‘periods of crisis’ during which other 
rights and interests compete with privacy, national security interests should always 
outweigh privacy (and other individual rights).87 Accordingly, for those ‘essential’ 
data collecting and processing circumstances, the nothing to hide argument remains a 
‘formidable’ one.88  
Solove himself replies that such an argument will face two counter-arguments. 
First, he identifies the problem of the argument that ‘it myopically views privacy as a 
form of concealment or secrecy.’89 This argument erroneously assumes that privacy is 
merely about hiding something wrong. However, by ‘understanding privacy as a 
plurality of related problems,’ it ‘demonstrates that concealment of bad things is just 
 
83 Ibid 764. 
84 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th edn, Aspen Publishers 1998) 46. 
85 Ibid 46. 
86 Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security 23-24. 
87 Solove terms the argument the ‘national security argument.’ For further discussion, see: ibid 62-70. 
88 Ibid 24. 
89 Solove, ‘"I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ 764. 
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one among many problems caused by government programmes’ when collecting and 
processing personal data. 90  Briefly, the concept of privacy is not merely about 
covering A’s bad things from being known by B. Rather, this is about the right to 
decide whether or not to disclose personal information.  
Secondly, he argues that the ‘nothing to hide’ argument is problematic even if 
there are no bad things, or even if there is nothing for A to hide. He addresses this as a 
Kafkaesque problem in connection with the ‘nothing to hide’ argument. 91  This 
conceptual of problem focuses on the issue of not being able to access one’s personal 
data. He indicates problems in this respect: aggregation, exclusion, secondary use, and 
distortion.92 He aptly argues that ‘without greater transparency in data mining, it is 
hard to claim that programs like the National Security Administration data mining 
program will not reveal information people might want to hide, as we don’t know 
precisely what is revealed,’93 (emphasis added) Furthermore, he proceeds: ‘having 
nothing to hide will not always dispel predictions of future activity.’ This reasoning 
seems to be related to the right to know and control how one’s personal information 
will be used and the right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in one’s 
personal information.  
What will the Gewirthian moral principles comment on this?  
In the light of the first argument, from the perspective of A, A has a generic right 
to informational privacy, which is an prerequisite of an ability to act at all or with any 
general chances of success, whatever purpose (E) is being pursued. Therefore, 
regardless of the purpose, for example, no matter A wants to hide something sensitive 
 
90 Ibid 764. 
91 Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security 26-29. 
92 Ibid 27-28. 
93 Solove, ‘"I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ 766. 
243 
 
                                                
(E1), to hide something embarrassing (E2), to hide something illegal (E3), or even to 
hide nothing (Ex), A has a generic right to informational privacy – if E is valuable to A. 
Indeed, I may even consider E to be even morally bad – what I need to attach is 
simply a positive value to my purpose on non-moral grounds, and to act according to 
these attached grounds to achieve the chosen purpose by my agency.94 The ‘nothing to 
hide’ argument is simply wrong because it challenges the purpose of exercising a 
generic right.  
Solove is, furthermore, correct in suggesting that the concealment of bad things 
cannot cover all aspects of privacy. However, this objection is by no means conclusive 
as the bad things, which may place an agent at risk, can still be the purpose of action 
without violating a right. Then, what if A’s generic right causes risks or disadvantages 
to B (in the sense that Posner suggests, i.e., that the concealed discreditable 
disadvantage may violate other rights and interests)? From B’s perspective, 
possessing correct information (on A) is necessary to be able to act for the vary 
possibility of acting; and to have additional information (on A) can improve B’s 
capacities for successful action, regardless of B’s purpose. Such information is thus 
either a non-subtractive or an additive need. The PGC places A under both negative 
and positive responsibilities to B. Such a positive obligation includes a number of 
informational obligations. For example, if A has HIV and fully acknowledges it, A is 
under a duty to disclose this to B before they are going to have any (unsafe) sexual 
intercourse, otherwise B will not be aware of the risk.  
However, it must be noted that such a positive duty has its limits.95 First, the PGC 
 
94 Gewirth, Reason and Morality 50-51, Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An 
Analysis and Defence of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (The 
University of Chicago Press 1991) 21-22. 
95 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 175. 
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does not require agents to be superheroes; rather, the PGC requires them to be 
ordinary agents.96 This can be termed the comparable cost proviso.97 This is to say 
that A has positive duties only in a proportionate way (based on the measurement in 
terms of the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action) that do not bear 
incommensurate cost to A’s own generic conditions of agency. Therefore, for example, 
if A has HIV and fully acknowledges it, the PGC does not require A to sacrifice A’s 
informational privacy, disproportionately by publicly announcing or broadcasting it 
via the media. Secondly, neither does the PGC encourages B to take advantage of A’s 
good will. If B is able to deal with B’s generic requirements by B’s own efforts, A’s 
positive duties are simply not called into play. This is termed as the own unaided 
effort proviso.98  
In J.Y. Interpretation No. 293 regarding the right to personal financial 
informational privacy, for example, no matter why A wants to hide A’s personal 
financial information, A has a generic right to informational privacy. When A has a 
positive duty which suffers the cost of giving up A’s informational privacy by 
disclosing A’s personal financial information, so as to deal with state-owned banks’ 
non-performing loans, the PGC does not require A to disproportionately disclose A’s 
personal data. 
Furthermore, the ‘nothing to hide’ argument fails to take the right to access one’s 
personal information, including the right to know and control how their personal 
information will be used, and the right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in 
 
96 This is because the prevention or removal of transactional inconsistency should take priority over 
other criteria for resolving conflicts of duties since the former is the most direct way to fulfil the central 
requirement of the PGC. See: Gewirth, Reason and Morality 344-345. Also, Gewirth, The Community 
of Rights 47. 
97 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Individual Rights, Social Justice, and the Allocation Of Advances in 
Biotechnology’ (n 36) 61. 
98 Ibid 61. 
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their information into account. As Solove points out, it ‘assumes a particular view 
about what privacy entails to the exclusion of other perspectives.’99 It should be noted 
that such rights do not only fall within the scope of the right to privacy, but may be 
necessary means to help realising other generic rights. For example, not being able to 
correct inaccurate personal health information may cause harm to health or life. 
Ignoring such rights thus should be avoided on the PGC basis since the agent should 
be granted necessary means to achieve the protection of generic rights. 
Lastly, it must be noted that even if there is a conflict, A still has the right to 
decide whether or not to disclose information, the right to know and control how their 
personal information will be used, and the right to correct any inaccurate entries 
contained in their information – regardless of whether those rights are overridden by 
countervailing rights and interests or not. Therefore, there is in fact a privacy violation 
even if an agent is in possession of something sensitive, embarrassing or illegal to 
conceal – though this violation may be justified either in a procedural or substantive 
way. 
2. Informational Privacy and Technology 
Having mapped out the right to informational privacy, it is crucial to note that this is a 
right profoundly affected by modern technologies. It has been observed, for example, 
that ‘[i]nformation privacy is a fluid concept because its public recognition has 
coincided with the rise of modern technologies.’100 It follows that a key task in the 
informational privacy regime is to make it absolutely clear as to how to deal with the 
changing concepts of informational privacy.  
 
99 Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security 29. 
100 Ming-Li Wang, ‘Information Privacy in a Network Society: Decision Making Amidst Constant 
Change’ (2010) 5 National Taiwan University Law Review 140. 
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The development of technology could affect the right to informational privacy in 
three different scenarios: (1) an agent (A) does not know that A’s information has been 
collected, processed or disclosed; (2) the other agents (B, data controllers, e.g., the 
government) collect, disclose or process A’s information against A’s will; and (3) A 
waives A’s benefits of the right to informational privacy. 
First, in the case that A does not know that A’s information has been processed, A 
is unable to control what B can know about him. Function creeps of certain 
information technologies such as insensible data mining via the RFID technology,101 
for example, can at least diminish the successful possibilities of A or to the extent 
leading A not being able to act at all, as A acts on the basis of the false assumptions. 
This type of violation against the PGC is equivalent to denying A’s GCA.  
Secondly, new technologies may be used as a medium to disclose A’s information 
against A’s will. This violates A’s generic right. This frequently happens when B 
misapplies the ‘nothing to hide’ argument discussed above and disproportionately 
extends A’s duties to B. For example, conditioning the issuance of an ID card upon 
comprehensive compulsory fingerprinting without (proper) purpose (as the factor in J. 
Y. Interpretation No. 603) is to violate A’s right to decide whether or not to disclose 
information. This scenario also includes the prevention of potential objections. The 
system without the opt-out clause for reading out sensitive biometric information on 
RFID tags is an obvious example in such a scenario. 
As regards the third scenario, the substantial changes of cutting-edge information 
and communication technologies provide motivations to agents to disclose/ share 
information with others. For example, a legal professional may want to post her 
 
101 For example, consumer information can be read while a tag attached on an agent who walks in a 
mall/ high streets with any warning signs reminding the agent about the RFID readouts.  
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contributions on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)102 so as to let more 
people acknowledge or even discuss/ follow her brilliant ideas, and a politician may 
be willing to post everything about her on her blog so as to conduct vigorous 
propaganda. In this trend it is reasonable to anticipate that A may tend to trade A’s 
information ‘given the right price.’103 
However, this might lead to a presumption of the interest-based reasoning – after 
all, it seems correct to argue that ‘[g]iving away some personal data is not only 
acceptable, but also desirable under the right conditions.’104 Nevertheless, to explore 
this issue more in depth, the fact that some netizens who would like to disclose their 
information for reasons other than ‘exchanging’ something for a corresponding price, 
or even for reasons that may have them hurt (such as disclosing the information that 
she will get drunk easily by drinking some specific types of wine, on her Facebook, 
might let others try to take advantage of her ), shows that the will conception is to be 
applied to the right to informational privacy. 105  The latter is crucial in the 
revolutionary age of web 2.0106 of information technology. This preference is not 
forbidden by the PGC. This is because there are no direct duties towards oneself 
under the PGC – the benefits of the generic rights can always be freely waived – 
provided that this waiving does not threaten the generic rights of others. 107  
Nevertheless, there is no denying that there can be good, and essential, reasons to 
interfere with such voluntarily waives of the benefits of the right to informational 
 
102 http://www.ssrn.com/ 
103 Wang (n 100) 143. 
104 Ibid 144. Cf. Richard A. Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 393-422. 
105 See also: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 81. 
106 Originally the unidirectional websites are produced for the web users (netizens) to view the content 
that was created by the website controllers. In contrast to these websites, the web 2.0 information 
technology allows users to communicate and collaborate with each other by using the web platforms as 
both the user and creators in the social media dialogue. Examples of web 2.0 include wikis (e.g., 
Wikipedia), blogs, video sharing sites (e.g., YouTube), social networking sites (e.g., Facebook and 
Twitter) and so on. 
107 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw 194. 
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privacy, which are grounded in the protection of rights of a higher degree of 
needfulness of generic condition of agency.108  
 
6.4 Comments on Personal Data Protection Provisions 
6.4.1 Consent in the Data Protection Principles: the Procedure Justification   
This subsection aims to offer a critical analysis of consent in the two data protection 
law regimes at hand. This will primarily draw upon Beyleveld and Brownsword’s 
contribution: Consent in the Law. The work which operates with the PGC,109 should 
be capable of maintaining the coherence of this thesis. This is crucial in relation to 
previous sections in which the will conception of rights has been analysed. This part 
will, moreover, include examples by reference to two data protection regimes. We 
shall be able to identify and respond to the problems that arise out of these examples.  
To begin, it should be noted that it is not the intention of the thesis (as well as any 
PGC-based work) to overestimate or undervalue the role of consent. This is because 
this mistake falls into the misunderstanding of thinking that ‘consent is the necessary 
justifying reason (the Fallacy of Necessity),’ while the latter commits the error of 
thinking that ‘consent is a sufficient justifying reason (the Fallacy of Sufficiency).’110 
Indeed, such fallacies have been noted by theWP29 in its Opinion on the Definition of 
Consent:111 
 
108 Ibid 81. 
109 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 32. 
110 Ibid 355. Also, Roger Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and 
Confidentiality’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009) 90-
92; Roger Brownsword, ‘The Cult of Consent: Fixation and Fallacy’ (2004) 15 King's Law Journal 223. 
111 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent 
(01197/11/EN, WP187, 2011) 2, 7. 
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Consent is one of several legal grounds to process personal data. It has an important 
role, but this does not exclude the possibility, depending on the context, of other 
legal grounds perhaps being more appropriate from both the controller’s and from 
the data subject’s perspective. 
The order in which the legal grounds are cited under Article 7 is relevant, but it does 
not mean that consent is always the most appropriate ground to legitimise the 
processing of personal data. (emphasis added) 
In this case, it should be emphasised that both procedural, i.e., consent, and 
substantive justifications are allowed under the PGC; it is ‘the right kind of 
justification has to be applied in the right kind of way’ that should be taken into 
consideration.112 Therefore, the use of consent in the correct context is crucial. As the 
WP29 puts, if consent is not rightly applied in practice, ‘this would weaken the 
position of data subjects.’113 (original emphasis) 
To avoid the Fallacy of Necessity, i.e., the worship of consent, it must be noted 
that consent, as a procedural justification, depends on the engagement of the main 
claim (either a right or a duty).114 In other words, since ‘what determines whether 
such acts are morally permissible is not the presence or absence of consent but the 
application of background duties (or rights),’115 it should bear in mind that ‘if there is 
no right there is no claim’ and ‘no right, with or without consent, adds up to no 
claim.’116 Hence, consent should not be considered in a free-standing way. In this 
 
112 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 337. 
113 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111)10. 
114 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, Privacy, and Medical Research’ in 
Michael Boylan (ed), International Public Health Policy and Ethics (Springer Netherlands 2008) 52. 
115 Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ 91. 
116 Ibid 92. Also, Gavin Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law 
Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 Mod L Rev 726. 
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regard, consent should be regarded as a safeguard117 which is operated as a defence 
rather than a cause of action.118 
Furthermore, under the PGC reasoning, a data subject’s (G, who is also a consent-
giver) consent should be the primary consideration according to the principle of the 
‘priority of consent,’ 119  which demonstrates that wherever possible, the consent-
receiver (R, normally the data controller or the third party) should always firstly seek 
G’s consent ‘rather than doing the wrong and then seeking to justify it by reference to 
overriding rights.’120 This is because the existence of consent offers two benefits: (1) 
it provides R with a licence to do X, whatever X may be; and (2) R can act without 
‘having to engage contestable substantive justifications.’121 Additionally, under the 
Formosan privacy framework focusing on the right of personality, consent must 
always be taken into account seriously in order to reflect the self-determination/ 
autonomy characteristic of such a right. In this regard, consent functions as opposing 
the wrongdoings. 
There is, on the other hand, also a need to avoid the Fallacy of Sufficiency. The 
opinion of the WP29 identifies that consent is not the only ground for lawfulness.122 It 
notes that although the other grounds in Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive 
require ‘a “necessity” test, which strictly limits the context in which they can apply,’ it 
does not follow that consent ‘leaves more margin of manoeuvre than the other 
grounds.’ 123  Moreover, it is noted that ‘obtaining consent does not negate the 
 
117 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111) 7. 
118 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 242. 
119 Ibid 337. The principle of ‘priority of consent’ can be understood by referencing Beyleveld and 
Brownsword that ‘in the absence of consent, a wrong will be done to agents whose rights are violated 
even if, all things are considered, the wrongdoing can be substantively justified as the lesser of two 
evils.’ Ibid 63. 
120 Ibid 62. 
121 Ibid 63. 
122 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111) 7-8. 
123 Ibid 7. 
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controller's obligations under Article 6 with regard to fairness, necessity and 
proportionality, as well as data quality,’ and ‘nor does obtaining consent allow the 
circumvention of other provisions, such as Article 8(5).’124 However, these reasons 
are not explicit enough to distinguish the functions and features of consent. The 
features of the consent thus require further explanation.  
First, consent plays a role as the procedural, rather than substantive, justification 
of violations.125 Such a procedural justification refers to an authorising act or decision 
rather than justifications referring to ‘some set of background standards characterising 
(in the justificatory argument) particular acts as permitted (including required).’126 
Secondly, consent can only be justified in an ‘agent-relative’ way.127 Only the 
agent (G) who gives the consent is precluded from asserting that it has been wronged. 
Such a consent which precludes wrongdoing is not a general waiver to all benefits of 
all agents. Other agents can still claim their rights to which G has given its consent. 
For example, although G has consented to R to collect and process its personal data, it 
precludes G, and merely G, from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of G’s 
given consent. Where there is any data involving any other agent, no matter whether 
G’s data is related or not, R has to rely on other justifications.  
Thirdly, by doing the authorised act (X), R does no wrong to G.128 This has to be 
distinguished from the circumstances of violation which are justified by reference to 
overriding rights. As regards to the latter situation, there are some tests/ criteria to 
strike a balance between competing interests. This can surely result in the idea that 
 
124 Ibid 7. 
125 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 61. 
126 Ibid 61. 
127 Ibid 61-62. 
128 Ibid 62. 
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consent leaves no more ‘margin of manoeuvre than the other grounds’129 since there 
are different forms of justification. Hence, to violate a right without consent is not 
necessary to act in a way that cannot be justified substantively.130  
Accordingly, the function of consent as a procedural justification must not be 
confused with substantive justifications: the former authorises the action (X) for the 
consent receiver does to the giver, it follows that the former therefore does no wrong 
to the latter: the consent receiver’s doing X to the giver is permissible.131 For the 
substantive justifications, they are justified by referencing to ‘overriding rights’ or 
things considered as the lesser wrong.132  For the sake of substantive justifications, 
e.g., public interests or other compelling rights and interests, doing X without consent 
might still be justified under the PGC, or any right-based theoretical framework.133 
Overall, the consent as ‘procedure justification is one thing, substantive justification is 
quite another.’ 134  It should be kept in mind that the validity of such substantive 
justifications by which G and R are bound rather than G’s consent should appeal to 
the general principles of the PGC.135 
With respect to the observations of the WP29 opinion, the obtaining of consent 
does not (1) negate the obligations of data controller; nor (2) allow the circumvention 
of other provisions. It should be noted that, moreover, in its opinion on the definition 
of consent, the WP29 also underlined that there are issues in relation to the conditions 
of valid consent and the operation of consent in the context of private or public wrong, 
e.g., the right of individuals to withdraw their consent; consent given before the 
 
129 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111) 7. 
130 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 238-239. 
131 Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ 89. 
132 Ibid 89. 
133 See: ibid 96-97. 
134 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 239. 
135 Ibid 336. 
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beginning of the processing; requirements regarding the quality and the accessibility 
of the information. Such an observation made by the opinion of the WP29, is able to 
show the recognition that ‘the relevance of consent might reflect it significance by 
according it various degrees of justificatory weight.’ 136  In the case of what the 
opinion means, arguably, it might be taken to indicate that the WP29 prefers a smaller 
role for consent.137  
Having undertaken the groundwork, we are now able to identify and comment on 
the problems of Article 6 of the PDPL. Article 6(1) of the PDPL states:  
Personal information of medical treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health 
examination and criminal record should not be collected, processed or used. 
However, the following situations are not subject to the limits set in the preceding 
sentence: 
  1. when in accordance with law; 
  2. when it is necessary for the government agency to perform its duties or for the 
non- government agency to fulfil the legal obligation, and when there are proper 
security measures. 
  3. when the Party has disclosed such information by himself, or when the 
information concerned has been publicized legally; 
  4. when the personal information is collected, processed or used under certain 
methods by a government agency or an academic research institution based on the 
purpose of medical treatment, personal hygiene or crime prevention statistics and/or 
study. 
 
136 Ibid 231. 
137 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111) 7-8. 
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The confusion of the integrity of consent under the PDPL can be identified by 
comparing: (1) the absence of the consent justification when collecting and processing 
sensitive personal data (Article 6); with (2) the existence of such a procedure 
justification regarding non-special categories of personal data (Articles 15(II) and 
19(V)). In this regard, it might lead to the misunderstanding that the more sensitive 
personal data is involved, the less consent from the data subjects is demanded. 
The primary clarification should be the identification of, if at all, to what extent 
rights are covered by the law. Under Article 6, the relevant right is the protection of 
special categories of personal data. Given the sensitive character of such data, the law 
provides a higher standard of protection by forbidding the collection and processing 
of such data in general. Consequently, the higher protection of sensitive categories of 
personal data, which places autonomy at the heart of the data protection regime, 
would fit with the pattern of any will-based approach.  
Arguably, since consent can reflect individual autonomy to some extent, it should 
be a root justification with respect to sensitive personal data. The function of consent 
here could signal concession with regard to the benefits covered by the right and 
assume a new set of rights and obligations.138 This is particularly crucial in taking the 
rule-preclusionary conception of property into account: G should be granted a right to 
control G’s body and G’s body parts, including those body parts which have been 
removed or tissue containing genetic information about G, e.g., biometric data. What 
the WP29 states may reflect that ‘the notion of consent is traditionally linked with the 
idea that the data subject should be in control of the use that is being made of his 
data.’139 Hence, the idea that consent should play a more central role in relation to 
 
138 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 238. 
139 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 111) 8. 
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protection of sensitive personal data seems to be favourable. Accordingly, there must 
be something inadequate in relation to the integrity of consent in this provision. 
However, to avoid committing mistakes, in particular the Fallacy of Necessity, 
there is a need to assess this claim in a more careful way. It should be, firstly, recalled 
that if there is no violation of R, there is no need to call for any form of 
justification.140 Moreover, in the absence of consent, the violation of the rights entails 
that a wrong has been done.141 Such a wrong can only be justified by a PGC-sensitive 
substantive justification.142  Hence, to justify the violation, R will need to have a 
substantive justification provided by antecedent and overriding rights and interests. 
Now, this Formosan provision, unlike Article 8(2)(a) of the Data Protection 
Directive, does not mention the justification regarding consent. However, nor does it 
prohibit the procedural consent as is referred by Article 8(2)(a) of the Data Protection 
Directive. Thus, at least in the private sector, according to the principle of the priority 
of consent, where practicable, R should firstly seek G’s valid consent.  
Moreover, considering the role and integrity of consent under Article 6, one has 
to consider whether the absence of a rule on consent is due to the misgiving that 
consent might interfere with legitimate public interests covered in the substantive 
justifications. In this regard, the first two exemptions of Article 6 concern the binding 
force of legislation and the third one is related to the principle of Estoppel. The forth 
exemption is more crucial with respect to the central issue of the thesis. We shall look 
at this in the next subsection.  
 
 
140 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 238. 
141 Ibid 238. 
142 Ibid 238. 
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6.4.2 The Right to Academic Research and Its Benefits in the Data Protection 
Law Regime: the Substantive Justification 
The starting point of this subsection is one of a few substantive justifications under 
Article 6 of the PDPL: a governmental or private academic research institution may 
collect and process sensitive personal data (including biometric data on the basis of 
the purpose of medical treatment, personal hygiene or crime prevention statistics 
and/or study). Critics argue that it is, however, problematic if this is done without the 
valid consent of the data subjects. This is because, as mentioned above, Article 6 itself 
does not clearly take consent as a justification and might invite the misleading 
interpretation that the research ‘privilege’ overrides the right to information self-
determination.143  
The PGC allows the possibility of the justification of the ‘right-violations.’144 
Since the right to privacy is not an absolute right, one cannot immediately deny that 
there are chances for the research value to override the right to privacy as such. 
However, if the research value is capable of overriding the right to privacy and the 
right to protect personal data, ‘then it must be conceived of as itself protecting 
fundamental rights and values.’145 This is because only a right to generic condition of 
agency with more importance of needfulness for action can override the less 
important right to generic condition of agency. It can be argued that the research 
value may be considered as a generic condition of agency since it is at least an 
additive good to improve the data subject’s purpose-achieving ability. Again, the 
critical point is whether such a ‘public interest’ is proportionately regulated and 
 
143 Ching-Yi Liu, ‘Not So Improved: Initial Commentry on the Personal Data Protection Law’ (2010) 
183 The Taiwan Law Review153. 
144 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 297. 
145 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 
18 King's Law Journal 276. 
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managed by effective safeguards, such as strict rules or anonymisation of data to be 
approved through the institutional framework when these competing rights and 
interests are in conflict. 
The PDPL does not itself define the scope of the exemption and the other types of 
the ‘public interest’ with respect to the forth justification of the violation of Article 6. 
Instead, it asks the administrative authority (the Ministry of Justice)146 to prescribe the 
content and scope of the public interest in the enforcement rules. This is permitted by 
the PGC since some acts are to be classified morally optional.147 Though an act does 
not result in a private wrong through a direct application of the PGC, it may be 
justified by virtue of an indirect application of the PGC.148 In the current case, the 
authority can be viewed as a competent decision-making governmental body applying 
the PGC – if the later regulations, which should assist in defining the shape and scope 
of individual rights and to ‘preserve the context in which autonomous agents will 
enjoy the opportunity to flourish as members of a community committed to human 
rights and responsibilities,’149 are in line with Gewirthian principles.  
The rules set out by administrative authorities (quasi legislations) may not be 
necessarily followed by the courts. This is because, on the basis of the separation of 
power, the respect of the independence of the judicial powers and the quasi 
legislations are only taken into account by courts in reaching decisions. 150  
Consequently, the Gewirthian principles should also be taken into account by the 
 
146 Article 6(II) states that: ‘The rules of the range, procedure and any other items to be followed 
concerning Item 4 of the preceding Paragraph should be set by the government authority in charge of 
subject industry at the central government level in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice.’ 
147 Examples can be found at: Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 289. 
148 Ibid 289. 
149 Ibid 271. It must be noted that this is only one of the general guidelines regarding the justification of 
the public wrong. A more detailed discussion with respect to such guidelines will be presented in the 
next Chapter. 
150 For relevant English legislation, see: Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the 
Constitution (6th edn, CUP 2007) 473-478. 
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latter judicial review. 
Turning to the debate in relation to the comparison between the right to 
informational self-determination, the right to privacy, and the right to benefit from 
advances in science and technology, indeed, there is no explicit provision emphasising 
that consent should be put in a central position in the Formosan data protection law 
regime. 151  However, it is noted that as long as the two interests can co-exist, a 
permissive approach should be maintained. Furthermore, when applying the 
Gewirthian reasoning to interpret the ‘public interest’, it must be borne in mind that 
the equation shall rest firmly on the generic conditions of agency. This shall not 
favour the opinion that a substantial serious harm to a particular agent is outweighed 
by the sum of individually negligible goods to the other agents within the collective 
sphere. Hence, the need for individual consent should not always give way to the 
‘public interest.’ 
Moreover, the central purpose of the PDPL is to govern the collection, processing 
and use of personal information so as to prevent harm on personality rights, and to 
facilitate the proper use of personal information. Since the principle of the priority of 
consent plays a central role under the PGC architecture to prevent generic harm on 
agents, the State should take the following criteria into account:152  
1. Not to strict the exercise of the generic rights unless the agents concerned 
specifically consent to such a limitation (procedural justification) or for the sake 
of equivalent or overriding rights of other agents (substantive justification; and  
 
151 It should be noted that in the European law regime, the centrality of consent with respect to the 
collection and processing of sensitive personal data has been clearly emphasised by the ECHR. In other 
words, without explicit consent, the processing of sensitive data will engage Article 8.1 of the ECHR. 
See: Z. v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. Also, Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical 
Research and the Public Good’ 284. For a later comparison between the European and Formosan data 
protection law regimes, see Chapter 8 of the thesis.   
152 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 290. 
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2. To consider necessary settlement for  
(1) Good community order (in a moral optional sense); and 
(2) The settlement of a genuine moral disagreement as to the permissibility 
of conduc
However, as previously suggested, different values and interests do not always 
necessarily come into conflict. Under a broad conception of privacy, those ‘medical 
research concerned with increasing life choices and improved quality of life,’ and 
those crime-preventing researches concerned with securing personal space, can also 
be thought of as privacy values.153 This invites the introduction of ‘the co-operative 
model.’154 We shall look at this in the following chapter. 
 
6.5 Summary 
Until now, this thesis has dealt with understanding the concept of privacy in both 
European and Formosan legal systems, by building on the general literature of 
regulations. This chapter has shown that modern technologies further complicate the 
concept of privacy and its regulation in both jurisdictions. Improving the availability 
of proper regulatory tools, then, needs to be considered. This shall be done by 
understanding whether particular technologies at issue present their own exceptional 
problems. 
 
 
153 Beyleveld and Pattinson, ‘Moral Interests, Privacy, and Medical Research’ 53. 
154 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ in Sheila AM 
McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 156-158 and 
Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 275-289. 
Chapter 7 
Implementing the PGC: Guidelines for Legal Regulations to 
Facilitate Dealing with Privacy and Data Protection Issues 
Regarding Technologies 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In previous sections we have seen that generic rights, such as the right to benefit from 
advances in science and technology and the right to privacy, are prone to coming into 
conflict. We have also seen how the PGC deal with this and the comments in relation 
to current normative frameworks. We now have a basis on which to consider how 
guidelines should be set in a regulatory and legal context according to which the PGC 
will be governed.  
Implementation of generic rights requires respondents/ legislatures who can 
effectively secure them.1 The current global framework consists of inaccurate and 
antiquated rules that lack appropriate guidelines to deal with biometrics and RFID 
specifically.2 This calls for smart regulatory strategies and the clarification of the law. 
In this light, this chapter aims to offer a series of guidelines to deal with the advanced 
technologies at hand. It must, however, be noted that the chapter does not intend to 
provide a comprehensive regulatory policy and a statement of legal rules, nor does it 
cover exhaustively all aspects of governance. 
                                                 
1 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 56. 
2 Section 5.2.2. 
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The legal regimes, following the dialectically necessary argument, must accept 
the idea that the PGC is the supreme principle of all rules directed at action on pain of 
contradicting their legal validity. Moreover, the alternative contingent argument from 
the acceptance of human rights shows that, if the principle of instrumental reason is 
correct, any legal system recognises human rights and considers that every human 
agent should be treated equally must treat the PGC as a necessary criterion of legal 
validity. It is assumed, therefore, that all agents/ parties involved in the discussion 
comply with the Gewirthian principle of morality. 
However, it is unrealistic for the development and application of the PGC to 
presume an ideal legal regime where supremely rational agents universally seek to 
uphold, or at least to attempt to apply, the PGC.3 A more plausible/ pragmatic way of 
giving guidance on a PGC basis is to apply PGC-values, or at least apply values that 
are not forbidden by the PGC, ‘in ignorance or denial of the PGC as the supreme 
principle of morality.’4  
This chapter will firstly introduce a model to avoid conflicts between competing 
generic rights. This will allow for the full range of rights at hand to be achieved to a 
large extent. Secondly, to define the abstract concept of the PGC in such a way that it 
can be practically measured, the design of a regulatory framework reflecting the 
requirements of a democratic society (in a PGC-oriented sense) will be proposed to 
guide future deliberation and action. 
 
                                                 
3 Shaun D. Pattinson, Influencing Traits Before Birth (Ashgate Publishing 2002) 169. 
4 Ibid 169. See also, Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and 
Defence of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (The University of 
Chicago Press 1991) 149-150, and Phil Bielby, Competence and Vulnerability in Biomedical Research 
(Springer 2008) 87. 
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7.2 The Co-operative Model 
7.2.1 Introducing the Co-operative Model 
1. The Conflict model and the Acceptance of A Broad Concept of Privacy  
I have addressed that when there are conflicts, the application of the PGC can 
reconcile various competing rights and interests by employing the criterion of degrees 
of needfulness for action and successful action. To strike a balance between 
competing rights and interests, on the other hand, the traditional position in relation to 
the proportionality test has been coined the ‘weak proportionality test’ by Vries et al., 
which indicates the consistence of  
a mere balancing of a fundamental right and another interest – for example: privacy 
and crime control – does in fact not offer any guarantee for the preservation of that 
fundamental right, since the approach itself assumes that preserving the one per 
definition implies weakening the other, and vice versa.5 
This type of test excludes the possibility that both interests considered may be 
fostered and protected in an optimal way since it sees the balancing test as weighing 
one interest against the other.6 For example, with respect to the relationship between 
data protection values, particularly privacy, and the right to benefit from advances in 
science and technology, this model suggests that the former interests always conflict 
with the latter one.7 This has been termed the ‘conflict model.’8 It views competing 
                                                 
5 Katja de Vries and others, ‘The German Constitutional Court Judgment on Data Retention: 
Proportionality Overrides Unlimited Surveillance (Doesn’t It?)’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), 
Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice (Springer 2011) 21. 
6 Ibid 21. 
7 See for example: R v Department of Health ex p. Source Informatics [1999] 4 All ER 185, [2000] 1 
All ER 786, cited from Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research 
Values’ in Sheila AM McLean (ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 
Publishing 2006) 152. 
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rights as a zero-sum trade-off and holds that the right to privacy does not in any way, 
or at least not in a realistic fashion, support advances in science and technology. For 
example, Posner and Vermeule argue that ‘[a]t the security-liberty frontier, any 
increase in security requires a decrease in liberty.’9 Such a model can be summarised 
as follows: 
a. For those who consider that privacy values should always give way when 
there is a conflict, endorsing a narrow conception of privacy,10 
(i) The data subjects have a duty to participate in the application of such 
technologies by giving up their personal data, including very sensitive 
data such as biometric data. In this regard, valid consent is not 
required unless there is a higher right/ interest involved.  
(ii) The data subjects may lose their control over their personal data since 
the benefits of such applications prevail over privacy values. Any 
secondary/ further use with respect to personal data such as 
associating with the RFID system may be easily (or, abusively) 
justified. 
In this light, however, there is a risk that the value of consent is diminished to 
an extent that individual rights and human dignity are undervalued or even 
ignored. This contradicts the principle of the priority of consent.11  
Moreover, it is arguable that the participations in the research and application 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 155. 
9 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts (OUP 
2007) 12. 
10 It is argued that, normally, the conflict model is associated with the narrow concept of privacy. 
Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 156. 
11 Section 6.4.1. 
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will necessarily result in benefits for science and technology. One must firstly 
justify whether there is a generic right to research (without leading to any 
specific interest) or a generic right to apply certain technology (as an end). 
Even if there are such generic rights, one has to, moreover, justify that they 
can always override the right to privacy. 
On the basis of empirical research, it has been pointed out that the narrow 
conception of privacy and data protection results in a performance problem: 
‘there are black boxes and lacking mechanisms to ensure an effective data 
protection.’12 
b. In contrast, for those who maintain that privacy values should always override 
benefits of science and technology, since the right to privacy is not an 
absolute right, there must still be chances of fallacy. In fact, even the most 
extreme privacy advocates rarely suggest that privacy values should always 
override the benefits of science and technology. Moreover, there is a tendency 
for supporters of a narrow conception of privacy to regard the right to privacy 
as a personal interest while seeing the right to benefit from advances of 
science and technology as a general public interest. 13  Under a Utilitarian 
calculus, which should be familiar to those who adopt of narrow conception 
of privacy, this situation comes into play frequently. 
Mention should also be made to the fact that ‘if there is a high concern of 
privacy, it is merely communicated. Mostly there is a low interest in 
                                                 
12 Daniel Guagnin, Leon Hempl and Carla Ilten, ‘Privacy Practices and the Claim for Accountability’ in 
René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2011) 103-104. 
13 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 156. 
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enhancing privacy.’14 Consequently, on the basis of the narrow conception of 
privacy, even though privacy concerns are highly valued, privacy may still 
not prevail. 
However, it might be incorrect to always regard privacy/ data protection values 
and other values as belonging to two mutually exclusive sets. In other words, there 
might be/ is a possibility for data protection values, particularly the right to privacy, 
and the right to benefit from advances in science and technology of being capable of 
supporting each other. Indeed, there are counter-arguments to the conflict model of 
the balancing test. For example, the Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland 
indicates that when justifying the processing and use of person data for medical 
research purposes, the explanation of public interest (in Article 8 of the ECHR) should 
refer to both ‘the encouragement of good medical research and the protection of 
patient privacy.’15  Furthermore, with respect to the relationship between national/ 
public security and privacy, Solove disagrees with the ‘all-or-nothing argument’ by 
arguing that the two interests need not be mutually exclusive.16 Vries et al., moreover, 
by taking the ‘necessary in a democratic state’ test in relation to the ECtHR 
judgements, propose a ‘stronger proportionality test,’ which contends that there is a 
possibility to reconcile the multiple values.17 This is because, they argue, the ECtHR 
criteria of balancing ‘encompass[es] the possibility to refuse a measure because it 
harms the essence of a fundamental right or of the constitutional order, even if it can 
                                                 
14 Guagnin, Hempl and Ilten (n 12) 103. 
15 Graeme Laurie and Nayha Sethi, ‘Information Governance of Use of Patient Data in Medical 
Research in Scotland: Current and Future Scenarios’ (Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP))  
<http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Scoping_Report_Final_August_2010.pdf> 
accessed 6 August 2011, 8. 
16 Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: the False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale University 
Press 2011) 33-37. 
17 Vries and others (n 5) 21-22. Also, David Wright and others, ‘Precaution and Privacy Impact 
Assessment as Modes towards Risk Governance’ in René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible 
Research and Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies and Security 
Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European Union 2011) 93-94. 
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be shown that this measure can effectively realise another legitimate interest.’18 They 
suggest that, furthermore, there is an ‘even stronger’ proportionality test requiring to 
‘explore if there are alternative measures that allow for the realisation of the 
legitimate interest in a way that does not affect the fundamental rights in the same 
way as the proposed measure.’19  
Nevertheless, there are two problems with respect to Vries and others’ model, i.e. 
the stronger proportionality test. First, it is doubtful that the model remains a type of 
balancing test since there is no conflict between multiple values. Vries et al. state that, 
indeed, this issue is no longer a ‘balance’ between two values; instead, it is an answer 
to a series of questions in relation to the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in democratic constitutional states.20 Accordingly, instead of using the term 
‘weak proportionality test’ and ‘stronger proportionality test,’ the proposed model 
builds upon the basis of what Beyleveld coins the ‘conflict model’ and the ‘co-
operative model.’21  
Secondly, the context of this idea and the justification of the argument have not 
yet been clearly spelt out in general terms. This deserves further attention. Briefly, the 
central idea of the co-operative model is that there is the possibility for two sets of 
values of being capable of supporting each other rather than coming into conflict. For 
example, with respect to the issues at stake:  
a. The fulfilment of data protection requirements, particularly the protection of 
the right to privacy, can support applications of modern technologies. By 
                                                 
18 Vries and others (n 5) 21-22. 
19 Ibid 22. 
20 Ibid 22. Also, Wright and others (n 17) 94. 
21 See: Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 156-158. Also, 
Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ (2007) 18 
King's Law Journal 275-289. 
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improving data subjects’ trust, for example, not only the willingness of being 
subjects in a database, but also the chance of collecting more accurate and 
updated personal (sensitive) data will be expanded; and  
b. Conversely, the applications of modern technologies may improve security 
and convenience of the private lives of individuals (including considerations 
of privacy values) as well as public interests. For example, the 
implementation of PETs22 can prevent unnecessary or unwanted processing of 
personal data. The right to benefit from advances in science and technology 
can also provide individuals with more control over their private lives by 
providing them with more options. This fits with the concept of decisional 
privacy and informational privacy under the broad conception of privacy. 
Indeed, the co-operative model reflects the acceptance of broad conception of 
privacy, which is in line with the PGC.  
We have considered that the conflict model is commonly associated with the 
narrow conception of privacy while the co-operative model tends to be associated 
with a broad conception of privacy. However, there remains a possibility for the 
conflict model to operate in relation to a broad conception of privacy. Nevertheless, 
such a relationship may generate a tension, or sometimes, a contradiction.23 This is 
because under a European data protection model, to collect and process personal data 
for research and applications of science and technology, necessary rights protection 
measures must be taken into account. This is particularly crucial as Article 25 of the 
Data Protection Directive requires that transfer of personal data to a third country 
should only be allowed under the condition that the country in question ensures an 
                                                 
22 Section 7.2.2. 
23 Cf: Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 156. 
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adequate level of protection. Specifically, according to Articles 424 and 25(1)25 of the 
Data Protection Directive, a multi-national biometric database, which is more 
effective for achieving the purpose of protecting national and social security, whether 
transfer personal data within or outside the territory of the EU, must be handled 
according to respect for privacy. In this regard, the protection of privacy supports 
research and applications of science and technology. This is against the central idea of 
the conflict model that privacy interests always conflict with the benefits from 
scientific and technological advances.  
 
2. The Justification of the Co-operative Model  
Since the acceptance of a broad conception of privacy is a prerequisite of the co-
operative model, the justification of accepting a broad conception of privacy will 
justify this model.26  I shall thus provide support for a broad conceptualisation of 
privacy. 
                                                 
24 Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive: 
1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this Directive to the 
processing of personal data where: 
 (a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on 
the territory of the Member State; when the same controller is established on the territory of several 
Member States, he must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments 
complies with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable; 
 (b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory, but in a place where its national 
law applies by virtue of international public law; 
 (c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal 
data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member 
State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community. 
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1(c), the controller must designate a representative 
established in the territory of that Member State, without prejudice to legal actions which could be 
initiated against the controller himself. 
25 Article 25(1) of the Data Protection Directive: The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a 
third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after 
transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate 
level of protection. 
26 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 158. 
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The legal justification for the acceptance of a broad concept of privacy in the 
European human rights regime has been addressed in section 4.3 of the thesis. As 
regards the Formosan system, the adoption of the European data protection model 
together with a number of Constitutional Interpretations, e.g., J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 
535, 585, 603 and 613,27 can offer support to a broad concept of privacy. Hence, 
given the place of the ECHR in relation to EU law and the Formosan Constitution, it 
is legally justified to adopt the broad conception of privacy.  
Apart from the legal aspects of justification, Beyleveld also suggests ethical 
reasons to justify the co-operative model. The first step is to relate the relationship 
between privacy and benefits from advances in science and technology to the 
relationship between data subjects and data controllers. In this regard, the rights and 
interests owned by data subjects cover both privacy and benefits from advanced 
science and technology since the European data protection model sets out the data 
protection law as a protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other hand, 
from the controller’s point of view, the data controller also possesses both interests. 
The two parties should, therefore, work in partnership since there is mutual respect for 
the rights of both parties. 
Now, under the PGC thinking, in principle, data subjects must be treated as ends 
and possess negative and positive rights. In effect, data controllers must view those 
subjects ‘not as information crops to be harvested for the common good or their own 
purposes, but as partners whose purposes are to be respected.’28 In this light, the 
partnership between the two parties calls for the co-operative model, which asks the 
two parties to be treated equally, rather than competing with each other as suggested 
                                                 
27 Section 5.3.2. 
28 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 159. 
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in the conflict. This then presents a pragmatic reason justification of the co-operative 
model.  
Indeed, to scrutinise the pragmatic reason in detail, we can consider game-
theoretic ideas29 to explain the behaviour of partners (data subject and data controller) 
in contexts where the outcome of actions depends on how agents chose to act in 
partnership games.30 To do so, it is important for us to be sure how the situation is 
characterised. Here, I think of it as a prisoner’s dilemma.31 That is, ‘the predicament 
of the parties in the ideal bargaining position is structurally equivalent to the situation’ 
of the players of the game, which attempts to demonstrate ‘(1) that rational agents in a 
suitably idealized bargaining situation will agree on a specific, unique distribution of 
the benefits of cooperation, (2) what this distribution looks like, (3) that this 
distribution determines what is just, and (4), in case of Gauthier, that rational agents 
will comply with the terms of the bargain.’32  
In the situation of the iterated prisoners' dilemma game, 33 it can be argued that 
                                                 
29 According to Ross, Game Theory is ‘is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among 
economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where 
the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents.’ For basic understandings on 
Game Theory, see: Don Ross, ‘Game Theory’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/> accessed 5 May 2012. 
30 Indeed, there might be other elements (e.g. data pirates) affecting the payoff of the game we are 
discussing. However, it is plausible for us to resist adding complications unless they are necessary. This 
is because we would not want the complications to ‘obscure the basic forces at work.’ As Baird et al. 
address, ‘[t]he test of a model is not whether it is “realistic,” but whether it sheds light on the problem 
at hand.’ Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner and Randal Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard 
University Press 1994) 46. 
31 In the standard story of the pensioners’ dilemma, there will be two accused persons. The police do 
not have enough information for a conviction. The police then separate the two men, and offer both the 
same deal in the interview: if neither of them confessed that the other guy is guilty, they will go to jail 
for a year. If they both betray each other, they will end up in jail for two years. But if one rat the other 
guy out and the other keep silent, then the one betrayed will go home free and the other will go to jail 
for five years. Each person must choose either to betray or remain silent; the decision of each is kept 
secret from the other. See, e.g., ibid 33. 
32 Bruno Verbeek, ‘Game Theory and Ethics’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/> accessed 5 May 2012. See also, Steven Kuhn, 
‘Prisoner's Dilemma’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/> accessed 5 May 2012. For Gauthier’s theory, see: 
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (OUP 1986). 
33 If two players play prisoners' dilemma more than once in succession and they act according to 
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without any cooperation (co-ordination), the agents involved in data collecting, 
processing and using are doomed to end up with the bad outcome even though there is 
a possible outcome that is better for game-players.34 Hence, if agents are rational and 
thus put into place a rational plan of action, then acting according to the plan can be 
rational and beneficial ‘even if so acting requires doing things that are not, considered 
from the standpoint of the moment of action, optimal.’35  With this in mind, it is 
justified to believe that even if the mechanisms for the enhancement of the co-
operative model may require agents to be less optimal and constrained (not pursuing 
their own best outcome), e.g., to increase preliminary investments and time, the model 
remains rational.  
The better strategies for the (iterated) prisoners' dilemma have argued that players 
shall be nice, retaliating (i.e., not a blind trust), forgiving, and non-envious.36 In his 
contribution Axelrod contends that,  
Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation 
discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Its 
forgiveness helps restore mutual co-operation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to 
the other player, thereby eliciting long-term co-operation.37 
All of these are closely relating to the trust between rights holders. Indeed, through 
the way of satisfying each other by treating others as oneself, it is capable of 
enhancing incentives to cooperation. In this regard, to take cooperative actions against 
narrow self-interest can pragmatically generate better outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                            
previous strategy of their opponent, the game is called iterated prisoners' dilemma. 
34 To put into economics jargon, the best outcome here is termed Pareto inefficient. 
35 Verbeek (n 32). 
36 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books 1984) 54. 
37 Ibid 54. For the counterclaims and justifications, see: Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of 
Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton University Press 
1997). 
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However, it should be noted that the implication of game-theoretic ideas here is 
different from the utility/ moral contractarian (of Gauthier) theory. Both of the 
Gauthierian and Gewirthian theories claim that (human) agents must be treated with 
equal regard and respect.38 However, rather than pursuing maximum happiness or 
Gauthier’s discussion in the light of a co-operative bargaining position of constrained 
maximisation of self-interest, my intention of using game-theoretic analysis in 
relation to the pragmatic reasoning of the co-operative model is to minimise the risk 
of violating generic rights in so far as it is possible to do so. Accordingly, the full 
avoidance of generic harm is the highest-ranked outcome – although this is not always 
possible. In other words, there remains a possibility of conflict under the co-operative 
model. I will return to this point later. 
I have provided support and justification for a broad conception of privacy. It is 
noted that the conflict model is normally coupled with the narrow conception of 
privacy. 39 In this regard, it is also normally inferred that the values that conflict with 
privacy (with a narrow conception) are grounded in the public interest and tend to 
promote important values/ basic needs like human safety, human health, and human 
life. 40 If so, on the basis of the narrow conception of privacy, as these values are 
always more important than privacy, it is assumed that preserving non-privacy values 
implies weakening privacy values. This might mislead us to consider that agents have 
a duty to engage in activities supporting such values to the extent that consent is not 
required unless an even more important value/ interest is harmed. Such a view is 
closer to the interest-conception than the will-conception, which I have addressed in 
Section 4.3.2.   
                                                 
38 This can be a contingent requirement central to the alternative argument addressed in section 3.4.2. 
39 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Medical Research Values’ 156. 
40 Ibid 155-156. 
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On the other hand, on the basis of a broad conception of privacy, privacy does not 
merely protect one value, but several. In this regard, the broad conception of privacy 
implies a greater opportunity to apply the co-operative model. However, recognition 
of the limits of such an approach is needed. 
 
3. Limits of the Broad Conception of Privacy 
It must be noted that a broad conception of privacy is not to say that ‘everything is 
privacy.’ In other words, the conception of privacy still needs to stay within some 
basic characteristics of privacy. As addressed in Section 4.2.1, any discussion 
defending the fundamental value of privacy interests has to define the concept so as to 
differentiate it from other ideas. In this regard, logically, as there must be different 
ideas, the conception of privacy will never cover every value. In sum, the conception 
of privacy can be broad, but it still needs to be privacy rather than irrelevant 
conceptions e.g., the right a fair trial. 
Moreover, the consequence of a broad conception of privacy is that it does not 
only protect one value but several. Hence, there is a second limit to the broad 
conception of privacy – a possibility of conflict within the co-operative model. 
Specifically, ‘not only is privacy capable of conflicting with other non-privacy 
interests, but some privacy interests are capable of conflicting with each other.’ 41 
There is no denying that under a broad conception of privacy, protected privacy 
values may still be in conflict with each other. This is similar to the idea of 
partnership we have already discussed: in general, partners co-operate with each other 
                                                 
41 Ibid 158. 
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in order to efficiently avoid risks of violating/ take care of general interests of all the 
partners. However, there remains a possibility for the interests of different partners to 
clash. Moreover, even the interests of the same partner (agent) can come into conflict. 
In this regard, the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action can then be used to 
assess these competing values within the conception of privacy both inter-personally 
and intra-personally.42 
Nevertheless, it is recalled that provided that valid consent is obtained, there is no 
need to deal with the subsequent substantive justification. Hence, with respect to the 
co-operative model, valid consent is a crucial, serving as a device to respect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Specifically, if the relationship between the 
controller/ processor and the data subjects can be built on a basis of trust within a co-
operative model, i.e., the data subjects are confident that the controller/ processor will 
only do what has been agreed, conflicts can be efficiently reduced. Methods 
contributing to improving the opportunity of obtaining valid consent from data 
subjects must therefore be evaluated and applied. This will be explored in the next 
subsection. 
4. Consent and the Co-operative Model 
On the basis of the narrow concept of privacy which is normally coupled with the 
conflict model, the use of personal data without consent will not necessarily involve a 
breach of privacy. This is because, on the basis of the conflict model, if there is any 
conflict between privacy and non-privacy interests, one of them must give way. If a 
non-privacy interest is more important than privacy (which is usually claimed by 
conflict model supporters), consent is not necessarily required unless the actions 
                                                 
42 Ibid 158. See: Chapter 6. 
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protecting the non-privacy interest will result in more important generic harms. 
Secondly, on the basis of a narrow concept of privacy, privacy can hardly override 
non-privacy interests. Opposite to this, if the conflict model is coupled with the broad 
conception of privacy, actions protecting non-privacy values can never be undertaken 
without consent. However, as I have addressed above, such a relationship may 
generate a tension or contradiction, this circumstance can barely happen. In sum, 
consent plays a less crucial role in the conflict model. 
On the other hand, valid consent has more opportunities to be obtained when the 
broad concept of privacy is adopted. Provided that consent is validly obtained, there is 
no conflict. Such preventive measures to improving opportunities for consent are 
capable of avoiding harm. This is exactly the central idea of the co-operative model. It 
should be noted, on the one hand, that the higher chances for consent can make the 
co-operative model more applicable; on the other hand, consent may work well if 
privacy interests cooperate with each other (coupled with the broad conception of 
privacy). In this respect, indeed, consent and the co-operative model cooperate.  
Moreover, when the procedural justification –valid consent is in play, the conflict 
between two interests disappears and the generic harm is avoided. It is thus no longer 
a ‘conflict model’ as the two interests are supporting each other. Hence, consent plays 
a more important role in the co-operative model rather than the conflict model. 
 
7.2.2 Enhance the Co-operative Model 
I have said in the previous subsection that, by accepting a broad conception of privacy, 
the co-operative model is more suitable. This subsection aims to address how to 
enhance the co-operative model by exemplifying two notable privacy and data 
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protection enhancing mechanisms which particularly engage the practicability of the 
co-operative model. For the purpose of this thesis, this subsection will not offer a 
comprehensive review of the entire framework, but will instead analyse how to couple 
the suggested mechanisms with the co-operative model. It is pointed out that, based 
on the co-operative model, the technologic-centricity and agent-centricity 
characteristics of such mechanisms cannot be seen as ontologically distinct matters 
but instead they are capable of supporting each other. In this regard, the focal point is 
to consolidate trust in order to improve opportunities for obtaining valid consent.  
 
1. The Enhancement of the Co-operative Model 
If there is a conflict between generic rights, harm is caused in general. The harm may 
be justified according to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action. If not, then 
remedies may be applied. Article 23(1) of the Data Protection Directive deals with 
this by stating that ‘Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered 
damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible 
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.’  
However, with the PGC in mind, it is noted that the risk of violating generic 
rights must be minimised in so far as it is possible to do so. In this regard, the 
enhancement of the co-operative model can be used to effectively minimise the risk of 
violating the right to privacy.  
In terms of ethical or privacy issues with respect to the development of new 
technologies, risks could be more easily assessed in the initial stages such as the 
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designing period since any control or change is more difficult when a technology has 
become more deeply entrenched. 43  However, with reference to the Collingridge 
dilemma,44 impact is difficult to predict at the early stage.45 To deal with this, privacy 
and data protection issues need to be assessed early on with not only the expert 
assessment of data controllers, e.g., policy makers/ inventors in the public domain as 
well as private enterprises, but also with the involvement of the data subjects and 
supervisors. This dilemma calls for an early engagement, e.g., mutual communication 
and dialogue in a ‘codes of conduct’ form,46 involving every participant of the data 
processing, which mirrors the spirit of the co-operative model. With this in mind, 
early privacy and data protection intervention in the research and innovation of 
science and technology process can ‘help to avoid that technologies fail to embed in 
society and or help that their positive and negative impacts are better governed and 
exploited at a much earlier stage.’47 In this respect, appropriate risk assessment is 
definitely part of the procedure towards ‘healthy’ types of scientific and technological 
developments, which can avoid (at least to some extent) subsequent conflicts between 
the interest of the progress of research and the values of privacy and data protection. 
This is in line with the idea that the risk of violating the PGC must be minimised in so 
far as it is possible to do so. Accordingly, it is plausible to argue that a legal standard 
‘applicable to European privacy and data protection legislation’ should be established 
                                                 
43 René von Schomberg, ‘Introduction: Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the 
Information and Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields’ in René von 
Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2011) 8. 
44 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Palgrave Macmillan 1981). 
45 Schomberg (n 44) 8. 
46 Codes of conduct, as Menevidis and others argue, are particular rules/ guidelines to individuals when 
dealing with themes concerning ethical values in relation to researches and innovations of science and 
technology, e.g., biometric data processing. For details, see: Zaharya Menevidis, Samantha Swartzman 
and Efstratios Stylianidis, ‘Code of Conduct for FP7 Researchers on Medical and Biometric Data 
Privacy’ in René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the 
Information and Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office 
of the European Union 2011) 116-132. 
47 Schomberg (n 44) 9. 
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and followed on the basis of such reasoning.48 
With a view to avoiding harm, both prevention and precaution relate to risk 
assessment and anticipation of harm at an early stage. However, there is a need to 
distinguish prevention and precaution.49 It is noted that risk assessment includes two 
types of risks, namely the identified and uncertain ones. It has been argued that 
preventive measures ‘take place when there are identifiable risks,’ while precaution is 
supposed to deal with uncertain risks.50 For example, in terms of the precautionary 
principle, it is mentioned in Article 174 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (now Article 191 
TEFU), which was the first provision to incorporate the precautionary principle into 
the environment policy of the EU, that ‘[t]he Contracting Parties shall apply the 
precautionary principle, where to take preventive measures when there is reason to 
assume that substances or energy introduced... when there is no conclusive evidence 
of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects.’ (emphasis added) 
Moreover, to assess risks in both preventive actions and precautionary 
assessments, the possibility of risk should be understood in a broad sense in order to 
ensure a higher level of protection of generic rights. To accept a broader conception of 
privacy enables us to achieve the purpose of evaluating risks in this context. As 
Warren et al. address, ‘PIAs have to consider privacy risks in a wider framework that 
takes into account the broader set of community values and expectations about 
privacy.’51 Again, this is in line with the justification of the co-operative model.  
                                                 
48 Luiz Costa, ‘Privacy and the Precautionary Principle’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & Security 
Review14. 
49 Ibid 16. 
50 Ibid 16. 
51 Adam Warren and others, ‘Privacy Impact Assessments: International Experience as a Basis for UK 
Guidance’ (2008) 24 Computer Law & Security Review 235. 
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Although Article 20(1) of the Directive provides a prior checking approach,52 as 
Costa observes, unlike Article 2 of Directive 85/337/EEC, 53  there is no specific 
provision offered. I argue that, in light of uncertain risks, in order to adopt the 
precautionary principle to deal with harms to the right to privacy and the right to 
protect personal data, it is better to enhance the co-operative model by applying the 
Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment (PIA).54 On the other hand, when 
dealing with specific and identified risks, Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
which adopt a ‘privacy by design’ idea are more appropriate. 
  
                                                 
52 It states: ‘Member States shall determine the processing operations likely to present specific risks to 
the rights and freedoms of data subjects and shall check that these processing operations are examined 
prior to the start thereof.’ 
53 Suggesting the environmental impact assessment, Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the Directive state that 
‘Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects 
likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia, of their nature, size or location 
are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects,…’ and ‘The environmental impact 
assessment may be integrated into the existing procedures for consent to projects in the Member States, 
or, failing this, into other procedures or into procedures to be established to comply with the aims of 
this Directive.’   
54 Cf. Recital 70 of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation: ‘…such indiscriminate 
general notification obligation should be abolished, and replaced by effective procedures and 
mechanism which focus instead on those processing operations which are likely to present specific 
risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes. 
In such cases, a data protection impact assessment should be carried out by the controller or processor 
prior to the processing, which should include in particular the envisaged measures, safeguards and 
mechanisms for ensuring the protection of personal data and for demonstrating the compliance with 
this Regulation.’ 
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Figure 7.1: A Brief Structure of the Co-operative Model 
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2. Privacy Impact Assessment 
To understand PIA, it is better to begin by looking at the social and ethical 
intervention in compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms in research and 
innovation of science and technology. The term ‘responsible research and innovation’ 
refers to55  
transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become 
mutually responsive to each other with a view on the (ethical) acceptability, 
sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable 
products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological 
advances in our society). 
This definition suggests proposals beyond scientific and technological excellence 
which should include a social and ethical review.56 In this regard, the conduct of 
collective collaboration between researchers/ inventors and social scientists is 
desirable. This is close to the definition of an instrument of risk governance, i.e., 
PIA:57  
a process of engaging stakeholders in order to consider how privacy might be 
impacted by the development of a new technology, product, service, project or 
policy and what measures could be taken to avoid or mitigate unwanted effects. 
The advantage of the use of PIA is to ‘reduce the human cost of trial and error and 
                                                 
55 Schomberg (n 44) 9. The justification of responsible research and innovation can be found at: ibid 8-
9. 
56 Ibid 10. For detailed discussions on responsible research and innovation including its concept, limits 
and applications, see: Bernd Carsten Stahl, ‘IT for a Better Future. How to Integrate Ethics, Politics and 
Innovation’ in René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the 
Information and Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office 
of the European Union 2011) 28-31.  
57 Wright and others (n 12) 84. 
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make advantage of a societal learning process of stakeholders and technical 
innovators.’58 Indeed, this methodology of risk management is by no means a new 
idea. For example, it was reviewed by the WP29.59 The proposed framework aims to 
assist the Member States as well as their citizens and third parties in addressing 
privacy and data protection risks as required by EU Directives, in particular the Data 
Protection Directive. It is expected to achieve its purpose by taking appropriate 
actions, i.e., ‘a close examination of the cost and benefits of specific security and 
privacy-related risks’60 in order to prevent, or at least minimise, the negative impact 
of the biometric and RFID systems as well as the deployment of their applications. In 
this regard, the suggested PIA has to be consistent with the data protection 
requirements set out by the EU and the ECHR standard given/ interpreted by the 
ECtHR.  
The WP29 is not the only EU authority or consolation party who noticed the 
necessity of PIA. The European Parliament, in its resolution on Passenger Name 
Records (PNR), also noticed that ‘any new legislative instrument must be preceded by 
a Privacy Impact Assessment and a proportionality test,…’ 61  There are other 
indications of a growing interest in PIA. Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the 
                                                 
58 Schomberg (n 44) 10. 
59 It should be noted that PIA reviewed by the WP29 is specifically for the RFID applications. See: 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy and 
Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications (No 00066/10/EN, WP175, 
2010) and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal 
for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications (No 
00327/11/EN, WP180, 2011). It should be noted here that the main critique on the first version of the 
proposed framework addressed by the first opinion is the concern over the fails to ‘invite the RFID 
operator to assess privacy and data protection issues that could arise when tags are carried by 
individuals in everyday life.’ This leads to the revised version of the framework. See: Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection 
Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications 9. For a general overview, see: Laurie and Sethi 
(n 15) 48, 59. 
60 Communication form the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework, COM (2007) 96 final 6. 
61 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada. OJ 2011/C 81 E/12. 
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European Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 
for example, remarked in July 2010 that ‘businesses and public authorities… will 
need to better assume their responsibilities by putting in place certain mechanisms 
such as the appointment of Data Protection Officers, the carrying out of Privacy 
Impact Assessments and applying a ‘Privacy by Design’ approach.’62 Moreover, the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has also offered a standard for 
PIA in the field of financial services.63  
PIA defined in the framework assessing RFID applications is organised as 
follows.64 First, there is a ‘pre-assessment (initial analysis) phase’, which classifies 
the application basis on a 4-level scale.65  This allows to determine whether later 
stages of PIA are needed or not. Secondly, a four-step risk assessment phase is 
suggested: (1) to characterise the application; (2) to identify the risks of personal data 
in terms of privacy and compliance with European data protection law regime; (3) to 
identify and recommend controls; and (4) to document the detailed results of PIA in 
reports.  
This concerted co-operation is crucial in the design of technology early on. 
Indeed, the idea of ‘privacy by design’, which indicates the concept of ‘embedding 
privacy proactively into technology itself,’ 66  has been noticed in a European 
                                                 
62 Viviane Reding, ‘Towards A True Single Market of Data Protection (SPEECH/10/386, Meeting of 
the Article 29 Working Party, Review of the Data protection Legal Framework)’ (The EU, 2010)  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/386> accessed 24 April 2012.  
63 International Organization for Standardization, ‘ISO 22307:2008: Financial services -- Privacy 
impact assessment, 16 Apr 2008.’ (2008)  
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=40897> accessed 
20 Februrary 2012. 
64 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal for a 
Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications 4-5. 
65 Ibid 4. Also, the appendix of the opinion, 6-7. 
66 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies (No 00720/12/EN, WP193, 2012) 28. 
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Commission proposal on a major legal reform of data protection rules in early 2012.67 
In the proposed Article 19(2) of the new Directive, it is set out that the Member States 
must ensure the compliance of the controller with the obligations to ‘adopt policies 
and implement appropriate measures, which meet in particular the principles of data 
protection by design and data protection by default.’68 
In this regard, the ‘privacy by design’ concept of PIA can be understood as 
follows: 
(1) Help data controllers: 
a. To address privacy and data protection issues before the technological 
applications have been deployed. This is able to save a considerable 
amount of cost on amending the services and products affecting privacy 
concerns.69  
b. To assess privacy risks, find out ‘technical and organisational measures’ 
against harms and protect rights set forth by the data protection principles. 
By doing so, this can also assist data controllers to ‘gain more insight’ into 
the privacy and data protection issues regarding the applications.70  
c. To build/ improve the trust afforded by data subjects. This enables data 
controllers to collect and process personal data more easily and accurately. 
                                                 
67 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes A Comprehensive Reform of the Data Protection 
Rules’ (2012)  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm> accessed 
30 Janurary 2012. 
68 Recital 38 of the proposed Directive. European Commission, ‘Proposal for A Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or 
Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of 
Such Data, (COM(2012) 10 final)’ (2012)  <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 30 Janurary 
2012. 
69 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2010 on the Industry Proposal for a Privacy 
and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications 5.  
70 Ibid 5. 
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This leads to a higher chance for data subjects to consent. In this regard, 
there will not be a violation of the rights considered. The relationship 
between data subjects and controllers in this aspect will be further 
discussed together with the next measure enhancing the co-operative 
model.  
(2) Help data subjects: 
a. To secure and strengthen their ability to exercise their privacy and data 
protection rights. 
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological applications at a 
lower cost. This is because the manufacturing costs/ risks of the industries 
have been reduced to some extent for the reasons set out above, and the 
consumers thus may have the chance to share the gained profits. 
Additionally, the data protection authorities (DPAs) can identify best practices 
regarding the way data protection is implemented by private industries and public 
authorities. Hence, the privacy by design characteristic implies technology is left in 
the hands of main parties of data processing. In this regard, PIA can be a useful means 
to simplify the process for data subjects, data controllers and DPAs ‘in monitoring 
potential privacy risks prior to the implementation of any particular model.’ 71  
(emphasis added) More importantly, such approach is decisive for establishing an 
environment based on trust. 72  Indeed, PIA not only increases the possibility of 
                                                 
71 Laurie and Sethi (n 15) 59. It is noted that the prior risk assessment measures are not applied by 
every legal regimes. However, risk analysis measures are needed to obtain an effective set of security 
instrument. See: G.W. van Blarkom, J.J. Borking and P. Verhaar, ‘PET’ in G.W. van Blarkom, J.J. 
Borking and J.G.E. Olk (eds), Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies - The case of 
Intelligent Software Agents (College bescherming persoonsgegevens 2003) 45. 
72 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on ‘Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps towards a 
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avoiding conflicts of interest, by building public trust, it also ‘[a]chieving a better 
balance among conflict interests.’73 Overall, a well-designed PIA can pragmatically 
reflect the promises of the co-operative model.  
 
3. Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
PETs have been defined as a system of the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) 74  that protects privacy, in particular informational privacy and 
personal identity. They aim to minimise the unnecessary collection and processing of 
personal data altogether, or gives direct control over revelation of personal data to the 
agent concerned, without the unbearable loss of the functionality of the ICT.75 The 
application, according to Burkert, must be distinguished from those data security 
technologies seeking to ‘render data processing safe regardless of the legitimacy of 
processing.’ 76  This is because PETs emphasise that personal data can only be 
collected if necessary in the very first place.77 This reflects the fact that the security of 
personal data is not the only data protection principle. PETs should, therefore, take the 
overall data principles into account.  
‘Privacy by design’ is a crucial basis for the successful application of PETs.78 
                                                                                                                                            
policy framework’ COM(2007) 96, paragraph 52, OJ 2008/C 101/01. 
73 Wright and others (n 17) 90. 
74 See: Chapter 2. 
75 Herbert Burkert, ‘Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision’ in Philip E. Agre and 
Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (MIT Press 1998) 125; Dag 
Wiese Schartum, ‘Designing and Formulating Data Protection Laws’ (2010) 1 International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology20; Colin Bennett and Charles Raab, The Governance of Privacy: 
Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (MIT Press 2006) 141; John J. Borking, ‘Why Adopting 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) Takes so Much Time’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), 
Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice (Springer 2011) 309-310; and Blarkom, 
Borking and Verhaar (n 72) 33. 
76 Burkert (n 76) 125. 
77 Bennett and Raab (n 76) 141. 
78 Ronald Koorn and others, Privacy Enhancing Technologies –White Paper for Decision-Makers 
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This characteristic, as we have seen, fits in with the co-operation model. Additional 
attention is directed to the requirement of the design of PETs to provide user 
protection against discovery and misuse of individual identity, namely: (1) 
pseudonymity; (2) anonymity; (3) unlinkability; and (4) unobservability. 79  The 
implementation of PETs should firstly identify what kind of risk in relation to privacy 
they are designed to protect.80 Once this is identified, a number of creative further 
processes can be developed. For example, biometrics is one of the possibilities of 
using PETs.81 Moreover, there are options, composed of technologies divided in four 
categories presenting different characters of design, positioned with respect to 
different levels of effectiveness of the protection of privacy.82  
 
Figure 1: Effectiveness of different options of PETs83 
                                                                                                                                            
(2004) 3. 
79 Blarkom, Borking and Verhaar (n 72) 47-49. 
80 Ibid 37-38. 
81 Seven principles/ types of the PET developments have been listed by Blarkom, Borking and Verhaar, 
namely: (1) limitation in the collection of personal data; (2) identification/ authentication/ authorisation; 
(3) standard techniques used for privacy protection; (4) pseudo-identity; (5) encryption; (6) biometrics; 
and (7) audit ability. Ibid 37-42.  
82 Borking (n 76) 310-311. 
83 Koorn and others (n 79) 33 < http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_overig/PET_whitebook.pdf >, 
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To reflect the privacy by design line of reasoning, two approaches have been 
presented.84 First, the ‘engineer-oriented’ approach takes the enhancement of catering 
for the privacy dimension into account to offer standards and guidelines for IT 
security. 85  Secondly, the “market-oriented” approach stresses elements including 
‘self-regulation, audit schemes and quality seals.’86 Examples of live applications of 
PETs can be found in a variety of sectors, e.g., higher education,87 health sector,88 
social security network,89 transportation,90 and anonymous service.91 
These four concepts which enable securing identity protection of personal data 
(but should not be viewed as confined to personal identity protection), however, do 
not necessarily protect privacy. The reasoning behind this argument goes as follows. 
1. Under the broad conception of privacy adopted in the co-operation model, a 
right to know the personal implications for oneself of the advance of science 
and technology arguably exists under the right to privacy, but is rendered 
impossible by the design of PETs.  
Individuals, arguably, have a privacy right for the developments of science 
and technology to be conducted. This is because the enjoyment of such 
                                                                                                                                            
accessed 8th February 2012. Also cited by Borking (n 76) 311. TTP in the figure means Trusted Third 
Party, which is a separated database. It should be noted that the staircase here does not represent a 
growth model but options depending on the ‘individual situation.’ Ibid 310. 
84 Walter Peissl, ‘Responsible Research and Innovation in ICT: The Case of Privacy’ in René von 
Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2011) 39-42. 
85 Ibid 39. 
86 Ibid 39. 
87 E.g. the Higher Education Clearinghouse (StudieLink). Koorn and others (n 79) 8. 
88 E.g. the National Central Medication Registration (LCMR system), National Trauma Information 
System (NTIS) in the Netherlands, hospital information system, and online medical history file. Ibid 10, 
22, 26, 61. 
89 E.g. RINIS Clearinghouse and Suwinet systems in the Netherlands. Ibid 13, 24. 
90 E.g. road pricing system and transport smart card. Ibid 27, 56. 
91 E.g. the AgeKey system to prove the age to purchase tobaccos in the Netherlands and electronic 
voting. Ibid 31, 36. 
288 
developments can also improve private life. However, it is noted that the less 
useful the results, the weaker the justification for such developments in 
science and technology. Anonymised data, for example, is less valuable for 
such science and technology than the non-anonymised data. Therefore, the 
concept of privacy in relation to the enjoyment of science and technology 
might not be protected.92  
2. It is common to assume that technology remains stable and performs as 
intended across time and space. This perspective which puts technology in the 
centre is termed the ‘techno-centric’ view by Gürses and Berendt.93 However, 
two technical facts must be pointed out. First, there is no trust with regards to 
the internet.94 Accordingly, the effectiveness of biometric applications may be 
overestimated if without proper consultation with technical experts. For 
example, with reference to the introduction of biometric passport in the 
Netherlands, engineers – and not politicians - warned that:95  
The effectiveness of biometry is highly overrated, especially by politicians 
and policy makers. Despite rapid growth in applications, the large-scale use 
of biometry is untested. The difficulty is that it is not only unproven in a huge 
single application (such as e-passports), but also not with many different 
applications in parallel... The interference caused by the diversity of 
applications—each with its own security policy, if any—may lead to 
                                                 
92 Cf. Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Is consent necessary and/ or sufficient to authorise medical database 
research?’ (Regulation and Governance of Medical Database Research in the United Kingdom, 
Sheffield, 17th June 2011 ). 
93 Seda Gürses and Bettina Berendt, ‘PETs in the Surveillance Society: A Critical Review of the 
Potentials and Limitations of the Privacy as Confidentiality Paradigm’ in Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet 
and Paul De Hert (eds), Data Protection in a Profiled World (Springer 2010) 302. 
94 Ibid 307. 
95 Jaap-Henk Hoepman and others, ‘Crossing Borders: Security and Privacy Issues of the European e-
Passport’ (2006) 4266 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 152-167. 
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unforeseen forms of fraud. 
Secondly, the protection through the confidentiality of personal data 
emanating from individuals is limited in scope. 96  Hence, arguably, it is 
unrealistic to expect that technical methods can actually keep personal data 
confidential and in line with all data protection principles.  
Both of the problems can be addressed by improving opportunities for consent 
and enhancing its substance. In the first case, by obtaining consent (with respect to 
waive the right to know the personal implications for oneself of the advance of 
science and technology), there is no need for substantive justification. It is thus noted 
that technologies which can achieve this purpose are also PETs.97  
In the second situation, it is suggested that a human-centric model which 
concentrates on ‘how humans make sense of and interact with technology in various 
circumstances’98 should also be taken into account. This is not forbidden by the PGC 
since this approach considers human beings/ agents as an end rather than the method 
through which to develop technology. The approach indicates that PETs and social 
practices (in a human-centric sense) can be seen as supporting each other. In this light, 
it is suggested that PETs alone cannot be enough to satisfy the need of the 
accountability of the data subjects. For example, accountability in relation to the use 
of anonymous data for transparency instruments and the avoidance of data abuses 
should be considered.99 Moreover, a study on the basis of empirical evidence has 
shown that anonymising data may still result in specific concerns over the mistrust of 
                                                 
96 Gürses and Berendt (n 94) 307. 
97 Beyleveld, ‘Is consent necessary and/ or sufficient to authorise medical database research?’. 
98 Gürses and Berendt (n 94) 302-303 cited from Wanda J. Orlikowski, ‘Sociomaterial Practices: 
Exploring Technology at Work’ (2008) 28 Organization Studies 1435-1448. 
99 Gürses and Berendt (n 94) 315. 
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data controllers of the public and private sectors.100  Accordingly, as Koorn et al. 
suggest, proper applications of PETs require an effective foundation of organisational 
management,101 e.g., Identity and Access Management (IAM), which minimise the 
process, use and access to sensitive personal data102 such as biometric data.   
Overall, the focal point of the practicability of enhancing the co-operative model 
falls on the improvement of opportunities for valid consent regarding all participants 
of personal data collection, processing and use. To achieve this purpose, the suggested 
instruments include enhancing the ability to trust, positive experiences, predictable 
performances, comprehensive transparent information, shared values, better 
communications and interface designs. 103  In this light, technologies improving 
opportunities for consent and enhancing its meaningfulness are also PETs.104 We must, 
in addition, take into account the best social practices that we can gather, avoiding the 
risk of applying the techno-centric model alone. This includes a series of pragmatic 
guidelines and practices. Once such mechanisms are defined, for example, States 
should ensure that the biometric data controllers and the RFID operators will ensure 
the mechanisms are contextualised in the competent institutional frameworks such as 
the DPAs. This shall be discussed in the following section.  
                                                 
100 Gill Haddow and others, ‘'Nothing Is Really Safe': A Focus Group Study on the Processes of 
Anonymizing and Sharing of Health Data for Research Purposes’ (2011) 17 Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 1140-1146. 
101 Koorn and others (n 79) 46-51. In this respect, a ‘sandwich of technologies’ model in combination 
of strategies including the prevention of identification, the guarantee against unlawful processing of 
personal data and the application of specific technologies to enhance privacy. Ibid 48-49. Also, 
Directorate-General Justice European Commission, Freedom and Security,, ‘Comparative Study on 
Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological 
Developments’ (2010)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 30 Janurary 2012, 49-50. 
102 Borking (n 76) 322-327. 
103 L. Korba, A. Patrick and R. Song, ‘Trust model and network aspects’ in G.W. van Blarkom, J.J. 
Borking and J.G.E. Olk (eds), Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies - The case of 
Intelligent Software Agents (College bescherming persoonsgegevens 2003) 157-161. 
104 Beyleveld, ‘Is consent necessary and/ or sufficient to authorise medical database research?’. 
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 7.3 Operationalising the PGC and the Co-operative Model 
7.3.1 Regulating Technology? 
To address the regulatory guidelines of sophisticated technologies at stake, two 
questions must be posed: first, whether and why should such technologies be 
regulated; secondly, if they should be regulated, how to provide guidelines to 
determine an adequate regulation of the technology at hand.  
In light of biometric technologies, a number of points previously raised in this 
thesis should be recalled when looking at the first question. It was pointed out that, on 
the basis of the rule-preclusionary conception of property, an agent has a prima facie 
right to her biometric samples. In addition, the agent also has a prima facie right to 
subsequent applications of her samples, subject to her consent to waive the benefit of 
the right or the overriding of competing rights. 105  To begin, I will discuss the 
regulatory tendency in relation to biometric samples and their subsequent applications. 
Following the discussion, attention will be then directed to the importance and 
proposed guidelines of principled and proportionate governance.  
By accepting the rule-preclusionary conception of property, the removal of 
biometric samples without any attempt to abandon it implies an agent’s retaining of 
rule-preclusionary control over the material.106 This includes positive and negative 
rights. To protect such a generic right as well as other overlapping generic rights e.g., 
the right to privacy from the insidious threat to the way an agent acts (as we have 
                                                 
105 Section 6.3.1. 
106 Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Directed Donation and Ownership of Human Organs’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 
407. 
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addressed in Chapter 2),107 it is at least arguable that there is a demand to determine 
adequate regulations. However, there might be different responses to this argument. 
For example, whenever new and powerful technologies have been developed to the 
point of being able to be widely applied and implemented, there will be opponents 
holding differing opinions. This is termed the ‘Luddite argument’ by Solove. 108  
Privacy and data protection advocates, for example, may be labelled as the Luddites. 
However, this can be rebutted by the ‘Titanic Phenomenon’, which holds that while 
many new technological proposals have great advantages, ‘proponents are not giving 
adequate thought to the consequences if they fail.’109This phenomenon, pointed out 
by Solove, refers to the tendency of those ‘quick’ users of the changing technologies: 
they tend to be overconfident or optimistic to apply the technology without 
‘appropriate legal architecture in place to use it responsibly.’110  
Another response is to abandon regulation and assume that technological 
prospects might/ be able to dictate the ‘right direction’ or to try at least to ‘hold the 
regulatory line, concentrating resources on the most serious violations.’ 111  These 
responses seem to be quite plausible within the free-market model as discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
Nevertheless, as we have also seen, the minimal-regulation model may not be 
adequate. For example, in terms of serious threats, Fukuyama considers that such 
                                                 
107 Under a broad concept of privacy, the rule-preclusionary control over the material and data is 
arguably included by privacy.  
108 Solove (n 16) 201. Luddites is a term originally means those who protested against the 
mechanisation of the Industrial Revolution in 19th century. Similarly, Beyleveld and Pattinson term this 
‘science hatred,’ meaning the belief that science is inherently evil. Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. 
Pattinson, ‘Individual Rights, Social Justice, and the Allocation Of Advances in Biotechnology’ in 
Michael Boylan (ed), Public Health Policy and Ethics (Kluwer 2004) 70. 
109 Solove (n 16) 199. The ‘Titanic Phenomenon’ indicates that the designers and builders of the Titanic 
did not provide enough lifeboats since they thought the ship is unsinkable.  
110 Ibid 203. 
111 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 315. 
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technologies cannot be captured by the Utilitarian calculus.112 Indeed, the principle of 
priority of consent and data protection practice are appreciated and encouraged in the 
Gewirthian approach. The theoretical framework granting generic conditions of 
agency does not, however, by itself, articulate much about the morality of the 
techniques of regulating subsequent applications of biometric samples. 
Regulating technology with respect to privacy and data protection issues 
encounters a more specific problem: the scope and the conception of personal data are 
influenced by rapidly changing technology and data-sharing practices. This is because 
the line between personal data and non-personal data – whether the data can be 
identified/ identifiable – profoundly depends on technology. The scope of personal 
data may expand since changing technologies provide stronger and more efficient 
abilities to identify and re-identify data. In this regard, Paul Ohm argues that the scope 
of personal data 113  ‘will never stop growing until it includes everything.’ 114  For 
example, it is pointed out in the press release on the 2012 reform of the EU data 
protection system that ‘[t]echnological progress and globalisation have profoundly 
changed the way our data is collected, accessed and used’115 and the cloud computing 
has been noted in particular as a specific type of new challenge.116 Ohm thus proposes 
an alternative approach to focus the privacy law on a different conception of personal 
data; the regulators should  
                                                 
112 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (Profile Books 2002) 101, citing from Brownsword (n 
112) 314. 
113 It seems that Ohm does not distinguish ideas between personal data and personally identifiable 
information (PII). Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1704. 
114 Ibid 1742. 
115 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes A Comprehensive Reform of the Data Protection 
Rules’ 1. 
116 European Commission, ‘How Will the EU's Reform Adapt Data Protection Rules to New 
Technological Developments?’ (2012)  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/factsheets/8_en.pdf> accessed 30 Janurary 2012. 
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…consider a series of factors to identify situations in which harm is likely and 
whether it outweighs the benefits of unfettered information flow. When they identify 
harm that outweighs these benefits, they should regulate, focusing on narrow 
contexts and specific sectors rather than trying to regulate broadly across 
industries.117 
Again, this resonates with the Utilitarian argument and therefore can be rebutted 
through the objections presented above. Moreover, the approach suggested by Ohm is 
to  
…resign themselves to a world with less privacy than they would like. But more 
often, regulators should prevent privacy harm by squeezing and reducing the flow of 
information in society, even though in doing so they may need to sacrifice, at least a 
little, important counter values like innovation, free speech, and security.118 
However, this approach faces the objections stemming from the European data 
protection model, which consider the protection of the flow of information as the 
primary purpose of the Data Protection Directive. As we have seen, this purpose may 
not come into conflict with privacy values. Indeed, Solove comments that ‘where the 
first step is to restrict the flow of information is a move in the wrong direction.’119 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in practice some measures suggested by 
Ohm, may still have their merits. For example, he suggests the regulators should 
‘incorporate risk assessment strategies that deal with the reality of easy 
                                                 
117 Ohm (n 114) 1759. 
118 Ibid 1706. 
119 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and A New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information’ (2011) 86 NYU Law Review 1868. 
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reidentification as the old PII model never could.’120 
As regards the choice between the European model (which regulates all forms of 
data collection, processing, and using in the absence of specific exemptions) and the 
American model (which is based on the primacy of freedom of information, whereby 
unless something fits the scope of specific regulations, it is not protected),121 having 
taken into account the problems of the minimal-regulation model, I contend that the 
European model should be favoured. Indeed, it has been suggested in a comparative 
study submitted to the European Commission:122  
Data protection law in the EU (in all areas covered by the previous three pillars) can 
and should continue to rest on the basic data protection principles and –criteria set 
out in Directive 95/46/EC. The application of these broad standards needs to be 
clarified (as further discussed below, in particular in sub-section V.4), but they 
themselves do not require major revision in order to meet the new challenges. On the 
contrary, they reflect European and national constitutional/human rights standards of 
the kind just mentioned, that need to be strongly re-affirmed. 
It is noted that in the 2012 EU data protection reform proposal, a single set of rules 
has been suggested. 123  This is, accordingly, consistent with the European data 
protection model.  
Moreover, Solove also suggests that, considering the problem in relation to the 
                                                 
120 Ohm (n 114) 1759. 
121 Section 5.1. 
122 European Commission, ‘Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in 
Particular in the Light of Technological Developments’ 21. 
123 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes A Comprehensive Reform of the Data Protection 
Rules’ 2. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ (2012)  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
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gap between the law and changing technologies,124 the ‘[l]aws must have sufficient 
breadth and flexibility to deal with rapidly evolving technology.’125 In this regard, his 
‘broad principle approach’ is in line with the European model.126  
 
7.3.2 Regulatory Design: A General Regulatory Position 
Different legal regimes may provide a variety of levels of protection against parts of 
the human body according to their relationship to an agent.127 What kind of regulatory 
design should we consider then? 
A number of complex desiderata have to be taken into account.128 For a start, let 
us consider the flexibility of this regulatory instrument. It has been argued that for 
those rights and interests to be given equally through universal access, universal 
denial, or completely random allocation.129 For those will not qualify as earth-shaking 
matters of justice or morality on the Gewirthian ground (at least for those does not 
prohibited by the PGC), a lighter form of regulation may be adequate. As regards the 
rights and interests that cannot be granted equally and those that present a clear 
violation of the generic conditions of agency, on the other hand, a more stringent 
regulation would be proportionally more suitable.  
It is noted that scientifically sound and ethically robust techniques are in the 
                                                 
124 Indeed, there is also a gap between legal privacy regulations and privacy practices since ‘practices 
often do not follow the written rules.’ Guagnin, Hempl and Ilten (n 12) 100. 
125 Solove (n 16) 170. 
126 Ibid 170-173. 
127 Pattinson, ‘Directed Donation and Ownership of Human Organs’ 406. Also, Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies 28. 
128 In Brownswords’ Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, he adopts Trebilcock and 
Iacobucci’s opinion that a number of values may be in a tension. These values include: independence, 
accountability, expertise, detachment, transparency, confidentiality, efficiency, due process, 
predictability, and flexibility. See: Brownsword (n 112) 299. 
129 See section 6.2. 
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interest of all agents. Indeed, under a broad conception of privacy, both values can be 
encompassed by privacy. The rights of agents should be respected with adequate 
privacy and data protection practices. In the light of the technologies at hand, due to 
the sensitive nature and higher potential risks towards the right to privacy and data 
protection, a ‘burdensome’ regulatory position (as Utilitarian or supporters of the free-
market model see it)130 is considered by the thesis.  
Based on the PGC, considerations with respect to consent are prioritised. This is 
particularly important when considering the conflicts between crucial rights according 
to the hierarchy of generic conditions of agency. This is because although conflicts 
can be reconciled according to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action, a 
generic harm has been done (although it can be justified). By possessing valid consent, 
on the other hand, no violation is caused. Hence, for a rigid regulatory design, 
attention should be firstly paid to consent without falling into the error of the Fallacy 
of Necessity and Fallacy of Sufficiency.  
However, in modern pluralistic communities, the idea of governance by consent 
may not be practical since such a consent-utopia is more likely to appear in a city-
state with direct democracy.131 The efficiency and validity of consent is, therefore, 
crucial for the regulatory design: by obtaining valid consent in a relatively efficient 
way, the tendency and possibility for a community to insist on emphasising consent 
can be expected and achieved. Indeed, in the proposed EU 2012 General Data 
Protection Regulation, in terms of consent, there is a requirement of ‘explicit’, which 
aims to ‘avoid confusing parallelism with 'unambiguous' consent and in order to have 
one single and consistent definition of consent…’132 Beyleveld and Brownsword have, 
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in this regard, offered a number of rather clear considerations and comments 
including: subjects of consent, the signalling of consent, unforced will to choose, the 
information for consent, reasonable interpretation, and the negation of consent.133  
I argue that the trust between the giver and the receiver of consent penetrates 
through the texture of all themes presented above. The following points thus should 
be taken into consideration in developing a framework for the proposed regulatory 
design. 
1. Respect for User and Controller  
It has been observed that one of the new trends of biometric use is the potential to 
collect and analyse personal data remotely ‘without the need of cooperation or action 
required from the individual.’  RFID (including NFC) is definitely a mature selection 
among such covert techniques. This kind of secret but potentially non-proportional 
collection and processing is not in line with our suggestion of the co-operative model.  
Both the principle of fidelity to protect the giver’s free will and the principle of 
reasonable transactional expectation to protect the receiver’s interests, which guide 
the requirements of an adequate consent,  should be taken into account whilst looking 
at the relationship of trust between the two parties. First, since the fidelity principle 
suggests that ‘every effort must be made to keep faith with the agent’s will,’  the 
relationship of trust between the two parties ought to be positive. To regard the 
consent giver as consenting when there is a possibility that he is actually not 
consenting can result in serious harm for him.  To avoid this situation, the best way is 
                                                                                                                                            
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ 8. The condition of consent is set out in 
Article 7 of the proposed General Regulation. 
133 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law 125-227. 
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actually to improve the trust between the two parties. For example, seeking the giver’s 
subjective intention to signal consent and double-checking any delayed/ unclear 
consent can improve the trust of the receiver. In this light, there is a lesser chance/ 
tendency for the consent-receiver to assume or regard the giver’s lack of consent as 
consent. Hence, it is suggested that in relation to implementing trusted technologies, 
we should ‘define a legal framework and describe attributes, capabilities, 
characteristics and qualities which allow users to verify whether the systems are 
trustworthy.’ 
Conversely, there is also a need for the receiver to believe that the giver’s consent 
is not misleading and deceiving. With a positive relationship based on trust, the 
receiver may be more likely to presume that the giver’s signalling of consent is 
reasonably trustworthy and valid. 
2. Transparent Information 
The co-operative model seeks to assure data subjects (consent-givers) that 
regardless of the application adopted, it operates according to a reliable system based 
on trust. Measures to ensure the easy and affordable availability of information and 
accurate understanding of the applications of the technology can, in effect, improve 
the chances for the giver to consent to the receiver’s policy with respect to the 
applications of the technology at issue. These practices should be made accessible to 
all without excessive efforts and subject to independent supervision.  
3. The Application of Appropriate Mechanisms 
It has been suggested that data controllers, on the basis of the principle of 
proportionality, should ‘ensure that a proper mechanism to exercise such rights is 
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incorporated in the application.’134 With this in mind, PIA and PETs including choice, 
anonymisation and authorisation-based approaches (with their respective limitations) 
should be encouraged to improve opportunities for consent. To make the most of these 
mechanisms, however, some conditions should be noted.  
First, the applications should seek to deliver the maximum degree of privacy 
protection by ensuring the ideas of privacy by design and privacy by default. Hence, 
the enhancing mechanisms of the co-operative model are better embedded into the 
design and architecture of applications. Secondly, it should be ascertained that such 
mechanisms are fully and correctly implemented.135 Moreover, additional assessments 
should be taken into consideration with respect to the specificities of the data 
controller. For example, it is suggested that data processing in relation to biometric 
data requires specific attention towards the risks of identity fraud, the purpose 
diversion, and data breach. 136  Thirdly, it is advised that the introduction of ‘an 
independent and legally binding control that PETs are properly implemented.’137 
An additional mention should be made of the risks of any possible conduct 
resulting in unauthorised reconstruction/ re-identification/ re-link of a biometric 
feature to the reference template.138 Technical measures such as the prevention of the 
centralised storage of biometric data and the possibility of revoking the identity link 
‘either in order to renew it or to permanently delete it e.g. when the consent is revoked’ 
                                                 
134 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies 9. 
135 Emilio Mordini, ‘ANNEX I: Policy Brief on: Whole Body – Imaging at Airport Checkpoints: the 
Ethical and Policy Context’ in René von Schomberg (ed), Towards Responsible Research and 
Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields 
(Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies 
and Security Technologies Fields 2011) 200-201. 
136 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies 30-31. 
137 Mordini (n 136) 168. 
138 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies 31. 
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are encouraged.139 In this regard, the WP29 recommends the TURBINE technology 
which aims to ‘protect the biometric template by cryptographic transformation of the 
fingerprint information into a non-invertible key that allows matching by bit-to-bit 
comparison’ as well as enhancing user trust.140  
4. Accountable Practices 
In addition to technical measures for applying appropriate mechanisms, good 
privacy and data protection practices are also crucial in improving the relationship of 
trust. It has to be noted that legislative compliance is a necessary, rather than a 
sufficient, requirement to ensure privacy and data protection. As Solove contends that, 
in light of regulating privacy, technology, and security, basic principles such as 
minimising the collection and use of personal data and particularised suspicion rather 
than blanket searches should be applied.141 In the European data protection model, for 
example, safety, data quality and the obligations of data controllers to provide 
accurate and sufficient information on the data subject can arguably improve public 
trust with respect to data collecting, processing and using when introducing biometric 
applications. It should be noted that obtaining consent does not absolve the 
obligations of the data controller under data protection practice. With such safeguards, 
the consent-giver is more likely to consent as their presence of consent frees up the 
giver from liability. Hence, the consent-giver may have reason to provide accurate 
personal data for the needs of scientific research and technical applications.  
                                                 
139 Ibid 32. 
140 Ibid 32. TURBINE (TrUsted Revocable Biometric IdeNtitiEs) is an EU-funded research project 
elaborating a privacy-friendly biometric method with specific attention on fingerprints. For further 
details, see: The European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on a research project funded by the European Union under the Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7) for Research and Technology Development - Turbine (TrUsted Revocable Biometric 
IdeNtitiEs)’ (2011)  
<http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions
/2011/11-02-01_FP7_EN.pdf> accessed 23 May 2012. 
141 Solove (n 16) 172. 
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5. Independent Supervisory Institution 
Legal regimes should be in favour of an independent authority (or more than one) 
to facilitate dealing with privacy and data protection issues regarding technologies at 
stake. Indeed, this type of regulatory design has been supported by numerous 
commentators. For example, Solove points out that ‘[g]overnment officials must be 
supervised to ensure that they keep their activities circumscribed, prevent abuses of 
power, and remain accountable for their behaviour.’142 Moreover, with respect to the 
implementations of PETs, it is suggested that they create necessary public confidence 
towards data protection supervisory authorities (DPAs).143 The following guidelines 
in relation to the roles and functions of such authority should be taken into account. 
a. It is precisely due to the acceptance of the broad conception of privacy that 
authorities are capable of dealing with certain aspects of privacy issues in a 
more efficient way: viewed through the lens of such a broad concept, conflicts 
may take place and it is more appropriate to view them as conflicts between 
privacy values (which can be overseen by the same authority).144 
This is particularly important for those authorities in charge of overseeing and 
enforcing privacy rights. For example, the ICO of the UK, which is 
responsible for the four main fields of personal data protection and 
transparency of information, including the DPA, the FOIA, the Environmental 
Information Regulations and the Privacy and Electronic Communication 
Regulations, must endeavour to strike a balance between the fields they are in 
                                                 
142 Ibid 172. Solove terms this the ‘oversight’ principle.  
143 Koorn and others (n 79) 51. 
144 It is noted that Beyleveld suggests that the conflict might also be better to be viewed as a conflict 
between different research values. Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the 
Public Good’ 288. 
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charge of. 
b. The authorities, in effect, need to play multiple roles. For example, in the 
European data protection model, the authority is: (1) a promoter of data 
protection law compliance; (2) a guardian in delivering rulings on complaints 
for violations of data protection laws; and (3) a defender in (assisting to) 
prosecuting those who are suspected of breaching data protection laws.145 In 
this regard, three points have to be made: 
(1) As a promoter, public engagement should be encouraged;  
(2) As regards the roles as the guardian and the defender of privacy and 
data protection practice, it is considered that when the receiver and the 
supervisory authority is the same body or, when the supervisory 
authority is subject to the receiver, its trustworthiness is arguably 
reduced. In light of this, an independent body is more appropriate since 
the receiver can be (indeed, is usually) the government itself. Moreover,  
(3) To achieve greater performance, the authorities should be offered some 
margin of discretion in order to be more effective. Accordingly, they 
should be given the power to decide their own priorities and to start 
actions on their own initiative.146 
c. The system of prior checks is better employed, or at least supervised,147 by an 
independent data protection authority. This is because such data protection 
authority ought to possess expertise as well as public trust (due to its 
                                                 
145 Section 5.2.1.2. 
146 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform 
Proposals (No 00530/12/EN, WP191, 2012) 18. 
147 In this case, the independent data protection unit of the individual research/application project 
should work with the supervisory authority. Beyleveld, ‘Is consent necessary and/ or sufficient to 
authorise medical database research?’. 
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independence).   
d. The relationship between other authorities/ authoring bodies (such as 
Research Ethics Committees of biotechnological researches) and the data 
protection authority has to be taken into account: there is a need to distinguish 
the functions of each body and to reduce confusion regarding their respective 
functions and any existing functional overlap. This cooperation should 
include, for example, the legal assessment and specific supervisory measures 
to be taken.148 
e. The independent privacy and data protection authority should possess 
necessary powers of enforcement and an adequate budget. This can improve 
the public trust in such authority.   
We have seen that the European data protection model requires Member States to 
provide such an independent supervisory authority with their own jurisdiction.149 Due 
to the flexibility of the Directive, the implementation of the Directive can differ in 
each States. However, the functions of the data protection authority should still be 
effectively performed. The ICO of the UK, for example, has been criticised as lacking 
the essential powers of enforcement (although subsequently the ICO has been 
awarded a substantial deterrent of a fine up to £500,000 against violations of data 
protection).150  
Taiwan, however, does not adopt this approach regarding an independent data 
protection when borrowing from the European experience. There is, therefore, a need 
to analyse whether this approach can be applied generally. This will be explored in the 
                                                 
148 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform 
Proposals 19. 
149 Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive.  
150 Laurie and Sethi (n 15) 35. 
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following chapter.  
 
7.4 Summary 
Pragmatically, the thesis suggests that a well-designed framework can improve 
the relationship of trust between data subjects and data controllers in order to obtain 
consent. Under the co-operative model, such a framework can be seen as a safeguard 
with respect to both the right to benefit from advances in science and technology and 
privacy and data protection rights. In this regard, an independent supervisory 
authority can possess the characteristics of expertise, transparency, efficiency and due 
process – based on trust towards public authorities. Indeed, by establishing a 
trustworthy institutional framework, although reconciling competing values of 
regulatory design can be difficult, those values are capable of presenting positive-sum 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 8 
A PGC-compliant Regulatory Framework and Rule of 
Personal Data Protection for Taiwan 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, there are limited specific regulations in Europe as well 
as in Taiwan that govern rapidly developing technologies considered here. At the 
beginning of this chapter, I will analytically compare the regulatory positions of 
Europe and Taiwan for the relevant technology. This inquiry will focus on privacy and 
personal data protection issues. It is observed that the objectives and principles of data 
protection are similar in both areas, as the Formosan data protection regime borrowed 
a number of practices from the European data protection model. However, some 
differences between the two regimes exist. To discuss this, the chapter will cover three 
themes among the differences, namely consent and public interests, the operation of 
data protection principles in practice, and the relevant supervisory authorities. 
Situations will be identified as being consistent or not with the requirements of the 
PGC. I argue that such regulatory mechanisms must be critically justified on the basis 
of the PGC.  
On the basis of the analysis, this chapter aims to propose a PGC-derived 
regulatory framework and rule of personal data protection with respect to 
development of technology for Taiwan. The regulation of both data protection regimes 
is suboptimal and thus can be improved. Lessons for Taiwan may be learned from the 
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European data protection model experience and vice versa.  
 
8.2 The Analytic Comparison of Regulation between Taiwan and 
Europe: Biometric and RFID Technologies 
This comparative section will analyse the provisions of the European and Formosan 
privacy regime in a sense of microcomparison 1  concentrating on specific legal 
problems in relation to biometric and RFID technologies. Two elements of 
comparative methodology are necessarily involved, namely the exploring of both 
similarities and differences. This is because, as Dannemann observes, that ‘there is no 
point in comparing what is identical, and little point in comparing what has nothing in 
common.’2  
On the one hand, based on the functional-approach3 towards microcomparison, it 
can be presumed that different legal regimes may express similar solutions to similar 
cases. On the other hand, other scholarly writings tend to consider the difference 
theory. This is because comparative study highlights contrasts; therefore differences 
constitute the first and foremost phenomena to observe.4 Additionally, critics of the 
functionalists argue that the focus of functionalism on result-based comparisons 
 
1 The comparative studies which focus on general question are termed by Zweigert and Kötz as the 
macrocomparison. On the other hand, those focuses on specific legal problems are termed as the 
microcomparison. See: Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony 
Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 63. Also, Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities 
or Differences?’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 387-388. 
2 Dannemann (n 1) 384. 
3 The functional method puts great emphasis on distinguishing differences within similarity. For further 
discussion, see: Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 339-382. Also, 
Dannemann (n 1) 388. 
4 Dannemann (n 1) 387. 
309 
 
                                                
should be avoided.5  
However, it is worth noting that, as Jansen puts, ‘comprehensive comparative 
knowledge requires an analysis both of similarities and dissimilarities, and of genetic 
relations, for they complement each other.’ 6  In this regard, the comparative 
judgements of this section will take the PGC as the tertium comparationis7 relating to 
observable explanatory similarities and dissimilarities. The first subsection will focus 
on the similarities of the two legal regimes, and the remaining subsections will 
specifically discuss the analytic dissimilarities which will require emphases on 
different regulatory methods and responses. 
 
8.2.1 Not So Different: the Framework of Legal Protection  
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that both Taiwan’s academic lawyers and 
policymakers have adopted elements of western jurisprudence, particularly the 
German system. The result of this is a rather complex hybrid legal regime.8 Under no 
circumstance is the assessment of the fluid nature of the right to privacy in Taiwan 
able to avoid these systemic complexities. 
The European countries and Taiwan share a high level of similar protection of 
personal data by having a main regulatory provision. In the EU it is the Data 
 
5 Ibid 390. 
6 Nils Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 337. 
7 Tertium comparationis is the quality that two things which are being compared have in common. 
Jansen regards this as a choice about ‘what matters’ in relations aspects ‘of the law are relevant for the 
comparative lawyer, and which aspects of the law might benefit from the additional knowledge which 
comparison provides.’ Ibid 314-315. 
8 Chung-Lin Chen, ‘In Search of a New Approach of Information Privacy Judicial Review: Interpreting 
No. 603 of Taiwan's Constitutional Court as a Guide’ (2010) 20 Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review 27. 
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Protection Directive. As regards the main data protection regulatory instrument in 
Taiwan, since the PDPL (as well as the CPDPL) is profoundly influenced by the 
European model, it is inevitable that they share a great number of common regulatory 
methods. For example, the main legal protection bases both aim to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals/ the right to personality, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the collection, processing and use of 
personal data.  
1. Personal biometric data is treated as sensitive personal data. How about 
the biometric samples? 
Neither the Data Protection Directive nor the PDPL specifically mention biometric 
data. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 9  it is arguable that the 
Directive covers biometric data as far as the data subject concerned is able to be 
identified or identifiable.10 Moreover, biometric data can be considered as sensitive 
data since it could reveal, or openly include, either health data, data on ethnic origin, 
or sexual life, e.g., homosexuality,11 – if there is a possibility to reasonably identify or 
relink biometric data and relevant sensitive data. 
With respect to the Formosan data protection regime, on the other hand, 
biometric data can also fall under the categories of sensitive data since it is related to 
either genetic information or sex life. For example, fingerprints have been regarded as 
a type of sensitive data by the Honourable Justices: 
 
9 Section 2.3.1.2. 
10 See Chapter 7. For a similar argument particularly in relation to DNA and the genetic data, see: 
Ségolène Rouillé-Mirza and Jessica Wright, ‘Comparative Study on the Implementation and Effect of 
Directive 95/46/EC on Data Protection in Europe: Medical Research’ in Deryck Beyleveld and others 
(eds), Data Protection Directive and Medicial Research Across Europe (Ashgete Publishing 2004) 193-
194. 
11 J. A. Y. Hall and D. Kimura, ‘Dermatoglyphic Asymmetry and Sexual Orientation in Men’ (1994) 
108 Behavioral Neuroscience 1203. 
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Fingerprints are biological features of an individual’s person, which are 
characterized by personal uniqueness and lifetime unchangeability. As such, they 
will become a form of personal information that is highly capable of performing the 
function of identity verification once they are connected with one’s identity. Because 
fingerprints possess such trait as leaving traces at touching an object, they will be in 
a key position to opening the complete file of a person by means of cross-checking 
the fingerprints stored in the database. As fingerprints are of the aforesaid 
characteristics, they may very well be used to monitor an individual’s sensitive 
information if the State collects fingerprints and establishes databases by means of 
identity confirmation. (emphasis added)12 
Yet this viewpoint was not totally appreciated by every Honourable Justice (nor the 
government). In the dissenting opinion held by (the former) Honourable Justice Syue-
Ming Yu, for example, it is argued that, by citing two U.S. cases,13  although the 
fingerprints themselves are a type of personal information (data), they may not 
necessarily involve the violation of the right to privacy. This is because: (1) 
fingerprints do not fall within the scope of ‘physical condition’ thus they cannot be 
viewed as ‘the medical information’ that ‘the Legislature regarded as too private to be 
made available to the public’;14 and (2) the right to privacy regarding fingerprints is 
without substance since ‘[t]he day is long past when fingerprinting carried with it a 
stigma of criminality.’15 Nevertheless, such arguments can no longer stand after the 
amendment of the CPDPL. 
 
12 J. Y. Interpretation No. 603.  
13 See Judge Mosk’s dissenting opinion in Thomas v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F.Supp. 1002 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169; 
721 P.2d 50. He also considered that ‘a fingerprint is merely an additional means of identifying the 
applicant, like age, sex, weight, height, hair and eye colour -- all of which, I note, this petitioner is 
perfectly willing to reveal.’ 
14 Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169; 721 P.2d 50. 
15 Thomas v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F.Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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A further question is whether the biometric samples could be considered as 
sensitive data. DNA samples, for instance, have not been regulated in the Data 
Protection Directive and the related guidance. It is observed that ‘[v]ery often the 
situation in the individual country is unclear in relation to either genetic information 
or samples.’16 In the Formosan context, similarly, the PDPL refers to genetic and sex 
life information within the scope of sensitive data. Yet it remains unclear with respect 
to samples themselves. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Article 18 of the Human 
Biobank Management Act17 provides:  
(I) Any storage, use, or disclosure of the concerned operator’s entire biological 
specimens and related data and information shall be encoded, encrypted, 
delinked, or transformed so that the participant’s identity is unable to be 
determined. 
(II) An Operator shall encrypt and independently administer information that can 
determine the identity of an individual participant, such as his/her name, 
identification number, and date of birth. An Operator shall establish a review 
and control procedure for cross referencing the aforesaid personal 
information with the biological specimens and relevant data and information. 
Such information shall be restored immediately after each necessary use… 
Although the purpose of this Act specifically refers to medical research on 
biometrics,18 e.g. genes, to reason by analogy form this legal provision, it is arguable 
(and seems to me to be convincing) to suggest that biometric samples for any 
 
16 Rouillé-Mirza and Wright (n 10) 194. 
17 Available at< http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=L0020164>, accessed 14 
May 2011. 
18 Article 3(4) states that the term ‘biobank’ refers to ‘for the purpose of biomedical research, the 
Biobank contains participants’ biological specimens, natural persons’ information and other related data 
and information based on human population or specific groups. These biological specimens, derivatives, 
or relevant data are stored in the ‘biomedical research.’ And the term ‘biomedical research’ is defined 
by Article 3(3) as referring to ‘medical research on basic biometrics, such as genes.’ (emphasis added) 
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purposes should fall under the sensitive data protection regime. This is because there 
appears, furthermore, to be no reason in principle why the notion of ‘sensitive data’ 
should be taken to exclude any other purpose. 
2. Similar data protection principles 
It has been suggested by the WP29 (of the EU) and the T-PD (of the CoE) that a 
number of basic data protection principles, e.g., the principle of purpose specification, 
the principle of proportionality, and the principle of precautionary,19 have to be taken 
into account when processing biometric data.  
Reflecting the greatly influential European model, the PDPL also covers a 
number of general data protection principles. As regards biometric data, it is stated by 
the Human Biobank Management Act in its Article 20 that ‘[a]ny use of biological 
specimens, derivatives and relevant data and information in the Biobank shall not be 
used for purposes other than biomedical research.’ 
However, such principles are inevitably followed by a number of exceptions. A 
more detailed comparison between the European and Formosan provisions will be 
provided in the next subsection, focusing on the differences.   
Overall, looking micro-comparatively at the developing technologies at hand, the 
Formosan regulatory tools are similar to the European ones. However, it is referred by 
the Constitutional Court that ‘[d]espite the admissibility of other nations’ similar 
 
19 Working Document on biometrics, 1 August 2003, available at: 
< http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf >, accessed 14 May 2011. 
The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ‘Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of 
Convention 108 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data’ (T-PD, 2005)  
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/data_protection/documents/reports_and_studies_of_data_protection_committees/2Biometrics
_2005_en.pdf> accessed 13 February 2010. 
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legislations and domestic popular polls as materials used in interpreting the 
Constitution, they cannot be used as the sole basis of determining the meanings and 
intents thereof.’20 This is particularly true in terms of the complex hybrid Taiwanese 
legal regime. It is thus unsurprising to find that some local commentators may 
criticise the fact that the European model of regulating personal data is impractical 
due to the rigid approach of seeking maximum privacy protections, which can become 
a barrier to the free flow of information.21 Many local commentators thus hold the 
opinion that the European model may not be suitable for Taiwan.  
However, I argue that there is a need to re-affirm the European model in the 
Formosan data protection regime.22 This is because: 
a. Although the European model has set a high standard for protecting the right 
to (informational) privacy, this is not prohibited by the PGC since such a right 
is a generic right. On the contrary, it is welcomed.  
b. It must not be forgotten that one of the purposes of the Data Protection 
Directive is to improve the information flow. Moreover, the proposal of the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation clearly addressed that ‘[t]his 
Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free 
movement of personal data.’23 Indeed, the improvement of the information 
flow and privacy are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, there seems to be 
 
20 J. Y. Interpretation No. 603. 
21 Ming-Li Wang, ‘Information Privacy in a Network Society: Decision Making Amidst Constant 
Change’ (2010) 5 National Taiwan University Law Review131-136. 
22 See also: Directorate-General Justice European Commission, Freedom and Security,, ‘Comparative 
Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological 
Developments’ (2010)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 30 Janurary 2012, para. 27. 
23 Article 1(1). 
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a misunderstanding behind the objection to the Directive on the grounds that 
it places greater emphasis on the protection of personal data rather than the 
free flow of information. Meanwhile, the WP29 addresses that the 
interpretation should not be ‘unduly restricted’ or ‘overstretched.’24 With this 
in mind, in Article 1(3) of the proposal of 2012 EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, it is stated that ‘[t]he free movement of personal data within the 
Union shall neither be restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.’ 
c. The benefits of this right can be waived by valid consent under the will-
conception (which is, as argued in Chapter 5, in line with the European data 
protection model), thus there is not a necessary conflict between the rights 
and interests; and   
d. When there is actually a conflict between values regarding advances of 
science and technology and privacy and data protection values, without a 
valid consent, there is a violation of the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection unless there is a substantive justification on the basis of the 
criterion of degrees of needfulness of generic conditions of agency. Moreover, 
on the basis of previous discussion of the co-operative model, the right to 
privacy under the European model is not necessarily a barrier to the other 
rights.  
 
8.2.2 Not So Similar (I): Consent and Public Interests 
It has been emphasised that consent as a procedural justification is crucial to data 
 
24 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data (No 
01248/07/EN, WP136, 2007) 5-6. 
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protection and privacy questions. Both data protection regimes carry a number of 
consent elements. However, the status of consent is implicitly stated in both regimes. 
It thus seems that the role of consent is quite similar in the context of both regimes. 
Nevertheless, this is not quite the right understanding. With respect to the 
European perspective, it has been demonstrated that although the Data Protection 
Directive does not clearly emphasise the principle of priority of consent, one should 
not invite interpretations departing from this principle.25 In the M. S. v Sweden case 
which is in agreement with the criterion in terms of will-conception thinking,26 for 
example, it has been held by the ECtHR that processing sensitive personal data 
without consent violates the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.27 
On the other hand, however, this may not be valid in Taiwan. As pointed out 
previously, there is confusion around the validity of consent under the PDPL: there is 
an absence, whether intentional or not, of the issue of consent in the sensitive data 
rules (Article 6 of the PDPL). Moreover, in J. Y. Interpretation No. 603, the principle 
of priority of consent when processing sensitive personal data has not been mentioned. 
An alternative argument, therefore, is needed. To meet this need, I have argued that, 
based on the Gewirthian moral principles, Article 6 of the PDPL requires, at least 
implicitly, a practicable consent as an exemption to the barring of processing and 
collecting sensitive data. Nevertheless, the question of ‘why does the (Formosan) law 
not address the obtaining of consent as an exemption when processing sensitive 
categories of personal data’ still needs to be analysed in greater detail when discussing 
 
25 See Chapter 5. 
26 MS v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR 313, paras 34-35. See also, section 4.3.2 and Z. v Finland (1998) 25 
EHRR 371. 
27 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in Relation to Medical Research’ in Deryck 
Beyleveld and others (eds), The Data Protection Directive and Medicial Research Across Europe 
(Ashgate Publishing 2004) 11. 
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the regulation method. 
By acknowledging the confusion of the issue of consent in the PDPL framework, 
it seems that Formosan law makers do not sincerely follow the aim of the PDPL to 
prevent the harm of the right to personality – at least not as sincere as their European 
accompany. A handful of observations in relation to the PDPL reflect this: 
1. There is no consent exemption in Article 6 of the PDPL. It might invite a 
misunderstanding that even though a data subject gives her valid consent, no 
one can collect or process her sensitive personal data unless at least one of the 
exemptions in Article 6 (e.g., in accordance with law, the fulfilment of the 
legal obligation) is engaged. 28  In effect, this misunderstanding may be 
occurred in judicial reviews if the court strictly follows the wording of the 
PDPL. 
2. Although ‘nothing in the Data Protection Directive states clearly that any 
condition takes priority over by another,’29 consent is the leading condition in 
Articles 7 and 8. Indeed, what really matters is the reason why consent as a 
procedural justification is key. With respect to Article 8(1) of the ECHR, for 
example, the violation of the rights granted is engaged without a valid consent, 
unless Article 8(2) is justified. Nevertheless, this is not the case in the PDPL 
in terms of sensitive personal data, which should be protected at a higher 
level.30  
3. Lastly, it is worth noting that the first condition in these four articles (in 
relation to the conditions for the principle of purpose) is the same: to fulfil the 
 
28 Section 6.4.1. 
29 Beyleveld (n 27) 11. 
30 As regards non-sensitive personal data, the consent condition in play is the second and the fifth in 
Articles 15 and 19 respectively, let alone it is the last condition in Articles 16 and 20. 
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functions provided in the laws and regulations. With regard to the exemptions 
from the prohibition on collecting and processing sensitive personal data (e.g. 
biometric data), unsurprisingly, the fulfilment of the legal obligations is on 
the top of the list in Article 6 of the PDPL.  
Therefore, the observations set out above seem to imply that the Formosan 
regulation method gives extra weight to collective interests (the value of obeying the 
law) rather than the individual interests and their choices.31 On the basis of this, it can 
accordingly be argued that the Formosan hybrid legal regime is still significantly 
influenced by the traditional Chinese value of ‘sacrificing the "small" me, for the 
completion of the "big" me,’ i.e., sacrificing oneself for the sake of the whole. 
How to look at this problem on the basis of the PGC?  
The generic rights of an agent balance (according to the criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action) vis-à-vis other rights – generic rights of other agents, either 
individually or collectively as the State/ community. Since law has its own culture of 
relative restraint,32 the way that consent is managed can be different. Nevertheless, it 
should always be borne in mind that, under Gewirthian theory, the rules governing 
interactions between agents in a complex community should not be confused with the 
rationale upheld by Utilitarianism. Specifically, it is not a regulative method trying to 
maximise utility for a State as a whole regardless of the cost borne by some of its 
members (i.e., data subjects who provide biometric data). Instead, ‘it is that of 
imposing relatively slight costs on some persons only in order to prevent far greater 
 
31 It is noted that the English courts have tended to interpret the scope of public interest in rather ‘broad 
and inconclusive terms.’ However, the courts, in the particular situations of each case, still balance 
privacy and competing public interest. See: Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Confidentiality 
and Data Protection’ in Andrew Grubb, Judith Laing and Jean McHale (eds), Principles of Medical 
Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 666. 
32 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 334. 
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costs from having to be borne by other persons, so that an equality of generic rights 
for all persons may be more nearly approached.’33 This is particularly crucial when 
looking at sensitive personal data, which contains information for accessing the 
complete files of data subjects. It has been suggested that ‘where a society takes 
individuals and their consent seriously – particularly so, perhaps, where social 
relationships are framed by a respect for human rights – the concept of consent will 
come to play a key role in its practical thinking.’34 
In the Formosan data protection regime, although there is confusion on the 
validity of the consent element, there is no denying that consent does play a role in the 
PDPL.  Recently, the awareness of the importance of individual rights and related 
voluntarily choices has been reflected in Taiwan’s data protection regime. In terms of 
the accessing biometric data, for example, the growing awareness of the principle of 
priority of consent is reflected to in Article 6(I) of the Human Biobank Management 
Act: 
Collections of biological specimens shall be conducted in compliance with medical 
and research ethics. Participants shall be informed of related matters in a clearly 
comprehensible manner. Such matters shall be specified in an agreement of consent. 
Any collection may only be undertaken after the participant’s written consent is 
obtained. 
 
8.2.3 Not So Similar (II): the Operation of Data Protection Principles 
This subsection will focus on how the data protection principles operate in the 
 
33 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press 1978) 344. 
34 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent in the Law (n 32) 2-3. 
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European and Formosan regimes. For regulators it is easy to realise that, as cited by 
Brownsword in referencing UNESCO,35 there is a need for the establishment and the 
maintenance of regulatory regimes to enable individuals to enjoy the benefits of 
science and technology and ensure that fundamental human rights and freedoms are 
fully respected and protected. It is, however, never going to be easy to put this into 
practice – either in the European or the Formosan legal regime. It has been contended 
in the opening chapter that the primary hurdle to biometric and RFID technologies is 
the data protection concerns, e.g., function creep, data tracking, and data profiling. To 
deal with such concerns, a number of data protection principles, as well as the 
advantages promised and the right to the benefits of these technologies, need to be 
taken into account.  
Let us start from the purpose principle, which is particularly helpful to deal with 
the function creep and data profiling problems brought about by the RFID 
applications. In Europe, the main data protection regulatory instrument declares that 
personal data must be ‘…collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.’36 The Directive 
itself does not provide clear guidance on the exact meaning of ‘incompatible’ 
processing. In an investigation in relation to the European data protection law regime, 
it has been pointed out that although most of the Member States follow the term 
‘incompatible’, some countries (e.g. Germany, Greece, the Czech Republic, and 
Latvia) go further by stating that ‘the data may only be further processed for the 
purpose for which they were originally collected.’ 37  For example, the (German) 
Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG, 1 September 2009) 
 
35 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 284. 
36 Article 6(b) of the Data Protection Directive.  
37 Rouillé-Mirza and Wright (n 10) 208. 
321 
 
                                                
states in its Section 14(1):38 
The recording, alteration or use of personal data shall be lawful when required to 
carry out the tasks for which the controller is responsible and for the purpose for 
which the data were collected. If no prior collection took place, the data may be 
altered or used only for the purpose for which they were recorded. (emphasis added) 
By virtue of such provision, this approach accordingly presents some exceptions.39 As 
a legal regime adopting transplants mainly from the German experience, Taiwan 
follows this approach in Articles 19 and 20 of the PDPL. 
Yet two dissimilarities are worth noting when considering the different regulatory 
methods. These two differences are termed ‘the two worships’ here. The first one is 
the worship of public interest, which has already been discussed with respect to the 
consent issues in the last subsection. In the German implementation of the Directive, 
the exemption requires to ‘prevent significant disadvantages to the common good or a 
threat to public security or to preserve significant concerns of the common good.’40 
Although it does not clearly mention that the common good must override the rights 
of the data subjects, the requirement of ‘significance’ does imply a similar 
requirement. The proportionality principle should be taken into account in this regard. 
However, in the PDPL, the public sectors is allowed to justify the violation of the 
purpose principle wherever the ‘public interest is involved.’41  
 
38 This English translation is accessed from the official website of the (German) Federal Commissioner 
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. Available at < 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/BDSG_idFv01092009.pdf?__blob=publicatio
nFile > accessed 21 May 2011. 
39 There are 9 conditions of lawfully recording, alteration or use for other purposes in Section 14(2) of 
the BDSG. There conditions can be viewed as the exemptions of Section 14(1).  
40 Section 14(2)6 of the BDSG. 
41 To interpret this, it is plausible to apply the balancing tests such as the proportionality principle. 
However, the justification of using the test may be weaker, as the text of the article mentions only the 
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It should be noted that the proposal of the EU Data Protection Regulation has 
introduced broad exceptions for public authorities on the grounds of public interest.42 
If this is the trend, then this is similar to the Formosan worship of public interest. 
However, the WP29 criticises this approach as such broad and unspecified exceptions, 
which lack ‘adequate safeguards for the protection of individuals,’ are unjustified.43 
With this in mind, in contrast to the Formosan worship of public interest, which offers 
an extremely broad exception of ‘wherever the public interest is involved,’ the WP29 
suggests the proposed Regulation should identify the specific public interests in as 
much detail as possible.44  
The second worship is the worship of research. It is frequent; sometimes even 
essential, to use biometric data for scientific/ biotechnological/ academic/ medical 
research. The German exemption for reasons of scientific research is described as 
…necessary for the purposes of scientific research, where the scientific interest in 
carrying out the research project significantly outweighs the data subject’s interest in 
ruling out the possibility of collection and the purpose of the research cannot be 
achieved in any other way or would require a disproportionate effort. (emphasis 
added)45 
Moreover, when using sensitive data for scientific research, the BDSG provides in 
Section 14(5): 
In weighing the public interest under the first sentence, no. 2, special attention shall 
 
involvement of public interest. 
42 E.g., Articles 6(4), 9(2)(g), 17(5), 21(1)(c), and 33(5) of the proposed General Regulation.  
43 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform 
Proposals (No 00530/12/EN, WP191, 2012) 12-13. 
44 Ibid 12. 
45 Section 14(2)9 of the BDSG. 
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be paid to the scientific interest in the research project. 
 (emphasis added) 
On the other hand, the PDPL has a considerably lenient standard in relation to the 
purpose principle (as well as other principles such as the principle of proportionality). 
It simply states that where it is necessary in the name of public interest for the 
purpose of academic research conducted by an official research institution, and as 
long as the personal data ‘may not lead to the identification of a certain person after 
the treatment of the provider or the disclosure of the collector,’ the data controllers 
can further process personal data beyond the original purpose.46  
This ‘generous offer’ for academic research has been criticised by the local 
commentators as it comprehensively reduces the burden of respecting data protection 
principles such as the purpose principle.47 Furthermore, such a regulatory operation 
also calls attention to the potential violations of the right to personality since the 
consent justification is not even mentioned in Article 6 of the PDPL.  
It seems plausible to regard the benefits of research as falling under the scope of 
‘the economic-social rights’ defined by the ICESCR, and relate the right to privacy 
and personal data protection to ‘the political-civil rights’ embodied in the ICCPR. 
This is because while Article 17 of the ICCPR mentions the right to privacy, Article 
15(1)(b) grants a right to benefit from advances in science and technology. In this 
regard, the ‘full-belly’ thesis contends that, in terms of the two separate sets of rights, 
 
46 Articles 19 and 20 of the PDPL. 
47 Ching-Yi Liu, ‘Not So Improved: Initial Commentry on the Personal Data Protection Law’ (2010) 
183 The Taiwan Law Review152-156. Also, Wen-Tsong Chiou, ‘Comments on the Framework 
Problems of the Draft of Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law from the Perspective of 
the Conceptual Distinction between Information Self-determination and Information Privacy’ (2009) 
168 The Taiwan Law Review 184-186. 
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the economic-social rights should take priority over the other set of rights.48 This is 
because it is implied, on the basis of the ‘full-belly’ thesis, that economic rights to 
subsistence are ‘basic needs’ which should be fulfilled before an individual can 
‘indulge in the “luxury” of worrying about her political freedoms.’49  
Does such a worship of the ‘research privilege’ in Taiwan’s data protection 
regime support the disputed interpretation that economic-social rights are more crucial 
than political-civil rights? Will such a research interest which might be able to save 
lives, prevent from illness, or extend life spans, be considered as being more needed 
for agency than other objects of the political-civil rights? Three points must be made 
to respond to this, with reference to the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action.  
1. The PGC does not deny that there is a right to benefit from research, since 
such research protects or improves generic rights such as life, health or a 
more comfortable life. Such a right can be considered at least as an additive 
right since in many cases the benefits of research can improve an agent’s 
capacities for successful action, regardless of the agent’s purposes.50 
2. The PGC does not presume that economic-social rights should outweigh 
political-civil rights, or vice versa.51  Gewirth himself disproves the thesis 
arguing that economic-social rights should outweigh political-civil rights (for 
example, the generic need for food is prior to the civil liberties) by offering 
three reasons:52 
 
48 Rhoda Howard, ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and 
Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1983) 5 Human Rights Quarterly 467-490. 
49 Ibid 469. Also, Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 53. 
50 See section 6.2. 
51 In Howard’s article, similarly, he contends that he is not saying that ‘civil and political rights must 
take priority over economic, social, and cultural rights.’ This is because, as he argues, that the two sets 
of rights are ‘interactive, not sequential.’ See: Howard (n 48) 469. 
52 Gewirth, The Community of Rights 53. 
325 
 
                                                
a) Some violations of political-civil rights (such as torture and summary 
execution) can be as serious as some violations of economic-social 
rights (such as the prevention of being in a state of starvation). 
b) The requirement of equal distribution of political-civil rights can 
control the distribution of economic-social rights via the determination 
of political power in a community.  
c) Political-civil rights are essential for equal human dignity which is 
consistently required by the PGC. 
In fact, each group of rights (political-civil rights and economic-social rights) 
contains different categories of generic rights (i.e., the basic rights, non-
subtractive rights, and additive rights) within the hierarchy criterion. 
Moreover, the generic rights within the same category of needs are also 
placed in a hierarchical order. Without being specific on which right is at 
issue, one is unable to identify which objects should be compared based on 
this criterion.53 In other words, we should not forget that which generic rights 
can override the other can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
3. It appears that the full-belly argument is in agreement with the conflict model 
in relation to a narrow conception of privacy. These two categories of rights, 
however, are not necessarily in conflict. The PGC requires the prevention of 
violating generic rights rather than increasing the amounts of goods. Without 
the infringements of generic rights, the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action simply does not come into play. With this in mind, we must not forget 
that the improvement of the benefits and interests of economic rights is also 
an improvement of the right to private life. In other words, this right can be 
 
53 See section 4.3.4. 
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both political and economic in nature. Moreover, indeed, with respect to the 
three reasons given above which disprove the full-belly thesis, the co-
operative model can be used to identify what is wrong with this thesis: the 
two sets of rights in play are simply not always a game of zero-sum trade off.  
Let us take an example which is adduced in Gewirth’s remark: ‘since driving 
automobiles, which may lead to deaths, is less needed for action than is life, 
the criterion (of degrees of needfulness for action) might be held to justify 
infringing the right to drive automobiles.’54 Gewirth responses this thesis by 
arguing:55  
Person’s freedom of action normally involves that they can control how they 
drive and hence their degree of risk in driving. The driver can markedly 
lower this risk by driving carefully and defensively and by abstaining from 
liquor and drugs. Since it is the driver who mainly controls whether and to 
what extent her life will be endangered, she is still enabled to give primary 
weight to the right to life, despite the statistical possibility of mortal accidents. 
Thus the hierarchic priority of the right to life over the right to drive 
automobiles, which reflects the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action, 
is not refuted by the lethal possibilities of the latter right. (emphasis added)  
In this case, what Gewirth does not clearly point out is that, by considering 
the voluntarily choice (which can control/ decide whether, and to what extent, 
to waive the benefits of an agent’s generic rights) as able to play a part in the 
reconciliation between two kinds of rights, there is not necessarily a conflict. 
Since the conflict has not occurred, the criterion is, by its own nature, not 
 
54 Gewirth, The Community of Rights 50. 
55 Ibid 54. 
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refuted. In the above case it is the ability to control whether and to what 
extent the agent’s life will be endangered that prevents/ diminishes the two 
above-mentioned rights from coming into conflict.  
Overall, the generic conditions of agency cannot be culturally or legally 
dependent since there are no such binding requirements outside the context of the 
PGC. Hence, no matter which regulatory method is chosen to reflect the legal culture, 
the primary task should be the genuine attempt to avoid conflict between generic 
interests. This can be achieved by introducing the co-operative model. If conflicts 
cannot be prevented, then the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action should be 
applied. Therefore, if the ‘worship of research’ model fails to strike a balance between 
the right to benefit from research and the other fundamental rights and freedoms in 
relation to processing personal data, then the former right has to be considered based 
on the criterion provided by the PGC. 
 
8.2.4 Not So Similar (III): The Supervisory Authorities 
The independent supervisory authority (or authorities) has been indicated in the 
Directive as the main safeguard on data protection in Europe. It has been suggested 
that the national supervisory authority in each Member State plays multi-functional 
role as the promoter, the guardian, and the defender of the data protection. Some 
regulatory safeguards in the Directive such as prior checking of processing operations 
(Article 20) and notification (Article 18) are essentially related to such authorities. To 
be more specific on the processing of biometric data at the domestic level, for 
example, several European countries require that processing biometric data for the 
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health purposes must be checked or authorised by an Ethics Committee and 
supervisory authority.56   
However, the Formosan data protection regime is quite different from the 
European model in this regard – there is no supervisory authority responsible for the 
application of the PDPL. Article 25 of the PDPL simply states that 
[f]or the non-government agency that violates the provisions of this Law, one of the following 
actions may be ordered jointly with a fine as regulated by the government authority in charge of 
subject industry at the central government level, municipality directly under the central 
government, or county or city government… 
This evokes radically divergent views.  
Perhaps the most common characteristic shared by the data protection regimes 
worldwide is that there is always a gap between the law and the explosive growth of 
technology. This problem might be tackled to some extent by the government 
authorities themselves rather than an ‘outsider,’ since those authorities are: (1) usually 
more professional to specific techniques than those law makers in general; and (2) 
easier to make quick and targeted responses.57 Accordingly, it might be argued that 
the Formosan model is easier to manage and to adapt to data protection concerns in 
connection with specific technologies. For example, it less likely for law experts in 
the Ministry of Justice to be aware of the possibility of function creep problem in the 
private field, yet the scientific experts under the Ministry of the Economic Affairs 
may identify and deal with these issues more easily.  
 
56 Rouillé-Mirza and Wright (n 10) 222-223. 
57 Wang (n 21) 146, cited from Richard Stewart, ‘Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1975) 
88 Harvard Law Review 1669. 
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However, what appeared in the first reading of such a flexible management model 
in Taiwan has emerged as a tangled set of experiences that reflected quite the opposite 
to what was expected. As might be easily assumed, public agencies have adopted 
quite different strategies to meet the CPDPL requirements and have developed diverse 
interpretations and decisions in relation to similar cases. For example, for public 
officials in scientific capacity, the worship of the ‘research privilege’ cannot be totally 
avoided. In contrast, the authorities regulating the media and press may try to be more 
favourable towards privacy concerns (or any other competing interests such as 
protection of minors) on the basis of trends towards higher supervision. This thus 
commits a hydra-headed bureaucracy problem. Based on the inefficient and 
problematic experiences of the CPDPL and considering the integrity of the whole data 
protection framework, Taiwanese scholars suggest that the law-makers should follow 
the European approach to establish a supervisory authority to supervise this area.58  
 
8.3 Next Steps for Taiwan: A PGC-compliant Regulatory Framework 
and Rule of Personal Data Protection  
Now that we know the similarities and differences between the two data protection 
regimes, we are able to turn our attention to the content of a PGC-derived regulatory 
framework governing biometric and RFID technologies for Taiwan. It is recalled that 
the European data protection model roughly matches the PGC requirements, whilst 
being unaware of the PGC as the supreme moral principle. Even some regulatory 
approaches, arguably, may be considered as not fitting neatly with the requirements of 
the PGC, though at least they are not expressly forbidden by the supreme principle of 
 
58 However, this is not accepted by the legislators when amending the law. 
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morality. The European data protection model has profoundly influenced global data 
protection laws including the Formosan regime; in what areas has Taiwan learned 
from that model? This will be discussed on the basis of the guidelines provided in the 
previous chapter. Moreover, a number of best practices suggested by reports of the 
Scottish Health Informatics Programme59as well as opinions adopted by the WP2960 
are taken into consideration and re-structured on the PGC basis. 
 
8.3.1 Regulatory Attempts (I): Applying the Co-operative Model to the 
Regulations and Their Interpretations 
It has been argued that the co-operative model is more effective if efficiently applied. 
The keys of the success of this model depend on the elements which are worth 
revisiting, listed below: 
1. The Acceptance of A Broad Concept of Privacy 
It has been emphasised that the acceptance of a broad conception of privacy is of 
central importance with regard to the practical application of the co-operative model. 
It is arguable that, however, the European expansionist approach may result in 
comprising everything. For example, section 3(1) of the BDSG refers personal data to 
 
59 E.g. Graeme Laurie and Nayha Sethi, ‘Information Governance of Use of Patient Data in Medical 
Research in Scotland: Current and Future Scenarios’ (Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP))  
<http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Scoping_Report_Final_August_2010.pdf> 
accessed 6 August 2011 and Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP), ‘SHIP Guiding Principles 
and Best Practices: A document of the SHIP Information Governance Working Group’ (Scottish Health 
Informatics Programme (SHIP), 22 October 2010)  <http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Guiding_Principles_and_Best_Practices_221010.pdf> accessed 
17 October 2011. 
60 E.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies (No 00720/12/EN, WP193, 2012) and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 
9/2011 on the Revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment 
Framework for RFID Applications (No 00327/11/EN, WP180, 2011). 
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‘any information concerning the personal or material circumstances of an identified or 
identifiable natural person.’ Such a broad concept may be viewed as being too broad 
to deal with different levels of data protection. This might lead to a conviction that the 
two types of data should be treated as equivalent categories.61 However, this is not so 
true. Taking section 3(1) of the BDSG as an example, a broad conception of privacy 
does not require agents/ regulators to treat the two categories (i.e., the identified and 
identifiable agent) equally; rather, it simply ask regulators to treat them within the 
concept of privacy. It is recalled that under the PGC line of reasoning, different 
generic needs are ordered in a hierarchy and within the same level of generic needs, 
although there is still a hierarchy of generic needs since the degree of needfulness for 
action are different.62 In other words, to consider both categorises as conceptions of 
privacy does not necessarily mean that they will be treated them equally.  
With this in mind, it is suggested that the Formosan data protection regulators as 
well as law practitioners should adopt a broad conception of privacy. It seems that 
Formosan constitutional interpretation welcomes such an idea by reading J. Y. 
Interpretation Nos. 535 and 603. However, the recent constitutional interpretation 
seems to be hesitant on this. In J. Y. Interpretation No. 689, although the Honourable 
Judges consider that the rights at issue include spatial privacy (bodily integrity and the 
right to be let alone) and informational privacy respectively, they do not apply the 
idea of privacy to deal with the debate between ‘private actions’ and the freedom of 
media.63 Nevertheless, this can still be seen as a starting point – not satisfying but 
encouraging – of the acceptance of a broad concept of privacy. 
 
61 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and A New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information’ (2011) 86 NYU Law Review1817, 1873-1877. See also: Ulrich Dammann, 
Kommentar zum Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Spiros Simitis ed, 6th edn, Auflage 2006) §3, cited from 
Schwartz and Solove (n 61) 1874. 
62 Section 3.6. 
63 Chien-Liang Lee, ‘The Conflict and Balance between the Freedom of Media and the Protection of 
Private Life: Brief Comments on J. Y. Interpretation No. 689’ (2011) 184 The Taiwan Law Review 38. 
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2. Consent 
It is observed that  
Where a data protection regime is underwritten by an ethic of rights and where (as I 
take it) the ethic is based on a choice (or will) theory of rights, there is no escaping 
the fact that consent must be central to that regime.64 
In this light, the principle of the priority of consent could be applied in the Taiwanese 
data protection regime. Hence, where possible and practicable, consent should be 
obtained from each agent (data subject) prior to the collection, processing and use of 
personal data. However, it is noted that the confusion around the integrity of consent 
under the PDPL as well as in other places of the legal regime must be put right.65 In 
this case, the two Fallacies of consent should be prevented. There are indeed a series 
of best practices that the European data protection model requires in obtaining consent 
that are practicable, for example:66 
1. Consent procedures should be designed to obtain valid and sincere consent: 
data subjects must be given sufficient and accurate information in order to 
make a decision that reflects their voluntarily wishes; they must be given 
sincere opportunity to ask questions and have these answered; and they must 
not be subject to coercive measures. This has been noted in the 2012 data 
protection rules reform: whenever consent is required for data processing, 
 
64 Roger Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ 
in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009) 87. 
65 Section 6.4.1. 
66 Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) (n 59) 5. 
333 
 
                                                
consent has to be given explicitly rather than be assumed.67 
2. Where there are prospects of future use of data that are unknown/ uncertain at 
the time of consent, then data subjects should be informed of the broad/ 
possible purposes for which said data might be used.  
The above measures reflect a will-based reasoning to keep faith with the agent’s 
free will. The first point is particularly crucial with respect to biometric applications, 
whilst the second should be carefully considered to avoid the function creep of RFID 
applications. It must be noted that with respect to the second point regarding informed 
consent, I am not suggesting that data subjects should be informed about ‘everything’ 
that could happen in future processing. This is simply because it is impossible to do so, 
as the nature of the progress and impacts of science and technology can never be fully 
anticipated.  
Indeed, since sensitive personal data should be placed in a higher hierarchy, the 
suggestions outlined above should be applied more strictly on a proportional basis 
with regard to biometric applications. We have seen that the unique cultural dynamics 
in Taiwan that cause confusion are based on the problematic understanding of public 
interest. It seems to me that Formosan regulators should make this clear and borrow 
practicable experiences from the European model, e.g., recent reform proposals, in 
particular on how to avoid confusion on the integrity of consent.  
 
67 It is stated in Recital 25 of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation that: ‘Consent should be 
given explicitly by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific and informed indication of 
the data subject's wishes, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action by the data subject, 
ensuring that individuals are aware that they give their consent to the processing of personal data, 
including by ticking a box when visiting an Internet website or by any other statement or conduct 
which clearly indicates in this context the data subject's acceptance of the proposed processing of their 
personal data. Silence or inactivity should therefore not constitute consent. Consent should cover all 
processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. If the data subject's consent is to be 
given following an electronic request, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily 
disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided.’ 
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Where obtaining consent is not reasonably possible/ practicable, on the other 
hand, anonymisation of data as a type of PETs can be taken into account.68 However, 
the appropriateness of this course of action is limited, since the possibility of re-
identification of personal data is increased by rapid developments of biometric and 
RFID technologies. Moreover, it has been said that advances in information science 
have made anonymisation ‘a broken promise’ which fails to protect personal data.69 
 
3. Trust  
I have argued that it is better if obtained through sincere trust to move agents to 
give/acquire valid consent.70 Hence, regulators should try to craft mechanisms for 
building trust in their agents.71 Rules reflecting the necessity for better trust are also 
encouraged. To keep faith with the agent’s free will, the need for responsibility and 
accountability of data processing in relation to the applications of new technologies 
should always be taken into account. In this regard, the EU data protection reform 
offers an increased responsibility and accountability for data processing, e.g., the duty 
to notify the national data protection supervisory authority with respect to serious data 
breaches as soon as possible.72  
In the 2012 EU General Data Protection Regulation proposal, it is pointed out 
that there are worries on behalf of the data subjects in relation to the loss of control of 
their personal data, which ‘eats away at their trust in online and other services and 
 
68 Laurie and Sethi (n 59) 58. 
69 Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ 
(2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701. 
70 Section 7.3.2. 
71 Ohm (n 69) 1767. 
72 Articles 31 and 32. 
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holds back the growth of the digital economy in general.’ 73  (original emphasis) 
Accordingly, a series of new rules are suggested in the proposal in order to gain more 
power of control for data subjects: data subjects will have easier access to their own 
personal data; the right of data portability, i.e., easier to transfer of personal data from 
one data controller to another; and the ‘right to be forgotten,’ i.e., the possibility to 
delete personal data if there are no legitimate grounds for retaining it. These new rules 
with respect to data subjects’ power of control over their personal data not only favour 
the trust element of data processing, but also reflect the rule-preclusionary conception 
of property. This is therefore encouraged.  
Further supplementary measures to enhance the co-operative model are also 
suggested to deal with uncertain and identified risks of the technologies at hand. In 
the EU data protection reforming proposal, this is coupled with the principles of 
‘privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default.’74 
PIA is a practicable instrument for identifying/ monitoring potential privacy risks 
prior to the implementation of any particular model.75 PETs as well as good data 
protection practices, e.g., transparent controls and security processes which are the 
data controller's responsibility,76 are also recommended in the general guidelines. This 
is in line with Article 17(1) of the Data Protection Directive which requires that data 
controller must efficiently implement measures, including technological provisions 
(e.g., PETs) and organisational ones (e.g., PIA), which ‘ensure a level of security 
 
73 European Commission, ‘Why Do We Need an EU Data Protection Reform?’ (2012)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.pdf> accessed 30 
Janurary 2012. 
74 Article 30(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation proposal. 
75 Laurie and Sethi (n 59) 59. 
76 It is suggested that although ‘it is possible that these policies may not be developed solely by data 
controllers, but in conjunction with others, e.g. lawyers, but ultimate responsibility for implementation 
of such policies will lie with the data controller.’ Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) (n 59) 
3. 
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appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be 
protected.’ Indeed, according to Borking, PETs have to be applied ‘for implementing 
the legal specifications in the EU privacy directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC, like 
data minimization, consent requirements, access rights of data subject, privacy safe 
construction of terminals in information systems.’ 77  Moreover, Koorn and others 
observe that one of the advantages offered by the utilisation of PETs is that it ‘signals 
trustworthiness, and creates public confidence in the processing of their personal data 
in government information systems.’78 
However, in practical applications, there are factors affecting the adoption of 
PETs. For example, in their contribution Klüver and others contend that PETs, so far, 
have not been applied as broad as possible because of lacks of availability of PETs 
and user friendliness. 79  Nevertheless, Borking suggests that ‘[g]ood education 
concerning the technical possibilities of PETs and concrete requirements in the 
legislation (such as a privacy impact or threat analysis assessment) is necessary for 
promoting the PETs applications.’ 80  In his article on the basis of the empirical 
approach, he concludes that there are two crucial issues affecting the adoption of 
PETs: (1) the positive factor, i.e. legal and regulatory pressure regarding privacy 
protection, and (2) the negative factor, i.e. costs for investment in PETs.81 To solve the 
negative issue, he proposes to consider investments in PETs as ‘regular investments, 
 
77 John J. Borking, ‘Why Adopting Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) Takes so Much Time’ in 
Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice 
(Springer 2011) 310. 
78 Ronald Koorn and others, Privacy Enhancing Technologies –White Paper for Decision-Makers 
(2004) 1, 6. 
79 Lars Klüver, Walter Peissl and Tore Tennøe, ICT and Privacy in Europe: Experiences from 
Technology Assessment of ICT and Privacy in Seven Different European Countries (EPTA 2006) 41. 
Borking (n 77) 311-312. 
80 Borking (n 77) 338. 
81 Ibid 314-327. 
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characterized by cash flow patterns.’82  
Moreover, in order to promote public confidence, high standards of research and 
application practice should be met during all aspects of the research process. 83  
However, the two mechanisms remain underdeveloped in the Formosan data 
protection regime. The introduction and further training for both the data controllers 
and data subjects are thus needed. These mechanisms, for this purpose, should be 
better communicated both to the public and to oversight bodies/ individuals with 
responsibility through an independent authority, which is yet to be established in 
Taiwan.84 
Lastly, public engagement is an integral part of good governance in relation to the 
trust between data controllers and data subjects. Hence, active engagement exercises 
should be developed and implemented. Moreover, such an engagement includes 
stakeholder engagement for private applications for technologies at issue. Again, 
public interests and expectations ‘should be monitored over time by an appropriate 
body or individuals with appropriate expertise for the task.’85  
 
4. Balancing Interests and Rights 
(i) State responsibilities and individual rig
Under the PGC, agents possess any given generic rights and are under the duty to 
respect the generic needs of an agent. The duty to respect generic rights of all agents, 
 
82 Ibid 339. 
83 Laurie and Sethi (n 59) 59. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on 
Developments in Biometric Technologies 34. 
84 For further suggestions, see section 8.3.2. 
85 Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) (n 59) 16. 
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in particularly the positive rights of agents, must consider the empirical conditions of 
their possible implementation.86 In the light of the universality of the generic rights, 
the implementation of generic rights rests on the shoulders of various governmental 
institutions in order to secure/ promote the rights.87 However, it should be emphasised 
that ‘these institutions function as representatives of individuals, who are in this way 
jointly responsible for providing the needed assistance.’ 88  (emphasis added) The 
agents here are, in principle, those ultimately responsible for the generic rights.89  
Accordingly, the prevention of abusing State powers to implement the protection 
of generic rights must be taken into account and reviewed at all times. We have 
mentioned in section 8.2.2 that the Taiwanese hybrid legal regime is profoundly 
influenced by the traditional Chinese value of sacrificing oneself for the sake of the 
whole. This leads to misinterpretations and incorrect implementations that the 
responsibility of states to protect individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms 
(1) is the basis of fundamental rights and freedoms of agents; and  
(2) could override fundamental rights and freedoms of agents. 
The first mistake is self-explanatory, since governmental institutions operate as 
representatives of individuals. As regards the second fallacy, we must not forget that 
such duties logically originated from the duties of agents to implement the generic 
rights. Only a generic right/ fundamental right and freedom can override another 
generic right/ fundamental right and freedom according to the criterion of degrees of 
needfulness for action when the two rights are in conflict. It is crucial to appreciate 
that we should not make the mistake to consider the generic rights of an agent, which 
 
86 Gewirth, The Community of Rights 55. 
87 Ibid 55. 
88 Ibid 55. 
89 Ibid 56. 
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might be able to limit/ override a generic right, as the duty of States.  
(ii) Balancing the interests between academic research/ enjoyment of 
advances of science and technology and privacy: the precautionary model 
The second issue to be taken into account is how to avoid the worship of privacy and 
the worship of academic research/ enjoyment of advances of science and technology 
in the Formosan legal regime. It is observed that there is a tendency for Taiwanese 
regulators to make judgements on scientific developments by assuming that no 
unwanted risk would occur merely from applying the ‘mature technology.’ In other 
words, it seems that a ‘small risk’ of the violation of privacy is offset by the benefits 
in everyday life and economic profits. In this case, biometric and RFID applications 
thus are interpreted as being subject to strict data protection regulations only when the 
end applications are clearly not substantially equivalent to their expected 
performances/ interests. 
It is therefore unsurprising that with respect to privacy debates concerning such 
research and its applications, Formosan scientific researchers (as well as global 
scientists) argue that the technical solution of anonymisation is able to respond to the 
privacy concerns. This is reflected by Article 18 of the Human Biobank Management 
Act.90  This seems quite similar to the American (including the U.S., Canada and 
Argentina) attitude in relation to the GM corps,91 which seems to be more or less in 
favour of scientific applications. The purpose of this thesis is not to judge the 
approach chosen by the Taiwanese regulator. However, as I have said, the possibility 
 
90 Article 18.I states that ‘Any storage, use, or disclosure of the concerned operator’s entire biological 
specimens and related data and information shall be encoded, encrypted, delinked, or transformed so 
that the participant’s identity is unable to be determined.’ 
91 See: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Complex Technology, Complex Calculations: Uses 
and Abuses of Precautionary Reasoning in Law’ in Paul Sollie and Marcus Düwell (eds), Evaluating 
New Technologies (Springer 2009) 187-189. 
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of re-identification on such data is expending due to the development of technology. 
How to deal with the problem brought by the massive amounts of personal data? 
What suggestions (a coherent set of the PGC-compliant regulation) should the thesis 
propose on the basis of the theoretical framework chosen? 
Let us revisit the precautionary reasoning on the PGC ground as the starting point. 
92 I argue that the principle should be considered with respect to the growing scope of 
personal data (or, PII). This is because it is useful in dealing with the uncertain 
privacy risks brought about by the capacity of re-identification. Indeed, the principle 
is formulated by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in relation to the concerns over 
genetically modified crops that the regulators may ‘impose restrictions on otherwise 
legitimate commercial activities, if there is a risk, even if not yet a scientifically 
demonstrated risk…’93  
However, there are a handful of general objections to the principle in relation to 
the complexity of technology, for example, (1) the degree of scientific uncertainty; (2) 
the types of risk; (3) the degree or character of the perceived hazard; and (4) the 
measure of precaution to be taken.94 Specifically, the central idea of the principle rests 
on the assumption that actions are to be avoided ‘simply because they might possibly 
threaten wholly unacceptable outcomes.’95  The uncertainty of the failure and risk 
stemmed from technologies, arguably, can be minimised by the development of 
science and technology. The expansion of the protection of personal data (the 
European data protection approach) therefore seems to be overreacting to some 
 
92 Cf. section 3.2.3. 
93 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Ethical and Social Issues (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 1999) 162. 
94 Beyleveld and Brownsword, ‘Complex Technology, Complex Calculations: Uses and Abuses of 
Precautionary Reasoning in Law’ 178-180. 
95 See Beyleveld and Brownsword’s introduction to ‘Pascal’s Wager.’ Ibid 181. 
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commentators.   
To respond to these objections and justify the precautionary model for the 
Formosan data protection regime, let us recall what was presented in the theoretical 
part of the thesis.96 The PGC is a moral principle requiring a set of categorically 
obligatory imperatives for action, which is binding on all agents. We have said that 
the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by data protection laws are generic 
rights. A broad conception of privacy (i.e. the expansionist approach described by 
Schwartz and Solove)97 therefore is essential to avoid the violation of the right to 
privacy as well as the generic rights protected by data protection law. This is because, 
according to the precautionary reasoning, to violate a generic right by mistaking a 
generic right for non-generic right causes more harm than mistaking a non-generic 
right as a generic harm under the PGC, as the PGC requires the prevention of generic 
harm. The European data protection model to regard identifiable data (including that 
which may possibly be re-identified) as personal data is thus reasonable.  
However, it is noted that the protected rights and freedoms are not absolute. Thus, 
according to precautionary reasoning and the criterion of degrees of needfulness for 
action, although identifiable/ re- identifiable data should be included within the scope 
of personal data (in a broad-concept sense) to avoid the risk of violating privacy, it 
needs to be proportionately treated on the basis of the possibility of being identified. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that, as the WP29 puts, ‘[i]n cases where biometric data, like 
a template, are stored in a way that no reasonable means can be used by the controller 
or by any other person to identify the data subject, those data should not be qualified 
 
96 Chapter 3. 
97 Schwartz and Solove (n 61) 1817. 
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as personal data.’98  
To sum up: 
1. If data refers to an identified agent, the risk level is the highest.  
2. If data refers to an identifiable agent, the risk level is lower than the identified 
one. Since there remains a possibility of risk, minimising the risk of violating 
generic rights (e.g. privacy) is still needed. It is noted that according to the 
criterion of degree of needfulness for action, since the risk of identifiable data 
is lower than that of identified data, to protect the competing generic need 
(e.g. the right to enjoy the advances of science and technology), such data 
should be proportionately less limited than identified data.  
Such a distinction between identified and identifiable data is particularly relevant 
to the Formosan data protection regime, which seems to be hesitating to totally accept 
the European data protection model.  
 
8.3.2 The Regulatory Attempts (II): The Institutional Framework 
It was suggested in Chapter 7 that an independent data protection institutional 
framework could better apply the co-operative model in practice. However, it has 
been pointed out that although the Formosan data protection legal regime borrows a 
certain number of experiences from the European model,99 there is no single authority 
 
98 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, (n 83) 5. 
99 In the 2012 EU General Data Protection Regulation proposal, it is stated that an independent 
supervisory authorities in Member States are essential to protect personal data. Recital 92 of the 
document: ‘The establishment of supervisory authorities in Member States, exercising their functions 
with complete independence, is an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of their personal data. Member States may establish more than one supervisory authority, 
to reflect their constitutional, organisational and administrative structure.’ 
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with complete independence in charge.100  
The imaginable and foreseeable disadvantages of the hydra-headed bureaucracy 
model are not difficult to identify. For example, it has been observed that the model 
applied in Taiwan may generate inconsistent data protection implementations. 101  
However, by not establishing a new public authority, public spending is reduced; 
therefore, the model might be justified in the context of austerity measures. 
Nonetheless, this goal can hardly be achieved by taking the current model applied in 
Taiwan, as the cost to taxpayers still needs to be invested in vertical and horizontal 
communications within the governmental authorities to solve problems of the hydra-
headed bureaucracy model.  
Furthermore, the central problem of the hydra-headed bureaucracy model lies on 
the issue of whether the responsible authorities are capable and credible in being in 
charge of data protection matters. Let us take J. Y. Interpretation No. 689 as an 
example.  
It is stipulated in Article 89 (2) of the Social Order Maintenance Law that a fine 
can be imposed on individuals who trace others without justified reasons and fail to 
desist from trailing/ stalking after valid warning. The applicant is a show-biz reporter 
who trailed and took pictures of celebrities. After being advised to stop such 
behaviour, the applicant continued engaging in these activities. The investigation and 
decision on whether or not to penalise the trailing act is held by the policing sector. In 
relation to the issue of striking, a balance between the freedom of media and the right 
to privacy and personal data protection, the majority opinion rules that the freedom of 
media is not an absolute right and thus can be restricted. It is justified by the 
 
100 Section 5.3.3.2. 
101 Section 5.3.3.2. 
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requirements including a number of ‘public interests’ and the intolerance on the basis 
of ‘social norms.’  
Although the Honourable Judges hold that the rule is constitutional,102 the Court 
advises relevant authorities to re-consider whether it is appropriate to leave the 
policing sector to decide such matters. This is because, it reasons, such penalising 
power is indeed rather complex for the policing sector to exercise. The Honourable 
Judges further suggest that the authorities should take into account whether it is 
appropriate to have courts render the direct decision in order to ensure the efficacy of 
governmental authorities and balance between the freedom of media and personal 
data protection, with particular reference to the right to privacy.  
By applying the hydra-headed bureaucracy model, it might be said that it is easier 
for the policing sector to manage and respond to urgent violations of generic rights. 
However, the expertise and capabilities of the police authorities, as suggested by the 
Constitutional Court, must also be taken into account – after all, it deals with rather 
complex questions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms.103 Furthermore, the 
European data protection and privacy model is indeed rather ‘burdensome’ to not only 
data controllers but also to governmental agencies. A specialised institution that can 
take full responsibility for these issues would thus be appropriate.  
In addition to establishing an independent Formosan data protection supervisory 
authority with adequate functions, ‘adequate financial and human resources, premises 
 
102 It is noted that it remains dubious whether the Interpretation achieves the purpose of striking a 
balance between the freedom of media and the right to privacy. See, e.g., Lee (n 63) 29-49. 
103 It seems that the alternative choice may be the Ministry of Justice to decide such matters. However, 
we have also said that the Ministry of Justice cannot play such a role properly since the independency 
of the department is remaining doubtful. See: section 8.2.4. 
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and infrastructure,’104 I suggest that  
1. An advisory board for the creation of an independent institution should be 
formed. The composition of the board of experts should include members 
from diverse backgrounds who possess the necessary expertise in not only 
data protection law field, but other fields, e.g., technological, social-
economical expertise, in order to make appropriate and justifiable decisions. 
This is particularly crucial when drawing up technical standards in relation to 
privacy by design and by default PETs. Moreover, as the WP29 suggests, 
appropriate consultations with respect to external technical experts, e.g., 
international standardisation organisations, are recommended.105 
2. This institution should offer appropriate training modules to data controllers 
(including governmental agencies) as well as data subjects. Appropriate 
reviews of the practices should be carried out. 
3. An optimal model would include investigative powers, effective powers of 
intervention, the power to engage in legal proceedings and the power to 
appropriate.106 
Such guidelines should be able to assist the success of the co-operative model. 
 
 
104 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ (2012)  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> accessed 30 Janurary 2012, Recital 94. 
105 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the Data Protection Reform 
Proposals 11. 
106 Cf: Recital 100 of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation: ‘In order to ensure 
consistent monitoring and enforcement of this Regulation throughout the Union, the supervisory 
authorities should have in each Member State the same duties and effective powers, including powers 
of investigation, legally binding intervention, decisions and sanctions, particularly in cases of 
complaints from individuals, and to engage in legal proceedings. Investigative powers of supervisory 
authorities as regards access to premises should be exercised in conformity with Union law and 
national law. This concerns in particular the requirement to obtain a prior judicial authorisation.’ 
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8.4 Summary 
I have compared the data protection regulations in both legal regimes with a 
particular focus on the technologies at issue. It has been shown that although it 
roughly applies the European data protection model, the current Formosan data 
protection framework has its own unique problems with respect to the applications of 
biometric and RFID technologies. Since we have seen that the European model 
roughly matches the PGC requirements, it is suggested that the Formosan data 
protection framework needs no major revision in order to meet the new challenges 
brought about by the advanced technologies at issue – in other words, there is a need 
to strong argument to re-affirm the European model in the Formosan data protection 
regime. However, minor corrections to improve reliability of data processing are 
called for, in particular a consistent approach to maintaining valid consent, 
precautionary and preventive measures against risks of developing such technologies, 
and an independent institutional framework.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Answering the Research Questions 
The central aim of this thesis is to examine how to strike a balance between the 
benefits and the risks of biometric and RFID technologies within a data protection 
regime. Throughout this thesis, I have sought to provide an answer to this question. 
By way of conclusion, it is time to assess whether this thesis has met its proposed 
aims and review its findings in response to the research questions listed at the start.  
Chapter 2 provided an essential overview of biometric and RFID systems and 
their omnipresence in people's daily lives. This included key terms, the promised 
benefits and the potential risks of these technologies. The data protection concerns 
discussed with respect to the technologies at hand presented four notable themes: the 
concept of privacy, consent, trust, and interests-balancing issues between public 
goods and individual interests. Having set out the background, the thesis then turned 
to its main theme. 
1. Identifying and justifying an adequate theoretical framework to deal 
with the question 
To deal with data protection concerns, researching how to strike a balance between 
the concerned rights and their competing rights generally raises numerous conceptual 
questions, which are intensified in relation to emerging technologies. In particular, 
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this particularly raises the question of the choice, justification, and applicability of the 
theoretical approach adopted. Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with this question. 
Indeed, there is a rich variety of theoretical evaluations to contend with. The 
theoretical framework chosen in this thesis is the Principle of Generic Consistency. 
The PGC has been briefly illustrated, focusing on concepts of the agents, generic 
rights and the relationships between the two concepts in Chapter 3. 
A convincing justification of a single theory can at least prevent blind spots 
where the chosen ethical theory is not well developed and the risk of inconsistency. 
Two arguments have been presented in relation to the justification of the theoretical 
framework. By applying the dialectically necessary argument to the concept of agency 
in three stages, the PGC has been justified as the basic principle of human rights in 
any community, requiring agents to act in accordance with the generic rights of all 
agents. However, some are sceptical towards this theory. Most of them focus their 
critiques on stages II and III, in particular the ASA and the LPU.1 Nevertheless, the 
dialectically necessary argument has not been convincingly countered, as most of the 
suggested flaws are misunderstandings. 
Even if the flaw has been identified and explained, I have presented the 
dialectically contingent argument to deal with this. On the basis of this method, any 
legal regime which recognises human rights and is based on the assumption of 
impartiality must grant the PGC a similar status, or else contradict acceptance of such 
recognition. Overall, very few objections are insurmountable. However, it must be 
noted that rather than defending or providing a full analysis of this moral theory, the 
primary mission of this thesis is only to apply the PGC to produce clear guidelines 
 
1 Section 3.1. 
349 
 
and principles to strike a balance between the benefits and the risks of biometric and 
RFID technologies within a data protection regime. 
The generic needs of agency are hierarchical. Fundamental rights and freedoms, 
such as the right to benefit from advances in science and technology and the right to 
privacy, are prone to coming into conflict. In Chapter 3, direct application of the PGC 
as the general methodology to reconcile competing rights and interests was presented.  
The following chapter moved on to elaborate a specific application of the PGC to 
select issues. Chapter 4 first defined the field of privacy concepts and then described 
how it has been analysed to allow the identification, evaluation, and comparison of 
competing rights and interests in a specific conflict. 
It has been argued that, with respect to the concept of privacy, reductionist 
theories are not capable of dealing with the issues of current and future development 
of the right to privacy. I have further argued that it is unwise to tag or limit the 
concepts of privacy and becloud oneself to the extension of the concepts of privacy at 
the stage of identifying and valuing rights covered by the notion of privacy. I have 
indicated a plethora of different rights that fall under the heading of the right to 
privacy by using the categorisation deriving from Allen. However, the impossibility of 
an exhaustive definition of privacy, which is intensified by the emergence of new 
technologies, raises questions of inconsistency and instability. Nevertheless, the PGC 
provides a rationale to assist in identifying generic rights covered by privacy. 
 Moreover, the problem of inconsistency and instability with respect to the 
approach of balancing test applied by courts can be solved by applying the criterion of 
degrees of needfulness for action. After indicating that the ECHR is in line with the 
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PGC, I have shown how the criterion operates in practice by taking the Marper case 
before the ECHR as an example. On the basis of this criterion, as generic rights are 
ranked hierarchically, I have argued that the criterion here offers a role as the law of 
gravity (gravitation), which gives weight to objects with mass according to degrees of 
needfulness for action. Some points have to be noted in this respect. First, as a 
collective right within a community/ society presents a right which is designed to 
improve the benefits of all agents in such a community/ society, the criterion ought to 
be able to deal with the collective right or the public good.2 Secondly, the criterion 
here is concerned with preventing violations of necessary means of agency (including 
harms consisting in removing or threatening the basic, non-subtractive, or additive 
rights available to all agents), rather than increasing the benefits. Thirdly, it should be 
noted that, unlike the utilitarian argument, if a generic right is more needed for action 
than another generic right, the former will not be overridden by the latter – even if the 
latter one is relevant to a large number of agents.   
2. Probing and evaluating current regulations of biometric and RFID 
technologies in Europe and Taiwan 
Chapters 5 and 6 were devoted to fulfil the mission of probing and evaluating 
current regulations of biometric and RFID technologies in Europe and Taiwan. Any 
research in connection to the context of global data protection law regime must 
carefully explore the European model. With this in mind, The Data Protection 
Directive is definitely a significant milestone worth analysing. This part examined 
themes in relation to consent and the balancing of different interests such as public 
goods and individual interests, the institutional framework of reference and the 
relationship between the Directive, the ECHR and the Data Protection Convention. 
 
2 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 48. 
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Moreover, the application and the domestic influence of the European data protection 
model have also been discussed.  
On the other hand, the position of the right to privacy and personal data 
protection with respect to the regulatory mechanisms for modern technologies in 
Taiwan has also been outlined. Although a legal foundation regarding the right to 
privacy in Taiwan is relatively weak due to the profound cultural influences of both 
the Chinese immigrants and the Nationalists Party (KMT), there has been a demand of 
judicial effort with regards to the emerging rights and interests. The PDPL is a major 
player in this regard. Moreover, the concept of privacy in the Formosan legal regime 
was examined. As regards specific data protection law regarding biometric and RFID 
applications, it has been observed, unsurprisingly, that there are relatively few 
regulations in both regimes. 
On the basis of the legal issues highlighted so far, I have identified a number of 
questions to be evaluated. Before the evaluation, I argued that both the European and 
Formosan legal regimes are in line with the PGC and can be considered as a clear 
application and the two communities are competent decision-making bodies applying 
the PGC. In Chapter 6, I replied each question in turn. First, I argued that there is 
indeed a generic right to benefit from science and technology. This is because, in the 
light of the PGC, vast fields of technologies bring about improvements which increase 
the overall general chances of success. Also, this right has been recognised in relevant 
international human rights instruments. However, as such rights to generic conditions 
of agency impose obligations to the other agents, they potentially conflict with the 
other agents’ generic rights. Moreover, due to the nature of the rights at issue, it can 
also cause harm to other rights to generic condition of agency. This leads to the 
second issue identified: the data protection concerns, in particular the right to privacy, 
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brought by modern technologies.  
As previously mentioned, I adopted Allen’s categorisation as a general 
application to examine the concepts of privacy. With respect to spatial privacy, firstly, 
I argued that, given that an agent acts through its own body, to violate the integrity of 
her/his body can generically affect her/his capacity to act at all or act successfully. A 
generic right to bodily integrity should thus be granted. Moreover, it is not a sincere 
grant to afford an agent’s right to have bodily integrity without granting them to 
control their body. However, this does not follow the recognition of control over 
subsequent uses of their body. Nevertheless, the functional aspect of the claim for 
such a question should be taken into account for the analysis of the right to bodily 
integrity in relation to the concept of the right to privacy, particularly when the 
research/ application focuses on the subsequent uses of the body parts. In this respect, 
I adopt Beyleveld and Brownsword’s justification for property rights, i.e., the 
‘rule-preclusionary’ conception of property,3  and suggest that biometric samples 
would imply exclusive use, subject to the waiver (with valid consent) or the 
overriding rights of others, whether individually or collectively, without bargaining 
the specific right in every particular use. 
In the light of decisional privacy, I have argued that to deny an agent’s decisional 
privacy by acting against its free and voluntary choice, either those decisions 
concerning only its/her/his own business, or establishing or changing relationships 
with others, amounts to a violation of the PGC. Moreover, it should be noted that it is 
by virtue of vulnerable agency that the generic rights are to be granted and impose 
duties on other agents to respect the generic rights of the right-holder, rather than a 
 
3 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001) 
171-194. 
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protection from external interferences. Therefore, the collection and processing of 
biometric data and the employment of RFID technology should not be seen as freeing 
an agent from social or legal constraints. Rather, we should regard an agent as an end 
who independently and voluntarily acts for any kind of purposes. 
In respect to informational privacy, I have discussed the ‘nothing to hide’ 
argument. I have contended that regardless of the purpose, for example, of whether 
the agent wants to hide something sensitive, embarrassing, illegal, or even to hide 
nothing, there is a generic right to informational privacy – if the purpose is valuable/ 
good to it. Moreover, it is correct that the concealment of negative matters cannot 
cover all aspects of the notion of privacy. However, this is by no means conclusive as 
the negative/wrong matters, which may place an agent at risk, can still be the purpose 
of action without violating a right. Furthermore, the ‘nothing to hide’ argument fails to 
take certain informational rights into account, such as the right to know and control 
how personal information will be used, and the right to correct any inaccurate entries 
contained in stored information, the right to decide whether or not to disclose 
information, the right to know and control how personal information will be used, and 
the right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in stored information. 
To adequately focus on the specific forms of privacy that are relevant to the thesis, 
it is crucial to note that it is a right profoundly affected by modern technologies. I 
have addressed that in the cases in which: (1) an agent does not know that their 
information has been processed; and (2) new technologies are used as a medium to 
disclose an agent’s information against their will, the agent’s generic rights are 
violated. With regards to the substantial changes brought about by cutting-edge 
information and communication technologies that provide motivations for agents to 
disclose/ share information with others, this is not forbidden by the PGC. This is 
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because there are no direct duties to oneself under the PGC – the benefits of the 
generic rights can always be freely waived – provided that this waiving does not 
threaten the generic rights of others.4 
How to deal with competing rights that conflict with one another is the central 
issue to be examined. Both procedural and substantive justifications are allowed under 
the PGC. With respect to consent as the procedural justification, we should neither 
overestimate nor underestimate the function of consent. What should be emphasised is 
the use of consent in the correct context. Accordingly, we should prevent from 
committing the Fallacy of Necessity as well as the Fallacy of Sufficiency. Two further 
issues need to be clarified. First, consent should be regarded as a safeguard operating 
as a defence rather than as a cause of action.5 In this respect, the priority of consent 
should always be born in mind. Secondly, the function of consent as a procedural 
justification must not be confused with substantive justifications. Consent authorises 
the action for the consent receiver does something to the consent giver, it thus follows 
that the consent receiver does no wrong to the consent giver. 
On the basis of the groundwork on consent, I argued that the confusions 
surrounding the integrity of consent under the PDPL should be clarified. As consent 
can reflect individual autonomy to some extent, it should be a root justification with 
respect to sensitive personal data. 
With regards to the substantive justification to the right to academic research and 
its benefits in the data protection law regime, it has been noted that the equation shall 
rest firmly on the generic conditions of agency. Here, on the basis of the direct 
application of the PGC, we assess the reconciliation of competing rights by applying 
 
4 Ibid 194. 
5 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 242. 
355 
 
                                                
the criterion of degrees of needfulness for action. However, it should be noted that the 
critical point is whether such a ‘public interest’ is proportionately regulated by 
effective safeguards, such as strict rules or anonymisation of data to approval through 
the institutional framework when these competing rights and interests come into 
conflict. More importantly, again, the outcome of any balancing test shall not favour 
the opinion that a substantial serious harm to a particular agent is outweighed by the 
sum of individually negligible goods for the other agents within the collective group. 
 
3. Providing clear guidelines and principles for legal regulations to deal 
with the two technologies at issue 
It has been contended that balancing tests under a conflict model tend to exclude the 
possibility that both interests at issue can be fostered and protected in an optimal way, 
since a balancing test is generally viewed as weighing one interest against the other. 
In this light, there is a risk that the value of consent is diminished to the extent that 
individual rights and human dignity are undervalued or even ignored.  
However, it is problematic to suggest that the balancing of competing rights is a 
zero-sum trade-off. Instead, in line with a broad concept of privacy, it has been argued 
in Chapter 7 that there is the possibility of two sets of values being capable of 
supporting each other.6 This is because, on the one hand, the fulfilment of data 
protection requirements, and in particular the protection of the right to privacy, can 
support applications of modern technologies; on the other hand, the applications of 
 
6 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Research Values’ in Sheila AM McLean 
(ed), First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 156-158, and Deryck 
Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public Good’ 18 King's Law 
Journal 275-289. 
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modern technologies can improve security and convenience of private life of 
individuals (which are also privacy values) as well as the public interest. 
With respect to the justification of the co-operative model, as the acceptance of a 
broad conception of privacy is a prerequisite of the co-operative model, the 
justification of the acceptance of a broad concept of privacy will justify this model.7 
Apart from the legal justification in relation to the two data protection regimes 
addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, there are also ethical and pragmatic reasons. The first 
step is to relate the relationship between privacy and benefits from advances in 
science and technology to the relationship between data subjects and data controllers. 
Under the PGC reasoning, data subjects must be treated as ends and possess both 
negative and positive rights. Accordingly, both parties share the common interests of 
the two rights and interests: the two parties should, therefore, work as partners since 
there is mutual respect for rights of both parties. 
This is also in line with the pragmatic justification. To assess the pragmatic 
reason in a detail, we can take game-theory ideas into account to explain behaviours 
of partners (data subjects and data controllers) in contexts where the outcome of 
actions depends on how agents chose to act. By doing so, I characterised the situation 
as a prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, it can be argued that without any cooperation, 
the agents involved in data collecting, processing and using are prone to coming into 
conflict. As regards the enhancement of the co-operative model, I argued that all of 
the suggested strategies are closely related to the trust between rights holders. In other 
words, through the way of satisfying each other by treating others as oneself, it is 
possible to enhance incentives to improve cooperation. However, it should be noted 
that, on the basis of game-theoretic thinking, the full avoidance of generic harm is the 
 
7 Beyleveld, ‘Conceptualising Privacy in Relation to Research Values’ 158. 
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highest-ranked outcome – although this is not always possible. In other words, there is 
a possibility of conflict within the co-operative model. Nevertheless, it is recalled that 
provided that valid consent is obtained, there is no need to deal with subsequent 
substantive justifications. Hence, with respect to the co-operative model, valid 
consent is a crucial key which serves as a device to show respect to fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
With this in mind, I have demonstrated two key privacy and data protection 
enhancing mechanisms, which espouse the practicability of the co-operative model, 
namely PIA and PETs. Applying these frameworks, I suggested that a well-designed 
structure with an early engagement of the two mechanisms is capable of improving 
trust between participants of the collection and processing of personal data. Moreover, 
the risk of violating generic rights can be minimised in so far as it is possible to do so. 
This is because risks could be more easily assessed in the initial stages since any 
control or change is difficult when the technology has become entrenched further. It is 
noted that, in this regard, risk assessment includes two types of risks, namely the 
identified and the uncertain ones. The former ones can be dealt with preventive 
measures, while precautionary assessments are employed to identify uncertain risks. 
However, PETs do not necessarily protect privacy effectively. First, under a broad 
concept of privacy, the right to know one’s personal implications for oneself is 
rendered impossible by the design of PETs. Moreover, anonymised data is less 
valuable for such technologies. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that technical 
methods can actually keep personal data confidential and in line with all data 
protection principles. This is particularly true when processing data via internet or 
intranet because there is no trust on the internet. To deal with this, I have argued that 
the improvement of opportunities for consent and enhancement of its meaningfulness 
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by taking account relevant social practices are capable of dealing with the problem. 
Hence, technologies which can achieve the above purpose are also PETs. 
In the light of regulating biometric technologies, I have said that it is at least 
arguable that there is a need to draw efficient regulations. This is because although it 
might be argued that commentators may hold differing opinions towards emerging 
technologies, an overconfident attitude without appropriate legal architecture to 
ensure a responsible approach to research and innovation is by no means an accurate 
way to consider the consequences if they fail.  
Moreover, I argued that a more ‘burdensome’ data protection regulatory model 
which is in line with the European data protection model, rather than the 
minimal-regulating model, should be encouraged. 
A number of complex desiderata must be taken into account in terms of 
regulatory design. In the light of the flexibility of the regulatory instruments, it has 
been argued that a lighter regulatory model can be applied to rights and interests that 
can be given equally.8 Also, this model can be applied to those will not qualify as 
earth-shaking matters of justice or morality on Gewirthian grounds (at least for those 
does not prohibited by the PGC). As regards the rights and interests cannot be given 
equally and those possess a clear violation against generic conditions of agency to an 
open future, on the other hand, a more rigid regulation is proportionally demanded. In 
this regard, attention should be firstly paid to consent without resorting to Fallacy of 
Necessity and Fallacy of Sufficiency arguments. Hence, the efficiency and validity of 
consent is crucial for the regulatory design. Moreover, in pursuit of a smart regulatory 
 
8 Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson, ‘Individual Rights, Social Justice, and the Allocation Of 
Advances in Biotechnology’ in Michael Boylan (ed), Public Health Policy and Ethics (Kluwer 2004) 
66. 
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design, I suggested that regulators should consider elements such as the respect for 
users and controllers, transparent information, the application of appropriate 
mechanisms, accountably practices, and the establishment of an independent 
supervisory institution. By establishing a reliable framework as such, those values are 
able to deliver positive-sum outcomes. 
 
4. Producing a coherently theorised regulatory framework and rule for 
Formosan data protection law regime 
The European data protection model is the most influentially global regulatory trend. 
It is recalled that the European data protection model roughly matches the PGC 
requirements, in ignorance of the PGC as the supreme moral principle. Some of the 
interpretations of the ECHR are problematic on the basis of the PGC-based value. 
However, it has been argued that the PGC remains valid. In this regard, the European 
data protection regime provides a substantial case study of reference for other data 
protection regimes. In pursuit of the purpose of producing an appropriate framework 
and rule for Formosan data protection law regime with respect to technologies at issue, 
I examined the analytic comparison of regulatory positions between European and 
Taiwanese situations in Chapter 8. 
It is observed that the objectives and principles of data protection are similar in 
both areas, as the Formosan data protection law regime absorbs elements from 
(indeed, follows) the European data protection model. With this in mind, European 
countries and Taiwan share a high level of equivalent protection of personal data by 
having a main regulatory (or, ‘burdensome’) provision. Although there are differing 
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opinions and objections as to the acceptance of the European data protection model, I 
argued that there is a need to re-affirm the European model in the Formosan data 
protection regime. This is because the two rights and interests are simply not a 
zero-sum trade-off and conflict can be frequently and effectively avoided through 
valid consent. Moreover, even if there is a conflict, the criterion provided by PGC can 
be used to solve the problem.  
As regards the differences, I examined three themes, namely, consent and public 
interests, the operation of data protection principles in effect, and the supervisory 
authorities. In the Formosan legal regime, the traditional value of ‘sacrificing oneself 
for the sake of the whole’ results in a worship of overvaluing public/ collective 
interest. Such a worship of public interest considerably diminished the role of consent 
and the effectiveness of operation of data protection principles. More importantly, 
there is no single independent supervisory authority in charge of data protection 
business.  
The first suggestion relies on the attempts to apply the co-operative model to the 
legislation and their applications. First, a broad concept of privacy is fundamental to 
the suggested regulatory model. In this case, recent Constitutional Interpretations can 
be seen as an encouraging starting point. Secondly, on the basis of the principle of the 
priority of consent, I argued that where possible and practicable, valid consent should 
be obtained from each agent (data subject) prior to the collection, processing and use 
of personal data. In this respect, conditions of best practice have been attached in 
section 8.3.1. Thirdly, mechanisms such as PIA and PETs for establishing trust in 
agents should be encouraged to imply in the early stage. In this regard, supplementary 
measures to promote these mechanisms such as further education, concrete 
requirements in the legislation, good practices, public engagement, and to regard 
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investments in improving trustworthiness as regular investments, are strongly 
recommended. Lastly, in terms of the consideration on balancing interests and rights 
at issue, the worship, or illusion, of public interest including the ‘research interest’ 
must be put right. It is, again, recalled that technologies are not always stable, in 
particularly developing ones. A precautionary analysis thus is suggested to prevent 
generic harm. After all, on the basis of the PGC ground, what should be borne in mind 
is that the agents (or, individuals here) are the ultimate respondents of the generic 
rights.   
Unlike the first suggestion which dealt with legislation and rules roughly in line 
with the European data protection model, the second suggestion concentrated on the 
institutional framework which has not yet been applied. In this case I have observed 
that the Formosan hydra-headed bureaucratic model generates inconsistent data 
protection implications. Moreover, without an appropriate level of independence and 
expertise, it seems unconvincing that relevant authorities are capable and credible to 
be in charge of data protection and privacy issues with respect to ICT in an 
information society. With this in mind, I have suggested that an institutional 
framework constituting an independent body with adequate advisory board, budgets, 
functions, powers and practice should be instituted to assist the success of the 
co-operative model. In sum, minor corrections to improve trustworthiness of data 
processing are encouraged; in particular a consistent approach to maintain valid 
consent, precautionary and preventive measures against risks of developing such 
technologies, and an independent institutional framework. 
 
9.2 Future Research 
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Until now, I hope to have at least provided a defensible/ adequate theoretical 
framework and developed appropriate principles and guidelines in this field. The 
frequent situations occurring in daily life which inspired this thesis has never played a 
less primary role. Indeed, the technologies at issue have developed in a way that can 
be used in extensive applications in a considerably broad range of diverse 
environments. Accordingly, the right to benefit from advances of science and 
technology seems to be more crucial than ever. However, so do our concerns over 
privacy and data protection. This is particularly true with respect to new trends on 
biometric technologies in conjunction with remote RFID technology without the need 
of cooperation required from data subjects. Nevertheless, as Brownsword remarked in 
a lecture, ‘in the information society there is never a shortage of critics with respect to 
privacy and data protection rights and informed consent.’9 In this regard, what we 
need to do is to consistently and continually promote the generic conditions without 
harming, or diminishing the opportunities for agents to be entitled attempts to consent. 
At least two plausible avenues of research in this regard can be envisaged.  
First, we must not forget that there remains a gap between rapid technologies and 
regulations. It has been recalled by the WP29 that new trends on biometrics change 
their focus to profiling specific needs of individuals allowing more than merely 
identification or categorisation of an individual.10 Crucially, the image of personal 
bodily integrity of an individual may soon be a complete picture in the eyes of data 
controllers. Although I have tried to provide some guidance, associated regulatory 
policies should always be assessed throughout the procedure of personal data 
 
9 Roger Brownsword, ‘Informed Consent in the Information Society’ (Durham CELLS Lecture, 
Durham, 8 May 2012). 
10 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies (No 00720/12/EN, WP193, 2012) 16-17. 
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collection and processing. In this regard, the operationalizing of the enhancement of 
the co-operative model will need, and will surely be inspired by, new technologies 
and technical/ social mechanisms. Consequently, updated research examining such 
objects on the basis of a broad concept of privacy can offer fertile ground for future 
study. 
The second avenue for further research concerns reforms of data protection legal 
regimes. In the EU, a General Regulation of Data Protection has been drafted. 
Although the road to the completion of this stage of reform remains rather lengthy, it 
has at least arrived to a consistent confirmation of the European data protection 
approach. What we need to do is to closely assess its development as well as 
influences. As regards Formosan data protection law regime, on the other hand, it 
seems to me that, there are still many things to be improved. With this in mind, I 
consider that, on the basis of the principle of priority of consent, the starting point 
should be the more detailed clarification of the integrity of consent within data 
protection law.11 Furthermore, an adequate institutional framework in charge of data 
protection and privacy should be continually encouraged in Taiwan.  
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